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WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division

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GERMAN NAVAL STAFF OPERATIONS DIVISION

Part A - Vol. 51 - November 1943

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WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
(Operations Division)

PART A

November 1943

Chief, Naval Staff:	Grand Admiral Doenitz
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Vice Admiral Meisel
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:	Rear Admiral Wagner

Volume 51

begun:	1 Nov. 1943
closed:	30 Nov. 1943

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.


Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 51 is the seventh of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records and Library.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

Washington, D. C.
1948



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Items of Political Importance,

According to a Reuter report from Washington, no new military decisions were reached in Moscow, as all such decisions had already been made in the course of the Quebec Conference and elsewhere. In Moscow none of the partners tried to urge a re-examination of any existing plans. It was learned that one of the chief resolutions provided for the establishment of a permanent Three-Power-Committee in London that will occupy itself with the problems arising from the liberation of the occupied territories of Europe. Its work will parallel that of the Mediterranean Commission. In Moscow the Allies reached full agreement as to the handling of Germany. Well-informed circles in Washington are of the opinion that in the course of the Moscow Conference it was decided to carry out the military occupation of Germany in order to ensure observance of the Armistice.

According to the New York Times, agreement in principle was reached concerning the so-called satellite states. The problem of boundaries, however, was not definitely settled.

According to an EFE-report from New York, Stalin is said to have acceded to the Anglo-American desires for the occupation of Reich territory by the U.S. and British after the Allied victory. In return for this Moscow was conceded the Baltic states, as well as certain security zones in Finland, Poland and Rumania.

According to Reuter, the number of miners on strike in the U.S.A. has increased to 163,000. It is expected that the President will announce energetic counter-measures in Congress on 1 November. It is likely that the Government will again take over control **of the mines.**

The Badoglio government returned the destroyers TROMBE and TIGRE to the French navy (Giraud). Badoglio is at present carrying on negotiations with British and U.S. representatives at Naples with regard to the enlargement of his Cabinet in accordance with Allied demands.

According to Transocean reports the Japanese foreign minister declared that Japan was not pursuing any territorial ambitions, and did not wish to interfere in political problems concerning the African continent; the United States, in turn, was not entitled to interfere in the problems of East Asia. All continents should be connected with each other by a dense network of economic relations.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I) Army Situation:

The situation in the area of Kerch is obscure. Lines with the Crimea are out of order. Chief, Army General Staff expressed the desire that the Navy might anchor a ship between Odessa and Sevastopol to be used as a radio link or otherwise for purposes of communications. This demand cannot of course be complied with. According to a report of the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff at 1000, a Russian landing south of Kerch was repulsed. Near Eltigen the Russians succeeded in forming a bridgehead. Detailed reports are not yet available. The development of the situation near Perekop forced the 44th Section Commander to attempt a break-through to the west in the Kherson area. A strong enemy attack was directed against our own bridgehead at Berislav, which, however, we were able to hold. Also in the area of Kiev and Gomel we were successful in resisting strong enemy attacks.

In Italy the enemy commenced strong attacks against the Barbara line on 30 Oct. Part of the line was driven back a few miles.

II) Chief of Staff, Naval Staff urged that the provision of the six PT boats destined for the Black Sea be hastened by all possible means. Naval (Ship) Construction Division must investigate thoroughly how the efficiency of the Linz dockyard can be improved. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is already investigating what allocations are suitable to serve the purpose desired. As soon as a general picture of the situation has been gained, a report on this matter is to be made for the Fuehrer.

III) The projected report to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff concerning the necessity of requisitioning Rumanian territory for the Navy, is to be made to the Fuehrer verbally by Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters.

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IV) Commanding Admiral, Task Force reported by letter about the difficulties concerning the problem of accommodation ships for dockyard workers for project "Paul". The STAVANGERFJORD will not be ready for use until the end of November. To take her place, the steamer MONTE ROSA is to be withdrawn from leave-ship unit Oslo-Aarhus as soon as she is replaced by the steamer WINRICH v. KNIEPRODE. The transfer of the steamer MONTE ROSA to Alta is expected to be carried out by 15 Nov.. The first 150 dockyard workers must be accommodated on repair ships.

Special Items:

I) Determination of average water temperatures in the Mediterranean, ordered by Naval Staff, Operations Division for the assessment of conditions for operations by midget submarines, shows far more favorable conditions than those prevailing in our latitudes. Note in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

II) A summary of the planes shot down by Naval anti-aircraft guns in September 1943 is contained in letter of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Aircraft Section, Defense as per l/Skl 33691/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume X.

III) A summary from the situation report of the War Economy Staff of the Armed Forces High Command for September 1943 gives the following facts:

1) Further breakdowns and delays in armament production through lack of manpower; insufficient and belated deliveries of materiel caused by air attacks as well as by a recent restriction of transport facilities due to lack of railway cars.

2) The situation as regards labor is still strained. An improvement is expected from the new employment of Italian military internees.

3) It was possible to overcome increased difficulties of transport by intensified measures. The large number of railway cars returning from Italy will provide a certain relief.

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- 4) The production of coal as well as of iron and steel again somewhat surpassed that of last month. The effects of damage by air attacks and alarms were reduced.
- 5) In September also it was possible to meet the demands of the Armed Forces for fuel to the extent provided for, despite the decrease of imports from Rumania due to difficulties of transport. This was achieved in particular by drawing upon the reserves in circulation. The interruptions in production caused by the air attack on Floesti have been overcome.
- 6) There was a further increase in production of Buna rubber, but it is still 15 % below the maximum monthly production this year. Natural rubber supplies were altogether about 30 % below requirements.
- 7) It was possible to meet the demands of the Armed Forces for wood on the average by 60 %, on the basis of allotments from the Reich Forestry Office.
- 8) The damage to the oil and fuel extraction installations caused by air attacks only affected a small part of the total production. Coal production in Reich territory suffered a loss of only 1 %. No loss at all was reported in the production of coke. The loss in the production of steel and iron was again reduced during the month under review, amounting to about 5 %. The damage to traffic installations generally did not cause any lengthy interruptions.
- 9) Record grain crop in 1943. Fat supply situation not completely satisfactory. Fat stock balance unfavorable. Potato crop in 1943, amounting to 50 million tons, was 15 million tons below that of last year.
- 10) In order to maintain the tobacco supplies for the civilian population, a change in the distribution of tobacco had to be effected starting 1 Oct. 1943. Now the Armed Forces receive only 45,5 % of the available supply of tobacco as against 60 % formerly, the civilian sector thereby receiving 54,5 % as against 40 % formerly. Thus the individual soldier no longer receives three times, but only twice, the tobacco ration of the individual civilian.
- 11) Demolitions in the east were carried out nearly everywhere to the extent ordered; evacuation of goods, however, could not be carried out in the main to the extent planned.

Copy of report as per 1/Skl 30096/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XII.

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Situation 1 Nov. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Through a raid by the Intelligence Station at Dijon on 16 Sept. 1943, the following enemy missions of the British Intelligence Service during the months August/September 1943 became known:

1) Enemy requires exact information:

a) on time of arrival and departure of blockade runners from French Atlantic harbors;

b) on any stores of machines and equipment in the coastal area that might be of use to Japan;

c) on the existence and number of supply ships for submarines;

d) on whether, and in what harbors of the Atlantic, ships are anchored which are to be sunk in case of invasion in order to close the harbor mouth.

2) In case of arrival in port, information is requested concerning harbor, date of arrival and cargo of the following ships:

German ships: the REGENSBURG, ERMLAND, RIO GRANDE, BURGENLAND

German tankers: the BRAKE, CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN, UCKERMARK, WINNETOU,

Italian ships: the PIETRO ORSEOLO,

former British ships: the SPEY-BANK,

former Dutch ships: the KOTA-NOPAN,

former Norwegian ships: the SILVA-PLANA.

3) Blockade runners:

Certain large ships able to make the run France-Japan without an intermediate landing would be stationed in French Atlantic harbors - in particular Bordeaux - and would guarantee the supply to Japanese industry of designs, machines and tools.

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Group West and Naval Office, Bordeaux were informed so as to enable them to evaluate the information when carrying out the necessary defense measures.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reported the departure of the OSORNO on 27 Oct. from Jokjokarta.

The OSORNO, ALSTERUFER and RIO GRANDE were ordered by Radiogram 1946 to amend the secret enemy callsigns given them by the Naval Attaché in Tokio. For details see Radiogram 1946.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

One British vessel each was located:

at 1012 in BE 5240,
at 1544 in BE 2670,
at 1857 in AM 4320,
at 1955 in BE 2425,
at 2245 in BE 3820.

Our own air reconnaissance sighted a destroyer at 1825 in BE 3241, course 250°.

In the Channel, enemy targets were located west of Le Tréport and north of Gris Nez on 31 Oct. at 2250, and on 1 Nov. at 0022.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic coast:

Former outer approach routes to St. Nazaire, La Pallice and in the Gironde are closed and new routes substituted.

One submarine was escorted out and one in.

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Channel coast:

PT boats S "100" and "141" put into Boulogne at 0200. Convoy NORDVAARD and torpedo boat T "14" transferred to Flushing. Near Lezardrieux and Nieuport a total of nine ground mines was cleared.

Minesweeper M "3643" ran aground on a jetty while entering Ouistreham and sank.

The minelaying operation of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th PT Boat Flotillas against the east coast of England and the torpedo operation of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla against a westbound convoy were broken off owing to bad visibility. All the boats returned at 2215.

At the request of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Group West reported that destroyers Z "27" and ZH "1" left the Elbe at 1730 for transfer to the west area. The boats are scheduled to arrive on 2 Nov. at 0700 in Rotterdam and to proceed to Dunkirk at 1900 for transfer to Cherbourg on the night of 3 Nov. Fighter escort is guaranteed by Group West. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff was informed by Naval Staff, Operations Division.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Near Scheveningen and north of Vlieland eight mines were cleared.

At 1900 convoy "1186" with escort NORDVAARD and torpedo boat T "14" left Flushing for Rotterdam. Convoy "1185" Hoek - Elbe was carried out as planned. Otherwise nothing to report.

Norway/Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea five planes were detected on operation. At 1800 on 31 Oct. enemy batteries unsuccessfully fired on an incoming Petsamo convoy with 348 rounds. Slight material damage was sustained in battery "Sensenhauser". On the same day six enemy flights into the area of Vardoe were reported and one each into the areas of Petsamo and Banak.

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2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 37 ships were escorted north and 22 south. Due to lack of escorts 25 ships altogether remained lying in harbor.

Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff, for information, of the order concerning transfer of destroyers:

Arrival of destroyer Z "38" at Narvik is scheduled for 5 Nov.. Re-transfer of the IHN is to take place subsequently. Instead of the RIEDEL, the GALSTER is to be transferred home, along with the IHN. The RIEDEL and Z "31" are to start home only after the arrival of the STEINBRINK and Z "34" at Alta. The GALSTER will transfer to Narvik in due time, proceeding independently. A two to three days' stay by the IHN and GALSTER at Kristiansand South is anticipated for a blockade-runner operation.

Naval Command, Norway reported location of its forces as of 1 Nov.. For details see Teletype 1005.

Group North/Fleet reported start of the third part of minelaying operations in the Arctic Ocean with the departure of submarine U "636" on 2 Nov.. It is anticipated that the three operations "Eistorte", "Eiszapfen", and "Eisschrank" will be carried out in November. A further minelaying submarine will not be ready for action until mid-December.

On 22 Oct. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division in accordance with instructions from Chief, Naval Staff, issued the following order to Group North/Fleet, with copy to Commanding Admiral, Task Force and the TIRPITZ:

"1. Taking into account all possible situations, the Naval Staff cannot forego exploitation of the combat value of the ship according to the degree of her state of repair at the time.

It is therefore required that above and beyond the reported readiness of her batteries, 50 % of her heavy and medium guns and 60 % of her anti-aircraft batteries are to remain ready for firing. Various possibilities and also the effects on the carrying out and terminal date of the dockyard period are to be investigated. Final decision will depend on this investigation.

2. While appreciating the statements of Commanding Admiral, Task Force concerning leave for the crew, in case of procedure as under paragraph 1, leave must be handled accordingly.

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3. Likewise, as a last resort, the necessity cannot be foregone of using the TIRPIIZ as a floating battery for local defense at another point that can be reached by towing, if the situation should so demand. Work in the dockyard, including under-water work, however, is not to be affected by this."

In this connection Commanding Admiral, Task Force reported that, according to dockyard estimates, execution of this order would entail a one-month prolongation of work on the TIRPIIZ. He stated that everything must be done to make the ship ready for action in good time for the spring. Commanding Admiral, Task Force therefore considers demands to maintain action readiness during the dockyard period to be wrong, since they would prolong the time required.

Group North/Fleet assumes that no prolongation of the dockyard period is expected from the increased demands by the Naval Staff for action readiness, and asks for an investigation by High Command, Navy as to whether the fears of Commanding Admiral, Task Force with regard to prolongation of the dockyard period are justified. Furthermore, Group assumes that the "last resort" measure will of course only be required if the current state of dockyard repairs allows of it, and that the difficulties mentioned by Commanding Admiral, Task Force have been taken into account by the Naval Staff.

According to the view of Group North/Fleet, this measure is, in fact, intended as a last resort, to which all other considerations, even regarding continuation of the dockyard period etc., must be subordinate.

Complete agreement with the views of Group North/Fleet.
Further settlement of the matter lies with Naval Staff,
Quartermaster Division.

As to preparations for operation "Wallenstein", Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff, for information, of the following instructions to Naval Commands North, Baltic, Norway; Commanding Admiral, Submarines; Training Unit, Fleet; Commander, Destroyers; Commander, PT Boats and Commander, Minelayers.

"1.) The difficulties in preparing for operation "Wallenstein" lie in guaranteeing the supplies of fuel, ammunition etc. necessary for the conduct of battle operations. Without these, above all supplies of fuel, operations by surface forces would necessarily come to a standstill after two or three days. Previous requests were based on storing up the supplies considered necessary in those harbors that come into question for the operation. Due to our own fuel situation, but also due to scarcity of all other supplies, this procedure cannot be carried out for the present.

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2.) Thus supplies can only be ensured if we are successful in having the small supplies on hand, available as quickly as possible and aboard ship in an operational supply-line when the code word is given, and then by shifting this supply-line to the scene of naval operations. The new supplies brought up after the start of operation "Wallenstein" must be transported to the operational area in the same manner. This arrangement also makes possible the quick and expedient commitment of naval forces for tasks other than those provided for in the "Wallenstein" order. The execution and preparation of this operational supply-line can be effected only, if preparations are continuously made by certain offices on a mobilisation basis; close collaboration with the responsible offices of the High Command, Navy is necessary with regard to fuel, tankers, mines etc. Group North will continue its preparations on this basis, but will also gratefully accept proposals from the offices addressed.

3.) These preparations do not exclude the necessity of a certain storing up, for instance of fuel and mine supplies, for primary requirements, in the main distribution points e.g. Kiel and Swinemuende. This question will be handled directly by Group and Naval Staff."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

A gun carrier of the MOSKWA class on Kronstadt roads turned away under the protection of a smoke screen when fired on by battery "Peterhof". Our own battery "Dubnia" was shelled ineffectively from the Oranienburg pocket from 1115 - 1145. The assault operation reported on 31 Oct. on the land front was carried out in battalion strength. Penetration into the main defense line was blocked. Activity by assault detachments has of late increased perceptibly.

In the morning our air reconnaissance located about 30 very small craft in Lavansaari and 12 in Grafskaya Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-eight vessels were engaged in minesweeping in the Baltic Sea entrances and 22 in the Baltic. The STEINBRINK and destroyer Z "34" are proceeding through the Baltic Sea entrances to the north.

At 0900 the steamer MARIENBURG (1,322 BRT) was sunk off Steinort with an aerial torpedo by an enemy plane. Eleven of the crew and of the ship's anti-aircraft battery are missing. Northeast of Lyserort the heavy gun carrier POLARES was unsuccessfully attacked by a torpedo bomber at

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1324.

There are no special reports from the area of Commander, Minesweepers Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.

The following is a survey for the month of October from Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch on the status of troop and leave traffic in the Baltic Sea area:

1.) During the month of October 14,000 relief troops were sent from Stettin to Oslo and 18,000 men from Oslo to Stettin aboard the ships ISAR, DONAU, and ILLER.

2.) Beginning 24 Oct., an Air Force labor battalion of 700 men and a prisoners' labor battalion of the Air Force of 2,300 men with an escort of 100 men were transported from Finland to Oslo aboard the ships ISAR, DONAU, ILLER, and GOTENLAND.

3.) Leave traffic Norway-Denmark combined with evacuation of the 181st Infantry Division was carried through in three units of three ships each from Oslo to Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Aalborg. The evacuation of the division was completed on 16 Oct.. Every two days leave traffic takes about 2 - 3,000 men in each direction.

Armed Forces High Command, Special Staff for Mercantile and Economic Warfare asked the Foreign Office to bring up the question of exchange of goods by air between Sweden and Britain in the course of the imminent negotiations on reorganization of the Gothenburg traffic, in order to achieve a restriction of Swedish export to the enemy on this route also.

Twenty-four of the 60 naval artillery lighters under construction are intended for the formation of the flotilla for Lake Peipus.

These vessels should be ready for operation by the end of April or beginning of May. The Supreme Command is relying upon this.

According to the latest report from Krupp, however, a delay is to be expected. Work is not to begin in January but only at the end of February, and would, therefore, extend into May. Naval Staff has informed the Naval (Ship) Construction Division that such a delay is impossible and asked them to take special measures to ensure the completion of the naval artillery lighters by the date fixed.

V. Submarine Warfare.

North Atlantic:

One submarine of Group "Schill" is presumed lost, probably through an

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air attack at night before the beginning of the convoy operation. Commanding Admiral, Submarines intends to send group "Schill" out on the night-run of a southbound convoy in about BE 80 on 3 or 4 Nov.. So far, long-range reconnaissance has been without result.

Submarine U "214" reported discovery of supply rendezvous point in CD 73 by a carrier-borne plane. Point of rendezvous was changed.

The experiences of the past three weeks show that supply operations in the North Atlantic can only be carried out with heavy losses.

Submarines U "220" and U "402" were lost through carrier-borne planes in BD. The fate of two further submarines is causing anxiety. Warding-off of planes at the supply rendezvous was repeatedly reported. In October altogether two tanker-submarines and two operational submarines are known to have been lost during supply operations. Hence, supply operations in the area north of the Azores can no longer be carried out. The total operational endurance of submarines is thereby shortened. Unfortunately, prospects of locating convoys without our own air reconnaissance continue to diminish.

At 2030 submarine U "953" sighted a fast troop transport convoy, speed 13 knots, course 40°, in BE 8183. The submarines in the north are being sent in against this.

Submarine U "103" has carried out a minelaying operation off the harbor of Takoradi as planned.

Indian Ocean:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reports:

"1) Chief of Operations Division expressed the urgent request of the Admiral's Staff to have a German submarine operate for a short time in the sea area off Madras and against coastal traffic north of it, the Japanese submarines not being suitable for such operations because of the shallow water and their lack of maneuverability, and their smaller boats not being available for the time being. The Japanese Navy is greatly interested in reconnaissance and, if possible, also in nuisance raids. The Admiral's Staff suggested appointing Dommes, with whom the Japanese Commanding Admiral, Submarines at Penang has already had preliminary discussions. Suggest complying with request in view of great Japanese cooperation at Penang.

2) The Japanese Commanding Admiral, Submarines at Penang, who controls operations in the Indian Ocean, has expressed the desire that the head of the German office at Penang be informed about all movements etc. of German submarines in the Indian Ocean, in order to operate Japanese submarines accordingly and increase co-operation.

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If sanctioned from there, suggest stationing of experienced submarine officers at Penang be considered."

VI. Aerial Warfare.

British Isles and Vicinity:

Twenty-six planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation in the western area.

In the evening twelve of our bombers were on operation against towns on the south coast of England.

During the day minor enemy forces dropped twelve high-explosive bombs on one of our convoys in the area of the Scheldt estuary.

In addition, traffic installations and an airfield in northern France were attacked. One plane was shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

Mediterranean Theater:

In the Italian area the 2nd Air Force carried out air reconnaissance. In addition to this, Naples was raided by 106 bombers during the night of 1 Nov.. According to a preliminary report there were thirteen direct hits on ships. Three Ju 88's are overdue.

At noon major enemy forces with fighter escort attacked the station and harbor of Ancona and Rimini, causing heavy damage. Minor forces repeatedly raided Spezia and the Aquino road. No military damage is reported.

Air Force Command, Southeast reports reconnaissance in the Aegean. At noon the enemy carried out a raid against the airfield northwest of Scutari with 25 fighter-bombers under fighter escort. Two of our own planes were destroyed and two damaged. One Ju 52 with men on leave and wounded aboard was shot down. Four enemy planes were shot down by fighters, and one by anti-aircraft guns.

Eastern Front:

Photographic reconnaissance of the harbors in the northeastern area of

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the Black Sea and Sea of Asov was carried out. For results see Enemy Situation Black Sea. There are no further reports.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the morning a DIDO class cruiser sailed from Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. A French cruiser passed the Straits of Gibraltar westward-bound.

According to air reconnaissance, 60 eastbound merchantmen were 30 miles north-northeast of Cape Tres Forcas at 1740, evidently identical with the large convoy entering the Mediterranean on 31 Oct. The eastbound convoy reported near Cape Spartel on 31 Oct., consisting of five freighters, one tanker and two auxiliary warships, entered Gibraltar the same day.

During the night of 30 Sept. (evidently meant to read 31 Oct. Tr.N.) only slight shipping traffic was established in the area of Naples. The town was fully lit up. It seems that three torpedo boats and three LCI's were lying in Termoli. During the night of 31 Oct. parachutists landed six miles west of Pescara.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

On the evening of 31 Oct. PT boat activity was interrupted because of bad weather and engine trouble. Start of the operation was apparently detected by enemy air reconnaissance. The three PT boats moved to Viareggio.

On 31 Oct. mopping-up operations were carried out on the island of Capraja. On 31 Oct. at noon motor minesweeper R "12" and two naval landing craft were damaged by bomb-splinters in the course of an enemy air raid on Civitavecchia. One steamer and several small vessels were sunk. As a result, the scheduled minelaying operation by naval landing craft MFP "150" cannot be carried out.

The harbors south of Ancona were subjected to continuous enemy air attacks and can no longer be used without anti-aircraft defense.

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During the night of 31 Oct. SG "20" broke off her minelaying operation owing to bad weather. Due to damage to the minelaying gear the boat can at present no longer be used as a mine carrier.

Agreement was reached between Naval Staff, Special Weapons Division and Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division concerning employment of the 10th (Italian) PT Boat Flotilla for defense purposes. Copy as per letter Sk1/S 30074/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a) Adriatic:

According to agents' reports there are 500 Italians on the island of Brac, but no British. During the night of 30 Oct., 15 guns of up to 10,5 cm fired for some time out to sea.

Six steamers arrived at Trieste on the afternoon of 31 Oct.. One motor tanker left Trieste for Zara.

At Monfalcone one transport-submarine and one submarine-chaser were launched on 31 Oct..

b) Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

Two miles west of Kalymnos a surfaced submarine was sighted at 0635 on course to Leros.

Own Situation:

During the night of 31 Oct. the DRACHE carried out a minelaying operation in the gulf of Salonika.

Submarine pursuit south of Amorgos was without result. Convoy traffic was carried out without special incidents.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean received instructions from the Naval Staff immediately to submit operational order or operational instructions for submarine U "565", which is being transferred to the Aegean.

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c) Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance on 31 Oct. three merchantmen were proceeding on easterly course off the Turkish coast. According to radio intelligence four PT boats, destroyer "G" and two submarines were located at sea. On 1 Nov. no shipping was observed in the central and eastern Black Sea.

According to photographic reconnaissance 15 landingcraft were lying in Gelendzhik, 2 in Novorossiisk, 7 in Anapa, 7 in Taman and 12 pontoons in Temriuk. Air reconnaissance sighted about 20 small craft between Taman and the Strait of Kerch, and between Temriuk and the Strait of Kerch 1 gun boat on northwesterly course, 8 tugs, 1 coastal craft, 4 motor minesweepers, and 5 gunboats on easterly course.

During the night of 31 Oct. the enemy landed near Kamysh Burun and 1 km north of Cape Takli. According to a report from Commanding Admiral, Black Sea the bridgehead near Kamysh Burun was reduced in the evening to 3 km along the coast and a depth of 700 m.

Own Situation:

The Army ordered the evacuation of Skadovsk. Harbor and barracks were demolished.

Barrage S 73 was laid as planned.

After completing dockyard period, submarine U "19" transferred to Constanta.

West of Sevastopol minesweeping was carried out by seven motor minesweepers.

Damage to buildings of the Port Commander in Feodosiya was caused during air attacks on Feodosiya, Sevastopol, and Simferopol in the afternoon and evening; other damage was slight. During the night of 1 Nov. patrol line was taken up by seven naval landingcraft in the Strait of Kerch and by three PT boats and two naval landing craft on the south coast of the Kerch peninsula.

Commanding Admiral, Black Sea ordered the immediate towing of all unnecessary vessels and landing craft from Kherson to Odessa.

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Naval Staff ordered Group South to forward situation report of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea direct to Naval Staff along with reports of importance for conduct of the war as a whole and for the army, for forwarding to the General Staff.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

According to a report from the Military Attaché at Bangkok, the enemy offensive in Burma is not expected to start until the beginning of next year.

Since a further withdrawal from present positions in the area of New Guinea - Solomons would endanger the situation as a whole, the Japanese are determined now to stand firm. The number of enemy aircraft-carriers operating in this area is estimated at ten, five of them being converted merchantmen.

The Japanese are reckoning with commitment of 70 - 80 U.S. submarines in the Pacific, one third of these being at present in the zone of operations.

Japanese casualties as a result of brisk enemy air activity are only slight. Material losses, however, are considerable and serious in view of the scarcity of shipping space.

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Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, the communiqué issued on the Moscow Conference reads as follows:

"In the first place the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union openly and thoroughly discussed the measures that had to be taken in order to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Final military operations were discussed, concerning which decisions were reached. They are of such a nature as to serve as a future basis for closest military co-operation between the three countries.

The three Governments acknowledge that it lies within their own national interests to continue their present close co-operation and co-ordination in carrying on the war after hostilities have ceased.

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and China jointly declared:

"That their joint action, which is aimed at continuation of the war against their respective enemies, is to be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security." They acknowledge the necessity of creating an international organization of all peace-loving nations, in order to maintain international peace and security. They declare that after hostilities have ceased they will not employ their military forces within the territory of other nations, with the exception of those cases provided in this declaration and only after joint discussions. They furthermore declare that they wish to reach a general agreement with the Allied nations on the control of armaments in the postwar period.

The foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union determined that the policy of the Allies towards Italy must be based on the fact that Fascism has to be completely destroyed and the Italian people given the chance of creating for themselves a Government and other institutions on a democratic basis. The Italian Government must take on a more democratic aspect. Freedom of speech, press and religion must be restored. All Fascist institutions and organizations must be eliminated and all Fascist or pro-Fascist elements removed from the Government. All political prisoners must be released and pardoned, and the Fascist leaders and army generals, who are known as "war criminals" or are suspected of similar actions, must be arrested and sentenced. The time for carrying out these measures will be settled on the spot by the Supreme Commander, on the basis of instructions from the joint General Staffs.

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The Governments of Great Britain, the USSR and the United States agreed that Austria "should be liberated from German domination". They expressed their desire to see Austria rise again as a free and independent nation. However, Austria will be reminded of the fact that she is guilty of having participated in the war on the side of Germany. Therefore in the final settlement the contribution made by Austria herself through her liberation will be taken into consideration.

Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, representing the interests of thirty-two joint Allied nations, declared that at the time when an armistice is granted to any German government, German officers and men, as well as Party members, who were guilty of, or responsible for, atrocities, executions etc. would be sent to the countries in which they had committed their crimes, in order to be sentenced and punished in accordance with the laws of those countries."

For detailed version see War Diary, Part C, Volume VIII.

As far as the situation can be judged by the Naval Staff, the following facts are concluded:

- 1.) Nothing at all is reported on the results of military discussions and substantially no details on political discussions.
- 2.) Mutual understanding in the political sphere is obviously only basic. Its compromise character is shown by the resort to permanent commissions.
- 3.) The fact of this limited understanding is to be regarded as a success for the Anglo-Saxons. The extent of this is qualified by the concessions that probably had to be granted in the military sphere.
- 4.) Evidently the nations concerned understood and agreed that the failure of the conference would have meant a considerable relief for Germany. Their decision to conclude a compromise proves their unanimous desire to continue the war until the final defeat of Germany.
- 5.) To what extent Stalin is dependent on increased military support can only be surmised. If he had thought he could deal with Germany without this support, there would have been no reason for his abandoning, at least theoretically, his political freedom of action which he has so carefully preserved up to now. After the heavy sacrifices Russia has made, it is easy to understand that for her part she is eager to finish the war as quickly as possible. Perhaps she fears that she will be deprived of the fruits of her successes if German resist-

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ance costs still more losses in men and materiel. Therefore, for the present, Stalin is foregoing attempts at an order in Europe consisting of a division into spheres of interest.

6.) England still intends to build up her future position in Europe on the simultaneous weakening of Germany and Russia. In this regard nothing would be more dangerous than a "tie" in the Russo-German conflict. Thus, England is depending on a definite military victory by Russia over Germany; on the other hand, she must prevent Russia from being able to exploit this victory at the expense of England. The result of the Moscow Conference apparently takes both requirements fully into consideration. At the price of effective military support, designed to accelerate the Russian victory, England has bought Russia's renouncement of the division of Europe into spheres of interest, thereby preventing her from being able to exercise unlimited power in a great part of Central Europe. There can be no doubt that to oblige Russia to take part in a joint consultant control of postwar Europe through a coalition of the victors has been the constant goal of British endeavours since 1941. The Moscow Conference must be regarded as an important step in the direction desired.

7.) From the German angle, the following conclusions must be drawn from this situation:

a) Serious military efforts by the Anglo-Saxons for the support of Russia are shortly to be expected.

b) In order to render ineffective the decisions of the conference and to avert the dangers entailed in them, a positive military decision in favor of Russia must be prevented by every effort. Every moment of time that can be won for us will serve to shake the principles on which the Moscow agreement was reached. The quicker we embarrass the Moscow partners by making them adhere in practice to their agreements, the sooner will there be possibilities for this. Bones of contention for this purpose are to be found in sufficient quantity between the Arctic and the Aegean.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I) Army Situation:

We did not succeed in compressing the Russian beachhead near Kerch. Till now the defense of the approach to the Crimea along the Tartar Wall was successful. In the Nogai Steppe the 44th Army Corps succeeded in building up a narrow defensive zone 30 km before Kherson. It was possible to hold the bridgehead near Berislav. Our counter-attacks

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near Krivoi Rog were without success.

No important activity was reported from the rest of the eastern front and from Italy.

II) 1.) According to information from the Fuehrer's headquarters, a plan to charge Field Marshal Rommel with a special task (inspection of entire coastal defense on all fronts) is under consideration. Field Marshal Kesselring would then be appointed Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest.

2.) Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff pointed out the fact that our troops are burdened with 8,000 Italian military internees on the island of Rhodes. Group South, Commanding Admiral, Aegean received instructions from the Naval Staff that evacuation of this large number is urgently desired. Commanding Admiral, Aegean is to submit a brief survey of the situation and report his intentions.

3.) According to further information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy new instructions from the Fuehrer concerning reinforcement in the western area are on the way. These instructions result from the Moscow decisions.

III) Report of Quartermaster General, Naval Staff.

1.) About 1,100 naval troops were withdrawn from the Crimea, most of them being transferred to the area of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic.

2.) According to a report from Group West the projected organization of the Italian formation under the command of Captain Grossi is now to be introduced within the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West.

3.) By order of the Fuehrer, total responsibility for sea transport in the Black Sea, the Adriatic and Aegean was transferred to the Commanding Admirals concerned.

4.) No further progress was reported concerning the question of the construction site for naval landing craft at Salonika. The Main Committee still takes the view that construction of transportable craft in the existing dockyards in Germany and their transfer via the Danube would be quicker than the erection of the required construction site.

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Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will direct an urgent request to the Main Committee referring to the operational necessity of quickly taking in hand the measures requested in Salonika by the Naval Staff.

IV) Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports that the Chief of the Air Force General Staff, on the basis of a discussion by telephone with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, promised that possibilities will be sought of granting the Navy a somewhat more favorable allocation of Hohentwiel sets.

Special Items:

I) Commanding Admiral, South advised the Naval Staff, for information, of the following teleprint to German Naval Command, Italy:

"With letter OKM 1/Skl I op 30089/43 Gkdos dated 28 Oct. Naval Staff ordered the transfer of all PT boats and of 16 motor minesweepers from the Ligurian Sea to the Adriatic. Commanding Admiral, South has serious objections, especially to the withdrawal of all PT boats. The critical situation on the east coast of the Adriatic and in the Aegean is fully acknowledged and a reinforcement of the naval forces there is likewise considered necessary. However, the complete withdrawal from the west coast of the only PT boats suitable for offensive operations would release so many enemy forces that our own increase of strength in the Adriatic and Aegean would be more than equalized. The few PT boats at present in action on the west coast alone have actually effected an extraordinary pinning-down of light enemy naval forces in this area, where the enemy is still bringing up the main part of his supplies for the Italian front. For the time being a similar threat to enemy supply routes in the Adriatic and Aegean cannot be achieved by PT boats. Furthermore, the pinning-down of enemy forces on the west coast has contributed up to now to the fact that light enemy naval forces have desisted from serious attacks on our own coastal traffic. This coastal traffic is of decisive importance for further fighting in Italy, since, due to the peculiarity of the Italian road and railroad network, this latter can be put out of action to a great extent by systematic air raids. The Naval Staff should, therefore, be asked to reconsider its decision and to leave some of the PT boats on the west coast of Italy; or to transfer new PT boats through France to the Mediterranean, simultaneously with transfer to the Adriatic of boats from there. It is furthermore requested, as has been done several times before, that a considerable increase in the number of submarines operating in the Mediterranean be effected. The successes up to date show that such considerably intensified operations would result in a decisive relief in land fighting

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as well as in the struggle for our own sea lanes."

Independently of the above information, Naval Staff had issued the following order to Group South, Commanding Admiral, Adriatic, German Naval Command, Italy and the 1st PT Boat Division:

"1.) After overhauling of the motors of the four boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla in the Adriatic has been completed, they are to be used by the 1st PT Boat Division according to the instructions of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic. Report intention to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic.

"2.) Task: Thrusts from the central Dalmatian coast against enemy supplies and naval forces off the east coast of Italy, aimed at damaging enemy supplies and, if possible, hindering enemy attempts at landing behind the German front.

"3.) Necessary preparations (selection of base, provision of fuel and torpedoes, communications etc.) will be made by the 1st PT Boat Division according to instructions of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic and with the assistance of German Naval Command, Italy."

II) Group North/Fleet advised Naval Staff, Operations Division, for information, of the order to Naval Commands, Norway, Baltic and North concerning plans to carry out two major mining operations at the end of November in the sea area of the Great Fisher Bank for reinforcement of the West Wall, in order to complete barrages 16 c and d weakened by enemy minesweeping activity.

Base for both these operations will probably be Kristiansand South. In order to establish any enemy mining laid down as a flank protection for the enemy barrage gap in the area of the Great Fisher Bank, Little Fisher Bank and Jutland Bank and on the probable approach and return routes of our minelaying formation, several exploratory sweeps for moored mines are considered urgently necessary before the execution of the projected mining operations.

The Naval Commands are requested to carry out the necessary exploratory sweeps by 25 Nov. Furthermore, Naval Command Norway is asked to clear the declared area from point $57^{\circ} 42' N 04^{\circ} 42' E$, point $57^{\circ} 42' N 05^{\circ} 12' E$, point $57^{\circ} 18' N 05^{\circ} 12' E$, point $57^{\circ} 18' N 04^{\circ} 42' E$ to $57^{\circ} 42' N 04^{\circ} 42' E$ with motor minesweepers, if possible, in order that the said area can be reported cleared of mines, become navigable again and used for later mining operations.

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III) A survey of High Command, Navy, Ordnance Branch regarding the anti-aircraft armament of submarines as of the end of October of this year has been received. Copy as per 1/Skl 30873/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume IV. In general it was possible to meet operational requirements.

Unfortunately, in the meantime equipment with 2 cm quadruple anti-aircraft guns has proven insufficient as to caliber, so that a further conversion of operational submarines to 3,7 cm anti-aircraft guns has become necessary.

IV) In reply to the inquiry from Naval Staff, Operations Division (see War Diary 31 Oct.), Group South reports concerning infantry defense for naval coastal batteries:

"High Command, Army Group E comments on the request by Naval Group South as follows:

1) The views of Naval Group South are appreciated. However, at present the high command of Army Group E is unfortunately not in a position to comply with the principles and requests set forth, since it has not only been denied the required reinforcements but has also been deprived of one more large unit (1st Armored Division). The requests of Naval Group South, therefore, must be submitted to Armed Forces High Command.

2) In detail, the following statements are made:

a) An infantry defense of naval coastal batteries on the Peloponnesos is ensured, even though slight, as fortress battalions are stationed in the sectors Githion, Kalame, (Kalamata), Pilos, Pyrgos, Gulf of Patras.

b) It must be the task of all branches of the three services stationed on the coast of the Peloponnesos to force the enemy to launch attacks, should he intend occupation of the country, and then to offer resistance to the utmost. If the bases and batteries are put out of action, they will have fulfilled their task and probably gained time for concentrated action by reserves held in readiness. In view of the defense task hitherto set Army Group E, a withdrawal from batteries and minefields cannot be considered.

3) New instructions for the whole area are expected, but they will not fundamentally change the task set. However, reinforcement of fortress troops on the Peloponnesos may be expected in the course of the next ten months".

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Group South adds that conditions on Corfu, Kephallenia and Zante are the same. On these islands, too, fortress battalions are stationed. However, these forces are apparently too weak to be able to withdraw any units for direct defense of coastal batteries. While the batteries are being built up (about four months), 80 naval engineers each will be available as infantry defense.

Thus, it must be stated that the defense of the coast essentially rests with the Navy alone. This situation makes it necessary for only actual battle units to be left directly on the coast, while all rear services must be withdrawn behind the main defense line. Practically speaking this means, for instance, large-scale evacuation of Patras. Commanding Admiral, Aegean is aware of this necessity and is making the necessary arrangements in this respect, as discussed verbally with Quartermaster General, Aegean.

Situation 2 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

From Portuguese consulate reports from Recife and Natal, dated 5 and 8 Oct., it is gathered that preparations for the shipment to Great Britain of a Brazilian expeditionary corps totalling 50,000 men are being carried out in such a way that these troops will be able to operate from Great Britain in the spring.

At Recife an extensive service for submarine reconnaissance has been established in close collaboration with the Americans. Further sea-planes with a wide range of action as well as 15 boats with torpedo equipment have arrived. Resumption of German submarine activity in the north Atlantic is regarded as a very great threat, which must be largely eliminated as serious difficulties for the troops fighting in Europe are feared. The patrol service from Recife extends to the area between the north coast of Brasil, the waters around the Cape Verde islands and the coast of Dakar. British surface forces and British air forces are also cooperating and are operating in the waters bounded by the Azores and Madeira. The system is completed by the bases of Gibraltar, Rabat, and Sierra Leone. Twenty-three U.S. warships are based in Natal; they, too, are scheduled for submarine patrol in the above-mentioned areas. Some of the vessels are equipped with helicopters.

The following details about the loss of the blockade-runner RAMSES have become known through a medical officer returned from captivity in Australia.

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At dawn on 28 Nov. 1942, the RAMSES met a convoy proceeding from Australia to the Persian Gulf at 23° 09' S, 99° 25' E. The convoy was escorted by the cruiser ADELAIDE and the Dutch torpedo cruiser VAN HEEMSKERK. According to statements of the ship's captain, the cruisers detected the RAMSES with location gear, since they approached her direct in the dawn light from beyond the range of visibility.

Unfortunately, the convoy included a sister ship of the vessel which the RAMSES represented herself to be to the British, the attempted deception thus being frustrated at once. In reply to the customary signal orders of the British to stop the ship and to await the search party, the RAMSES was scuttled. All secret documents and the secret mail were destroyed. The entire crew was picked up from the boats by the two destroyers. Until she sank, the cruisers took the RAMSES to be an auxiliary cruiser and kept at a great distance from her."

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 26 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel each was located:

at 1359 in BF 6763,
at 1339 in BF 4763,
at 1729 in AL 9350, and
at 1830 in BE 3740.

At 1220 our air reconnaissance sighted 3 southbound destroyers in BE 6593, and at 1415 a convoy consisting of 23 troop transports, some large ones, with 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers in BE 5322, course 40°. Further, 17 merchantmen with 3 escorts were sighted at 1700 in BE 2683, course 70°, and at 1703 44 merchantmen with presumably a cruiser and 7 escorts in BE 2668, also course 70°.

The Intelligence Service transmitted "Clipper" report on the sighting of a strongly escorted southbound convoy off Ireland on 27 Oct.

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In the Channel, targets were located in the area of Les Sept Iles and the Channel Islands from 1740 on the 1st to 0431 on the 2nd. These turned away after being fired on by battery "Painpol". Since further movements of an apparently large target which was located corresponded with the tide, and a search of this area at dawn by fighter planes was without result, it is possible that these were drifting balloons. On the grounds of the locations, army coastal batteries and batteries "Steinbruch" and "Mirus" fired the whole night, expending considerable ammunition.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The blockade-runner DRESDEN struck a ground mine during her transfer to the outer Gironde. The ship was able to put in under her own power though her engine was damaged. One mine was swept off the Gironde. Off Brest, two submarines were escorted in and off Lorient, two were escorted out.

At 1700 mine-exploding vessel "1" with two patrol boats was attacked by six enemy fighter-bombers on the approach route off Brest. The mine-exploding vessel and one patrol boat received hits; the patrol boat was heavily damaged and suffered casualties. Damage and casualties to the mine-exploding vessel have not yet been reported. One of the attacking planes was shot down for certain and a further one probably shot down. Southwest of Lorient minesweeper M "344" struck a mine and is being towed in.

Channel Coast:

Transfer of destroyers Z "27" and ZH "1" from Rotterdam to Dunkirk and torpedo operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla against a westbound convoy off the south coast of England are scheduled for the night of 2 Nov.. Near Calais two mines were cleared.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Minesweeping activity was carried out without special incidents.

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Westbound convoy 467 Elbe-Hook consisting of 3 steamers started out at 1200. Damage to 3 towed barges, 3 motor ships and 3 motor boats during the air raid on Emden on 31 Oct. is now reported.

Naval Command North transmitted an extract from the request of the 5th Air Force to Commander in Chief, Air Force to rescind temporarily the order to attack Danish fishing vessels in the prohibited areas of the North Sea. To this Naval Command North replied that approval of this request would entail withdrawal of the tacitly tolerated passage through German declared areas by Danish fishing vessels. Naval Command North was unable to assess to what extent this measure is compatible with the food economy situation and considered a basic decision by Naval Staff together with Commander in Chief, Air Force to be necessary. (see teleprint 1140).

Norway/Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Only two planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. On 1 Nov. three planes were reported in the Vardoe area.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty ships were escorted to the north and 31 to the south. A total of 21 ships was left in harbor due to lack of escorts.

Submarine U "636" left Tromsø for mine operation "Eistorte". Group North/Fleet then reported on Operational Order No. 9 from Admiral, Northern Waters concerning former operation "Katharina". New operation is called "Kakteenzucht". Comb-out of the traffic route is eliminated. A new factor, however, is the provision of two vessels of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla in an advanced position to pick up the 4th Destroyer Flotilla carrying out the operation. For details see teleprint 1/Skl 3261/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume IIa.

The Swedish steamer DROTTNINGHOLM, which was engaged in the exchange of wounded, is returning from England to Sweden with German approval. For details see War Diary, Part C, Volume VIII. At 1155 the steamer arrived at Kristiansand South. Resumption of passage is scheduled for the morning of 3 Nov..

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

The DICTO and LIONEL were transferred to the skerries off Uddevalla apparently ready for their blockade-run. A Norwegian captain who had a successful share in the last blockade-run has returned from England and is to conduct the break-through.

In the Skagerrak a British motor minesweeper was intercepted by patrol boat "1606" at 0530. The boat, which was flying the merchant marine flag, struck her flag and was towed into Frederikshavn. According to a report of Naval Command Baltic this motor minesweeper is identical with an alleged submarine reported in the Skagerrak on the night of 1 Nov.. According to reports so far available the motor minesweeper was on passage to Lysekil. Obviously several craft of this kind are engaged in blockade-running. Further information is to be expected.

In Kronstadt Bay a minesweeping unit consisting of 25 vessels with 2 Fugas (Russian patrol boat Tr.N.) and 3 escort vessels was sighted from 0900 to 1439 with alternating courses between Lavansaari, Great Tyters, and Neugrund. Six mine detonations were observed in the unit.

2. Own Situation:

Skagerrak patrol was carried out by eight patrol boats and two minesweepers.

Thirty-one vessels were engaged in mine clearance in the Baltic Sea entrances. Eight ELM/J mines were cleared. For details see Daily Situation. South of Gjedser Odde armed fishing vessel "99" of the Armed Fishing Vessel Training Flotilla was rammed by the mine ship OSTMARK and sunk. The whole crew was saved.

Crash boat "102" from Bug has been overdue since 1 Nov.. The crew was probably overpowered by eleven French prisoners on board. According to press reports, the boat entered a Swedish harbor.

Escort and transport operations were carried out in the whole Baltic Sea without incident.

When bringing in the net south of Nargen, the Finnish steamer SUOMI was unsuccessfully attacked by aerial torpedo from an enemy plane near Packerort at 1245. The area between Kolkas and Backofen was temporarily closed to merchant shipping. Coastal mine boats were sent out

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on a mining operation west of Tolboukin lighthouse and four Finnish PT boats were ordered out to mine the area east of Tyters. The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is carrying out mine clearance south of Kalbada Ground. Much drifting Russian sweeping gear was sighted south of Namsi Bank. One piece of gear was partially salvaged. West of this bank a line consisting of twelve buoys in east-west line was sighted. Evidently this is a large-scale minesweeping operation by the enemy to clear the way for an extensive landing in Narva Bay.

Southwest of Namsi Bank the 25th Minesweeper Flotilla had an engagement with enemy PT boats and gunboats. Three enemy boats were destroyed, a fourth probably destroyed and further ones damaged.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The expected HX-convoy was not located. On 5th Nov. the boats are to be disposed in five groups of four each in BC, where the next HX convoy is expected.

At 1800 submarine U "592" sighted several vessels at first proceeding east, then west, at high speed in BC 6762. Pursuit was without success. The boat presumes it was a carrier with escort.

Air reconnaissance has not yet located the southbound convoy awaited by group "Schill" in BE. The group, consisting of eight boats, is in patrol line from BE 7647 to 8557. There are no reports of successes from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 14 bombers, 71 heavy fighters, 268 fighters and 24 reconnaissance planes were on operation. For results of reconnaissance see Enemy Situation West Area.

During the evening one bomber and ten fighter-bombers carried out a nuisance raid on London.

Minor enemy forces penetrated the occupied west area by day. For attack on mine-exploding vessel "1" see Situation West Area. An airfield in northern France was raided during the evening. No enemy

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flights into Reich territory are reported.

Mediterranean Theater:

During the attack on Naples on the night of 1 Nov., 44 aerial torpedoes type 350 were dropped among other missiles. According to reports from the 2nd Air Force two steamers were heavily damaged and four less heavily. On 2 Nov. 12 fighter-bombers, 93 fighters and 14 reconnaissance planes of the 2nd Air Force were out on operation.

For results of air reconnaissance see Enemy Situation Mediterranean. The enemy attacked stations and traffic installations at Terni and Ancona. Late in the evening an unknown number of planes entered the area of Rome without attacking.

Air Force Command, Southeast had 146 fighters on operation. By day four, and in the evening three, enemy reconnaissance planes were over the Aegean; six planes were engaged in carrying supplies to the insurgents.

During a raid on the Freya radar installation at Durazzo two Spitfires were shot down in aerial combat. One barrack burnt out. In the morning a total of 21 planes entered the area of Scutari.

Around noon 100 - 170 Liberators, Fortresses, and Stirlings penetrated in three waves into the area of Vienna, via Zara-area Ljubljana and attacked the aircraft industry at Wiener Neustadt again, causing considerable damage. According to reports so far available seven of the raiders were shot down by our fighter defense. It is expected that this number will turn out to be higher.

At midnight on 2 Nov. ten high explosive bombs were dropped on the airfield of Castelli near Candia.

Eastern Front:

In the course of defense against the enemy landing in the Strait of Kerch anti-aircraft guns destroyed ten enemy landing craft.

In the Arctic Ocean, air reconnaissance reported the harbors of Archangel and Molotovsk as well as the whole White Sea free from ice.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Sixteen of the twenty-nine merchantmen of an eastbound convoy reported from Tangiers on 31 Oct. arrived at Gibraltar. On the evening of 1 Nov. a further convoy consisting of five freighters and two special vessels of 2,000 BRT each entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic. The French cruiser MONTCALM entered Gibraltar on the night of 1 Nov. and sailed on to the west on the evening of 2 Nov.

Besides the MONTCALM, 1 DIDO class, and 1 FIJI class cruiser, as well as 2 Italian cruisers, 4 British auxiliary merchant cruisers, 66 freighters, 12 tankers, 7 destroyers, 20 corvettes and escort vessels and also 165 planes were in Gibraltar at 1400.

During the evening 5 destroyers, 3 corvettes and 5 PT boats put out into the Mediterranean.

Tangiers and Cape Spartel reported strong patrol activity by destroyers, minesweepers and guard boats as well as planes off the Straits of Gibraltar, seemingly directed against submarines.

On 1 Nov. Tres Forcas reported an eastbound convoy consisting of 60 vessels, and on 2 Nov. at 1300 12 vessels, apparently landing boats, proceeding west.

At 1130 our air reconnaissance sighted a convoy of 55 ships 20 miles north-northeast of Arzeu, on course 60°.

On 1 Nov. at 2345 there were five ships 40 miles south of Salerno. Course was not reported. On the afternoon of 1 Nov. two destroyers left Ajaccio southbound, and on 2 Nov., two steamers were lying off the harbor. According to a report of the German Intelligence Service dated 1 Nov., a concentration of ships, in particular transport vessels, as well as the assembly of numerous special landing troops was observed in Sardinian harbors. Alleged target of operations is to the north.

Reconnaissance at noon on 2 Nov. revealed an increase of merchant shipping in the harbors of Apulia. There are no details.

At 1035 one submarine was located off Toulon.

According to a report of the German Intelligence Service from Portugal, a large convoy with war materiel and troops bound for the Mediterranean is said to have left eastern harbors of the United States

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on 1 Nov.. According to information from the Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy, of the four war transport ships left to the Italians, KT "10" and KT "15" probably went over to the enemy on 8 Sept. KT "16" and "32" are established to be at Genoa and Leghorn.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On the night of 1 Nov. mining operations were carried out by the KEHRWIEDER with naval landing craft F "514", and by the patrol boat LIDO with naval landing craft F "483" on the west and east coast respectively.

On the morning of 2 Nov. the harbor installations of Pescara were demolished. The entrance is still open. At Anconà 3 - 3,7 cm twin anti-aircraft guns will be ready for action from 1 Nov..

On 1 Nov. G "3" was put into service as a further boat of the Coastal Defense Flotilla Spezia.

Submarine pursuit off Toulon was without result. The steamer MEDJERTA was unsuccessfully attacked with torpedoes.

Commander Submarines, Mediterranean submitted Operational Order for submarine U "453" concerning mining off Bari. Copy as per 1/Skl 3257/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

Submarine U "453" left Pola for this operation.

According to a report from Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch, a total of 20 large French ships is ready for return to southern France, as far as their engines are concerned. Three of these ships already arrived at Marseilles on 30 Oct.. Transfer of the 20 ships will be finished on 13 Nov..

Admiral, German Naval Command Italy reported:

"In the course of today's discussion with Commanding General, Army Group B on the situation as a whole during which full agreement was reached, Field Marshal Rommel, among other things, advanced the plan of protection by a mine barrage of the Po valley area, with focal point Rimini - Po estuary an area particularly vulnerable to landings. In addition to this, Field Marshal Rommel asked for inshore waters defense by patrol units in this area. I pointed out the difficulties in providing mines and the fact that no patrol units are available. While fully appreciating the existing shortage of mines and the lack of patrol forces, Field Marshal Rommel nevertheless requested that his sug-

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gestion be considered favorably, pointing out the fact that the enemy would be able to roll up our front, even with inferior forces, from the said area.

A preliminary examination reveals the following requirements:

- 1) 1,500 moored mines and 2,000 cutting floats, also about 100 LMB's.
- 2) Provision of the necessary mine-carriers, in connection with which availability of the FASANA is again requested. Apart from naval landingcraft F "483" there is no mine-carrier available in this area at present, the GIORGIO having been damaged.
- 3) Formation of a coastal defense flotilla with at least 20 vessels; here attempts will be made to resort to available fishing craft in this area."

In War Diary under 10 Oct.; Group West submitted considerations on the organization of command in the western Mediterranean. Copy as per 1 Skl I a 3161/43 Gkdos. Chefs.; see War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

Naval Staff, Operations Division agrees with Group in so far as it is necessary to review the organization of command in the western Mediterranean along with the development of the situation. Chief, Naval Communications Division was asked to state his views on the considerations of Group West as regards communications as soon as possible.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a) Adriatic:

Enemy Situation:

Two Siebel ferries and two infantry boats which entered the harbor of Dubrovnik on 31 Oct. were fired on from Mljet. At Split the steamer MARCO was set on fire by ten British planes at 1530 on 1 Nov.. At the same time twelve British fighters were over Dubrovnik. A British submarine provides Hvar nightly with supplies and makes soundings of the channel. According to Croat information, the battery on Peljesac is said to have been destroyed by the SS. According to statements of the Croat Naval Command at Agram there is an enemy landing field on Lagosta and there is said to be a British PT boat base on Mljet at Porto Polace.

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According to an Air Force report from Army Group F at 1715 on 2 Nov., there were one large and four small ships behind a smoke screen west of the Sebeni mouth near Fieri (Albania), which fired four ranging shots on the lighthouse.

Own Situation:

Commanding Admiral, Adriatic was ordered to give a short weekly report on the situation with regard to bauxite transport:

Report dated 2 Nov. is as follows:

"Bauxite transport Adriatic impossible as long as the Dalmatian islands - the mopping-up of which is in progress or is being started - are still in the hands of the partisans. Routes west of the islands cannot be used because of the enemy situation, as destruction or capture must be expected. Coastal route within the islands from Dubrovnik by way of Split to Sibenik is barred by numerous enemy batteries. At present traffic between the said harbors is completely paralyzed; motor coaster traffic in the southern Adriatic as far as Dubrovnik is directed by SSKOS according to the situation. Shipping is possible from Trieste to Sibenik."

Motorships VERBANO and SANSEGO left Pola for Zara. Eleven tons of provisions were transported from Trieste and Venice to Split by three planes.

On 1 Nov. coastal defense vessel NA "3" was put into service with Coastal Defense Flotilla, North Adriatic.

b) Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 0805 one of our planes sighted two vessels, probably destroyers, 150 miles south of Rhodes, on southerly course.

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Own Situation:

At dawn operation "Symi" started by the landing of about 100 men of Assault Division Rhodes on the north coast. The crossing was effected by 1 motor ship, 2 escort vessels, and 2 motor boats. Resistance by a light anti-aircraft battery was broken by Ju 88 attack.

Of the total crew of 408 men of the steamer INGEBORG, 306 were saved.

The auxiliary sailing vessel CARMELO PADRE, in operational readiness, was put into service for the 15th Landing Flotilla.

On the southeast coast of Kos a further 7.5 cm anti-aircraft battery manned by Fascists is reported ready for action.

Traffic of small vessels was hampered by the weather.

Passage of the steamers BACCHUS and JOHANNES MAERSK from Piraeus to the Black Sea was interrupted at Khalkis due to lack of escort.

Group South transmitted the following report concerning postponement of operation "Zwischenspiel" from Commanding Admiral, Aegean:

"1.) The postponement of "Zwischenspiel" was ordered by the 10th Air Corps without consulting Commanding Admiral, Aegean. As was communicated by phone, weather conditions rendered a (parachute Tr. N.) jump impossible, so that the attempt to put out was not even made.

2.) The cancellation of "Zwischenspiel" was effected without consulting Commanding Admiral, Aegean. He repeatedly emphasized the importance of the operation. In order to bring the not very seaworthy naval artillery lighter without fail to her destination under the prevailing weather conditions, the convoy was reinforced by two coast patrol boats on 29 Oct. at 1900, as can be seen from the situation report dated 30 Oct.. It is not correct that "Zwischenspiel" was cancelled because the Navy could not disembark the landing group due to unfavorable weather conditions and lack of a seaworthy naval artillery lighter. The fact is that parachute troops could not be used owing to weather conditions.

3.) In addition to this, Commanding Admiral, Aegean had proposed the use of a naval landingcraft in lieu of a naval artillery lighter. However, Army Group E rejected that proposal."

To this Group South reported:

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"1.) We agree with Commanding Admiral, Aegean that with regard to the weather conditions and also eventual sea damage, use of the naval artillery lighter, which is not very seaworthy, would have been irresponsible, since in all probability materiel embarked would have been lost before arrival at Samos, thereby jeopardizing the result of the operation. To what extent a replacement of the naval artillery lighter by coast patrol boats is possible, cannot be estimated from here. At any rate, the naval artillery lighter is by no means suited for landing and disembarkation on the open coast in the manner of naval landing craft, as she has no landing ramps, but needs a pier."

2.) Views of the Group accord with those of Army Group E, that a withdrawal of naval landing craft from operation "Leopard" cannot be considered.

c) Black Sea:

At 1900 Group South transmitted the following report on the situation in the Crimea from Commanding Admiral, Black Sea:

"On 1 Nov. at about 0300 the enemy landed near Eltigen in the strength of a regiment. At 0315 the enemy stormed the steep shore. At 0500 30 further landing craft, apparently the second wave, appeared off the coast. They were forced by the 1st and 3rd Battery to withdraw east-northeast under the protection of a smoke screen. The beachhead was not mopped-up by dark but was narrowed to a length of about 3 km and a depth of 700 m.

Minor enemy forces which landed near Yanysch-Takli were destroyed and about 50 prisoners were taken. A further attempt at landing near Yenikale was frustrated by our artillery. It is to be expected that further forces will be brought up at Eltigen and that landings will be made at other points in order to tie down our forces. For defense of the coast seawards, four naval landing craft are in position in the Strait of Kerch off the enemy beachhead, and three further ones are between Cape Takli and Cape Tschaude. The south coast of the Kerch peninsula is protected by two naval landing craft between Takio-Opuk and by three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla between Opuk and Tschaude. The transfer of the Crimean group of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to Feodosiya for reinforcement of the patrol line on the south coast is scheduled for 3 Nov. If there are signs of enemy intentions to land on the south coast of the Crimea or in case of favorable weather conditions for this, the 1st PT Boat Flotilla will form patrol or reconnaissance line south of the Strait of Kerch and off the south coast of the Kerch peninsula, off shore for the purpose of an offensive against enemy forces based on the patrol line, in collaboration with night reconnaissance planes.

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Patrol lines are insufficient for the prevention of landings, but are able to weaken and confuse the enemy, thereby harassing the scheduled progress of landing. An important task is to warn the coast in good time. The landings must, however, be repulsed by coast defense. Commanding General, Army Command 17 is of the same opinion.

In the Perekop isthmus there are enemy tanks before the Tartar Wall. Our own front is being built up. Army Command 17 thinks that the front can be held. High Command, Army holds out prospects of reinforcements by air in the next few days."

At 2135 Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reported to Group South and Naval Staff, Operations Division:

"1. According to prisoners' statements, the strength of the enemy on the Eltigen beachhead is about 14,000 men. The enemy is defending himself tenaciously, supported by guns from the eastern shore and by numerous ground-attack planes. Definite Russian air superiority over the combat zone. Thus only a further narrowing of the beachhead to 1.5 km along the coast was possible. It is to be expected that fresh enemy forces will be brought up after dark. During the night of 2 Nov. three naval landing craft will be off the beachhead, four south of it, two within the Strait of Kerch between Cape Tschaude and Takli, and three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in the patrol line.

2. Near Perekop the position is unchanged. Further enemy troops filtered through over the Sivash Sea. Counter measures are in progress.

3. In the course of the day and after dark air attacks on Sevastopol and Simferopol; damage not yet reported."

On 5 Nov., Commanding Admiral, Black Sea plans to lay minefields against enemy landings:

- a. in Koktecel Bay with 150 UMA's
- b. in Barakaw Bay with 50 UMA's.

Commanding Admiral, Black Sea received instructions from Naval Staff to supplement situation reports by a report on plans, considerations for commitment of our naval forces and activity of patrol lines in the combat zone. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea received a detailed order to this effect from Group South by Radiogram 2026. For copy see Radiogram 2026 in file of teleprints. In addition, Group South asked Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to submit an appropriate proposal if he is of the opinion that a change of command organization in the western Black Sea is necessary due to pressure of current operations.

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The matter will be followed up by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. In accordance with inquiry of Army General Staff through the Naval Liaison Officer (see War Diary 31 Oct.) Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted to Army General Staff, to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, and to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison, a preliminary survey on Russian transport capacity in the Black Sea, and answered the other questions as follows:

"1. On the basis of data here, about 40 armored boats are estimated to be in the Sea of Azov.

2. Information available here gives no clue to the 30 landing craft missing according to air reconnaissance of 26 and 29 Oct."
Copy of letter l/Skl I a 33519/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIVa.

On the evening of 2 Nov. the enemy carried out air attacks against Sevastopol and Simferopol. Damage not yet reported.

In the morning the base of Tendra (20 km south of Ochakov) was evacuated as planned. On the evening of 1 Nov. FS "60" ran aground when entering Skadovsk for evacuation of the Port Commander. So far attempts at towing her off were without success. One further naval landing craft was sent to assist.

The outlet from Sevastopol is closed because aerial mines are suspected there.

One lighter of the Sevastopol-Odessa convoy sank due to sea damage, but there were no casualties.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Only general statements on the result of the Moscow Conference are to be found in the two large Russian newspapers "Isvestija" and "Pravda", which emphasize the agreement achieved and refer to the handling of concrete military problems.

For survey of the most important Anglo-Saxon and neutral press commentaries, see Foreign Press Report of the Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, dated 3 Nov. 1943.

According to Exchange Telegraph, it is emphasized in Moscow that the collaboration of the four great powers, resulting from the Moscow discussions with the participation of China, will not affect in any way the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. U.S. circles in Moscow are particularly pleased about the participation of China in the general discussions of the chief Allies.

About 500,000 miners have been drawn into the strike-wave in the U.S.

Eden has invited the Turkish foreign minister to come to Cairo for a discussion.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. According to a report from the German Naval Command, Italy, vessels of the 10th PT Boat Flotilla under Commander Prince of Borghese are still flying the German ensign. Until now the vessels have not been put into operation. The Naval Staff considers sailing under the German ensign to be inadvisable. As long as the Duce has not ordered a new ensign for republic-fascist Italy, use of the previous Italian ensign, removing the arms of Savoy, seems to be advisable. A proposal to this effect is to be transmitted to the Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters.

II. Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that as a result of representations by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff to Chief of the Air Force General Staff, the assignment of Hohentwiel apparatus to the Navy is to be increased to 50 % of the new output by March. As compared with our request, this means a moderate increase from January on. A further increase could only be obtained from the Ministry through Commander in Chief, Navy. Such an attempt, however, is not advisable in view of the good will already shown by Chief of the Air Force General Staff.

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III. Chief of Naval Intelligence Division submitted confirmed losses of enemy merchant shipping during the month of October. Total number: 73 ships totalling 357,975 BRT, out of which 39 ships totalling 217,889 BRT were sunk by our submarines. Copy as per 3/Skl 14500/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Volume "Enemy Shipping Losses 1943".

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division.

a) The following information has been received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy.

"On 30 Oct. Chief, Operations Staff stated that in agreement with Commanding General, Armed Forces, West he was firmly convinced that sooner or later, but in spring 1944 at the latest, the final decision on this war would be fought out in the west area. He took the view that apart from enemy landings at other places (Southern Norway/Denmark/Balkans) the enemy would decide on a landing operation in the west which, if it succeeded, could be extended to a large-scale operation against western Europe and the indispensable Ruhr area, thereby leading to the most dangerous threat for Germany. Despite their good condition, the Atlantic Wall and the Channel Wall would not be able to hinder a landing by the enemy, since for such an operation he would throw in all his available force. From the German side, the landing could never be prevented on a purely defensive basis, but could only be repulsed by strong, fresh and fully equipped offensive forces, that is to say the enemy must be forced back and driven from the continent by us in an offensive action.

Whether the enemy wants to or not, it is likely that he will be simply forced to carry out the landing on the Channel coast in order to deploy the strongest forces on the shortest sea route. The enemy will also be forced to eliminate the German special apparatus in the west. Thus the following would be the strategic aims of the enemy:

- 1) Occupation of the industrial areas of western Germany and France.
- 2) Elimination of the German submarine bases in the western area.
- 3) Elimination of the A 4-areas (rocket areas Tr.N.).
- 4) Establishment of the second front for the decisive relief of Soviet Russia.

Utilizing his strong air superiority, there are most favorable possibilities for air landings in the whole west area. At present our own army forces are by no means sufficient, and, as is known,

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naval forces, too, are quite inadequate for defense. Thus the following demands must be made:

- a) The transfer of forces from the west to the eastern front must cease at once.
- b) Everything that can be done for reinforcement of offensive power in the west (armored divisions) must be effected immediately.
- c) Coastal defense in the Channel area, as far as it is under construction, is to be completed with the utmost speed. The setting-up of further batteries is to be investigated.
- d) French manpower, which at present is working far too little or not at all, must be mobilized and fully engaged on the construction of defense. (This is all the more necessary since the withdrawal of strong contingents of workers recently was unavoidable.)
- e) The Navy must do everything to increase defensive readiness on the coast and prepare for commitment of the strongest possible naval forces suited for defense.
- f) The Air Force must organize operations by all forces which are in any way available, even from the home front (above all fighters) in such a way that they can go into action immediately.

At the same time the possibility of a simultaneous landing in southern Norway/Denmark must by no means be disregarded; there, too all defensive forces must be mobilized.

The Fuehrer agreed fundamentally with the views of Chief, Operations Staff and gave his consent as to the preparation of relevant measures. The whole problem is to be discussed again with the Chief of the Army General Staff within the next few days. The Fuehrer in person will talk over the whole problem also with the Grand Admiral at the next opportunity. He likewise considers a large-scale enemy landing in the west as the decisive hour of the war that must under all circumstances be turned to our favor by the ruthless employment of even the very last forces Germany can muster. It is possible that the simultaneous threat to Norway or Denmark is very serious. In that case he must demand the full commitment of the Navy. As many submarines as possible (he mentioned about 50), which could not be put into operation in the west area/Channel in any case, should be provided to proceed against the enemy operation in the north. The Navy must plan accordingly. For this he considered it particularly important to be-

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gin storing up Zaunkoenig torpedoes now for these submarines which will be put into operation in the northern area (northern North Sea/North Sea/Norway area) as this weapon would be of decisive value at just this point. A decrease in submarine activity in the Atlantic would have to be accepted, but this was also quite possible."

In addition to this, there is a report from Group West containing a review of the defensive readiness of the Navy in the west area and stating that the measures which it has so far been possible to take, are not sufficient.

For copy of the report as per l/Skl 3230/43 Gkdos. Chfs. which will be dealt with and reported on later, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

For Naval Staff the following considerations now arise from this situation:

The present defense of the area principally threatened does not offset the great danger to which our own conduct of the war will be exposed as a result of such an enemy intention.

Above all, the Army forces lack mobile local assault reserves and generally speaking, altogether lack a sufficiently large number of forces.

At the beginning of a large-scale landing operation, the Air Force will not be in a position to intervene decisively in the fighting round the coast and on land, because it will be fully engaged in combat against superior enemy air power.

The naval forces are extraordinarily weak and can no longer be reinforced by new constructions within the short space of time intervening.

At the most, thorough investigation can be made as to whether the situation renders it necessary to reinforce such naval forces as are suitable for defense against enemy landings by withdrawals from other areas.

Coastal defense is thus the chief means of defense against landings. Experience gathered in the Mediterranean has shown that such coastal defense must not only have greater facilities for defense against the present types of landing craft, but must also have weapons suited for combatting the enemy naval forces used extensively to support the troops which are landed.

According to the views of Naval Staff, equipment with coastal guns and the expansion of defensive installations is not sufficient, nor

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has the necessary state of completion been reached.

Thus the point is by all possible means to reinforce our defenses on the Channel coast as quickly as possible and within the next five months. If necessary, we should even take over certain quotas from the ship-building program, the execution of which will be to no purpose if the enemy, by his large-scale landing, should force us to our knees beforehand.

In consideration of all the circumstances of this particularly urgent emergency, the Quartermaster and Ordnance Division must be pressed immediately to make full use of all possibilities to reinforce the defensive power of the coasts threatened, with all suitable means and within the next weeks and months. As far as Naval Staff, Operations Division is informed, the following items, amongst others, come into consideration:

- 1) Large-scale equipment and provision of the coasts with rocket missiles from mobile rocket launchers, that can be launched against landing craft as well as against naval forces. This weapon is the only one that can be produced on a large-scale within the short time available and that can be set up without extensive preparations. Moreover, it promises a far-reaching effect on enemy morale if used as a surprise on a large-scale.
- 2) Speeding-up of all existing construction projects for coastal guns.
- 3) Increase in number of craft suited for defense against landings.
- 4) Reinforcement of mine barrages for defense against landings and for combating naval forces at shelling positions.
- 5) Change in the armament of some or of all PT boats so that, at the expense of torpedo equipment, they are equipped with a further 4 cm gun or with at least one gun of that caliber, if one has not yet been installed, in order to enable them to fight enemy PT boats.
 - a) Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will ask Chief, Naval Ordnance Division today to look into the problem of weapons. The matter is to be discussed further on 4 Nov. in the wider circle of those concerned.
 - b) Commander, Destroyers raised objection to endeavours to place the destroyers and torpedo boats which have been detached from home waters under the Commanding Admirals of their temporary operational area, not only as far as

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operations are concerned, but also with respect to their administration. On this the views of the Fleet Command are to hand, which are being investigated at present by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch. The problem is being thoroughly discussed but no definite decision has been reached. A further report will follow.

- c) Chief, Naval Intelligence Division raised the question as to whether, in case of the evacuation of Nikolayev, the new battleship (45,000 tons) under construction there should be destroyed or whether it would not be advisable, taking a long view, to keep this strong potential weapon in the eastern Mediterranean so that it might be able to stir up future British/Russian animosity.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff is of opinion that it is difficult to make a correct decision so far ahead, and has ordered that if need be the new construction must be blown up according to plan.

V. Army Situation:

For situation in the Crimea see under Black Sea.

On the eastern front our own attack in the area of Krivoi Rog failed. The enemy started fresh attacks at the focal points of Gomel and Nevel. Near Nevel a break-through was successful. The situation is confused. There are no special reports from Italy and the Balkans.

Special Items:

I. The basic statements of Naval Group South regarding the necessity of increased Air Force operations were submitted to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison by Naval Staff, Operations Division. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was informed. At the same time, Command of the 2nd Air Force submitted to Operations Staff correspondence with German Naval Command, Italy in which the Air Force rejects justifiable demands by the Navy on the grounds of insufficient forces; the 2nd Air Force asks that no future demands be made that exceed the forces available - also known to the Navy - "as these demands can be merely regarded as a contribution to the War Diary."

To this. Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch stated:

"It is true that demands have become so excessive that they can really no longer be complied with. Here also concentration points must be determined for reconnaissance, patrol, escort etc. Degrees of priority

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must be fixed for all sea areas, which, if possible, must be divided according to theaters of operation and in the relation of the latter to each other."

It will be unavoidable to point out to the offices concerned that they must accommodate themselves as far as possible to the situation of the Air Force as regards strength. There can be no doubt that certain economies can be achieved by greater concentration of the transports to be escorted with regard to time and number, and within the limits of naval strategy. The resultant unavoidable disadvantages will have to be weighed against the advantage of greater security as each case arises.

The basic demand of the Naval Staff for adequate support of naval operations by the Air Force, however, remains the same.

II. On 1 Nov. the Rumanian Naval Attaché went to see the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and requested to be informed on the situation. For notes on discussion as per 1/Skl 30791/43 Gkdos., see War Diary, Part C, Volume XIVa.

III. With reference to the Fuehrer's order providing that in case of the transfer of offices to Old Rumania the final decision remains with him, Group South now asks for permission, through Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, for a possible removal to Constanta of the Operations Staff, Commanding Admiral, Black' Sea together with its personnel and of naval landing craft to Mamaia.

As reported, the matter will be handled by Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, who will present it to the Fuehrer.

IV. On 27 Oct. the Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General Staff transmitted extract from review of the situation by Field Marshal von Manstein dated 20 Oct., together with his own comments.

Report with reply from Chief of Staff, Naval Staff is filed in War Diary, Part C, Volume a, as per order 1/Skl 3215/43 Gkdos. Chfs.

V. Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted a memorandum from Vice Admiral Abe to the Ministry concerning an air link Japan/Germany to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and Chief of Mercantile and Economic Warfare, with the following remarks:

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"Difficulties of overseas communications have considerably increased, and can virtually only be maintained by submarines. However, owing to the slowness of the boats, this requires a very long time. In the course of the war the necessity of this means of communication with Japan has become more and more evident and must be maintained at all costs.

The Naval Staff supports the Japanese request and asks for information as to what extent and when an air line Germany/Japan may be expected."

VI. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issued temporary service regulations for the liaison staff of the German Armed Forces with the Duce, dated 22 Oct. 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 33695/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

VII. Group South reported that in addition to Skaramanga, where a total of twenty-four armed fishing vessels can be built by the end of 1944, there is a possibility of constructing twelve further armed fishing vessels at other Greek dockyards, to be completed by the end of 1944. This depends on prompt arrival of materiel, i.e. by the end of 1943 for the first six armed fishing vessels, by March 1944 for the remaining six.

The construction of further armed fishing vessels is rendered urgently necessary by the situation in the Aegean, since due to the small number of craft available the units must be replenished, and some of the boats in service must be exchanged for new ones owing to their bad condition.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division therefore requests construction of twelve further armed fishing vessels in the Greek area by the end of 1944 and asks that Naval (Ship) Construction Division take steps accordingly.

VIII. A memorandum on the question of the organization of defense forces from Vice Admiral Ruge, dated 18 Oct., with commentary from Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch, dated 29 Oct., has been received.

Copy as per 1/Skl 33151/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IX. In evaluation of intelligence concerning foreign navies, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division reports on the traffic network Gulf of Guinea - Sudan and on mass production of engines for landingcraft in British dockyards.

Copy as per 1/Skl 33678 and 33815/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies."

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Situation 3 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmits an excerpt from statements of the crew as well as route chart and war diary of Ship "28" from 4 June to 17 Oct. 1943. On 15 June the raider sank the steamer HUGH SILVERDOWN without radio silence being broken by gun fire and torpedo in KV 87. The ship was carrying a cargo of war materiel. On 9 July the tanker FERNCastle was sunk without breaking radio silence by a light PT boat and gun fire in KV 89 after having been located by a ship-borne plane. On 7 Sept. the Norwegian tanker INDIA was sunk by gun fire and light PT boat in UK 76. All three sinkings were carried out by night. On 3 Aug. one ship, type CAPETOWN CASTLE, was sighted in UX 52. She approached the raider at a speed of 20 knots and then turned back. One light PT boat sent out at dusk missed an enemy vessel which was thought to be a patrol vessel probably co-operating with air reconnaissance. Probably the same vessel was again sighted on southwesterly course in UX 39 at dawn on 7 Aug. On 29 Aug. one cruiser of the PENSACOLA class was sighted in PN 75, on southeasterly course. Ship "28" turned to deceptive course for Valparaiso. The cruiser temporarily stood over towards Ship "28". The route along the west coast seems to be patrolled by warships. Ship "28" came unobserved into a convoy on course 260° in SW 97 during the night of 22 Sept. Two destroyers and five transports could be made out with certainty. The Commanding Officer presumed that ships proceeding east on the traffic route Hawai-West coast take the northern route, while those proceeding west take the southern route, so as to avoid encounters. The apparently very heavy traffic is carried out with fast ships only.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

In the Bay of Biscay 18 planes were located on operation. One British vessel each was located 60 and 85 miles southwest and south of Rockall Bank, 160 miles northwest of Brest and 80 miles south of Rockall Bank.

Our own air reconnaissance sighted one destroyer at 1235 in BE 3642 proceeding on course 100°, and one PT boat on westerly course in BF 1189 (in the Channel) at 1023. From 0103 to 0258 three objectives

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were continuously located north of Barfleur, first proceedings south, later east. From 0214 to 0220 and from 0517 to 0534 further objectives were located northwest of Gris Nez, proceeding at high speed on southwest course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One submarine was escorted out and two in.

On 2 Nov. mine-exploding vessel "1" sustained considerable damage by bomb near-misses and machine-gun fire in the course of the air raid already reported.

Four men were killed and 29 wounded. The ship proceeded to Brest under her own power. For brief action report see teletype 0830.

On 3 Nov. at 1005 the base of Casquet was attacked with machine-guns by two enemy planes. Barracks and the lighthouse were hit. Destroyer Z "24" was transferred from Pauillac to Bordeaux.

Channel Coast:

At 0200 enemy objectives located near Barfleur and Gris Nez were fired on by our batteries. A reconnaissance sweep by the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla from Le Havre against located objectives was without success.

In the course of a torpedo operation against a westbound convoy, nine boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla sank two steamers totalling 4,500 BRT off the south coast without any appreciable damage to themselves. Due to heavy seas and strong enemy defense there were numerous misses. For brief report see teletype 2020.

During the night of 3 Nov. destroyers Z "27" and ZH "1" continued passage west from Dunkirk, where they had put in at 0530, by way of Cherbourg. The 5th PT Boat Flotilla was provided for escort. From Cherbourg on, the KONDOR, FALKE and MOEWE are being transferred together with the two destroyers.

The minelaying operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas on the east coast was called off owing to bad visibility.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

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1. Enemy Situation:

Near Harwich our air reconnaissance sighted six PT boats proceeding east and a convoy, course not stated, also one destroyer near Queenstown.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North 16 mines were cleared. Convoy 467 Elbe-Hook went through as far as Helder as scheduled, and proceeded on to the Hook at 1600.

Around noon about 300 enemy planes carried out an attack against Wilhelmshaven from a height of 6,000 - 8,000 m. Apart from one enemy plane shot down by anti-aircraft fire, no further successes have thus far been reported. Considerable damage was caused in the dockyard and town. For details see teletype 2055.

In view of the development of the situation, patrol of the North Sea in accordance with the views of Naval Command North (see War Diary 31 Oct.) has now become particularly urgent. In order to carry out patrol with Danish fishing smacks manned by military personnel, Group North/Fleet, Naval Command North and Admiral Denmark received instructions from Naval Staff to re-examine thoroughly all possibilities of craft procurement and commitment. Discussion of the measures is scheduled for 16/17 Nov.

Norway/Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Eight enemy planes were located on operation over the North Sea.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-six ships were escorted to the north and 32 to the south. Due to lack of escort vessels 28 ships remained lying in the various harbors of this area.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Malmoe, departure of Norwegian ships from harbors of western Sweden must be expected soon. The steamer PACIFIC EXPRESS is manned and ready to put to sea. According to a report from the Consul General in Gothenburg, the

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British PT boat HOPE WELL landed at Lysekil on 2 Nov. at 0700, and carried out the same reloading tactics as did the PT boat CAIA VIKING which arrived on 28 Oct. and left again on 29 Oct. The HOPE WELL will leave again on the night of 3 Nov.

From the operational order of the third boat of the above type captured in the Skagerrak, it can be gathered that on 1 Nov. five such craft left Immingham or Hull in order to transport 10 - 15 tons of Diesel oil or lubricating oil to Lysekil. On their return passage Swedish ball-bearings, possibly from cargoes of the DICTO and LIONEL, will be taken on board.

The following passage route is taken from a captured chart:

From Flamborough Head to AN 5866 left edge center. Course 81° to 5912 center. Course 30° to 5645 center. Course 0° to 3811 right lower corner. Course 55° to 3549 right lower corner. Course 21° to 3582 center. Course 115° to 3567 left lower corner. Course 67° to 3672 right upper corner. Course 95° to AO 4155 right edge center. Course 51° to Halloe.

Between Nyborg and Korsoer a bomb exploded aboard the ferry ship SEELAND. After entering Korsoer a second explosion took place in the boiler room of the ship, which caught fire and had to be beached; the ship is regarded as a total loss. Damage caused by another bomb exploding aboard the ferry ODIN in Nyborg was only slight.

The detonations observed on Seiskari on various occasions are probably due to blastings for the construction of bunkers.

Air activity was reported over Tyters, Kurgolowo and Lippowo. During the forenoon a vessel shelled Peterhof from behind the northern fortifications of Kronstadt.

2. Own Situation:

For action report of patrol boat "1606" dated 2 Nov. on the capture of a British PT boat in the Skagerrak, see teletype 0351.

With regard to the detection of British merchant PT boats, Naval Command, Baltic pointed out the necessity of allocating fast offensive craft. (see teletype 1709).

At 1150 the STEINBRINK and destroyer Z "34" passed Kristiansand South to the north.

West of Pillau one mine was cleared.

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In the entire Baltic area escort service was carried out without incident.

The steamer ROLANDSECK was attacked without success by a torpedo bomber near Gotland on 1 Nov. and near Oesel on 2 Nov.

There are no special reports from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers and Admiral, Baltic States.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain based on a fisherman's report, one of our submarines was sunk off Cape Trafalgar early in the morning of 1 Nov. Twenty-seven or forty-one survivors were landed at Gibraltar.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "154" sighted a convoy with airship in FB 9241. At 1800, while making anticipatory maneuver, she was attacked by surprise by a Catalina with heavy bombs but sustained no damage.

Air reconnaissance for Group "Schill" was without any result. The group is in patrol line from BE 7813 - 8722. The expected convoy probably deviated to the west, and escaped the range of the FW 200.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

British Isles and Vicinity:

Seventy planes of the 3rd Air Force were on operation in the western area, and two in the Mediterranean.

In addition to the reported day raid on Wilhelmshaven, strong enemy forces carried out attacks against the Air Force station at Skiphol, the airfields of Triqueville and St. André, as well as against the Standard Oil plants near Caen.

During defense against the air attack on Wilhelmshaven, 109 of our fighters and heavy fighters contacted the enemy. Seventeen enemy planes were reported probably shot down. Six of our fighters were lost.

The number of planes shot down near Wiener Neustadt on 2 Nov. has increased to twelve.

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In the evening 400 - 500 planes entered the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area. Main targets of attack were Duesseldorf and Cologne. Considerable damage was caused. Seventeen enemy planes were brought down for certain by 59 of our fighters, and a further one was probably shot down. In the evening 40 of our bombers attacked Ipswich with observed effect.

Mediterranean Theater:

There are no special reports on our operations.

In Italy one enemy reconnaissance plane was shot down between Milan and Bologna.

Minor raids by the enemy were directed against airfields, supply routes and bridges in the front and rear areas. In the Aegean strong formations attacked the airfields of Eleusis and Araxos. One of the attacking planes was shot down. Four of our planes were damaged.

Eastern Front:

In the Black Sea there was reconnaissance activity. There are no further operational reports.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation western and central Mediterranean:

On 2 Nov. 6 PT boats, 8 destroyers, 1 transport and 16 freighters entered Gibraltar. 33 ships put out into the Atlantic, including 4 tankers, 4 raiders, 9 corvettes and 9 destroyers.

On 3 Nov. 5 destroyers, 3 corvettes, and 5 PT boats put out into the Mediterranean.

At 1145 our air reconnaissance sighted a convoy off Naples consisting of 50 vessels on course 260°.

At 0830 2 destroyers and 25 - 30 landing craft were northwest of Termoli.

About 50 small warships and 23 landing craft were reported leaving Brindisi and Bari. The landing craft are probably identical with those reported near Termoli. In addition to this, 22 small landing craft were identified by photograph at Baglioni near Pozzuoli.

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According to a report from the Portuguese consulate in Tunis, dated 18 Oct., large contingents of French troops are being moved to Corsica. The Gulf of Porto, the Gulf of Florent and the Gulf of Sagone are said to be the bases of operations for landings, probably directed against France.

In the same report information is included on the possibility of a shifting of the attack planned in the area of the North Sea to the Gulf of Lyons, particularly to the areas bounded by the mouth of the Rhône and Perpignan, with focal point in the canal of the Etang of Narbonne.

2. Own Situation Central and Western Mediterranean:

At 0115 submarine chaser "2206" was sunk with torpedo by a PT boat north of San Stefano. The survivors were picked up by motor minesweeper R "162" and an enemy PT boat. One enemy PT boat withdrew on fire.

Minelaying operations off the west and east coast were carried through as planned. On its return passage minelaying unit F "483" fought off an enemy air attack on the east coast and shot down one plane. Two PT boats will provide escort for a further minelaying operation by torpedo boat TA "24".

Enemy PT boat activity during the night and enemy air activity by day greatly hamper the maintenance of coastal traffic.

Ancona was again subjected to a heavy enemy air raid. The former Italian cruiser AUGUSTO was sunk and the steamer SAVOYA ran aground.

In the course of an enemy air raid on Civitavecchia on 2 Nov., damage was caused in the harbor and on the quays.

The appearance of enemy PT boats south of Piombino leads German Naval Command, Italy to ask the 2nd Air Force to attack the PT boat bases of Ischia and Capri.

Investigation with Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division showed that the transfer of motor minesweepers and PT boats as well as of naval landing craft on the route Piacenza-Venice is thoroughly practicable. If necessary, the boats must be lightered by barges. The transfer will be directed by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. Transfers will probably be carried out in the following order: mid-November to the beginning of December, seven boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and nine boats of the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla; starting December four boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla and eight boats of the

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7th PT Boat Flotilla.

German Naval Command, Italy received instructions to this effect from Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advised Naval Staff, for information, of the request to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff that an adequate share of the increased production of naval landing craft and Siebel ferries be assigned to German Naval Command, Italy for fulfilment of its tasks. The requirements are only calculated for the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and do not include the demands of Army Group B for 15 naval landing craft, 10 Siebel ferries and, in addition, 10 motor coasters or freight barges and 3 steamers of 1 - 1,500 BRT. The demand results from the difficult railway situation (see teletype 0020).

3. Area Naval Group South:

a) Adriatic:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 2 Nov. three destroyers fired 300 rounds on Durazzo. Apart from slight material damage, one motor coaster caught fire. The enemy unit withdrew southwards. The Air Force is being sent out.

On 2 Nov. at 1715 not five, but fifteen, enemy vessels were sighted south west of Durazzo; thus minelaying activity does not seem to be out of the question.

According to an intelligence report dated 8 Oct. the Communists in Dalmatia have at their disposal altogether six freighters and four tenders.

According to a further intelligence report out of the British Consulate General from Barcelona, the Anglo-American advance in Italy only represents preparation for a jump to the Adriatic countries, chief destination being the Adriatic coast, the Manfredonia area and the Gargano mountains, in order to occupy from here the islands of Lisso, Curzola, Prazza and Lesina, thus eliminating Spalato, Ragusa and Cattaro for German supplies.

Own Situation:

During another air attack on Split on the afternoon of 2 Nov., the steamer MARCO was damaged. Supplies for Split can only

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be carried by air. After the loss of two Do 24's through enemy air activity, flights are only possible with fighter escort.

The steamer SKARPANTO left Pola for Trieste.

b) Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 0840 our air reconnaissance sighted three destroyers in Turkish territorial waters east of Samos. During the night of 2 Nov. and on the morning of 3 Nov., Syra and the airfield of Eleusis were raided by planes. Near Salamis one plane was brought down by naval anti-aircraft fire.

Own Situation:

The occupation of the island of Symi was carried out without enemy resistance. Twenty days ago, the Anglo-Italian garrison withdrew to Castellrosso. In the course of mopping-up operations on Rhodes, 185 men were seized and their equipment and arms taken.

After carrying out minelaying operation, the motor ship DRACHE and motor minesweeper R "195" entered Salonika on 2nd Nov. On the same day the tanker ELLI caught fire in Salonika. The source of the fire is not known. It was extinguished.

The 2nd Naval Motor Transport Battalion was raided by partisans on its way from Kalamata to Tripolis. Two men and two vehicles were lost.

Light PT boat LS "5" was towed into Kos, damaged.

Preparations for operation "Leopard" are under way. The following transport is scheduled:

2 naval landing craft, 2 combined operations Commanders' boats, 13 combined operations landing boats and 9 combined operations boats.

Group South reports intention of putting the PT boats assigned to it each under a PT Boat Flotilla of Commanding Admiral, Aegean or Commanding Admiral, Adriatic, as far as their operational activity and administration are concerned. (See teletype 1910).

c) Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, altogether 4 motor mine-

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sweepers, 4 PT boats, 1 minesweeper and 1 gunboat were located in the area of the central to northern east coast on the afternoon and evening of 2 Nov. Destroyer "G" was probably still at sea. In addition to this, 5 submarines were located in the northwestern part and another one 65 miles west-northwest of Eupatoria.

On 2 Nov. at 2000 the enemy landed apparently strong forces in the northern part of the Strait of Kerch near Schukovka between Yenikale and Cape Fonar. During the forenoon of 3 Nov. he gained ground. The bringing-up of forces by sea is being carried out under the protection of gun fire from the eastern bank.

According to a reconnaissance report from the 4th Air Force at 2144, ferry traffic being carried out with 8 boats was observed in the northern part of the Strait of Kerch from Kossa Tschuschka to the beachhead of Bakhchi, and with 30 ferries and 20 boats over the Sivash. In Perekop Bay 24 boats were observed.

Own Situation:

In the course of an operation off the beachhead at Eltigen, during the night of 2 Nov. our naval landing craft five times came into contact with light enemy naval forces. They sank one enemy landing craft and damaged three motor gunboats without themselves suffering any losses. One motor gunboat was set on fire. No bringing-up of forces to the beachhead at Eltigen was observed. Since dawn we have been conducting an attack to clear this bridgehead. In order to support Army Command 17, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea put the following units into the land fighting:

- a. Naval Artillery Battalion 614 with 4 batteries in the isthmus of Perekop and Tschongar.
- b. Legion "Black Sea" with about 150 men near Perekop.
- c. New battery with four 4 cm Beaufors on the Sivash Sea.
- d. 15 7.62 cm guns without crew.
- e. 200 men from former Port Commanders of the Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus and from batteries put out of action.

The following order was given for setting up new infantry units:

- a. Transfer of 5 % of all naval shore units.
- b. Further transfer of crews from those batteries not yet ready for action.
- c. Assignment of several operational motor transport columns.

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During the night of 3 Nov. patrol lines are planned as follows:

- a) Four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in two groups on the south coast of the Kerch peninsula.
- b) Three boats of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla northwest of Cape Takli.
- c) Four naval landing craft off Eltigen.
- d) One naval landing craft in Kerch Bay.
- e) Five naval landing craft in the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch north of Yenikale.

In addition, the laying of further mine barrages south of Feodosiya is in preparation.

At 2300 Commanding Admiral, Black Sea gave the following situation report:

- 1) The beachhead north of Kerch was reinforced to much more than 3,000 men by continuous bringing-up of forces; preparations for ferrying heavy arms and tanks are apparently concluded. Intensified enemy attacks are expected on the morning of 4 Nov.
- 2) The beachhead at Eltigen was narrowed down to the shore area. Our attack ceased late in the afternoon; due to weather conditions enemy air activity was only slight.
- 3) An enemy attack north of Armiansk was repulsed. The enemy is being reinforced in the area of penetration south of the Tartar Wall. Twenty tanks were wiped out in this area.
- 4) The enemy position south of the Sivash Sea was narrowed down; the key position is in our hands.

Attempts to tow off naval landing craft MFP "560" off Skadovsk were without success. The engines were destroyed, while weapons, with the exception of the 7.5 cm gun, were salvaged.

On the afternoon of 1 Nov. one lighter was torpedoed and beached in the bay of Ak Mechet. At 0740 on 2 Nov. enemy submarines attacked a naval landing craft convoy Yalta-Sevastopol off Yalta, without success.

One naval landing craft and two patrol boats are engaged in the checking of craft between Ochakov and Kherson with orders to capture or destroy all craft suited for enemy attempts at crossing.

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The transfer of the 1st Battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 614 with 120 men from Ochakov to Sevastopol is being carried out by two naval landing craft.

Three armed fishing vessels had to give up their attempt to move from Kherson to Odessa by day as they were fired on by the enemy from the southern shore.

Group South ordered the transfer of the steamers SANTA FEE, JOHANNES MAERSK and of the tanker BACCHUS from the Aegean to the Black Sea. In view of the critical situation in the Crimea, the objections against unescorted passage are abandoned.

Group South advised Naval Staff, for information, of the following instructions to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea which were issued after a conference with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

- 1) The landings carried out on the Kerch peninsula are of decisive importance for our holding the Crimea at all. In case the army is forced to withdraw to the Feodosiya Straits, the Russian prospects of success in further operations against the Crimea will increase. This holds for operations at sea also. If our positions on the Kerch peninsula cannot be held there is danger, in view of our situation at the southern wing of the eastern front and the cutting-off of the Crimea, of loss of the Crimea with known consequences.
- 2) On the part of all services everything must be done in order to throw the Russians back again from the Kerch peninsula to Taman and to prevent further landings. As long as there are any naval forces at all at sea, they must be used. With regard to the available number of naval landing craft, PT boats and motor minesweepers, the commitment of only seven naval landing craft at this focal point is insufficient.
- 3) All possibilities of destroying or at least of decisively damaging Russian forces brought up by water must be exploited to the full.
- 4) Every enemy reinforcement in the beachheads so far established and every further landing requires constant transport by sea. Thus targets are always available. PT boats and motor minesweepers as well as naval landing craft will probably have the most favorable prospects of success during the night, but perhaps also occasionally by day, utilizing their gun fire in concentrated attacks. The strength of the enemy air force is known.
- 5) Operational control must direct these forces to the enemy. They will obviously be sent in against the enemy on the water, but may, if

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necessary, be brought up for gun fire support in a battle by the army against beachheads. Plans are to be coordinated with the Army and Air Force.

6) I know that the gravity of the situation is recognized there, too, and that everything will be done that is possible with the forces available."

Naval Staff transmitted the report of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea stating that patrol lines are insufficient to ward off enemy landings on the Crimea, to High Command, Army, Army General Staff, Naval Liaison Officer, to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison, with its own views as follows:

"Naval Staff is of the same opinion. The coastal sector from the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch to Feodosiya, which is particularly vulnerable to enemy landings, embraces a strip of about 140 km. Even in the more westerly coastal areas and harbors of the Crimea, an enemy landing is not out of the question so that even there defense forces for the surveillance of harbors and coast are indispensable. In addition to this, the protection of relief and supply transports from and to the Crimea, as well as minesweeping for our own convoy routes, demands a large number of defense forces. As a result of this, only such a slight number of defense forces is available for the most vulnerable coastal strip that enemy landings cannot be prevented. In the narrow area of the Strait of Kerch operations by our own forces are only possible by night; there, too, their freedom of movement is limited by our own mine barrages. In spite of this, naval landing craft in an all-out operation achieved successes on the night of 2 Nov. As already reported, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea furthermore plans the transfer of the Crimean Group of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to Feodosiya for reinforcement of the patrol line off the south coast of the Crimea and the laying of further mine barrages south of Feodosiya."

Group South asked for an investigation from Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division as to whether a dissolution of Naval Shore Command Ukraine is advisable in view of the development in the situation, also with regard to economy in personnel. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea agreed in principle. (See teletype 1815).

Further arrangements lie with Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

The miners' strike in the United States ended on 3 Nov.

According to news from Algiers, published in Switzerland, it is learned that on a Russian request the Mediterranean Commission is occupying itself with the question of the internationalization of the three entrances to the Mediterranean: the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. In addition to this, Russia is said to have requested the cession of naval and air bases in the Mediterranean in order to exercise control of this sea, together with England and the United States. Some islands in the Aegean are being taken into consideration for this purpose.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

The situation in the Crimea is outlined in the report made by Commanding Admiral, Black Sea on 3 Nov. at 2300. (See War Diary 3 Nov.)

In the sector of the 6th Army the enemy advanced up to the mouth of the Dnieper. The attack against Kherson has begun.

In the Kiev area, enemy pressure has considerably increased. The battles were carried up to the northern outskirts of the town.

In the sector of the Central Army Group the enemy succeeded in gaining ground at some points.

According to information at Headquarters, the Liaison Officer, Army General Staff reports on the situation on the eastern front as a whole as follows:

The bringing-up of five new divisions ready for action is in progress. Their commitment is not possible before 11 Nov. It is not yet decided where the attack is to take place. The 6th Army has hardly any appreciable fighting strength left. Thus the first operation that comes into question using all the fresh units will only start as from about 15 Nov., being a thrust from the bridgehead at Nikopol for the re-opening of the narrow pass of the Crimea. During the course of this operation which will take up several weeks, the northern flank of our own wedge projecting eastwards up into the area of Krivoi Rog will be greatly endangered.

As soon as the forces are brought up, a decision should be reached within three days. The decision is further aggravated by uneasiness due to the enemy concentration of strong mechanized forces in the area of Kiev.

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As far as the security of the Balkans is concerned, a reopening of the Crimean campaign would endanger them less than a thrust carried out from here to the southwest. Under these circumstances a thrust by us to the south would be senseless. A further source of anxiety is the area of Nevel where a gap is being closed with difficulty by troops drawn to a critical extent from the 18th Army. The situation is altogether full of serious points of anxiety. There will be perhaps no other alternative than a very decisive shortening of the front to a strategic extent, which would involve acceptance of the known and very regrettable consequences to military and economic policy. An order providing for the evacuation of the Crimea is not to be expected until a decision has been reached.

II. Naval Situation:

No special conferences and decisions.

III. Conference on the Reinforcement of Coastal Defense:

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff pointed out that the development in the situation renders short-term measures urgently necessary in accordance with the considerations of Naval Staff, Operations Division as per notes dated 3 Nov.

Chief, Naval Ordnance Division gave a survey on the number of guns available for coastal defense immediately or within the next four months, at the cost of other projects. In general, an increase in the output of guns and ammunition will take too long.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division stated that the only reason why new batteries could not be set up was because of the personnel problem. After that the question of rocket projectors was discussed. By the end of the year about 1,000 rocket projectors for 8.6 cm missiles, with a monthly increase of 500 later on, can be put into operation. The output of ammunition would have to be considerably increased. Only the Army has projectors of a large caliber (35 and 21 cm). Ranges are low (1 - 2,000 m). Only area fire is possible. At any rate, this weapon could be taken into consideration as an additional one for fighting off landings in the direct vicinity of the beach. It would have to be operated by battery crews. For the rest, the coastal battle itself is a concern of the Army. Group West and Naval Commands North and Norway would have to prepare sites and manner of disposition according to plan.

Furthermore, the question of conversion of the armament of PT boats in order to achieve stronger gun power was dealt with. Speedy investigation at the Naval (Ship) Construction Division is necessary and Commander, PT Boats is to be asked for his views.

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For the present, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff decided that, after a conference with Commander in Chief, Navy, Naval Staff, Operations Division should, if necessary, state precise requirements which will be discussed by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division with the Ordnance Divisions.

Special Items:

I. Naval Staff determined the nominal strength of naval forces of German Naval Command, Italy for the end of October 1943. Copy as per statement dated 4 Nov. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. On the basis of the requests submitted by the 6th Coast Patrol Flotilla and Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean concerning reinforcement of anti-submarine forces in the area of Toulon, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division received the following instructions:

"It is proposed that some of the new vessels still being constructed in the harbors of western Italy be assigned to the 6th Coast Patrol Flotilla to be put into operation in lieu of other less suitable vessels. Naval Staff, Operations Division is particularly anxious that at least three vessels suitable as submarine-chasers be assigned to the 6th Coast Patrol Flotilla, so that, in the end, it will have about six submarine-chasers. Since at present, some of the boats of the 22nd Submarine-chaser Flotilla are lying in French dockyards for lengthy repairs, it might perhaps be advisable to decommission about three of these and later put them into service again with the 6th Coast Patrol Flotilla, while German Naval Command, Italy commissions a corresponding number of new craft (corvettes) constructed in Italy with the crews thus released."

Copy of order 1/Skl I op 30689/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

III. Naval Staff, Operations Division decided to approve the request made by Group South, that, in view of the critical situation in the Aegean Sea the four PT boats soon to be ready in the Adriatic should not be left there just now. This had been ordered by Naval Staff in view of the operational needs in the Adriatic and with regard to

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the endurance of the boats' engines.

Group South, Commanding Admiral, Adriatic, Commanding Admiral, Aegean, German Naval Command, Italy, the 1st PT Boat Division and the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla consequently received the following instructions:

"1.) In accordance with the request of Group South, the order by Naval Staff, providing that the four boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla, soon to be ready in the Adriatic, are to be put into service in the central Adriatic, is cancelled. Transfer of the boats to the Aegean is sanctioned. Group South will report plans. The 1st PT Boat Division will inform Group South and Commanding Admiral, Adriatic, on readiness (based on engine hours).

2.) Regulations as to organization will be issued separately.

3.) German Naval Command, Italy informed Commanding General, Armed Forces, South that the urgency of tasks in the Aegean, particularly the capture of the remaining islands still in the hands of the enemy, forces Naval Staff to forego the commitment of these PT boats in the Adriatic for relief of the eastern wing of the army front in Italy."

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division was asked to issue the necessary instructions on organization as soon as possible. Naval Staff, Operations Division attaches particular importance to ensuring the independence of the PT Boat Flotilla Commanders in the disposition and command of their flotillas.

IV. In accordance with the express desire of the Japanese Admiral's Staff as requested by Vice Admiral Abè, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division is asked to instruct all offices engaged in the collection of intelligence, and particularly the German Intelligence Offices, to procure information on the movements of enemy capital ships. Agents in the Near East, especially, should be so instructed.

V. According to a report of the Ship Construction Commission given in the course of a session on 2 Nov., the zero series of the MZ (multi-purpose Tr.N.) boats provided for in the Fleet Construction program can only be built if the Food Ministry provides the necessary quota of 6,000 tons of iron. In exchange Naval Staff is to guarantee that for every MZ boat delivered one trawler is returned without delay to the Food Ministry.

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Apart from all other considerations with regard to this procedure, Naval Staff, Operations Division can agree that the proposed barter should include only such trawlers as are no longer fit for the purposes of warfare but can still be used for fishing off the coast. However, delivery as planned of the MZ boats suitable for operational purposes is a stipulation for surrender of the trawlers.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division received directions accordingly.

VI. In accordance with instructions from Naval Staff (see War Diary 13 Oct.), the Mining and Barrage Division submitted a report on the supplies of mines and anti-sweeping devices to be expected up to March 1944 based on present production. Contracts for new requirements are not yet fully placed. Thus a detailed survey is not yet available. Mines from the new production program cannot be expected before May 1944. However, the new program will effect an acceleration of current production.

It will not be possible to commence mass production of ZE (time-setting Tr.N.) III until May 1944.

In agreement with the newly established Special Committee for Mines and Mine Defense, it was requested at Minister Speer's office that the most urgent mining material be put under priority 1, with a privileged Armed Forces number.

VII. The Naval (Ship) Construction Division agreed with the main committee on arrangements for carrying out repairs and dockyard periods of naval forces.

Copy as per 1/Skl 34249/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VIII. For summary of enemy intelligence from 25 Oct. to 31 Oct. gained through radio decoding and radio intelligence, see Radio Monitoring Report 44/43.

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Situation 4 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

The exchanged German prisoners of war returning from Australia were brought from Freemantle to Suez aboard the British troop transport NEW AMSTERDAM. At first the ship was escorted by the Dutch torpedo cruiser VAN HEEMSKERK and later on by the British cruiser NEWCASTLE and an auxiliary cruiser. During the whole passage through the Indian Ocean zigzag courses were steered. When leaving Freemantle and entering Aden air escort was observed up to two days' run off the coast. Shipping in the Red Sea was particularly heavy towards the south. On 16 or 17 Oct. one battleship, probably belonging to the REVENGE class, passed through the Suez Canal southbound. The number of ships in the harbor of Port Said was extraordinarily high.

2. Own Situation:

Further details on the sinking of the Australian cruiser SIDNEY by ship "41" have become known through officers recently returned from captivity:

On 19 Nov. 41 ship "41" encountered the SIDNEY about 150 miles west of Carnavon (Australia). The cruiser carried on a lengthy exchange of flag signals with the raider which was withdrawing at a speed of 18 knots. Apparently the cruiser remained unaware of the character of ship "41" until the last moment. The latter succeeded in bringing her full broadside and torpedo armament into operation by surprise at a distance of 900 m. Her first salvos put both the front turrets and the bridge out of action. In the engagement lasting from 1735 to 1800 the SIDNEY continuously received numerous hits by gunfire. Ship "41" received three hits, one of which put the engine room out of action and caused a serious fire. The SIDNEY slowly withdrew, sinking. The sinking itself was not observed by ship "41". Since the fire extinguisher hose on this ship was destroyed, the fire could not be checked so that she had to be left and blown up. About 20 men were killed in action. A further 60 men were lost by the sinking of a large rubber dinghy. Most of the crew were able to save themselves by reaching the Australian coast, or were picked up by vessels on their way there.

This report confirms the picture already existing on the basis of enemy publications of this success and of the final sinking of ship "41".

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fourty-three planes were located on operation over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located at 1118 in AL 9990, at 1600 in AL 6510 and at 1828 in AL 8250.

Our air reconnaissance sighted one destroyer on course 150° at 0845 in BE 3541 and at 1235 in BF 3642.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One mine each was cleared off La Pallice and Lorient. Three submarines were escorted in and two out.

Channel Coast:

The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with the KONDOR, FALKE and MOEWE carried out the transfer to Cherbourg as ordered. At 1943 nine boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla left Cherbourg for the area up to northwest of the Channel Islands as remote escort for a west-bound destroyer. They returned on 5 Nov. at 0110.

On 3 Nov. from 2218 to 2254 British long-range batteries in the Channel fired on destroyers Z "27" and ZH "1" on their way from Dunkirk to Cherbourg. Z "27" received slight damage through splinters. From 2223 to 2256 our batteries returned fire by shelling British seaports. From 2140 the destroyers were detected by enemy radar and naval forces were sent out against them. On the night of 3 Nov. enemy targets were located in BF 3633/37/61/53/56 and in the sea area of Cape Antifer from 2400 to 0523. From 0345 a naval engagement was observed from land. According to a report received from Z "27", the destroyers were attacked without success by five fighter-bombers from 2315 to 0141. It was possible to disturb the runs-in to the target effectively by concentrated barrage fire based on accurate radio monitoring reports of the radio monitoring team on board. At 0044 British PT boats lying in ambush off Cape Antifer were detected by means of the first star shell and chased. In the course of this chase one PT boat was sunk for certain, and one or two further boats damaged. Due to good hydrophone bearings it was possible to evade a torpedo attack by other PT boats. Further pursuit was broken off at the order of the 2nd Coast Patrol Force. At 0530 the two destroyers entered Le Havre as ordered and left there at 1930. They were continuously detected by our own radar as far as Quessant, so that scheduled rendezvous off the Gironde is reckoned at 1600 on 5 Nov.

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During the night of 3 Nov. two boats of the 8th PT Boat Flotilla had an engagement with five motor gunboats between the Hook of Holland and IJmuiden. Hits were observed on the enemy boats while our own boats entered IJmuiden at 0145 undamaged and with slight casualties.

PT boat S "110" was damaged off the Hook by collision with S "120" in the course of exercises by the 4th PT Boat Flotilla. The boat entered the Hook under her own power.

At 0040 the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla left Le Havre for a sweep against enemy targets which had been located, but returned at 0600 without result.

Two mines each were cleared off Calais and Dunkirk.

Radio intelligence intercepted a report concerning the towing-off of a partly sunken British vessel from the west to Dover. This might be connected with the attack of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla on a westbound convoy on the night of 2 Nov.

During the night of 4 Nov., the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th PT Boat Flotillas, with 21 boats, proceeded to the east coast of England to carry out a mine and torpedo operation. It seems that an engagement ensued. There are no detailed reports yet.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

On 3 Nov. at 2310 Group patrol boat "1401" was attacked by four to six enemy PT boats in AN 8557. Three PT boats were sunk and two further ones set on fire. Our own damage was slight. The engagement took place partly at minimum range. Besides patrol boat "1401", boat "1409", anti-aircraft vessel FLJ "23" and the buoy-layer MAIN were involved. For brief report see teletype 1231.

On 4 Nov. at 0810 one naval fishing smack was heavily damaged by a mine off IJmuiden and was towed in, sinking.

Owing to the penetration of two planes into the area northwest of Borkum up to a point north of Norderney on the evening of 3 Nov., mines are suspected on shipping routes.

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At about 2010 patrol boat "2007" sighted enemy PT boats in the Molengat which turned off to the north after being fired on by star shells.

West of Texel four mines were cleared.

For supplementary report on damage to the naval dockyard at Wilhelmshaven see Daily Situation.

Naval Command, North reports that in accordance with his request the 3rd Air Force has extended the areas of reconnaissance for air watch of the North Sea mine area to the southwest by an area bounded to the east by the Dutch coast, to the west by 30° E., to the north by 53° 30' N. and to the south by 51° 30' N.

On the question of Danish fishing vessels, Group North reports that sailing and fishing by the Danes within the area of our own West Wall barrages must be prevented by all possible means. In the interest of operations by the Air Force and with regard to considerations of food economy it is suggested:

1. to permit a narrow passage through the declared area for the passage of Danish fishers to and from the Dogger Bank and in the area west of the declared area,
2. to guard this gap in the barrage and occasionally to examine passing vessels.
3. It is considered advisable to place the gap approximately off Roemoe, south of barrage 10a, and to provide it with difficult clearance obstacles against fishing nets by means of deep mines.
4. All vessels fishing in the declared area and in the barrage gap are to be ruthlessly destroyed or captured.
5. The fishing areas east of the declared area previously granted are to be newly established in view of the intended extension to the east. (See teletype 2202)

Norway/Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventeen enemy planes in the forenoon, and 4 in the afternoon were detected on operation over the North Sea or in the area Iceland/Faroes. On 3 Nov. slight air activity was observed in the area of

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Petsamo/Kirkeņes. Kiberg was attacked with bombs and machine-guns by about 30 planes.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-three ships were escorted to the north and 29 to the south. Owing to lack of escort, 16 ships were left lying in harbor.

Naval Staff, Operations Division asked Naval Command, Norway for a report concerning the delay of convoys.

Admiral, Northern Waters reported that minelaying operation "Katharina" which has now been renamed with codeword "Kakteenzucht" will not be carried out before 17 Nov.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

From radio data of British merchant PT boat MASTER SLANFAST it can be gathered that the British have established a flotilla consisting of PT boats and minesweepers with the designation "Motor coasters", apparently for the task of transporting important goods from Sweden, or from the DICTO and LIONEL to England. The GAY VIKING, HOPE WELL, NONSUCH, GAY CARSAIR and MASTER SLANFAST belong to this flotilla which is under the command of a commodore. In the special radio code for the flotilla the DICTO and LIONEL are designated as "Base Ships". In addition to long-wave and short-wave transmitters, the boats are equipped with radar of which, however, they may only make the most economic use possible.

From further data from the month of May this year, it is gathered that merchantmen, too, are equipped with RDF and Asdic and that the Admiralty attaches very great importance to news with regard to the detection of submarines by these merchantmen.

According to further reports, the HOPE WELL is armed with a stern and a bow gun. The DICTO and LIONEL are said to be lying between Lysekil and Uddevalla, so that their break-through at night must be expected at any time. According to radio intelligence the GAY VIKING, which left Lysekil on 29 Oct., received course instructions on the evening of 30 Oct. to enter a British harbor.

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In Kronstadt Bay exercises by two PT boats, one Fuga and one gun-boat were observed. In addition to this, minesweeping was carried out by two tugs with barges west of Kronstadt. Between 1430 and 1600 two guardboats, two PT boats and two tugs with barges put out to the west. Between 1102 and 1155 13 planes ineffectively attacked batteries at Kurgolowo. After Lavansaari had been shelled by army batteries, heavy explosions and smoke were observed. At 0820 a minesweeping formation consisting of 32 vessels was shelled by island batteries east of Tyters. The formation returned fire without effect and withdrew to the northeast at 1545. Ten mine detonations were observed within the formation.

Two air raids were directed against the "Seeigel" patrol. Damage was sustained by minesweepers M "30", M "460" and M "18". Twenty planes attacked the auxiliary group of minesweepers lying in Kotka. M "16" was heavily damaged, her bow being torn off. M "459" received only slight damage. There were also casualties.

2. Own Situation:

Two minesweepers and three patrol boats were sent out against a submarine detected at 1328 south of Arendal. So far no successes have been reported.

Twenty-nine vessels were sent out on minesweeping in the Baltic Sea entrances and 33 in the western Baltic. Near Seelands Ref and Pillau one ELM/J mine each was swept and south of Schulzgrund two were swept.

Transport and convoy traffic in the whole Baltic area was carried out as planned. In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic four coastal minelayers carried out a minelaying operation west of Tolboukin.

Naval Command, Baltic requested that the captured British merchant PT boat be assigned to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic for operations in the Skagerrak.

Group North/Fleet submitted views on the possibilities of preventing traffic by enemy merchant PT boats. All measures considered desirable such as employment of destroyers, torpedo boats, PT boats and motor minesweepers are impracticable owing to lack of forces. The simplest way, promising immediate results, namely a reinforcement of the Skagerrak barrages with shallow mines, cannot be considered at present owing to the lack of suitable mines. For copy of views see teletype 1215.

Group North invited Commander, Destroyers to express his opinion as to the question of using destroyers and torpedo boats. On 30 Oct. Naval Command, Baltic reported plans for minelaying in the Gulf of Finland for 1944, in accordance with instructions from Naval Staff (see War

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Diary 5 Oct.) and asked for general approval of proposals and requests.

Naval Staff, Operations Division came to the following decisions:

"1. Naval Staff considers the blocking of the Gulf of Finland to be definitely the main task of minelaying operations next spring. Possibilities, however, are limited by the small output of mines, although a special program was introduced. According to data so far available, an output of at least 6,000 mines (2,000 EMC and UMB each and 1,000 EMF and UMA each) as well as of 6,000 cutting floats can be expected. Thus, mine requirements for Project 1 are ensured, those for Projects 2 and 3 approximately; however, there will be no reserves for coastal defense or for alarm minefields.

2. The "Nashorn" reinforcement is approved. According to data here, the weakest stage in the northern part lies at a depth of about 40 m, in the southern part at a depth of about 60 m. The advantage of the EMF: all-around effect even in the horizontal level. Depth-setting is possible up to 58 m. The mine supply situation necessitates large-scale use of available EMF and UMA mines for "Nashorn" plans.

3. As to barrage system "Krebs", an average spacing of mines at 9 m apart will be attained with the required 3,600 mines laid for a length of 17 miles (without the Finnish section), so that economy is possible in case of need. The proposals of Naval Command, Baltic with regard to a depth extension of the barrage and clearance sweep of the projected minefield this autumn already, are approved.

4. An extension of the "Seeigel" barrage in the direction of Hungerburg cannot be agreed to. A barrage situated in the extension of the land front could not be protected against enemy attempts at sweeping. Narva/Hungerburg is out of the question - because situated in the front line - as a base for naval forces and supply point for the islands. Protection against enemy landings is effected by barrages near the coast (see under 5). In case mining of Narva Bay is necessary, this should be carried out, if possible, by the Navy, since the position and efficiency of the mines laid by naval forces will be more reliable, and availability of air forces is uncertain.

5. For the time being, provision of required moored mines for coastal defense and for alarm minefields is not yet assured. The laying of a barrage near the coast in the area east of 26° at depths under 20 m is possible, so that large-scale provision of available LM supplies is intended.

6. The provision of minelayers as requested is planned.

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7. For the rest, the barrage plan is generally approved. Final elaboration and decision will follow, as this year, after the matter has been jointly discussed by Naval Command, Baltic and Commander Minesweepers, Baltic with Naval Staff at the beginning of February next year in accordance with the situation then prevailing and with the mines available."

V. Submarine Warfare.

Our air reconnaissance did not locate the convoy awaited by Group "Schill". It must be assumed that it passed unobserved.

At 0300 submarine U "333" encountered landing craft in the fog proceeding on the course of the convoy on 160° and was detected by the searchlight of a destroyer. A T-5 torpedo which was fired missed. Commanding Admiral, Submarines assumes that the awaited convoy was not far off.

Submarine U "762" did not meet submarine U "405" at the supply rendezvous. Since request for position received no reply, U "405" must be presumed lost.

During the night, submarine U "168" was attacked with bombs by a Catalina when following up the convoy in LC 3130 in the Indian Ocean. The boat was damaged and is only able to dive to a limited extent. She plans to enter Penang on 10 Nov.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio received the following instructions:

"1. U-Dommes is the largest German boat-type, thus it will face the same difficulties in shallow waters as do the Japanese boats.

2. Nevertheless, as opposed to previous departure order, the first zone of operations for Dommes will now be the sea area of Madras. The boat is to remain in this area only as long as the prospects for attacks are favorable. Commitment of a German operational boat merely for purposes of reconnaissance in that area is not justified."

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Sixty planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation.

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In the evening nine of our bombers raided London. During the day the enemy carried out only single coastal flights over the occupied west area. During the evening about 20 enemy planes flew from the Heligoland Bight into the Baltic Sea entrances, presumably for mine-laying.

In the evening a strong formation, probably of Mosquitoes, penetrated into the area of Duesseldorf - Cologne. The main point of the attack was Leverkusen, where damage of various kinds was caused in the I.G. Farben plants; the resultant loss in production, however, is only slight.

Twelve enemy planes were reported over the sea area between Brest and St. Nazaire, probably engaged in minelaying.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force and Air Force Command, Southeast carried out chiefly reconnaissance tasks.

The enemy attacked some airfields during the day. In the evening bombs were dropped in the area of Viterbo. At 2005 50 enemy planes flew over Rome. During the night of 4 Nov. eight planes attacked the airfield of Candia.

3. Eastern Front:

Fifty-six planes of the 5th Air Force were out on operation, 44 of them on escort duty.

A later evaluation of aerial photography made on 29 Oct. showed that the four torpedo boats then reported 20 miles east of Svyatoi Noss were actually one large destroyer of the PETROSADOWSK class, two torpedo boats of the S class and one vessel, apparently an escort.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

In the afternoon one cruiser of the CAIRO class left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean and one French cruiser of the MONTCALM class put in from the Atlantic. Further, a large convoy bound for the Mediterranean and consisting of 23 transports, including 6 very large ones and 14 large ones, all carrying troops, passed the Straits in the afternoon, as well as 2 freighters escorted by 9 U.S. destroyers of the DUNLOP class.

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One cruiser of the CAIRO class remained in Gibraltar for some hours, and in the evening put out again into the Mediterranean.

At 1130 on 3 Nov. our air reconnaissance sighted three destroyers off Olbia on southerly course, as well as three patrol boats presumably engaged in patrol off the harbor.

There are no reports from the sea areas of Sicily, Naples, Corsica, and Sardinia.

On 3 Nov. naval forces of undetermined strength took part in the battles on land by shelling the Italian east coast in the Trigno sector. Enemy units sent in to carry out an outflanking landing near Vesta were forced to withdraw by our gun fire.

The 23 landing craft reported in Termoli on 3 Nov. turned out to be fishing vessels.

A supplementary report of 2 Nov. states that the commando operation by ten Italians and one Frenchman against Pescara was repulsed. The participants were taken prisoner and one PT boat sunk.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

There were no operations by our PT boats. Two boats are being transferred to Viareggio.

During the night of 3 Nov. torpedo boat TA "24" carried out minelaying off the west coast as planned and subsequently entered Spezia. One PT boat acting as escort had an engagement with enemy PT boats without result.

On 3 Nov. at 2000 an explosives dump of the 10th Italian PT Boat Flotilla blew up in Spezia, presumably as a result of sabotage.

Altogether 69 men of the sunken submarine-chaser "2206", including the commander, were saved. Seven men are missing and presumed to have been taken prisoner. The submarine-chaser was torpedoed by enemy PT boats.

Coastal traffic proceeded as planned.

In reply to the proposal of Commanding General, Army Group B transmitted by Admiral, German Naval Command, the latter received the following decision from Naval Staff:

"I. Naval Staff agrees with the opinion of Army Group B that within its sector the area Rimini-Po mouth is most vulnerable to landings, but landings in the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South seem to be more likely at present. More urgent than support of the army in

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defense against enemy attempts at landing in Italy is, however, the task of organizing supplies on the Dalmatian coast, since those for the tanks of Army Command 2 depend entirely on the sea route. To this, all other operations must take second place until further notice. Reference is made to the basic directive of Naval Staff concerning disposition of naval forces, dated 28 Oct.

II. With regard to the demands of Army Group B, the following decisions have been taken:

1. Up to now 1,372 moored mines, 1,600 cutting floats and 50 ground mines were assigned to German Naval Command, Italy for the Italian east coast, most of which have not yet been shipped to Italy owing to transport difficulties.

For the present the assignment of further anti-sweeping devices and moored mines is not possible owing to short supplies at home. The depth of the water off the Po valley area, however, enables extensive use of ground mines, of which more than the 100 requested can be delivered.

2. As to the FASANA, the previous decision providing that the FASANA be assigned to Group South must be adhered to. According to data here, the minelayer LIDO, apart from naval landing craft F "483", is also available as a minelayer. As far as possible, minelaying projects must be carried out in phases by these two boats.

3. For the time being the twelve boats of the Harbor Defense Flotilla are to be used for defense of coastal waters. At present no personnel can be provided for the commissioning of further boats, since the formation of units for Commanding Admiral, Adriatic is imperative."

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff advised Naval Staff, for information, of the following decision on the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South of 3 Nov.:

"The justification of the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is fully acknowledged, but the situation in the eastern Adriatic demands quick action. Therefore no change will be made in the assignment of the minelayer FASANA to Naval Group South. Furthermore, the plan for disposition of small ships known to him must remain in force for the time being, until it can be seen how measures initiated for speedier provision of vessels work out.

Further, reference is made to the Fuehrer's directive regarding shipping and transport, dated 25 Oct. 1943 and the subsequent executive instructions issued 31 Oct. 1943 (OKW/W.F.St. 006560/43 GK)."

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a) Adriatic:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, there is one battery of four probably 10.5 cm howitzers each on the north, east and west coast of the island of Drvenik/Veliki (west-southwest of Split). In communication with the fortress battery near Rogoznica. West of Split the western outlet of the Brac Channel can be closed.

On 3 Nov. Zara was raided by enemy planes. On 2 and 3 Nov. Durazzo was attacked from the air and a "Freya" installation was put out of action. On 3 Nov. between 0200 and 0230 Durazzo was shelled from the sea with about 200 rounds. Three sailing boats and one tug were damaged.

Mopping-up operations on Peljesac are only making slight progress, since the enemy received reinforcements from Korcula.

Own Situation:

The command station of the 1st PT Boat Division and of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla is Venice.

At 1400 a group of the 15th Landing Flotilla with 2 ferries, 3 infantry boats and the remaining 5 Italian torpedo boats left Sibenik for Dubrovnik. The boats are to be taken on further to the south.

Group South reports that the enemy air raid on Ancona and other harbors on the northeast coast of Italy emphasizes the approach of air threat to the harbors of the northern Adriatic. A strengthening of air defense in these harbors, constituting, with their dockyard installations, the only sources of power in the Adriatic and even in the Aegean, is imperative. (See teletype 1800).

Marginal note by Chief of Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division concerning discussion by telephone with Commanding Admiral, Group South on:

1. Station of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic,
2. Operational control of PT boats in the Adriatic and Aegean,
3. Transfer of Operations Staff of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to Constanta

as per 1/Skl 30979/43 Gkdos. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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b) Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 1043 our air reconnaissance sighted one submarine on course 300°, 25 miles northwest of Khios, as well as two vessels of the HUNT class and a further vessel of unknown type in Turkish waters 6 miles southsouthwest of Kueluek. The Italian minelayer ASIO has been observed since 24 Oct. in the harbor of Kueluek.

At 0835 three destroyers or escort boats were in the eastern Mediterranean 120 miles northwest of Alexandria on course 160°.

Own Situation:

Owing to unfavorable weather conditions the transfer of landing craft and naval forces for operation "Leopard" that was planned to start on 4 Nov. was postponed for twenty-four hours.

The hospital ship GRADISCA arriving from Marseilles, put into Patras on 3 Nov.

On 4 Nov. the mine ship DRACHE entered Khalkis. The two steamers and one tanker bound for the Black Sea are to leave Khalkis on 6 Nov.

Submarine U "565" entered Piraeus en route from Toulon.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, plans to carry out the re-transfer of military internees on Rhodes as urged by Armed Forces High Command using two or three vessels of the 15th Landing Flotilla in shuttle traffic from Scarpanto to Crete. About 1,000 Italians are to be transported west on each run while about 600 - 800 tons of supplies are to be transported east. Commanding Admiral, Aegean intends, when mopping-up of the eastern Aegean has been carried out and the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla is relieved of offensive operations to renew attempts to set up a steamer convoy to Rhodes, after considering the situation as a whole.

Naval Staff agrees with Commanding Admiral, Aegean, that further measures, with the exception of air transport, are at present impracticable. A report to this effect was made to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy.

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c) Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to a report from submarine U "9", there was a submarine 55 miles southwest of Novorossiisk on easterly course. The position of our own submarine was reported to Anapa by the enemy submarine.

At noon two merchantmen, each of 1,500 BRT, and fighter cover, were sighted 35 miles southwest of Adler on northwesterly course. At 0805 several vessels were located northwest of Kerch.

The night of 3 Nov. passed quietly on all fronts. At dawn enemy pressure increased on the beachhead in the Strait of Kerch northeast of Bakhchi.

Own Situation:

During the night of 3 Nov. our patrol forces had several encounters with the enemy in the Strait of Kerch. In the northern part one naval landing craft forced enemy landing boats to turn round, and damaged three of them. In the southern part motor minesweepers sank an enemy motor gunboat.

In the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch minelaying was carried out as planned.

Submarine U "24" put into Constanta.

At 0633 ship "19" sank an enemy submarine 45 miles southeast of Odessa.

The following operations are scheduled for the night of 4 Nov.:

1. Patrol line by 2 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla between Cape Opuk and Cape Takli and 3 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla north of Cape Takli,
3 boats of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla north therefrom up to Kamysch Burun,
1 naval landing craft in Kerch Bay,
5 naval landing craft between Yenikale and Cape Fonar,
3 naval landing craft northwest of Cape Fonar up to Cape Chronik.
2. Laying of barrages S 74 and S 75 with 3 naval landing craft and 4 minesweepers.
3. Departure of minelayers MURJESCU and ROMANIA with escort to lay barrage S 47.

The Naval Liaison Staff, Rumania has made an urgent request for

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assignment of 50 machine-guns with ammunition for reinforcement of Rumanian coastal batteries.

Commanding Admiral, Black Sea, Dockyard Control Staff has directed for the present that the dispersal ordered in Nikolayev be carried out only so far that current repairs and projected submarine constructions remain unaffected, at the risk of losing workshop installations in case of a speedy evacuation. The Dockyard Control Staff enquired whether dispersal should be carried out without regard to utility of the dockyards again soon or whether the above risk could be run. (See teletype 2320.)

At 0336 Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted a report on the situation in the Crimea as of 2300 on 3 Nov. to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, to Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison, and to Army General Staff, Naval Liaison Officer, and in the evening the following reports from Commanding Admiral, Black Sea of 2105 and 2204 were added:

a) Since 0600 enemy attacks to the west and south. Very heavy defensive battles. Enemy greatly superior. Situation extremely critical. Enemy supporting attacks by automatic guns and artillery. Twelve enemy tanks shot up. On the beachhead of Bakhchi (at the north of the Strait of Kerch) our weak forces engaged in bitter defensive battle against far superior enemy forces. Front runs along the line: Kopkany, Dschanko, heights west of Bakhchi, Height 144.1. Cape Warsawka retaken. Enemy strength now about two rifle divisions. Heavy operations by ground attack planes. In the afternoon an enemy attack from the beachhead of Eltigen repulsed.

b) Situation 1800:

1. Army Situation:

a) Northern Straits of the Crimea: break-through by several tanks and infantry. Counter-measures in progress. Our own troops weak and overtired.

b) Landing north of Kerch: bridgehead extended inland up to Bakhchi. During the day enemy strength increased to 2,000 - 3,000 men.

c) Beachhead at Eltigen narrowed, but not yet completely cleared.

2. Our own operations during the night of 2 Nov. have been reported.

3. Now that the naval landing craft used to carry out the evacuation order issued by Commanding General, Armed Forces are free again and have been brought up, there are at present ten naval landing

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craft available in the Strait of Kerch. A further four will be moved from Sevastopol to Feodosiya on the night of 2 Nov. (4 Nov.? Tr.N.) for operations in the Strait of Kerch. At the request of Army Group A, 13 naval landing craft have recently been engaged on operations between Odessa and Bug-Dnieper. There are eight naval landing craft for urgent tasks, partly of the Army, in the area of Yalta-Sevastopol-Ak Mechet. Four are en route from the west coast to the Crimea. Everything possible is being done to transfer further naval landing craft from that area to the Crimea. At present there are twenty naval landing craft in the Black Sea, apart from the rest of the twelve ready for limited action and those out of action. After minelaying operation "Feodosiya" has been carried out a further three will go into the Strait of Kerch.

4. Use of large freighters agreed with Army Group A in view of the new supply situation. Commander, Convoy instructed on the particular importance of escort.

5. As a last resort 300 further men withdrawn from the Navy for land fighting with the Army.

6. On the lower Dnieper a boat's group put in under Port Commander, Skadovsk to control all boats within reach, in order to prevent enemy attempts at crossing.

7. Consider main task to be support of the Army in the Strait of Kerch. Further, patrol off the south coast of the Kerch peninsula and offensive operations against enemy detected at sea.

At 1100 Commanding Admiral, Black Sea gave the following situation report, which was likewise transmitted to the above named offices as well as to Commander, Submarines, West for Chief, Naval Staff:

"The present situation in the areas of Army Group, South and of the 6th Army on the Dnieper bridgeheads makes relief at the northern outlet of the Crimea in the near future appear very improbable. At that point and on the beachhead north of Kerch enemy pressure is increasing slowly but surely through crossings during the day. Our own Army forces are being visibly exhausted, and reserves are scarcely available. In consequence, the final mopping-up of the beachhead at Eltigen, which was already promising, must be given up at the last moment, in order to gain reserves. In the Strait of Kerch successful support by naval forces can only be effected at night, owing to the short distance from effective enemy shore guns. Though it is very dangerous for slow naval forces to remain in Kerch harbors by day, this must be accepted. Any further enemy advance on land renders further defense more difficult because of the absence of prepared positions and it makes any regaining of territory more and more improbable. According to the view of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea a speedier bringing-up of sufficient troops with modern combat equipment is the only counter-

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measure. The threat to the sea route to Rumania and Transnistria from the air and sea by enemy naval forces, even from the Crimea and the southern part of the Ukraine, is estimated as slight, but, on the other hand, a great increase in air raids from the airfields in this area is expected.

On 30 Oct. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea gave a review of loading facilities, shipping space, with times of round trip, and loading capacity to Army Command 17 for forwarding to Army General Staff. Naval Staff, Operations Division was informed by the Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff.

Copy as per 1/Sk1 30713/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

From radiogram 2318 from Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to Army Group A it is learned that:

Naval Shore Commanders, Crimea and Caucasus each have about 3,500 officers, non-commissioned officers and men engaged in coastal defense, supply and repair work, as well as in units afloat.

About 800 men and Legion Southwest (volunteers) with 200 men, also the whole of Naval Artillery Battalion 614 on the northern front of the Crimea are directly at the disposal of the Army only.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

There is no special news from official sources. Press reports of both parties speak of large-scale actions in the area of Bougainville, with both sides suffering heavy losses in warships and planes. Official reports are awaited.

Items of Political Importance.

The "Neue Zuericher Zeitung" publishes information from well-informed circles in Washington according to which the three powers represented in Moscow, in examining the problem as to how to prevent new hostilities in the future, decided on the complete military occupation of Germany after her unconditional surrender, certain sectors being contemplated for the forces of every Allied nation. Future decisions on the internal administration of Germany would be left to the Commission in London, where, also, the problem of the disarmament of Germany is to be discussed. The Allies by no means intend to abandon the German people to economic misery, but they are agreed that the German war industry must be completely eradicated. As to determination of the future boundaries of Germany or partitioning of the Reich, it was agreed in Moscow to postpone a decision. If separatist movements should arise in Germany, things will be allowed to take their course, as these are decisions which have to be settled by the Germans themselves.

For the rest, the Swiss Press itself appears uneasy about the result of the Conference, since no clarity on the future fate of the small nations was achieved. It is feared that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are being abandoned.

According to a Reuter report from Washington, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs has accepted the Moscow decision by inserting it in the resolution on postwar policy introduced by Senator Conally.

The Spanish Army Minister denies rumors of differences between Franco and his generals.

With regard to the Conference in Cairo between Britain and Turkey, Reuter reports that undoubtedly Eden will inform the Turkish foreign minister in detail regarding the importance and the extent of the Moscow decisions. Menemencioglu will wish and receive instruction on the Allied plans in the Balkans, particularly with regard to Turkey. It is already assumed that Turkey will be invited to turn over air bases to the Allies, following the example of Portugal. The possibility is even mentioned of Turkey entering the war on the side of the Allies.

Diplomatic circles in Washington declared that important developments are to be expected shortly as a result of the Anglo-American discussions with European neutrals. The meeting between Eden and the Turks in Cairo represents an important phase. These discussions were not in the main initiated by the Allies. They were undertaken as a precaution by Turkey and Portugal, who are convinced that Germany will be defeated in 1944.

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A. Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.
(at 1115)

I. Report of Quartermaster General.

As to the dockyard period of the TIRPITZ, it must be decided in principle whether a prolongation of the repair period by about four weeks is to be accepted in favor of action readiness of the ship's batteries in accordance with the previous request by Naval Staff. In view of the recent survey of the situation with regard to increased danger of enemy invasion, the decision is difficult and must be left to Chief, Naval Staff. Naval Staff, Operations Division is of the opinion that speedy restoration of the operational readiness of the ship is urgent.

II. Report of Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

The former U.S. president, Hoover, advocates raising the blockade of Europe in favor of the starving peoples of German-occupied territories, so as to extend the measures already carried out for Greece to Belgium and other countries as well.

According to reliable reports, the Swedish General Staff is seriously concerned about the situation in the east. As opposed to this, the press and public opinion still adhere to their pro-Allied attitude.

According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Lisbon, no U.S. instructors have yet been observed in Portugal itself. However, the mere presence of British instructors gives no firm support to the assumption that the Allies intend to use Portugal as a bridgehead for their operation against the continent.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Army Situation:

For situation in the Crimea see: Own Situation Black Sea.

In the southern sector of the eastern front, between Kherson and Berislav as well as at the bridgehead of Nikopol, all attacks were repulsed. Between Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk strong enemy pressure against our northern flank continues. About 1 - 2 km of ground were lost. Lively activity is reported near Krivoi Rog. In the area of Kiev the Russians continue their attempt to break through, but so far have not achieved any success. Nevertheless the situation is still extremely critical. In the area of Nevel the enemy continues his tactics to penetrate further to the west, utilizing the forest and lake area which is difficult to survey.

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On the Italian front enemy attacks are very lively.
The bringing-up of new enemy divisions was observed.
Chief, Naval Staff returned from France.

B. Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff (at 1615).

I. Report on the army situation in accordance with the above account. In addition, the situation as a whole as on 4 Nov. was discussed.

Chief, Naval Staff stated that the question of evacuating the Crimea could only be judged within the situation as a whole. For this, the Fuehrer's anticipated instructions concerning survey of the situation in the west area are to be awaited. As regards the Crimea, it may be necessary to evacuate a total of 225,000 men.

For list of 3 Nov. 1943 from the Operations Division of the Army General Staff giving combat units, other organizations and materiel on the Crimea as of 24 Oct. 1943, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA. Also a survey by the Air Force General Staff, dated 1 Nov., on the units of the Air Force stationed on the Crimean base.

II. Naval Situation:

In connection with the daily situation, Chief of Operations Branch referred to the continuous minesweeping activity by the Russians south-east of Tyters. The possibility of an extensive landing by the enemy in Narva Bay must be taken into consideration. A pertinent evaluation of the situation by Naval Staff Army General Staff is being prepared.

As to the Aegean, Chief, Naval Staff remarked that carrying out the island operation will result in a heavy drain on forces that will make itself felt when supply to, or evacuation from, Crete and the other islands becomes necessary. The transfer of a second submarine from Toulon to the Aegean is planned with instructions that it pass the Sicilian Channel during the coming new-moon period. The small number of submarines available is resulting in a regrettable exposure of the western Mediterranean. The bringing-up of new submarines to the Mediterranean is extremely difficult; only one of five recently sent out succeeded in breaking-through.

III. The following is a calculation by Commanding Admiral, Black Sea with regard to the possibility of an evacuation of the Crimea by sea: At present there are 59 naval landing craft operationally ready, 12 further ones are ready to a limited extent and 7 are out of action, the total number thus amounting to 78. With regard to the existing berths,

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Sevastopol, Eupatoria and Ak Mechet must serve as main harbors of embarkation. The total shipping space available is 45,000 BRT, by means of which 210,000 men without heavy equipment can be transported in seven round trips taking 30,000 men each. Round trips will take four to six days each run. This calculation does not provide for any reserves for bad weather and enemy action.

The calculation of the time required reported to the Fuehrer by Naval Staff estimating twice forty days might correspond better to actual conditions.

IV. Chief, Naval Staff reported on the instructions of Commanding Admiral, Group South to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea (see War Diary 3 Nov.), the essence of which is more of a psychological nature.

Kherson has been evacuated economically. The decision concerning evacuation of Nikolayev depends on the strategic decisions of the Army.

The transfer of further PT boats by way of Linz to the Black Sea before the freezing of the Danube is in doubt, since the torpedo tubes are not to be delivered until November. Investigation is being made as to whether something can be done by drawing upon the tubes for the boats for Lake Peipus. The difficulty is said to lie in the problem of labor.

Chief, Naval Staff will discuss this question with Director Merker.

In this connection Quartermaster General, Naval Staff reported that in view of ice conditions the transfer of the boats as far as Linz must be carried out by December. The construction of new boats at Vegesack has been considerably delayed by enemy air raids. The only other way in which PT boats can be brought up in good time is by drawing upon those on operation.

It was pointed out urgently to Naval (Ship) Construction Division that, aside from PT boats, as many as possible of the new vessels under construction and repair at Linz must be moved to the Black Sea before the freezing of the Danube.

Regarding the expansion of Salonika for the construction of naval landing craft, Chief, Naval Staff is not of the opinion that this demand of the Naval Staff must be adhered to specifically. Minister Speer and Director Merker have shown convincingly that the re-equipment of the dockyard in Salonika will take longer than the production in Germany of suitable vessels which can be transported.

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V. A clear and accurate situation report by Group North/Fleet dated 31 Oct. has been received, showing the insufficiency of air reconnaissance in the North Sea and in Northern Waters. It can be seen, in view of recent experiences (enemy action near Bodoe, mine-sweeping in the West Wall and off the Skagerrak, appearance of enemy units near Spitzbergen and in the Barents Sea) that, with the reconnaissance situation at present, we must continually expect surprise attacks by the enemy that could have possibly disastrous consequences. Naval Staff, Operations Division has transmitted review of the situation to the Naval Liaison Officer with Air Force Operations Staff and to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. (Order 1/Skl 3233/43 gk. Chfs. in files 1.Skl./I L2/VI). The Naval Liaison Officer has been requested to inform the Chief of the General Staff on this review of the situation and on the difficulties of the Naval Staff.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, has been informed on the matter, so that the urgent necessity of operational measures for the northwest of the Reich can be pointed out on a suitable occasion in highest quarters as well.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

VI. Transfer of the official duties of Commanding Admiral, Task Force to Commander, Destroyers is scheduled to take place on 9 Nov. at Alta.

Special Items:

I. On the question of the disposition of Mediterranean forces (see War Diary 28 Oct. and 2 Nov.), Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff took the following decision:

"The review of the situation by Naval Staff and the measures introduced are agreed to. Enemy activity and our supply situation call for urgent reinforcement of our forces in the Adriatic and Aegean. A weakening of forces on the west coast of Italy must be accepted in view of better coastal defense in that area. For the time being, transfer of further PT boats through France into the Mediterranean is not possible owing to the situation in the West Area/Channel. The transfer of further submarines to the Mediterranean is in progress.

In future, individual requests with regard to the assignment of naval forces must be directed first to the Naval Staff (only for information to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff), since the Naval Staff

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is responsible for naval warfare in all theaters and is anxious to meet the demands of the various theaters to the greatest extent possible."

II. Naval Staff issued the following order:

1. The landing company of Admiral, Landing craft and Bases with six landing parties of one officer, one subordinate officer, three non-commissioned officers and 18 men each, is temporarily placed under the command of Naval Group South as regards operations.

2. The decision on their use in the Aegean and/or the Adriatic is left to Group South. Report intentions.

3. Admiral, Landing craft and Bases will see to speedy transfer in direct agreement with Group South.

III. On 27 Oct. Group West gave a summary report on the difficulties that had arisen in transferring large ships from the west area to Germany and asked for approval that the next transfer should not be scheduled until the new-moon period at the end of December. In the interests of better security on the transfer, Group West has informed the offices in the area that the ships are not to be transferred, explaining the difficulties.

Naval Staff agreed to this measure. Relevant order 1. Skl. 3237/43 gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIB.

IV. Naval Intelligence Division transmitted enemy situation report No. 21 dated 1 Nov.

With regard to the situation in the Mediterranean, Naval Intelligence Division gave the following summarized view:

"It is particularly noticeable that almost all carriers were included among the naval forces withdrawn from the Mediterranean.

The number of landing craft remaining up to now in the Mediterranean is still sufficient even for large-scale operations.

The withdrawals of naval vessels of all kinds are becoming significant for the Mediterranean due to the noticeable slow-down in bringing up reinforcements which has been observed since the beginning of September. This reduction in the bringing-up of forces indicates that for the time being the enemy is not planning any new large-scale operations in the Mediterranean, and actually only intends to continue the current campaign in Italy."

The report makes the following statement as regards the situation in England:

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"The landing craft withdrawn from the Mediterranean have been observed en route for England.

It is to be assumed - without proof up to now - that the naval forces withdrawn from the Mediterranean likewise went to England.

Therefore, the former disposition of the British Fleet, as it was before the landing on Sicily, would be substantially restored. However, consideration must be paid to the fact that no new intelligence on the commitment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean is available, and that it has not yet been ascertained what naval forces the enemy intends to transfer to this theater.

No reliable, concrete statements have been received on the number of merchantmen and landing boats in Great Britain suited for naval operations. On the other hand, from the enemy shipping situation in general and from single reports, the conclusion may be drawn that he has at his disposal the shipping necessary for operations to be launched from the British Isles. The significance of the transfer of landing boats from the Mediterranean to Great Britain thus does not lie in the number of vessels transferred. It is only the actual fact that these craft, and probably also naval forces, have been transferred to England that indicates future enemy operational plans.

Also, the transfer of large landing craft from the United States over the North Atlantic to Great Britain, first observed at the beginning of October 1943, indicates that the enemy is concentrating his forces in the area of Great Britain.

The probable concentration of naval forces in Great Britain shows that in this area the superiority of forces is being aimed at which is considered necessary by the enemy for the commencement of further operations."

On the whole, the change in the commitment of enemy forces proves that, beside the previous focal point in the Mediterranean, Great Britain is coming more and more into the foreground.

Copy of report as per l.Skl. 30826/43 gkdos. in War Diary "Files Enemy Situation Report, Naval Intelligence Division."

Situation 5 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio suggests giving two Arado 196's to Japan, now that ship "28" is lost, as it is unlikely we shall use them ourselves within the near future.

In the course of an operation lasting 357 days, under the command of Commander von Ruckteschell, ship "28" sank 40 ships totalling 94,392 BRT, and in the course of an operation lasting 137 days, under the command of Captain Gumprich, 3 ships totalling 27,632 BRT.

In the course of an operation lasting 288 days ship "10", under the command of Captain Gumprich, sank 10 ships totalling 56,037 BRT.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reports that six officers and 139 men of the Italian "Aquila" crews in Singapore have declared their willingness to collaborate, provided that those taken on by us are treated as free soldiers. The Japanese do not at present agree with this, but only to their release as civilians, as soon as employment has been found for them in Singapore.

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed the Liaison Officer with the Italian Commander, Submarines in Bordeaux to this effect. The Naval Attaché furthermore reported that Aquila "2" and "3" are ready for training. The dockyard overhaul of A "6" must be continued.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division was informed by Naval Staff, Operations Division that the FLIEDER passed the equator on 22 Oct. and will pass 20° E., south of the Cape of Good Hope on 11 Nov. Furthermore, the following meeting arranged in the southern area by the Japanese Commanding Admiral, Submarines with the supply ship BOGOTA regarding the supply ship TANNE was transmitted:

"The first rendezvous will take place at "Tannenwald" on 25 Nov. at 1400 mean local time. If the rendezvous does not materialize after three days, the TANNE will proceed further and will request refuelling from a German submarine in the Atlantic. The BOGOTA is carrying a large part of the supply fuel in casks, from which the supply tank (150 cbm) must be refilled after the boat has refuelled. Therefore the ship can only supply a maximum of 150 cbm at one refuelling. The BOGOTA and TANNE will, therefore, arrange a second rendezvous roughly to the southeast of Madagascar according to the situation and weather, and there carry out a second refuelling. The exact time and place of this second refuelling will not become known to Naval Staff."

The BOGOTA, WESERLAND and BURGENLAND received instructions regarding change of secret enemy call signs by radiogram 2239.

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II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 27 planes were observed on operation.

Between 1035 and 2117 seven British vessels were located at different positions in a radius up to 100 miles from Rockall Bank.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyers Z "27" and ZH "1" proceeded to the Gironde as planned without special incident and anchored at 1815 off Le Verdon roads.

The transfer of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with the CONDOR, MOEWE and FALKE from Cherbourg to Brest will take place on the night of 5 Nov. One submarine was escorted out of Brest.

On 6 Nov. torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" will transfer from Brest to Concarneau for exercises.

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed Group West, German Naval Command, Italy and Commander Submarines, Mediterranean of the exercises which the Spanish Air Force will carry out with our Air Force from 1 - 25 Nov. off the north coast of Spain between 9° and 8° W. up to 43° 53' N. as well as in the area of Cartagena and in the area of the Balearic Isles.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 4 Nov. the 2nd, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas carried out minelaying in the area of Smith Knoll and the mouth of the Humber. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla abandoned its operation, as one boat was put out of action owing to intake of water in the engine room.

The 8th PT Boat Flotilla and the 1st Group of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla carried out their minelaying unobserved.

The 2nd Group of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla was attacked by six enemy planes on its return passage; S "74" was heavily damaged and had to be sunk, as towing-in was impossible owing to heavy sea.

In the course of minelaying the 1st Group of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla encountered the flank escort of a convoy, broke through unobserved and

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scored torpedo hits on two steamers of 2,500 BRT, which were probably sunk. After having carried out its minelaying, the 2nd Group of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla started in against the convoy, but was driven off by the escort.

For brief report see teletype 2115. Shortly after midnight a heavy detonation and fire was observed on several boats, so that it is possible that the newly-laid mines had already been successful.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Two mines were swept off Terschelling, and five off Vlieland. Convoy Hook - Elbe was carried out.

At noon the town, harbor and dockyard of Helder as well as IJmuiden and vessels in Zeeland Waters were subjected to enemy air raids. Three planes were shot down, and a fourth caught fire.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the forenoon seven planes, and later twenty-one, were detected on operation over the North Sea.

On 4 Nov. slight reconnaissance activity was reported in the area of Vardoe and Makkaur and in the area of Banak.

Own Situation:

On 4 Nov. at 1900 the steamer SARDINIA went aground on the southern side of West Fjord. At 1730 on 5 Nov. the GALSTER left Alta for Narvik. On 4 Nov. at 1500 destroyer Z "38" entered Narvik. The BEITZEN refloated at 1540.

The supply flight for weather operation "Schatzgraeber" was carried out without success. It is planned to repeat this by moonlight.

Twenty-five ships were escorted to the north, and twenty-seven to the south. Twenty-seven ships were left lying in harbor owing to lack of escorts.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Two new heavy anti-aircraft gun emplacements were observed on the jetty of Oranienbaum.

At 0600 the left wing of the 9th Air Force Field Division in the Oranienbaum pocket was attacked. The attack was repulsed. Gun fire in the sector of the 10th Air Force Field Division increased in the course of the day. No new information on the naval situation.

2. Own Situation:

The front leading light at Aarhus was destroyed by sabotage. The submarine-chase in the Skagerrak was broken off at dawn, since no further locations had been made.

Thirty vessels were engaged on minesweeping in the Baltic Sea entrances, and thirty also in the western Baltic. Altogether three ELM mines were cleared in the Baltic Sea entrances.

The steamer HARALD SCHROEDER (922 GRT) was stranded southwest of Hainisch.

Troop transport traffic and convoy service was carried out in the whole Baltic area without incident.

Naval Command, Baltic transmitted an action report from patrol boat "606" on the capture of an enemy merchant PT boat on 2 Nov. For copy see teletype 0848. Furthermore, Naval Command, Baltic transmitted a preliminary interrogation report of the prisoners from this boat and a report on the spot evaluation of captured materiel. Relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 31038/43 gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Naval Command, Baltic advised Naval Staff, Operations Division, for information, of the report to Group North/Fleet that, in the present critical situation, forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic are unable to carry out the exploratory sweeps ordered in preparation for reinforcement of barrages 16 c and d (see War Diary 2 Nov.). In case a special flotilla should be transferred for this, Naval Command, Baltic proposes that it should be assigned to Naval Command, Norway and that the latter should also carry out the task planned for Naval Command, Baltic.

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V. Merchant Shipping:

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping reports that the following shipments are to be expected in November:

Requirements of shipping space for supplies to the Armed Forces and to war industries in Norway amount to about 500,000 tons.

For supplies to Finland, 24,000 tons are required, while 107,500 tons are to be shipped to the Baltic States.

In German coastal traffic (apart from coal) 132,000/147,000 tons are to be shipped in both directions. In coastal coal traffic about 200,000 tons are to be loaded, a maximum of 70,000 tons thereof from Rotterdam.

In November about 320,000 tons are to be expected from Lulea and about 100,000 tons from Oxeloesund.

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed the offices concerned.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

So far operations by groups "Schill" and "Tirpitz" have been without success. The disposition of group "Tirpitz" was changed.

Submarine U "642" passed the Straits of Gibraltar and reported from CH 72.

On 2 Nov. submarine U "848" sank a freighter (5,000 BRT) in the Strait of Natal. The boat sustained damage during three heavy air attacks in FL 6675, but is still able to dive.

Submarine U "170" was sent from FR 49 to render assistance.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio received the following instructions:

1. With regard to the reported sinking of the auxiliary warship, Junker is to report also:

- a) Exact times of the individual firings.
- b) Enemy course at each firing.
- c) Place of sinking.

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2. The result of the investigation of electric torpedoes brought back by Luedden, Schaefer and Pich to be reported. Special attention should be paid to the widely differing figures of motor revolutions reported by boats.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 13 bombers, 289 heavy fighters, 472 fighters and 20 reconnaissance planes were out on operation.

No reconnaissance results were achieved.

In the evening seven planes were on operation against London.

By day and during the night strong enemy formations were operating in the west area and Reich territory.

In addition to a machine-gun attack on the airfield of Beauvais, the enemy carried out an attack at 1535 on the construction site of the Todt Organization at St. Ingleves-Marquis, where 700 high explosive bombs were dropped. In spite of this, material damage was only slight.

Around noon 450 four-engined bombers in three groups with strong fighter escort entered the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area. Essen, Muenster, Duisburg, Duesseldorf, Wuppertal, Recklinghausen, Gelsenkirchen and other places were attacked.

For defense 647 planes of the Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area and 68 of the 3rd Air Force were sent out. Our fighters shot down eight planes for certain, and anti-aircraft brought down five for certain and one probably.

In the evening minor formations flew over the coastal area of the Heligoland Bight and into Western Germany. Bombs were dropped on Duesseldorf, Bochum and Dortmund. It is assumed that agents were landed in the area of Aalborg. Only 13 night fighters were out on defense, apparently without success.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the day 14 fighter-bombers, 62 fighters and 13 reconnaissance planes of the 2nd Air Force were out on operation. For evaluation of reconnaissance see Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean.

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On the night of 5 Nov. 102 bombers attacked ships in Naples. According to a preliminary report, one ship was sunk and nine damaged, four of our planes being lost. In the Italian area the enemy carried out air raids against the airfields of Viterbo and Devoli by day. At Devoli one Me 109 was destroyed, a further one shot down in aerial combat and ten slightly damaged.

Towards 2030 three or four bombs were dropped on the Vatican city which caused material damage.

Of Air Force Command, Southeast 15 bombers, 43 fighters, 14 reconnaissance planes and 13 transport planes were out on operation.

Five enemy Beaufighters carried out armed reconnaissance over the area of Rhodes, of which four were lost in aerial combat with four Me 109's. In addition, the island of Syros as well as the airfields of Martiza and Candia were attacked.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

At 1510 26 LCA's left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

At 1815 our air reconnaissance sighted 32 ships 30 miles west of Cape Tenes on course 80°, presumably the large transport convoy reported in the Straits of Gibraltar on 4 Nov.

In the area of Corsica/Sardinia only slight shipping was observed.

In the opinion of German Naval Command, Italy, Maddalena is serving as a base for PT boats for operations against our convoy traffic. On the northeastern point of Corsica and near Porto Vecchio camouflaged LCT's were discerned for the first time.

According to evaluation of aerial photography, there were at Maddalena: 2 vessels apparently destroyers, 16 PT boats and others; at Capri: 6 PT boats; in the harbor and roads of Naples: 2 destroyers, 5 PT boats, 1 LST, 7 LCI's, 10 LCT's, 10 LCT 250's, 11 LCT 120's, 6 LCM's, 34 freighters (214,000 BRT), 1 tanker (8,000 BRT).

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Eight to ten fairly large vessels were sighted in Castellammare Bay, while eight freighters and two escorts were sighted 80 miles northwest of Benghazi, on course 320°.

Naval Staff, Intelligence Division gives the following survey on the enemy situation in the Mediterranean as of 1 Nov.:

a. Warships:

Reports on battleships sighted on 28 and 30 Oct. near Alboran were false; they were probably mistaken for British or Italian cruisers which arrived at Gibraltar in the meantime. Two battleships of the NELSON class, one of the WARSPITE class, one of the RICHELIEU class and the LORRAINE (under strength) are assumed to be in the Mediterranean.

The number of cruisers has been reduced to 13 by the withdrawal of 5 to the Atlantic since mid-September; at least 2 of them are definitely out of action through air raids; 4 are assumed to be in the eastern Mediterranean.

Of about 65 destroyers, 6 are assumed sunk, and 6 heavily damaged, the number of destroyers ready for operation thus amounting at present to 53, of which about 15 are in the eastern Mediterranean.

b. Landing craft and transports:

Number: 153 LST's, 363 LCT's. Assumed disposition: about 35 % in the Italian area, 20 % in the western Mediterranean, 15 % in the Eastern Mediterranean, the rest unknown. Since the withdrawal of 80 LST's/LCI's reported on 26 Oct. 1943, no further withdrawal from the Mediterranean ascertained.

c. Convoy Situation:

The eastbound troop convoy of 7 transports passing the Straits of Gibraltar on 21 Oct. was followed by a further part-convoy of 5 transports on 23 Oct.; number of troops transported altogether about 25,000 men.

The eastbound convoy of 64 freighters and 1 tanker which passed the Straits of Gibraltar on 31 Oct. was according to schedule.

According to calculations, the monthly supply of material from England and the United States amounting to about 1,800,000 BRT (three convoys each with an average of 35 - 40 or 50 - 60 ships to each convoy) is only serving, apart from through-traffic estimated at 300,000 BRT, for supplies and not for additional accumulation of war materiel in the Mediterranean.

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According to an intelligence report based on British connections and dated 4 Nov., the Americans and British are making large-scale preparations for a landing in the Balkans. Date of readiness for landing 12 Nov. 1943.

After the Crimea has been occupied, the Soviet will carry out a landing on Rumanian territory with the support of submarines and the air force.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

The transfer of PT boats to Viareggio was broken off owing to weather conditions. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South ordered the destruction of the harbor of Pescara. The southernmost harbor of the east coast is now Guillanova. South of Ancona the fourth battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 632 brought down one plane.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

In the evening of 4 Nov. Zara was attacked from the air. The damage inflicted to military objectives is only slight. Two hundred people were killed. At noon on the same day one vessel in the harbor of Split was fired on by an enemy plane. For several days a balloon has been observed over Split at a great height.

The enemy attempt to land near Cattaro reported in the morning by Air Force Command, Southeast was not confirmed. The boats in question were our own Siebel ferries and landing craft.

The Army landing on 30 Oct. near Sibenik and Privlaka (northwest of Zara) was supported by six harbor defense boats. The steamer MARCO is no longer operationally ready.

The battery at Saseno (west of Valona) was taken over by the Navy. The searchlight battery for Naval Artillery Battalion 623 arrived at Durazzo.

On 4 Nov. at 1500 3 Siebel ferries and 3 infantry boats left Sebenik for Dubrovnik and on 1 Nov.; at 0500 2 Siebel ferries, and 2 infantry boats left Dubrovnik for Durazzo.

b. Aegean:

At 1300 the landing unit for "Leopard" was attacked by six Bristol Blenheims with torpedoes, bombs and machine-gun fire at Lavrion. The Navy reports no losses, the Army one killed and eight wounded. Two of the attacking planes were shot down for certain and a third probably. Among the four prisoners taken there is a colonel (wing commander).

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The landing unit consisting of 23 landing craft and 6 escort boats is transferring to Paros. Its arrival is scheduled for the morning of 6 Nov. Berths are protected by strong air cover. On 6 Nov. two landing craft and seven escorts will join them.

The steamer SANTA FE entered Khalkis en route from Piraeus to the Black Sea.

In accordance with the request of Group South (see War Diary 31 Oct.) Naval Staff has temporarily placed the landing company of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea comprising six landing parties under the command of Group South as regards operations. It is to be used in the Aegean or the Adriatic at the discretion of Group South. The latter reports that the landing company has been assigned for the present to Commanding Admiral, Aegean for mopping-up of the islands.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the harbors of northern Caucasia a further large number of PT boats, motor minesweepers and landing craft was observed. According to radio intelligence, the destroyer "H" was in the area of the central east coast at 1917.

Own Situation:

In the course of patrol of the Strait of Kerch during the night of 4 Nov., naval landing craft south of Yenikale were accurately fired on by three batteries of 10, 5 - 15 cm caliber from Kossa-Tschutschka and by light batteries from Yenikale, using searchlights continuously. Both groups of naval landing craft attempted to break through three times. Further attempts had to be given up owing to an approaching northeasterly storm.

In the course of the same night the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla sank two landing craft near Eltigen, one of them apparently a tug, and heavily damaged a PT boat. PT boats in the southern part of the Strait of Kerch as well as between Cape Opuk and Cape Takli did not sight any enemy vessels. Owing to weather conditions PT boats and motor minesweepers were forced to break off their operations towards midnight.

For the night of 5 Nov. a repetition is planned of the operation off Yenikale against enemy supplies to the beachhead, using five naval landing craft under the Commander of the 3rd Landing Flotilla. A preparatory attack by Stukas and support by our coastal guns at night will be attempted.

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Owing to weather conditions our motor minesweepers and naval landing craft could not leave Feodosiya for the patrol line off Eltigen and Kamysch Burun.

Under date of 4 Nov. it is now reported that naval landing craft F "314" with two further naval landing craft and convoy south of Kher-son repulsed a surprise attack by light guns, mortars, machine-guns and rifles. After eight minutes the enemy was silenced. F "314" received hits, but there were no casualties. On 6 Nov. naval landing craft F "313" was destroyed at the same point by gun fire from land. The enemy battery was silenced.

Twenty LMA mines were laid in Kerch Bay off Kolonka jetty. Owing to weather conditions minelaying operation S 47 was postponed.

Four naval landing craft from Sevastopol put into Feodosiya for operations in the Strait of Kerch.

No damage was caused by the air raid on Feodosiya at 1840.

The Army has revised its transport requirements as follows:

1. Constanta - Sevastopol 500 tons of supplies and about 200 cbm of fuel in tankers daily.
2. Odessa - Crimean harbors 800 tons without tankers daily.
3. Danube - Dnieper mouth 300 tons daily.
4. Odessa - Nikolayev at present 100 tons daily.

Chief, Supply and Transport, Black Sea intends to meet the demands as follows:

As to 1. by steamers ADREAL, PETER, COASA and suitable tankers.

As to 2. by 5 steamers each doing two round trips and 20 lighters with 7 tugs.

As to 3. by 10 lighters and 6 tugs.

As to 4. by 15 lighters and 5 tugs.

On 5 Nov. convoy traffic was carried out according to schedule.

Group South has instructed Commander, Convoy, Black Sea to carry out the transfer of the SANTA FE, JOH. MAERSK and BACCHUS without escort as fast as possible. For details see radiogram 2131.

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As to Nikolayev, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea has instructed the Dockyard Control Staff to maintain the efficiency of the dockyard to the greatest extent possible despite dispersal. The risk of losing workshop installations in case of a sudden evacuation must be accepted. The transfer of the dock to Odessa will be attempted. The dockyard has been instructed by Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to accelerate the repair of tankers by all possible means, as the situation in the Crimea calls for large fuel supplies by sea. Group South reports to Naval Staff that the question raised by the Dockyard Control Staff with regard to dispersal of the dockyard at Nikolayev must be decided by Naval Staff. According to the views of Group South, the situation in Nikolayev is scarcely tenable; even if our retreats on the Dnieper are halted, in view of the superior enemy air force it can scarcely be anticipated that the dockyard can operate as previously.

Some time ago Commanding Admiral, Black Sea received the order to carry out dispersal and did so. The naval vessels lying in Nikolayev, insofar as they were not engaged in the escort of transports, were transferred to Odessa as a precaution.

As to the situation on land, the following reports have been received:

At 1230: Enemy attacks launched from the beachhead at Eltigen were repulsed in a counter-thrust.

Since 0400: Enemy attacks with strong forces northeast of Kerch. Marked activity by scouting forces on the Perekop front.

At 1900: Dschanko northwest of Kerch was lost. Bitter fighting west of Cape Warsowka. Near Perekop all attempts to break through were repulsed. In the area of the 6th Army the enemy is increasing his reconnaissance activity before Kherson and receiving reinforcements. Army Group A ordered the evacuation of materiel from Kherson.

Group South transmitted a review of the situation from Army Group A dated 4 Nov.

After the seizure of Baksay northeast of Kerch increased attacks from this bridgehead are to be expected; as all reserves are already engaged in the battle, the situation here is very critical. Heavy defensive fighting in the Perekop isthmus will quickly reduce the fighting power of the formations. Our forces are strained to the utmost. Large reserves are no longer available.

Between Kherson and Berislav the enemy is bringing up more forces for further attempts at crossing the Dnieper.

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IX. Situation East Asia:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmitted the following information from the Japanese Admiral's Staff:

"1. On the morning of 1 Nov., 19 American transports escorted by 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers carried out a landing near Gazellenhafen on Bougainville. The convoy had been sighted beforehand south of Rendova, but contact was lost owing to bad weather. Stukas and fighters sent out against the landing places sank 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 2 transports and 40 landing boats; 15 of our planes were lost.

2. West of Bougainville 6 cruisers and 6 destroyers sent out from Rabaul encountered 8 American cruisers and 15 destroyers on the following night. One large American cruiser and 2 destroyers were sunk for certain and 2 further cruisers and 1 destroyer probably sunk. Our own losses: 1 destroyer sunk, 1 cruiser put out of control.

3. On 2 Nov. Rabaul was attacked by 250 B 25's escorted by P 38's. Of the attacking planes, 101 were shot down by new naval fighters that had just arrived, 51 by ship's guns and 13 by anti-aircraft guns on shore. Serious damage was caused to harbor installations in Rabaul, and 2 steamers were sunk. Our own losses, 15.

4. The strength of the American landing troops amounts to about one division. Since the island is of great strategic importance, the Japanese forces are determined to hold it by all means."

By way of the Embassy in Tokio, the Foreign Office transmitted a report from Bose that on the Burma front the British have withdrawn Indian troops into the second line. A large part of the Bose troops is already in Burma and the remainder is on the way. Entry into Indian territory is to take place this year. In spite of enemy superiority in numbers and arms, Bose and the Japanese Chief of General Staff are confident.

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Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, the Senate of the United States passed by 85 votes to 5 the resolution for organization of peace in the postwar period in the form in which it had already been approved by the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs. Seven points of the Moscow Agreement were included in the resolution, which states among other things:

"The Senate recognizes the necessity of establishing a general international organization at the earliest possible date, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peaceloving states, and ready to admit all such states, whether large or small, for the maintenance of peace and security. Any agreement as a result of this resolution can only be concluded with the approval and recommendation of the Senate, in case two thirds of the senators present are in favor of it."

According to the New York Times, settlement of the miners' strike was achieved only by the Government's meeting the wage demands of the Miners' Union to a large extent. Owing to the strike the output of coal was reduced by 40 million tons.

Reuter reports the establishment of a new shipping line between Vera Cruz and Lisbon.

Cordell Hull did not participate in the discussions at Cairo.

The Great East Asia Conference in which Japan, China, Siam, Manchukuo, the Philippines and Burma are participating, has begun under the presidency of Prime Minister Tojo.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. In the course of the daily conference on the situation Chief, Naval Staff stated that the enemy is able accurately to locate our submarines without our being in a position to detect it. Chief, Naval Communications Division was ordered to investigate once again what must be done with regard to increased security of codes, possibilities of disclosure and anti-location methods and devices. Under existing conditions it is practically impossible to have our submarines continue the fight.

Chief, Naval Communications Division asked for time to prepare a reply or proposals to this.

II. Report of Quartermaster General.

a. Battery "Grelleville" will be ready for firing with one

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turret in June 1944, and with the second one in July 1944. It is possible that these periods may be shortened by one month.

b. As to report on the dockyard period of the TIRPITZ, (see War Diary 5 Nov.) Chief, Naval Staff decided that the times scheduled for the restoration of operational readiness of the battleship are to be adhered to as far as possible. Thus, requests with regard to defensive readiness of the ship's batteries must take second place.

c. As to the transfer of PT boats to the Black Sea, it is possible to draw four PT boats from new constructions, three of which can be transferred to the Danube for certain, and a fourth probably, before the Elbe freezes up. The fifth and sixth boats could be drawn in time only from operational boats in the west area.

Chief, Naval Staff decided that in view of the new order by the Fuehrer regarding defensive power in the west area, recourse to boats intended for operations in the west does not come into the question. Therefore, only three or four boats can be provided for transfer to the Black Sea.

d. There is a new Fuehrer order providing that total control of all construction projects in the west area, with the exception of tasks with which Minister Speer is charged, be transferred to Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. For this purpose a special Armed Forces Staff will be established with Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. In addition to this, executive instructions on this order by the Fuehrer were issued by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

Naval Staff agrees in principle with these measures. The only serious aspect is the right of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to interfere in those construction projects still being carried out by the Navy under its own administration.

Chief, Naval Staff is of opinion that in view of the present situation these considerations must be withdrawn.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

III. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operation Division:

a. The order of Commanding General, Army Group F regarding new commencement of operation "Leopard" was discussed with Commanding Admiral, Aegean according to a report from Group South. Views expressed by Naval Staff to the Army Group, therefore, no longer come into consideration.

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Chief, Naval Staff agreed with the opinion of the Naval Staff that the formulation of the instructions is not adequate for this situation.

b. The new time for commencement of operation "Leopard" has been fixed as 9 Nov.

IV. Army Situation:

Regarding the situation in the Crimea, reference is made to the report of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea.

In the southern sector of the eastern front as far as Kiev it was comparatively quiet. Owing to encircling enemy attacks Kiev itself was abandoned. Our troops withdrew in a southwesterly direction. In the Nevel area the enemy break-through extended to the west and penetrated into an area controlled by partisans. Thus the East Wall position in this area can no longer be held.

On the Italian front our forces are falling back to the Barbara position under strong, continuous enemy pressure.

V. Meanwhile the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51 was received. Naval Staff informed Group West, Group North/Fleet, Naval Commands North, Baltic and Norway, Admiral Netherlands, Admiral Denmark, with copies to Admirals, Channel Coast and Atlantic Coast as well as extract to Coastal Defense Commander, Heligoland Bight.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the proposal of Naval Staff that all questions resulting from this instruction be discussed with the Commanding Generals and Admirals, Netherlands and Denmark. The date fixed is about 11 Nov. For this the following instructions were given to the above offices by Naval Staff as a basis for discussion:

1. Naval Forces:

Since appreciable withdrawal of forces from areas not threatened by enemy landings is impossible, Naval Staff intends to achieve reinforcement of naval forces suitable for defense against landings by quickly converting as large a number of naval landing craft as possible to naval landing craft (artillery). About two thirds to be assigned to Commanding Admiral, Defenses West and one third to Commanding Admiral, Defenses North. For the rest, all necessary preparations are to be made for the most effective use possible of all available naval forces. In this connection special importance is to be attached to the establishment of operational harbors and auxiliary bases (e.g.: PT boat bases in the Heligoland Bight, Southern Norway and Denmark).

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2. Coastal Defense:

Possibilities for the assignment of guns with personnel and of small arms are still to be investigated. Further instructions will follow.

3. Mine Barrages:

Naval Staff is again examining the possibilities of assigning additional mines. It is to be investigated again how coastal defense can be further strengthened by laying ground and moored mines (also mining the harbors). The proposals already submitted for this purpose are to be supplemented, if necessary. Ensure that available mines can be laid in case of emergency with the vessels available.

4. Provision of Alarm Units:

a. As a preparation for reinforcement of coastal defense of the west area, Denmark and Norway in case of an attack, alarm units are to be provided from the areas in question and from the home area of Naval Commands, North Sea and Baltic. For this purpose men of all ranks are to be detailed from schools, courses and offices in the rear, assembled within the individual commands and offices into part-detachments and held in readiness with weapons and equipment for immediate call and transfer.

The alarm units from the home area of Naval Commands, North Sea and Baltic are scheduled for the west area and Denmark; Naval Command, Norway will be entirely dependent on the alarm units activated by itself.

b. The men to be provided for the alarm units must have substantially completed their basic military training and must be trained in handling light infantry weapons and, if possible, also the light machine-gun. Special additional training will be ordered for some specific alarm units.

c. The fact cannot be avoided that preparations for organization and training for operations by alarm units will, to a certain extent, entail inroads into the other activities of the commands and offices. In any case, however, any prejudicial effect is to be avoided which jeopardizes the scheduled preparation of crews for submarines and surface forces and of the vessels themselves, or reduces the thoroughness of the training of crews.

d. In the west area and in Denmark assembly areas are to be provided for the alarm units that will be brought up from the home area in case of an attack. Here they will be divided according to tactical requirements, given additional equipment and their transport into the

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operational sector arranged. In Norway this matter will be handled by Naval Command, Norway."

Relevant instruction 1/Skl I op 3277/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C a.

Regarding the provision of numerous submarines for the northern sea areas, to which special importance is attached by Directive 51, Naval Staff does not consider it necessary that an additional number of boats be maintained already in the northern area as a precaution. Rather, it will suffice to assemble in that area the boats departing from home waters and perhaps those returning if the occasion arises."

Chief, Naval Staff was then informed of the considerations regarding increase in defense of the coasts that were discussed on 3 and 4 Nov. in the course of the conference on the situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

Chief, Naval Staff decided that all measures of that kind are to be taken in hand quickly as far as possible.

In connection with this, Commander PT boats, and Group West and Group North/Fleet for information, received the following instructions:

"1. Defense against a large-scale enemy landing in the west area expected to take place in the spring of 1944 or perhaps earlier will be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war. The enemy may launch diversionary attacks in other areas at the same time. A large-scale landing is also possible in Denmark.

2. The Fuehrer has now laid down his orders resulting from the review of the situation in Directive No. 51. According to this directive, it is one of the tasks of the Navy to prepare commitment of the strongest possible naval forces suited for attack against the enemy landing fleets.

3. This means for PT boats that, in addition to offensive operations off the British coast, they are charged, as a second main task of equal importance, with defensive operations against enemy attempts at landing.

4. This change in the assignment of tasks has made necessary certain measures in regard to materiel and organization which will be ordered separately. Among these a further reinforcement of the armament of PT boats and the establishment of further operational harbors and alternative bases in the area of the Heligoland Bight, Denmark and southern Norway are most urgent.

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Special Items:

I. The Fuehrer issued a new order regarding the command for Italy in accordance with which, after reaching the Bernhard Line, which must be held in every event, all forces stationed in Italy will be placed under the single command of the former Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, who will then receive the designation Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest. All units of the three branches of the Armed Forces and the Waffen-SS engaged in land fighting are under the command of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest. German Naval Command, Italy and the 2nd Air Force in naval and air operations come directly under Commander in Chief, Navy and Commander in Chief, Air Force. The latter will keep Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest, constantly advised of their intentions. In all questions concerning warfare on the continent and coastal defense they are subject to the instructions of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest. When immediate steps are necessary Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest is entitled to give binding orders to German Naval Command, Italy and to the 2nd Air Force, at the same time reporting to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Commander in Chief, Navy or Air Force. Copy of instructions as per 1/Skl 31168/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy asked Naval Staff for its opinion as regards the request of Army Group B concerning support of coastal defense by mine barrages off the sector Pescara-mouth of the Po.

III. As to the question of the increasing Russian minesweeping activity in the eastern minefield "Seeigel" in the area of Gross-Tyters - Vigrund, Naval Staff transmitted its views, as already noted, to High Command, Army, Army General Staff, with copies to Operations Staff, Navy and Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison. Copy teletype 1/Skl 31092/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Naval Staff, Intelligence Division transmitted an evaluation of the enemy situation as regards the British area and the Mediterranean to: Group North/Fleet; Group West; Group South; German Naval Command, Italy; Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean; Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West; Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison; Air Force Operations Staff, Foreign Affairs Section; and Armed Forces High Command, Army General Staff, Naval Liaison Officer. Copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 31244/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part D, "Enemy Situation Reports, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division".

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Situation 6 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-eight planes were detected on operation in the Bay of Biscay. The only locations received lie west of 30° W.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine was cleared west of Rochelle. Minesweeping was carried out on the barrage north of Bayonne.

Channel Coast:

Four ELM/J mines were cleared in the area of the Channel Islands.

At 1906 a patrol boat on the St. Malo roads was attacked with machine-guns by four low-flying enemy planes. One plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns.

Commander, Destroyers submitted the following proposal to Group West regarding the dockyard periods of torpedo boats: T "22" and T "23" will have to go to German dockyards at the beginning of January. As replacement, T "28" and T "29" can be transferred to the west area in the new-moon period of December. For details see teletype 1830.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Two ELM/A mines were cleared off Ijmuiden. Otherwise nothing to report.

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Norway/Northern Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from a reliable source in Bergen, one unit consisting of 1 small cruiser, 2 destroyers, 4 - 5 PT boats and 2 or 3 freighters was sighted between 0700 and 0900 on 4 Nov., 20 miles off Sandoe. Further out to sea there were 2 more vessels, one of them lying deep in the water and looking like a tanker or lighter. The unit was proceeding on northeasterly course at 12 - 16 knots.

Naval Command, Norway considers that this might be a planted report. On the other hand, a minelaying operation does not appear out of the question. In any case, this ignorance of enemy movements directly off our own coast again proves the fact of completely inadequate air reconnaissance. Thus, surprise attacks without any warning beforehand are to be expected at any time.

According to information from Commander, Armed Forces, Norway, an agent arrested at Trondheim stated that he was ordered in Stockholm to give light signals to parachutists and freight-carrying gliders landing near Harran (15 km northeast of Grong). Invasion group "Namsos" would land at the end of November to beginning of December. Landing of the main group in Namsos and closing of the railroad Trondheim - Mo near Harran by parachute troops.

The code words from the short-wave transmitter in London would be given at 1830 as follows:

1. Before the start of the operation: "Alt klart Laura".

2. Signal of readiness for agents:

"Meldingen til Sigrid. Mor er bin beste Velgaaende".

3. In case of cancellation of the operation: "Kyre til Mannen, heter Blanke".

To this Naval Command, Norway reports that, according to information from Commander, Armed Forces, a number of circumstances make this statement appear reliable.

Five enemy planes entered the area of Vardoe on 5 Nov. from 0700 - 1338.

2. Own Situation:

At 1140 the BEITZEN tied up at Haugesund Dockyard.

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Announcement of new declared area Sirafjord - Sletta by Naval Command, Norway, see teletype 1115.

Twenty-eight ships were escorted north and thirty-one south. A total of thirty-one ships remained lying in harbor.

Submarine U "636 left Tromsøe for minelaying west of the Straits of Yugor.

Naval Command, Norway advised Naval Staff, for information, of the report to Group North/Fleet regarding the instructions as to the carrying-out of exploratory sweeps (see War Diary 2 Nov.). Naval Command, Norway pointed out the disadvantage to escort service, from which two minesweeping flotillas would have to be withdrawn for at least four days. Naval Command, Norway considered the limits of the exploratory sweeps ordered to be too near to the West Wall barrages and the projected clearance sweep of declared area "D" not to be practicable due to the lack of motor minesweeper flotillas. It proposed desisting from exploratory sweeps, as already done in a former case, and having minelayers follow the torpedo boat mine escort.

The decision rests with Group North/Fleet.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The coast guard at Roedhuse reported a large vessel at 1220 in Yammer Bay and later a further vessel, both being lost from sight to the west at 1400. The vessels in question could not have been German. At 1700 on 5 Nov. the HOPE WELL was still in Lysekil.

At 1800 on 5 Nov. the bow of the former Danish submarine escort ship HENRIK GERNER was swamped and she ran aground. Sabotage is suspected.

In the forenoon ships in tow in Kronstadt Bay evaded further fire from our batteries by laying a smoke screen. Gun fire resistance was slight.

An attack by two refractory companies of the 215th Infantry Division was repulsed. Otherwise no combat activity was reported from the area of Army Command 18.

2. Own Situation:

Four mines were cleared in the Baltic Sea entrances.

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Crash boat FLD "102" reported overdue on 2 Nov. arrived in Sweden.

The boat and the French prisoners of war are there, while our own crew returned to Sassnitz.

Otherwise no special reports on transport traffic and escort service or on mine and patrol operations.

Naval Command, Baltic reports that after some time Swedish planes again appeared in the area Arkona - Rangow on 1 and 3 Nov. Naval Staff is asked to issue new instructions, in case the previous order to avoid everything that could lead to political differences with Sweden is no longer to remain in force.

For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

In connection with operation "Wallenstein", the training unit reported readiness of the NUERNBERG to Group North/Fleet. The ship can be ready for action within 24 hours. Location Gdynia. Furnace oil aboard at 0800 on 6 Nov.: 991 cbm; heavy Diesel oil: 184 cbm.

A weekly readiness report for PT boats in the Baltic Sea area was given by the PT Boat Training Division. Eighteen boats of the 1st and 9th PT Boat Flotillas are quite ready for operation, while work outstanding on two further boats will be completed on 8 Nov. One boat is being tested by the Warship Construction Testing Command. For further details see teletype 1550.

Reports regarding the arrival of the Swedish ship NAGARA as well as the incident of the "Drottningholm" in Kristiansand South are given in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

V. Submarine Warfare.

No successes were reported by Groups "Schill" and "Tirpitz". The operation by the latter against the awaited convoy was a failure. New disposition is planned.

The frequency of air raids without any enemy location being observed and the fact that enemy convoys obviously evade groups of submarines, leads to the supposition that the enemy is again using a new location method. It does not seem out of question that the run-in is made on some radiation from the boats. As there is theoretically a danger of radiation from the "Wanze", use of this gear is prohibited immediately.

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It will be replaced by an improved design (Wanze G 2) and by detector-receiver "Borkum", which is already being supplied. The use of other radio receivers which are not entirely safe is to be restricted as far as possible.

Measures for a thorough investigation of these instruments are in progress. Other measures for the investigation of further possibilities of location have been ordered.

Submarine U "536" returning from CB reports that the convoy route covered by naval forces and mines runs from CB 16 on a 200 m line between Brown and Emerald Bank to Lambry lightship.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the evening 38 planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operations against London and Norwich. The number of enemy planes brought down on 5 Nov. has increased to 18.

During the day and the night of 6 Nov. only a small number of enemy planes entered the west area and western Germany. Thirteen bombs were dropped on Bochum. Four planes laid mines in the area of Lorient. Altogether six planes were shot down during these operations.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

An enemy convoy consisting of 21 or 22 large transports that was located at 0700 east of Algiers on easterly course was successfully attacked with torpedoes and bombs by 55 of our planes at 1300 off Bougie and at 1543 off Jijelli. Three Ju 88's and three He 111's are missing. According to a preliminary report hits were scored on 14 ships (totalling 149,000 BRT) and 2 destroyers.

During the night of 6 Nov. single bombers of the 2nd Air Force were sent out against harbors in southern Italy and ships in these harbors. One steamer (3,000 BRT) was damaged off Salerno. Fire was caused in harbor installations.

At noon 25 enemy planes raided the airfield of Viterbo in the Italian area. One enemy fighter was shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast 30 fighter-bombers attacked the town and railway bridge of Motkovic on the Adriatic coast. Further flights, some of which dropped bombs, are reported from Paros, Naxos, and Kos. At Paros one enemy plane was shot down by our anti-aircraft guns.

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3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

It is now reported that an Atlantic convoy consisting of 25 fairly large ships entered Gibraltar on 3 Nov.

On 5 Nov. the 26 LCT's which put out into the Atlantic were followed by 3 further LCT's. At 2000 on 5 Nov. 2 Italian and 2 British cruisers, 1 French cruiser, 2 auxiliary cruisers, 8 destroyers, 22 corvettes and escort boats, 1 transport, 46 freighters and 6 tankers were lying in Gibraltar.

At 0400 on 6 Nov. an Atlantic convoy consisting of 2 freighters and 3 tankers put into Gibraltar, followed at 0930 by a cruiser of the AURORA class. At 1500 the Italian cruisers DUCA DE AOSTA and GUISEPPE GARI-BALDI escorted by two Italian destroyers left the harbor for gunnery exercises to the east.

At 1300 our air reconnaissance sighted an eastbound convoy of 28 ships proceeding at 14 knots 45 miles northwest of Bougie.

According to a reliable intelligence report dated 6 Nov., 110 U.S. landing craft are lying ready in Corsican harbors for a commando operation against the airfield and radio station of Frejus as well as against lines of communication, and for bringing in prisoners. The boats are under the command of a Canadian colonel.

In the forenoon one submarine was 5 miles east of Toulon. The large eastbound troop convoy was not located again.

According to an intelligence report, four U.S. freighters with war materiel and three ships with Australian troops left Port Said for Bari.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Demolition of the quay installations of Pescara began on the afternoon of 5 Nov. as planned. Torpedo boat T "24" and PT boat S "157" carried out minelaying operation near Elba as planned.

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At 1850 the British hospital ship ST. ANDREW sent out an SOS after an air attack 50 miles east of Termoli. Enemy air activity on the east coast and reconnaissance over convoy traffic indicate continuous surveillance.

In his report on the situation Commanding General, Armed Forces, South gives details on the enemy air attack on the Vatican city on the evening of 5 Nov. (see teletype 2000).

German Naval Command, Italy intends to assign torpedo boats TA "23", TA "25" and TA "26" to the 3rd Escort Flotilla, and TA "24", TA "27", the RIGEL, ERIDANO and DRAGONE to the 10th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Situation:

On the morning of 5 Nov. four PT boats shelled the Molunat peninsula west of Cattaro for a short time without effect.

Own Situation:

At noon on 5 Nov. 2 Siebel ferries and 7 infantry boats put into Dubrovnik, and in the morning of 6 Nov. 2 Siebel ferries and 2 infantry boats put into Durazzo. They are to continue their passage south on the evening of 6 Nov. The unit which arrived at Dubrovnik was shelled by a 7.5 cm battery from the southwestern point of Mljet. The battery was silenced by infantry boats. Splinters caused slight damage on one Siebel ferry.

Two combined operations boats, one assault boat and further landing craft arrived at Fiume for the island operation.

Convoy traffic was carried out without particular incidents.

Group South advised Naval Staff, Operations Division, for information, of the instructions to Commanding Admirals, Adriatic and Aegean, as well as to the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla that PT boats S "54" and S "61" under the Flotilla Commander are to be temporarily assigned to Commanding Admiral, Aegean as far as operations are concerned. Their task will be to take part in mopping-up the Dodecanese.

They will be transferred to Piraeus as from 9 Nov. PT boats and mine-sweepers from the sector of Commanding Admiral, Aegean will be put under the Flotilla Commander of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla for operations.

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S "30" and S "33" will be put under Commanding Admiral, Adriatic. Their task will be operations against enemy naval forces and supplies off the east coast of Italy.

Relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 3302/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

The four destroyers sighted during the night of 5 Nov. transferred to the Gulf of Mendelio with three PT boats. In the morning our air reconnaissance sighted: 2 destroyers and 2 PT boats off Kueluek; 2 escort vessels 10 miles northeast of Samos; 2 vessels, presumably merchantmen, 160 miles south of Castellrosso on course 60°; 1 destroyer or escort vessel 100 miles south of Castellrosso on course 90°. At noon there were 3 destroyers or escort vessels 18 miles west of Castellrosso proceeding at high speed on northerly course.

Own Situation:

Group South reports that operation "Leopard" will probably start on 9 Nov. It is planned to carry it out with 13 landing boats, 2 naval landing craft, 13 escort vessels (submarine-chasers, motor minesweepers, escort boats and coastal patrol boats) as well as 2 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats as covering group. According to the order of Commanding Admiral, Aegean for the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, this flotilla is to proceed from Piraeus to Syra on X-day minus one at 0030, and after refuelling, will proceed out into the operational area on the same day at 1300. At 2000 the flotilla will divide into two groups four miles southwest of Kalymnos. For flank protection against enemy surface forces the destroyer subdivision under the command of the Flotilla Commander will patrol west of Kalymnos/Leros, while two torpedo boats will patrol east of Pserimo/Kalymnos/Leros. Their task will be to drive the enemy away from landing craft, to engage and to destroy him in all-out operations. On X-day at 0400 the flotilla will assemble about 6 miles northwest of Leros for return to Syra at high speed between the known barrages. There the flotilla will refuel and remain ready for operation. Strong forces of the Air Force will cover the operational area.

Early in the morning landing flotilla "Leopard" entered Nausa Bay (Paros North). After the bringing-up of vessels from Naxos and Milos the unit consists of 25 landing craft and 13 escort boats. The flotilla is divided into four groups.

In the morning the unit was detected by enemy reconnaissance. At 1335 it was attacked by eight low-flying planes. Motor minesweepers R "194" and R "43" were put out of action and suffered casualties. No

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serious damage was inflicted on the landing boats. Three enemy planes were shot down. Further passage is scheduled for 1900.

No damage was reported during the shelling of Kos by guns of enemy naval forces on 5 Nov.

On the evening of 5 Nov. and during the night Syra, Kalymnos harbor as well as Rhodes were attacked by enemy planes. The entrances to the harbors of Kalymnos and Syra are closed because of mines suspected in that area.

The fighting on Amorgos is finished. We sustained no losses. Four survivors of the BULGARIA and 13 from the steamer INGEBORG were freed. Two coastal defense boats with prisoners and survivors left for Naxos.

The German Defense Command on Symi was relieved by a Fascist detachment.

According to a report by the Commander of the 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla, one of our reconnaissance planes was ineffectively fired on by an enemy destroyer from Turkish territorial waters.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence one destroyer was at sea. In addition two submarines were detected in the central to eastern Black Sea.

South of Eltigen a Russian lighter with 15 guns drifted to our coast. It probably belongs to the ships towed by the tug which was sunk by the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on the night of 4 Nov.

From captured materiel and interrogation of prisoners, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division has ascertained the new disposition of the Russian Asov Flotilla which consists mainly of armored boats transported to Yeisk by sea and rail. The flotilla is divided into three forces each of 4 groups of 4 boats each, according to plan. It is to be assumed that at present the flotilla has reached its full strength. Two or three groups of minesweepers that were brought up from the harbors of the Black Sea by rail in May 1943 are also attached to the flotilla, along with a number of patrol vessels that can also be used for minelaying. Copy of report as per 1/Skl 34499/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

According to intelligence reports, 2 cruisers, 6 torpedo boats, 3 submarines, 2 destroyers, 3 minesweepers and 2 tankers left Tuapse on 3 Nov. in the direction of the southern Crimea. All transports, passenger ships as well as all boats from Tuapse, Sotschi and Adler that are suited for landing operations are being transferred to Novorossiisk. Allegedly a landing on the southern Crimea is intended.

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Own Situation:

During the night of 5 Nov. seven naval landing craft were on operation in the Strait of Kerch in spite of unfavorable weather conditions. No supply traffic was encountered in the whole reconnaissance area. Enemy batteries and searchlights on land were suppressed by our Air Force.

The following operations are planned for the night of 6 Nov.:

- a. Renewed thrusts by four naval landing craft at the north part of the Strait of Kerch up to Cape Fonar.
- b. Operations by eight further naval landing craft off Kerch and off the Bay of Kamysch Burun, five of them off Kerch because the Army expects the enemy to land in that area,
- c. Operations by three motor minesweepers off Eltigen and
- d. by five PT boats off the southwest outlet of the Strait of Kerch.

Two boats of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla were transferred from Sevastopol to Feodosiya. The Commander of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported three fully-manned self-propelled landing boats sunk by the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and one PT boat and one landing boat shot up, one of them burnt out on the beach.

Naval artillery lighter MAL "4" left Sevastopol for operations in the Strait of Kerch.

The Quartermaster Staff of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea transferred to Odessa.

According to instructions from Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to Commander, Convoy, the supply situation on the Crimea, particularly with regard to ammunition and fuel, is critical. Therefore every attempt must be made for immediate establishment of convoys and departure of transports after loading. Any delay owing to the weather must be prevented as far as possible, and the most rigid standards applied.

Convoy escort to the extent formerly maintained must be given up.

Group South reports that traffic on the Bug for the withdrawal of ships and evacuation of Nikolayev is blocked due to the occupation of the Kinburn peninsula by the enemy. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea has been ordered to request from Army Group A the establishment of a bridgehead on the peninsula or suitable emplacement of guns on the north bank of the Dnieper. The use of smoke by the Air Force while convoys pass is urged.

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On the other hand Naval Staff is asked by Army General Staff to set up guns between the mouth of the Bug and Otchakov in order to repulse an outflanking landing by the enemy.

As to the situation on land, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports at noon:

1. Near Eltigen attempts to break through were continued. It was only possible to mop up some of the local penetrations.
2. Since early morning enemy attacks round the beachhead of Bakhchi with strong forces. Cape Chroni taken by the enemy. Radar gear demolished. The men put into land fighting.
3. Near Perekop our own counter-attack started early this morning to mop up the breach south of the Tartar Trench. Local successes achieved.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

In the course of a long speech made on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin stated, among other things, that with this year had come the turning point in the course of the war. The Moscow Conference was of historic importance. The Allies were determined to bring about the defeat of Germany. With regard to events in North Africa and Italy, as well as the air offensive against Germany, he stated:

"Of course, these battles in the south cannot yet be called a Second Front. They are somewhat in the form of a second front. The opening of a real second front is not behind the mountain (see 20 Nov. under Special Items III Tr.N.) and will accelerate victory and further strengthen the cooperation of the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition."

The designation of time selected is quite elastic.
At any rate, no conclusion need be drawn from it
that any decisions for swift action were made.

Stalin's speech naturally stands in the limelight of public interest. From press commentaries it is noted, among other things, that an unconditional surrender is also demanded of Finland.

According to an Exchange report, diplomatic circles have the impression that the successes of the Russian army and the possibility of an extension of the war to the Balkans are the main subjects of the Turkish/British discussions at Cairo, the political results of the Moscow Conference forming perhaps only the subject of secondary discussions.

According to Reuter, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Alexander, stated his conviction that the danger from German submarines will be overcome if the flow of planes, escort vessels and merchantmen continues at the same rate. The most difficult task outstanding is to wipe out the Japanese fleet.

As regards intensification of the aerial war against the German armament industry, Chief of British Bomber Command, Air Marshal Harris, declared amongst other things: "We intend to destroy what remains of the submarine offensive. This is going to make itself felt in the spring perhaps, but certainly before the leaves are falling next year".

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

Regarding the situation in the Crimea see Own Situation Black Sea.

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In the Kherson - Krivoi Rog sector of the eastern front activity was slight. The possibility of an encircling landing by the enemy west of the Bug is a particular source of anxiety. (Cf. War Diary 6 Nov. under Own Situation Black Sea.) Naval Staff, Operations Division informed the Naval Liaison Officer with Army General Staff of the proposal of Group South.

Russian workers in the dockyards of Nikolayev are becoming rebellious and are refusing to go on working.

The enemy break-through in the Kiev area developed into a thrust in the direction of Fastov. Thus the assembly area of our three fresh divisions was reached and had to be moved back to the west. Regarding the Crimea a decision has not yet been reached. However, as the development of the situation in the Kiev area demands the commitment of all available forces at this point, it is no longer possible at present to adhere to our intentions regarding the reopening of the entrance to the Crimea.

On this subject Chief, Naval Staff remarked that the decision now depends entirely on the Army. For the Navy there remains only the question: Can the Crimea be held or is an evacuation necessary? This decision also can only be made according to Army views. The tasks of the Navy consist of supply or evacuation. Views on this have already been reported to the Fuehrer.

The break-through near Nevel is also the source of grave anxiety. The enemy gained ground considerably in the direction of the upper Dvina. Attempts will be made to check the edges of the spearhead in the north and south and, if possible, to draw a thin defense line in the west.

A further cause of anxiety is the fact that the last air attack on the Ruhr area was carried out in daylight with strong fighter cover. It will therefore be necessary further to weaken air defense of the eastern front just as of the other fronts by withdrawal of all our fighters.

II. Report of Chief of Operations Branch, Operations Division on the following:

1. The Fuehrer's directive regarding the new regulation of command organization in Italy according to the notes in War Diary of 6 Nov. Admiral, German Naval Command is requested to express his views as to change of location.

2. The Fuehrer's directive for formation of an Army Group for special duties from Army Group B, under Field Marshal Rommel, which will be directly subordinate to the Fuehrer and receive his orders through Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

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Its tasks will be:

a. Study of defensive readiness on the coasts occupied by us and submission of proposals resulting therefrom.

b. Elaboration of operational studies for the control of offensive operations against an enemy landing in western Europe.

On the basis of a thorough investigation of the conditions for concentration, movement and action in the individual areas in question, these operational studies are to extend in particular to the following problems:

aa. Organization, set-up, command, and bringing-up of the forces of all branches of the Armed Forces for counter-attack, i.e.

- (1) of large reserves,
- (2) of combat groups from coastal areas which are not threatened,
- (3) of combat groups from reserve divisions, schools and other installations and units of the Armed Forces and Waffen-SS in the rear,
- (4) of mobilized forces of all branches of the Armed Forces from the home area.

bb. Planning of supplies for all forces of all branches of the Armed Forces and the Waffen-SS going into operation.

cc. Control of combat in the area of operations, special consideration being paid to the possibilities for our own and enemy use of tanks.

The first task of the special duties Army Group is to investigate the defensive readiness of Denmark and make proposals for its speedy improvement.

In view of the importance of these tasks it is necessary to exercise special care in the selection of an Admiral's Staff Officer of the Navy to join the Staff of the Army Group. Naval Staff, Operations Division suggests Capt. Reinicke.

III. According to a report of Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy the Assistant Secretary of State of the Italian Navy, Captain Ferrini, intends to appoint Commander Borghese as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Assistant Secretary of State. Location at Levico. The Italian Liaison Command will remain. Rear Admiral Varoli will retire. Commander Sestini will be the Chief of Staff. Agreement made subject to the approval of Naval Staff.

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Chief, Naval Staff has no objections to the intended appointments. Order 1/Skl I a 31248/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IV. Chief, Naval Staff agrees participation of Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast and of the Coastal Defense Commander, Heligoland Bight in the discussions on Directive 51 on 11 Nov. be left to the discretion of Group West and Naval Command, North. Chief, Naval Staff approves the instructions that will serve as a basis for points for discussion. (See War Diary 6 Nov.)

V. As regards dispersal of the dockyards at Nikolayev, Group South again summarized its views as follows:

- "1. The enemy advance in the Crimea and the southern part of the Ukraine up to the Dnieper and the spearhead at Krivoi Rog endanger Nikolayev from two directions.
2. Owing to ignorance of the plans and operational possibilities of higher Commands, the degree of danger and the future situation cannot be assessed from here.
3. Even if the present front were held, Nikolayev would be greatly endangered by the advance of enemy air bases.
4. In view of the development in the situation, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea some time ago received orders for dispersal in the area of Nikolayev and carried them out. Only fixed installations were left. A decision must be made as to whether these installations, very particularly workshop installations, are to be evacuated.
5. The Nikolayev dockyard represents 50 % of the dockyard capacity of the Black Sea; its unnecessary evacuation would entail restriction until its reconstruction at another place. However, loss of installations - in case the decision to evacuate were made too late - would entail permanent loss. Both cases are of serious consequence, particularly in view of projected submarine construction.
6. The question as to whether dispersal is to be continued without regard to further utility of the Nikolayev dockyard, or whether work is to be maintained at the risk of losing numerous workshop installations in case of rapid evacuation, depends on questions under 2. Therefore decision up to Naval Staff."

In the course of a discussion by telephone, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff pointed out the fact that the decision depends on measures by the Army and gave the following instructions:

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- "1. In Nikolayev the most urgent task is to ensure evacuation of all vessels able to remain afloat.
2. The dispersal of the dockyards is to be carried out without regard to further utility.
3. Ensure that the plans of the Army are not anticipated by evacuation from there.

Confirmation by teletype 1/Skl I a 31249/43 Gkdos. Previous data and order 1/Skl I a 31249/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

Special Items:

I) As to the question of reports by Military, Naval and Air Force Attachés, Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division announced on 3 Nov.:

"1. In the course of a discussion with Ambassador Ritter, Chief, Armed Forces High Command raised objection to the fact that a new order regarding reports by the attachés was issued by the Foreign Minister to the diplomatic representatives without previously consulting Armed Forces High Command or the branches of the Armed Forces. In answer to this Ambassador Ritter expressly stated that the instructions to the diplomatic representatives were within the bounds of the duty order and of the hitherto existing agreements and that they were not aimed at any changes. The need was felt to call the attention of the Foreign Minister once more to observance of the directions given in accordance with the agreements arrived at.

2. Chief, Armed Forces High Command then informed Ambassador Ritter that on the basis of the explanation given he will refrain from any further altercations with the Foreign Office. The attachés had been directed to act as previously ordered by Armed Forces High Command or the branches of the Armed Forces."

II. Group South submitted a copy of a report dated 26 Oct. on the morale of Italian sailors with the remark that the report corresponds with the impressions of Commanding Admiral, Aegean.

Copy as per 1/Skl 30588/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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Situation 7 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifty planes were observed on operation over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located; at 1432 in AM 8110, at 0023 on 8 Nov. in BE 6530 and at 0204 on 8 Nov. in BE 5770.

At 1045 our air reconnaissance sighted a northbound convoy consisting of 43 merchantmen and 7 escort vessels in CF 6983.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One mine was cleared off the mouth of the Gironde. Battery "Breslau" reported minelaying observed 3 km west of the western point of the Ile de Croix.

At 1515 destroyers Z "27" and ZH "1" put into Bordeaux.

At 0900 torpedo boats T "24" and T "26" left Brest for transfer to Concarneau. At 1300 they were sent out to render assistance to submarine U "123" that had been attacked by enemy planes in BF 5530. The submarine was picked up by submarine-chasers which were also sent out and was escorted to Lorient. At 1730 the torpedo boats arrived at Concarneau.

Destroyer Z "24" was transferred from Bordeaux to Royan.

Channel Coast:

Owing to stormy weather minesweeping and convoy duties were not carried out. Patrol positions were not taken up.

In spite of favorable visibility, enemy targets located by radar from 1906 to 2107 in the area Boulogne - Berk sur Mer were not confirmed. They were shelled by coastal batteries without result.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

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Unfavorable weather conditions restricted minesweeping and convoy activity. During the night of 7 Nov. patrol positions were not taken up. Four mines were cleared near Terschelling.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

On 5 and 6 Nov. slight gun fire was reported from the Petsamo area. On 6 Nov. six planes entered the area of Vardoe and seven the area near Bremanger on the west coast.

On 7 Nov. at 0033 two PT boats unsuccessfully attacked two of our patrol boats off Sogne Fjord. At 2132 one of our patrol boats reported submarine alarm in West Fjord.

Radio intelligence observed remarkably heavy radio traffic from Archangel and the presence of light British naval forces in the eastern Barents Sea, so that the approach of a QP convoy does not appear out of the question.

Own Situation:

At 0800 Commander, Destroyers left Narvik for Alta Fjord with the STEINBRINK, destroyers Z "34" and Z "38". At noon on 6 Nov. the GALSTER and IHN left Narvik southward-bound.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast intends to transfer the BEITZEN to Bergen after she has been made watertight in Haugesund dockyard.

Twenty-three ships were escorted north and twenty-seven south. Altogether ten ships remained lying in harbor.

In answer to the enquiry made, Naval Command, Norway reports that there is no delay in shipping and that round trips are proceeding normally. The ships only remain behind when unloading is not completed at the time of departure of a convoy; the next convoy follows within the next two days.

This report is still to be checked with reports on delays in convoys by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

As to the instructions from Naval Staff regarding expansion of coastal defense arising from the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51, Admiral Norway reports as follows:

"Expansion of coastal defense possible only by allocation of materiel and manpower.

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This can only be achieved by shutting down constructional projects of the Todt Organization which are not immediately serving the purpose of defense, as for instance construction of the railroad Mo - Fauske. Requests have been directed to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway. Naval Staff is asked to support these at Armed Forces High Command."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Southeast of Anholt one mine exploded in a fishing net. On 6 Nov. one mine exploded ahead of a fishing vessel in the same area. The steamer HOWALD SCHROEDER was refloated and put into Pernau.

Otherwise no special incidents.

V. Merchant Shipping.

The transport of ore from Luelea decreased greatly during the week of 10 - 16 Nov. The reason for this, with other similar information, is given within a survey on traffic as a whole in brief report No. 13/43 of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch. Copy as per 34385/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Brief Reports of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

Group "Tirpitz" was dispersed in the northern Atlantic. In order to prevent boats in patrol lines being located beforehand and by-passed by evasive manoevers, Commanding Admiral, Submarines plans a new type of disposition whereby the boats are scattered over a wide area. Each three boats of the 27 of the group will be assigned as their area one grid square of the large square AK or of the adjacent large squares AJ and BD.

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Owing to the great distance involved the operation by Group "Schill" against the northbound convoy of 34 ships located by our air reconnaissance in CF 69 at 1045 will not be possible until the night of 8 Nov. At 1800 on 8 Nov. the boats will be in patrol line from CF 2631 to 3296.

At 1000 submarine U "123" was attacked with machine-guns by an enemy plane in BF 5550 in the Bay of Biscay.

Submarine U "584", which was attacked on 31 Oct. at the supply rendezvous in BD, must be presumed lost.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio informs Commanding Admiral, Submarines of increased submarine danger off the entrance to Penang. Four enemy submarines are reported.

On 6 Nov. submarine U "178" evaded torpedoes at 05° 26' N. 10° 06' E. en route for Singapore. It is requested that submarines U "168" and U "533" be informed.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 30 bombers, 10 heavy fighters, 160 fighters and 23 reconnaissance planes were out on operation. During the night of 7 Nov., 8 fighter-bombers attacked London.

By day about 270 enemy planes entered French territory. Three airfields were attacked with machine-guns. Our anti-aircraft guns forced two U.S. fighters to make an emergency landing. A third plane crashed over Holland.

In the morning a formation of 250 four-engined planes with fighter escort entered the area of Trier - Saarbruecken in several waves, each numbering 60 - 80 machines. Probably owing to unfavorable weather conditions no attacks were carried out. On the return flight some bombs were dropped on the district of Dueren.

At the same time a formation of 150 Fortresses entered the area of Muenster in two waves and returned by way of Holland without attacking. The operation was apparently broken off owing to icing. On the return flight the formation dropped numerous bombs on the area of Maastricht. Eighty-one of our fighters did not come into contact with the enemy.

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During the night of 7 Nov. minor enemy forces carried out light nuisance raids over Belgium, northern France, western France as well as over German territory in the areas of Giessen, Coblenz - Cologne and Dortmund - Muenster.

According to a very reliable intelligence report dated 4 Nov., the highest authorities in the United States and in Great Britain are calling for the resumption of the air war against German territory by day and by night with intensified force. The enemy believes that he will decrease the effectiveness of our night fighters through a method of main attack and secondary attack and additional nuisance raids by Mosquitoes. As far as weather conditions in Great Britain allow, bad weather conditions over the target areas, which prevent German night fighter activity, are to be exploited. At present, however, weather conditions in Great Britain are unfavorable, particularly as regards heavy ground fog. After the attack on Duesseldorf during the night of 3 Nov. there was a considerable number of crash landings entailing total losses and difficulties in carrying out the operation exactly to schedule. The British formation leaders complained to the Commanding Air Officer, Heavy Bomber Formations about operational orders in weather conditions which led to considerable losses when taking-off and landing.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the attack on the convoy off Bougie and Jijelli on 6 Nov., 35 of the 55 planes sent out by us attacked. The operation was rendered difficult by weather conditions and by the loose formation of the enemy. As a total result, 1 troop transport of 10,000 - 14,000 BR1 and 1 destroyer are reported probably sunk, and 12 transports totalling about 129,000 BR1 and 1 destroyer heavily damaged. Two of these vessels were hit by HS "293's" and 13 by torpedoes.

On 7 Nov. 14 fighter-bombers, 26 fighters and 13 reconnaissance planes of the 2nd Air Force and 72 bombers - mainly for defense of the concentrations for operation "Leopard" - and also 23 fighters, 21 reconnaissance planes and 5 transport planes of Air Force Command, Southeast were out on operation.

In the afternoon the enemy attacked Ancona and Scutari. Twenty-five planes were reported on armed reconnaissance over the Aegean.

3. Eastern Front:

The 4th Air Force carried out photographic reconnaissance of Batum, Poti, Suchum, Sotschi and Tuapse. For result, which confirms previous knowledge, see details in Daily Situation.

Otherwise no operational reports received.

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VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

At 2000 on 6 Nov., 2 FIJI class, 1 DIDO class, and 1 MONT-CALM class cruisers, also 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 transport, 56 freighters, 7 tankers as well as 1 auxiliary cruiser and 1 Norwegian tanker in dock were observed in Gibraltar. In addition to this 9 destroyers, 11 corvettes and further small vessels were visible.

At 0200 on 7 Nov. one FIJI class cruiser left Gibraltar - direction unknown.

At 1055 Tres Forcas sighted 1 WARSPITE class, 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers and at 0800 a convoy consisting of 35 freighters and 2 tankers with 4 destroyers and 6 escort vessels bound for the Atlantic.

At 1015 a westbound convoy consisting of 4 merchantmen and 3 landing craft with 3 escort vessels was reported 23 miles north of Bone.

Off Cagliari a cruiser was sighted for the first time on easterly course. Two freighters were lying in Olbia.

Under date of 6 Nov. it is now reported:

At 0300 a convoy consisting of 8 freighters was sighted off Cape Antonio on northeasterly course. At noon a convoy of 20 merchantmen and 8 warships was on easterly course 12 miles northwest of Bougie.

At 1500 2 Italian cruisers and 2 Italian destroyers left Gibraltar westward-bound.

The German Liaison Officer with the Italian Commander, Submarines transmitted information from a Fascist living in Spain who had returned from the Balearic Islands, according to which the Italian gunboat PEGASO is lying at Formentor on Majorca, and the Italian cruiser REGOLO, the destroyers FUSILIERE, MITRAGLIERE and CARABINIERE and also PT boats of the Italian Air Force at Port Mahon on Minorca. In spite of an inadequate Spanish watch they cannot put out owing to lack of fuel. The morale of the crews is said to be pro-Mussolini.

This statement is contradicted by the order of Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff to the 3rd Air Force to keep a watch on the location of Italian warships, as it is reported that vessels interned at Port Mahon are engaged in the exchange of fuel and show unrest so that a break-out is to be expected.

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2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On Elba a further battery is now manned by Naval Artillery Battalion 616.

The minelaying operation by torpedo boat TA "24" with three PT boats in the area of Elba had to be postponed because of unfavorable weather conditions. Coastal traffic was also hampered by the weather. At 0915 submarine-chaser "2210" sank an enemy submarine 14 miles northwest of Genoa.

The demolition of the harbor of Pescara is being carried out according to plan and will be completed on 8 Nov. The rest of the demolition of Ortone will be carried out on 10 Nov.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

The operation planned by the Army in the area of Split is to start on 7 Nov. with small craft. The order to carry it out has not yet been received.

The steamer DIANA was damaged apparently by a torpedo hit 40 miles south-east of Pola, but entered Pola without losses.

Group South reports eleven steamers totalling 41,449 BRT sunk in the Adriatic in the month of October, and two steamers totalling 8,205 BRT damaged.

In accordance with orders, Commanding Admiral, Adriatic reports plans for operations by PT boats:

1. Offensive torpedo and minelaying operations against the east coast of Italy.
2. Operations off the Albanian coast and Dalmatian islands against warships and merchantmen, many of which have appeared lately by surprise, as well as against enemy vessels landing supplies for partisans, the coast being extensive and only occupied at present by a small number of troops.
3. Beyond the tasks under 2., in the course of mopping-up started on the islands off the Dalmatian coast it is intended to have PT boats operate against partisan shipping in special cases. According to previous experiences, the partisans are withdrawing with their vessels from island to island and continually forming new points of concentration. PT boats are only to operate as long as no other suitable vessels are yet available.

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b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 0400 according to air reconnaissance there were 3 destroyers in Turkish territorial waters east of Leros, first on northerly course and subsequently on easterly course. During the morning 2 destroyers, 2 escort vessels and 3 gunboats were sighted in Turkish territorial waters. At 0845 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers with fighter cover were on southerly course 170 miles south of Castellrosso and at 1200 4 destroyers and 4 PT boats were near Kueluek.

At 1415 a submerged submarine was detected in the outer Gulf of Athens.

In the morning and evening radio intelligence detected lively air reconnaissance in the area of Mylos - Paros - Naxos in connection with the concentration for operation "Leopard". Reconnaissance reports of 2110 on 6 Nov. led naval forces to the landing unit that was detected at 0026 on 7 Nov. At first it was supposed that destroyers were involved. However, in the course of the day a survey of the enemy situation led to the opinion that they were submarines.

Own Situation:

Because of the disclosure of the code name "Leopard", the new code name "Taifun" was ordered.

The advance group of the landing unit came into contact at 0026 with an unknown vessel. Coast patrol boat GA "45" was sunk. Thereupon the unit was ordered to seek protection of the land of Paros and Naxos. At 0050 the slow group entered Marmara Bay (Paros) and the fast group entered Naxos at 0206. One naval landing craft and two infantry boats ran aground in Nausa Bay, but with the exception of one infantry boat were refloated. In view of the existing conditions and the freshening wind, it was determined that the entire unit should not approach Amorgos until the situation cleared. The Air Force was asked to carry out reconnaissance flights and attacks against enemy naval forces in the Amorgos area by day and by night. Up to noon 2 motor minesweepers, 1 coast patrol boat, 1 naval landing craft, 1 armed fishing vessel, 7 infantry boats and 1 combined operations boat out of the total unit consisting of 38 vessels were out of action. Since the weather improved and the evaluation of the situation showed that the enemy attack on the unit was not carried out by destroyers, but by submarines, the continuation of the concentration was ordered after consultation with the Air Force. The landing unit was ordered to be in position in several groups between Paros and Naxos at 0700 on 8 Nov., and to proceed to Amorgos by day with very strong air cover, and there

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to disperse into sheltered bays on the north coast before dark. Off the coast, protection was provided by 2 submarine-chasers, 2 Q-ships as well as by 1 PT boat. In the evening the landing unit comprised 14 combined operations boats, 6 infantry boats, 2 submarine-chasers, 2 Q-ships, 1 armed fishing vessel, 2 naval landing craft and 2 motor minesweepers.

The main unit has orders not to wait for stragglers.

At 2130 on 6 Nov. submarine U "565" left Salamis for the operational area. Detailed order is not yet known.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 6 Nov. only moderate activity by PT boats and motor minesweepers, which increased in the evening, was detected in the northern part of the Caucasus coast, and in the central to southern part slight movement by small vessels was detected. Destroyer "H" probably entered its base on the evening of 6 Nov. Four submarines, position unknown, were detected in the northwestern area up to the west coast of the Crimea and a fifth in the eastern part of the Black Sea.

Own Situation:

In the successful operations of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla off Eltigen, already reported, 3 boats of this unit, under Flotilla Commander, Lieut. Klassmann, have sunk since 4 Nov. 1 motor gunboat, 1 PT boat, 5 landing boats, 1 tug, and heavily damaged 1 PT boat, often in fierce fighting, at times with hand grenades and small arms. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea requests that the name of the Flotilla Commander be mentioned in the Armed Forces communiqué.

According to radio intelligence, the attack of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla off Eltigen effectively hindered the bringing-up of fresh landing forces in addition to frustrating a new landing operation planned south of Eltigen.

The operation by the four naval landing craft in the northern part of the Strait of Kerch during this night was also successful. In spite of heavy gun fire from land the thrust was carried out as planned up to the area of Cape Fonar. No ferry traffic was encountered. One enemy motor gunboat was set on fire. The naval landing craft suffered casualties.

The naval landing craft off Kerch Bay and Kamysch Burun as well as the PT boats in the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch did not come into contact with the enemy.

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Operations by 4 PT boats, 10 naval landing craft and remote minesweepers are planned in the Strait of Kerch for the night of 7 Nov.

Barrages S 74 and S 75 were laid as planned.

At noon on 6 Nov. submarine U "9" entered Constanta.

As regards the enemy situation in the mouth of the Bug, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports that owing to lack of sufficient forces the use of smoke-screen bombers as requested on 5 Nov. from the 1st Air Corps for the relief of our naval landing craft traffic, could not be carried out. Also the proposal submitted on 5 Nov. to Army Command 17 to land our troops on the beachhead of Baussy with naval landing craft could not be carried out owing to lack of troops.

On 6 Nov. from 0550 - 0755 a group of six of our naval landing craft effectively shelled enemy emplacements on the south bank of the Dnieper, below Kherson, and the locality of Kudmivka, using all available weapons. The enemy was so overwhelmed that no resistance was offered.

Remnants of the enemy were observed fleeing southwards. Five boats, one cutter and one beached loaded lighter were destroyed. Naval landing craft MFP "313", which could not be salvaged, was likewise destroyed. Two loaded lighters were taken in tow. The Air Force supported the operation by bombing attacks.

Regarding the land situation on the Crimea, Army Group A reports on 6 Nov.:

"Strong enemy attacks from the Kerch beachheads and near Perekop repelled only by using up our last reserves. Our counter-attacks were without success owing to very strong enemy resistance. Further bringing-up of forces in the north and east confirms the impression that the enemy is using all available forces for the conquest of the Crimea. The situation in that area is most critical. At present lively enemy attempts at crossing from Kossa Tschuschka; the attack is expected to start from the Sivash bridgehead where the number of enemy forces has considerably increased. It was possible to hold the Tartar Trench in bitter fluctuating battles entailing very heavy losses."

From 1100 on 7 Nov. the continuation of heavy enemy attacks near Perekop is reported.

The following personnel has been made available by Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to the Army:

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1. 3 officers, 40 noncommissioned officers, 800 men,
2. Volunteer Legion Black Sea, consisting of 2 officers and 200 men,
3. Personnel of the battery in the Strait of Kerch which was put out of action. Number not yet ascertained.
4. In addition to this, the whole of Naval Artillery Battalion 614 on the northern front of the Crimea, consisting of 5 batteries. The 6th will be loaded in Nikolayev for transport by ship to Sevastopol, also for use on the northern front of the Crimea.

On the supply situation in the Crimea a report of the Naval Liaison Officer with High Command Army, Army General Staff has been received, the data of which are based on estimations by Army Command 17 of 3 Nov.

Copy as per 1/Skl 31462/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

According to this report the daily requirements of supplies from now on are estimated at 725 tons for the Army, including 300 tons of ammunition and 200 cbm of fuel, and 250 tons for the Air Force.

After decrease in stocks on hand, requirements of supplies will increase from the beginning of December and will reach their maximum level with 2,170 tons daily from mid-January, (as a result of the necessity of bringing up furnace coal and fodder). As it seems likely that these requirements can no longer be met to the full, a balance must be achieved at the same time by an immediate, ruthless cut in the consumption of coal and by full utilization of all stocks of wood. In addition to this, the return of horses would be necessary, if possible.

War Transport KT "25" and seven further naval landing craft are provided for the immediate transport of assault guns from Odessa to Sevastopol.

Group South emphasizes the request of the Naval Air Commander, Crimea for an earlier change-over to Ju 88's that was previously scheduled for the middle of 1944, since the BV 138's now in use are no longer equal to their tasks. The enemy is steadily advancing in the area west of the Black Sea and using air forces that are superior to the BV 138 in every respect. As compensation for the loss of the BV 138 an increased assignment of planes and crews for the 4th Long Range Reconnaissance / 122 is requested.

Naval Staff informed Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff of the request of Group South with the remark that the more acute situation and the further development to be expected in the Crimea puts emphasis on the problem of reconnaissance and protection of convoys. It is urgently necessary to bring about a speedy, at least tem-

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porary, improvement of the Black Sea area in the interests of all branches of the Armed Forces.

IX. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing special to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that full "special priority 3" is approved for the field of torpedo production and communications development. A new drive for mine production is in progress. The 15,000 tons of iron captured in Italy were not placed at the disposal of the Navy, as had been requested. It is to be assumed that the whole or part of it is going to shipbuilding.

II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division: The Cairo Conference concluded with a colorless communiqué.

Turkey has withdrawn her Ambassador from Rome. This measure does not mean the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, but is solely aimed at supporting Turkish freedom of action.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. The discussion of measures in accordance with the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51 is scheduled to take place on 11 Nov. It is left to the participants to bring with them a staff officer for discussion of individual problems.

IV. Report of Quartermaster General on the Fuehrer's directive of 25 Oct. regarding shipping in the area of Naval Group South. The directive reads:

"The Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Seas are operational areas. Military and industrial supplies on the sea routes along the coast of these areas, to Crete and to the islands of the Aegean and Ionian Sea are greatly endangered by the existing sea transport crisis, and demand the unqualified employment of available shipping under a uniform command as well as the bringing-up of suitable small shipping to the greatest possible extent.

For this purpose I issue the following orders:

1. High Command, Navy will take over sea transports in the above sea areas.

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2. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, in collaboration with High Command, Navy, will see to it that suitable small shipping from conversions and new constructions is provided quickly for use in the above sea areas, with preference given to the Aegean. The main committee for ship construction will make available the necessary quotas of iron and dockyard facilities.

3. Commander in Chief, Navy will inform me of the measures taken.

4. The necessary authorizing instructions will be issued by Chief, Armed Forces High Command."

The executive instructions of Chief, Armed Forces High Command read as follows:

"I. a. Navy and Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping:

1. The branches of the Naval Staff will take over all sea transport and will for this purpose be given the right to issue instructions to local offices of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping on the assignment of available shipping.

2. As before, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will see to the provision and management of the necessary shipping as well as to continuous replacement of merchant shipping tonnage that is lost. In this, the Navy is entitled to take part in planning for replacement of tonnage and to make the demands necessary for carrying out all sea transport as entrusted to it.

3. The instructions according to 2 apply to the transfer of ships by sea or by land as well as to replacement by new constructions and conversions and also apply to the Fuehrer's order on the increase in the number of small ships in the Aegean issued on 10 Oct. (OKW/W.F. St./QU I (M) No. 006101/43 Gkdos.)

4. The Fuehrer's order issued on 15 June 1943 to cover the requirements of crews for small ships in the Mediterranean by the Armed Forces is extended to the above sea areas. High Command, Navy will take over the execution of further necessary measures. (OKW/WFST/Org./Qu.Nr. 002841/43 Gkdos.)

b. Ministry of Armament and War Production and Navy:

1. The iron quotas necessary for the construction of small shipping are to be provided by all three branches of the Armed Forces and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping (mainly the Navy).

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2. Commander in Chief, Navy is authorized to exert his influence in the distribution of the iron quota available for the southeastern area and in the construction projects of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping (types for conversion and new construction).

II. In order further to clarify the relations of authority and command it is ordered:

Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, or the appropriate Army Group, will determine transport requirements and fix the priority of all land and sea transports for warfare and for industry.

III. I request that the Navy continually keep me suitably informed through Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, of the amount of shipping and transport that can probably be carried out."

In connection with this, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division issued the following instructions to the offices concerned, with copy to Group West; Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division; Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping; Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas.

"For carrying out sea transports it is ordered:

1. Commander in Chief, Navy expects all naval offices concerned to cooperate closely and with understanding with all other offices of the Armed Forces and of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping concerned, in order to achieve the maximum amount of transport. The sea transport crisis must be overcome at all costs.

2. Group South and German Naval Command, Italy are charged with carrying out sea transports each in their respective area. They will have to distribute and employ available shipping in accordance with the transport requirements and priority laid down by the competent Commander, Armed Forces or Army Group. In addition to management etc., loading and unloading is also to be left with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, as far as the latter were carried out by him up to now. Group South and German Naval Command, Italy will determine and report the date from which they will take over the responsibility for sea transport.

3. Group South and Naval Command, Italy will report to High Command, Navy, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch on:

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- a. Plans for the coming month with demands that cannot be met.
 - b. At the end of each month the number of persons and amount of goods transported in the past month according to prescribed form.
 - c. Daily shipping situation according to prescribed form. For the purpose of quick transmission, the Commanding Admirals will report directly on c. at the same time.
4. Group South and Naval Command, Italy will submit their demands for necessary replacement of shipping space, divided according to sea areas.
5. Reference is made to the advisability of port captains participating in tasks of sea transport."

Chief, Naval Staff approves, but is of the opinion that transfer of the task overburdens the Navy to an undesirable extent and that with the previous arrangement of sea transport in the area in question there was no need to doubt the good will of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to comply with military requirements. Besides, the Fuehrer's order was issued without consulting High Command, Navy.

To this, Quartermaster General, Naval Staff reports that the Army is the party mainly interested in sea transports; it must therefore be assumed that the new order was urged from these quarters without the naval offices concerned being consulted at the same time. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff is of the opinion that the order will result in requiring those offices that previously have done all the practical work now also to assume command and responsibility.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that the former Commanding Admiral, Aegean, at present in Berlin, be asked how this measure will work out in practice in the Aegean area.

V. Army Situation:

Our losses up to 5 Nov. amounting to 75 officers and 2,512 noncommissioned officers and men give proof of the severity of the fighting in the Crimea.

On the eastern front the focal point lies in the south in the Kiev area. The enemy pushed to a great extent to the southwest and west and took Fastov. The situation of the 13th and 7th Army Corps is unknown. All our forces are being used in the fighting against the dangerous spearhead.

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On the Italian front the enemy continues his heavy attacks with undiminished intensity. In general our main defense line was held. There is no reason for anxiety here.

The situation in the Balkans is unchanged.

Special Items:

I. According to Directive 51, the Navy is to prepare for the commitment of the strongest possible naval forces suited for defense against enemy attempts at landing in the west area and Denmark.

The provision of the largest possible number of naval landing craft (artillery) is considered the only possibility of procuring additional naval forces suited for defense against landings within the short time still available.

Therefore the following additional demand was transmitted to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division:

"By the end of 1943 for Commanding Admiral, Defenses West: 20, for Commanding Admiral, Defenses North: 10 = altogether: 30 naval landing craft (artillery).

By 31 Mar. 1944 for Commanding Admiral, Defenses West: 20, for Commanding Admiral, Defenses North: 10 = altogether: 30 naval landing craft (artillery).

Altogether: for Commanding Admiral, Defenses West: 40, for Commanding Admiral, Defenses North: 20 = 60 naval landing craft (artillery).

For this, it will be necessary to draw upon all naval landing craft that will become available in the home area during the coming months and, to a certain extent, also upon the boats of Admiral, Landing craft and Bases. This will not apply to the eight naval landing craft (mines) requested by Group West and to the six naval landing craft (mines) for the 24th Landing Flotilla; it is absolutely necessary to provide these 14 naval landing craft (mines)."

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is requested to introduce quickly all measures to ensure the fulfilment of the above demands. According to the above Fuehrer Directive, the provision of these 60 naval landing craft (artillery) has priority over all other projects.

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II. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division has instructed the shipyards of Luerksen and Schlichting to prepare the new PT boats under construction S "131", "148" and "149", for immediate transfer to the Black Sea.

Commander PT boats, raises objections to drawing upon new boats under construction, two of which are equipped with supercharged engines. Since operational boats have to be withdrawn in any case for reinforcement of the Training Flotilla, he proposes that three boats of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla, which had been reduced to seven boats by losses, should be provided for transfer to the Black Sea, while the rest should be assigned to the Training Flotilla and that the 4th Flotilla should be put back on operations in the middle of January with four new boats with supercharged engines. For details of the proposal see teletype 1715.

III. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division informs Groups North/ Fleet; West; South; Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean; German Naval Command, Italy; Naval Commands, North and Baltic on the enemy situation, based on a review by Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West, dated 5 Nov. as follows:

"In the area of Great Britain, importance must be attached to statements from a reliable source regarding transfer of ground personnel of the close-combat forces (TAF) from the area of the mouth of the Humber to the area west and northwest of London, as well as to the transfer of ground radio stations from the area southeast of London to the southwest, with main center in the area of Chichester - Portsmouth.

These movements are part of progressive offensive preparations and may perhaps be taken as an indication of plans against western Normandy and Brittany.

In the Mediterranean Area, the bringing-up of a new U.S. formation is of importance apart from the re-organization of the 15th U.S. Army Air Force in North Africa, which, together with the 12th Air Force, will make possible concentrated operations by strong U.S. Air Force formations. These enemy measures indicate the persistence of large-scale operational intentions in the Mediterranean area, the focal point seeming to lie in the central part, while there are still only comparatively small forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The east coast of the Adriatic is still regarded as the sector particularly endangered.

Southern Italy: Further strong enemy attacks, above all a quick follow-up by the British 8th Army, as well as the participation of enemy ships' batteries and leap-frog landings on the coasts, are to be expected. In the Balkans there are indications of further measures by the Anglo-American command in the coastal area of the Adriatic. The enemy air

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force is trying to eliminate effective operations by our air forces against enemy shipping movements in the area of the Aegean islands by increasing attacks on airfields, very particularly in Greece.

In Turkey the effect of the Moscow Conference is becoming noticeable in a mounting nervousness, which is understandable. The meeting of the Turkish foreign minister and his large retinue with Eden in Cairo, which directly followed, is undoubtedly closely connected with the conclusions of the Conference, and may be of essential importance for the future attitude of Turkey. On the whole, the possibility of a further swing by Turkey to the Anglo-American side seems to be growing nearer.

Situation 8 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

In the Great Lakes area the U.S. Navy has converted a former passenger steamer into a training aircraft-carrier named SABLE. The ship is said to have a speed of 40 knots.

At the end of October the Straits of Magellan were passed by four freighters bound for the Atlantic and six bound for the Pacific.

As to the shipping movements and the traffic situation in the southern Atlantic, Naval Staff has at present only very sparse information. On 5 Nov. one of our submarines was attacked by an enemy plane in FL 63. The following were sighted:

on 28 Aug. a twin-engined U.S. long-range reconnaissance plane at 12° 51'S 33° 18' W,

on 19 Aug. one merchantman at 16° 00'S 31° 29'W and

on 15 Sept. one merchantman at 24° 34' N 37° 28'W.

Information on the enemy situation for all ships in foreign waters was given accordingly by teletype 2024.

2. Own Situation:

The OSORNO, RIO GRANDE and ALSTERUFER received the following instructions, for captains only, by radiogram with special code "Tibet":

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1. For the OSORNO points "Offerte" and "Orange" are transferred 200 miles to the west. The island is to be kept at a good distance to the east.
2. Passing of "Orange" by the OSORNO not before 3 Dec., of "Rasthaus" by the RIO GRANDE not before 5 Dec. and of "Algebra" by the ALSTERUFER not before 8 Dec.
3. Waiting periods, preferably in grid squares GD, GE, GN, GO, GW, GX or a corresponding reduction of cruising speed is left to the discretion of captains.
4. Our own submarines are operating in the southern Atlantic east of the limits fixed in the sailing orders on the starboard of the homeward passage course.
5. This radiogram is to be kept particularly secret, in order to prevent compromise of the other ships."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-one planes were observed on operation over the Bay of Biscay.

At 1205 our air reconnaissance sighted one destroyer in CF 3968 on northerly course and at 1650 one cruiser in CF 3928 on westerly course, both vessels proceeding at high speed.

Off Brest further minelaying was observed.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

At 1000 the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with the KONDOR, FALKE, and MOEVE coming from Brest put into La Pallice. South of Brest two ELM/A mines were cleared. One submarine was escorted out and five in, one of the latter being U "123" that was picked up on 7 Nov. in BF 5530 not in BF 9530. Steamer convoy traffic proceeded according to plan.

3. Channel Coast:

From 1909 to 2051 an enemy objective was located by radar north of Cape Antifer without further details being ascertained. Owing to heavy seas only some patrol positions were taken up. Coastal channels were swept only within the area of the Channel Islands.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

During the day our minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas were out in strong force but at night they were restricted by weather conditions. North of Borkum one mine was cleared.

At 2240 a fire broke out in the stoke-hold of the motor minesweeper escort vessel ALDERS off Ijmuiden; the ship is putting in with the aid of tugs.

At 1800 convoy 1187 Hook-Elbe started out with two steamers.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

On the morning of 7 Nov. a single plane entered the area of Vardoe, in the afternoon four planes entered the Sandoe area and during the night of 7 Nov. a single plane entered the area of Stavanger.

Thirty-one ships were escorted north and nineteen south. Thirty ships remained lying in harbor.

On 7 Nov. at 2020 a submarine was located in AF 3393 (West Fjord near Rottvaer). Six patrol boats took up the chase and shipping in West Fjord is suspended.

The tug FRIGGA went aground in Ofoten Fjord and one naval landing craft in Bille Fjord.

On 7 Nov. at 1730 the GALSTER and IHN entered Aalesund and continued their passage south at 0800 on 8 Nov.

Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff of the following instructions regarding the transfer of destroyers Z "31" and the RIEDEL:

"1. On 10 Nov. Z "31" and the RIEDEL are to transfer from Narvik into home waters.

2. Control by Group North/Fleet as from 63° 30' N.

3. After entering Kristiansand South - probably on 13 Nov. - they will be placed at the disposal of Naval Command, Baltic for about two days for blockade-runner operations. Naval Command, Baltic will give orders to the destroyers directly.

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4. Refuelling provided at Kristiansand South."

Naval Command, Norway reports that repair work to make the BEITZEN watertight will not be completed until 9 or 10 Nov.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare.

At 2200 submarine U "648" encountered a carrier group on westerly course in the area of the Azores (BC 9935) and fired a triple spread at the carrier, which missed. The group was lost from sight in an artificial smoke screen and in a rainstorm. A T-5 torpedo fired at an escort vessel detonated prematurely.

At 1035 submarine U "714" sighted a steamer and four escorts in AJ 9414 on course 140° and reported an air attack at 1720, presumably when following the ships. Since then the boat has not reported again.

Submarine U "841" must be presumed lost. U "537" made frequent locations on normal frequencies and with Naxos in BC 40. On 31 Oct. the boat was attacked by a plane when the Naxos gear was out of action, and moved to BD 59.

Owing to one plane being put out of action, our air reconnaissance in the morning only covered the area between CF 3842, 3962, 6815, 5984, 3842 using location gear; in the afternoon our air reconnaissance also achieved no success in CF 3341, 6365, 8266, 2769, and 3341 with three planes using location gear. Either reconnaissance was too incomplete or the enemy deviated to the west. From 2000 Group "Schill" proceeded at maximum speed to position line CF 2561 - 3436. Reconnaissance with five planes without location gear is planned for 9 Nov. south of 41° N to 21° W.

As planned, the boats of dispersed group "Tirpitz" are proceeding to the northeast for new disposition.

No reports received from the Indian Ocean.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

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1. British Isles and Vicinity:

By day 16 reconnaissance planes, 26 fighters, 6 heavy fighters and 2 weather planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation.

During the night of 8 Nov. 13 planes dropped 14 SC 250's and 16 SD 70's over London.

By day minor enemy forces carried out attacks against trains in Belgium and northern France and on the construction site of the Todt Organization near St. Inglebert as well as against some points in the Rhineland.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes were mainly out on reconnaissance.

In the afternoon the enemy ineffectively attacked Turin and towns in the area of Genoa-Cremona-Pavia as well as shipping targets in Suda Bay and one of our convoys southwest of Amorgos (landing unit "Taifun").

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

According to a final statement from Algeciras, the convoy reported on 7 Nov. at 0800 from Tres Forcas consisted of 55 freighters, 3 tankers and 8 escorts. On 7 Nov. at 2050 it passed Pta Carnero. Nine of the freighters and 4 escort vessels of the convoy put into Gibraltar.

Since the evening of 7 Nov. there has been a large amount of shipping traffic in the area of Gibraltar.

The following ships put out into the Atlantic:

on 7 Nov. at 1645 3 U.S. destroyers from Gibraltar,

on 7 Nov. at 1730 3 U.S. freighters with deck cargo, 1 light cruiser and 1 destroyer from the Mediterranean,

on 8 Nov. at 1545 9 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 corvettes from Gibraltar,

on 7 Nov. at 1950 5 freighters from Gibraltar,

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on 7 Nov. at 2100 1 DIDO class, 1 FIJI class from Gibraltar.

Put into the Mediterranean:

on 7 Nov. at 1630 3 British destroyers,

on 8 Nov. at 1830 1 MONTCALM class,

on 8 Nov. at 0800 1 large transport (25,000 BRT):

Put into Gibraltar:

on 7 Nov. at 1830 2 freighters, 1 destroyer from the Mediterranean,

on 8 Nov. at 0630 1 battleship of the WARSPITE class in tow with 4 destroyers. The towing unit was reported at noon on 7 Nov. from Alboran.

It is possible that the damage to the battleship was caused by our air attack on 16 Sept. in the Gulf of Salerno, where one heavy vessel-battleship or heavy cruiser - was reported heavily damaged (cf. War Diary 16 Sept.).

In addition to the 9 reported freighters of the large convoy, 1 LCT, 2 Italian and 2 British destroyers put into Gibraltar from the Atlantic. According to air reconnaissance, 2 destroyers and 1 vessel, apparently a transport, were lying in Ajaccio, 2 naval landing craft in Bonifacio, 3 PT boats, 1 tanker, 3 steamers and 6 coastal vessels in Maddalena and two steamers in Olbia.

At 0923 2 vessels, presumably transports, 3 steamers, and 4 landing craft on southerly course were 35 miles northeast of Cape Spartivento and at 0918 11 landing craft on northerly course were 60 miles northeast of the same cape.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

The investigation of the explosives detonation in Spezia revealed no cause to blame the crews of the 10th Italian PT Boat Flotilla. At Ancona one tug was sunk during an enemy air attack. In the course of the scheduled demolition of Pescara, 21 further vessels, the transfer of which was impossible owing to lack of personnel, were sunk.

It is now reported that in the middle of October the coastal defense boat DELPHIN was commissioned in Leghorn.

Nothing special to report on the transport situation.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

On 6 and 7 Nov. the 3rd, 5th, and 8th battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 623 arrived at Durazzo. The torpedo battery in the entrance to Cattaro is reported ready for action with three tubes and three torpedoes. The explosion reported aboard the steamer DIANA was apparently caused by a torpedo hit.

The commitment of seven Arado 196's as a convoy escort squadron from Pola has been ordered.

The transfer of the Siebel ferries and infantry boats on the east coast to the south is proceeding as planned. The first group reached Corfu, the second Valona, the third entered Durazzo on 8 Nov. at 0700 and will continue passage at 0930.

The hospital ship GRADISCA is scheduled to leave Patras for Trieste by way of Corfu on 9 Nov.

Commander of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla intends to leave Venice with four boats on 9 Nov. and to proceed to Dubrovnik after refuelling at Pola. The two boats S "30" and S "33" will remain in Dubrovnik for operations. The Commander of the flotilla intends to go on to Patras with S "54" and S "61" at 1700 on 10 Nov.

Group South urges an investigation as to whether an overhauling of the engines of the PT boats and motor minesweepers is possible in the west area during their transfer to the Adriatic.

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance one vessel, apparently a cruiser, was on course 45° 150 miles north of Alexandria at 0820, and two destroyers on course 170° about 120 miles northnorthwest of Alexandria at 1045. The following submarine positions were reported in the Aegean:

At 0610 near Cape Sideros, at 0932 south of Scarpanto, at 1120 in the Strait of Kos, at 1132 65 miles southsoutheast of Rhodes and at 1550 off the north coast of Amorgos.

Own Situation:

Landing Unit "Taifun" started out from Paros according to plan at 0700 on 8 Nov. It was located by enemy planes at 1015 for

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the first time and attacked at 1330 by twelve low-flying enemy planes. Only three men were wounded. Most of the unit entered Amorgos at 1500. Three tankers and two combined operations boats remained in Nausa Bay. Motor minesweeper R "195" anchored in the Gulf of Marmara with engine damage.

Motor minesweepers R "34", "194" and "211" entered Piraeus for repair at 1150. At 1400 PT boat S "55" left Piraeus for the northern point of Amorgos in order to protect the landing unit against enemy naval forces.

During the night of 7 Nov., some bombs were dropped in the area of Nios. The steamers SANTA FE, JOH. MAERSK, and BACCHUS continued their passage from Khalkis to the Black Sea.

From a report of Group South (see teletype 1730), it is gathered that the plan of Commanding Admiral, Aegean that vessels of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla shall operate during operation "Taifun" as a covering group for the landing unit in the assault on Leros only by night, but then without restriction, is not approved by Army Group E. Group South acknowledges as justified the tactical objections by Commanding Admiral, Aegean against operations by day, but in view of the operational situation has issued an order to Commanding Admiral, Aegean in accordance with the views of Army Group E.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence two destroyers were at sea in the northeastern part of the east coast, while several submarines were in the sea area of the Crimea and west thereof. One submarine is apparently missing. According to statements of prisoners of war, the enemy lost two landing boats in the course of the landing near Eltigen on the night of 31 Oct. and regimental artillery of the 218th Rifle Division on the night of 4 Nov. Only three of twelve guns came back to the operational base. Several boats were lost near Yenikale.

Own Situation:

At 1116 submarine U "18" sank one tanker (2,000 BRT) on Batum roads. Off Eltigen the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla again sank two motor gunboats and one PT boat and damaged a further gunboat during the night of 7 Nov. Our PT boats did not contact the enemy. The thrust by naval landing craft in the northern part of the Strait of Kerch was broken off due to heavy shelling from the shore. Naval landing craft F "446" received a direct hit on the bridge.

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The following operations are planned for the night of 8 Nov.:

aa) Minelaying in the northern part of the Strait of Kerch by four naval landing craft.

bb) Patrol line off Kerch Bay by altogether twelve naval landing craft and two motor minesweepers.

According to a preliminary report four naval landing craft came into contact with enemy gunboats and PT boats off Eltigen at 2100 and 2156.

At 1300 submarine U "20" left Constanta for the operational area. The minelaying unit for mine operation S 47 also left Constanta.

Naval landing craft F "574" that ran aground near Kamysch Burun was refloated.

Convoy traffic proceeded without incidents. On the evening of 6 Nov. one remote minesweeper of the Danube Flotilla fought partisans with gun fire at the Kazan narrows.

According to a report of the Naval Liaison Officer with the High Command Army, General Staff, Army Group A has been ordered to occupy the projecting peninsula north of Yagoliski Bay in order to prevent an advance by the enemy and the closing of the channel south of Ochakov.

As to the army situation, Army Group A reports as follows:

At 1500: "No change in the beachheads on both sides of Kerch. On the Sivash beachhead enemy attacks repelled. Along the Tartar Wall extremely bitter and fierce fighting continued. After fluctuating battles the Tartar Trench in our hands from 700 m west of the reconnaissance car. Due to the bringing-up of fresh enemy forces in the direction of Perekop a further aggravation of the situation is to be expected. Anti-aircraft gun crews in the area of the Perekop pass destroyed 50 tanks from 31 Oct. - 4 Nov."

At 2000: "Heavy enemy attacks in the Perekop area, which were repulsed. The enemy who crossed the Sivash took Urshni."

At 2012 Commanding Admiral, Black Sea ordered precautionary preparations for the transfer of the Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine and the naval office at Nikolayev to Odessa and into the area of Odessa and for the transfer of the Dockyard Control Staff of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to Tiraspol.

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VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

In a resolution of the social democratic party of Finland it was declared on 8 Nov. that Finland is hoping that peace will soon be restored and that she will be able to retire from the war. However, it is out of the question that Finland will capitulate to a foreign power.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division:

a. According to a report of the German envoy in Bucarest, the situation in Rumania is gradually coming to a head. Symptoms of an attempt to leave an opening for going over to the Anglo-American side, seemingly by the silent toleration of Antonescu, are increasing. The situation is not without danger from a long-range point of view.

b. Naval Intelligence Division estimates the total transport capacity of the enemy in the Black Sea at about 55,000 men with light weapons.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

II. Army Situation:

From penetrations near Kiev and Nevel the enemy gained further considerable ground. A new, strong point of attack is apparent near Vitebsk.

III. Report of Chief of Operations Branch, Operations Division.

a. On the report of Group South regarding the commitment of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla in operation "Taifun" by day (see War Diary 8 Nov.). Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports that, after thorough consideration, the Naval Staff will desist from interference. If it is ordered that the Aegean must be held, the risk of losing the valuable vessels must be run, as the conquest of Leros represents an indispensable condition for carrying out the order.

Chief, Naval Staff is of the same opinion.

b. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmits the following for information:

1. A review of the possibilities of enemy attacks against the northern area dated 3 Nov. and

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2. a review of the possibilities of enemy attacks against the west area from the west.

Copies as per order Skl. Ia 3338/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. a.

As regards 1. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has arrived at the following summarized views:

"Only an attack on Oslo with secondary attacks on Jutland and the southern bases of Norway south of Bergen can have a farreaching operational effect.

At the same time, it demands the greatest risk and the most forces.

In addition, a pincer attack on Trondheim, with the active participation of Sweden, can lead to a decisive penetration by the Anglo-Saxons into the European fortress.

The remaining possibilities are of local significance only, but in the end they can decisively affect the supply situation."

As to 2. the views in short are that for a large-scale landing with operational aims the Channel Coast is most likely; a landing in the Netherlands is also possible, given special weather conditions. Cherbourg and Brittany are most likely for landings with a limited target and secondary operations.

c. In answer to the proposal of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea received the following radiogram from Chief, Naval Staff, with copy to Group South:

"The naval forces operating off the Crimean coast have contributed substantially to the favorable result of defensive fighting up to now by their successful operations. I express my appreciation to you all and particularly to the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. The fight must be continued with firmness and determination."

Situation 9 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report via "Ostrov", about 10,000 Canadian troops were shipped between 29 Oct. and 3 Nov.

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2. Own Situation:

The first three blockade-runners bound for Europe left Batavia. The first of them will pass 20° E., south of 45° S. on about 13 Nov. and is not to cross the equator before 3 Dec. Therefore the ship must wait about 10 days in the south Atlantic, or reduce her cruising speed accordingly. As no details on enemy traffic in the south Atlantic are known at present, the ships must be given freedom of action.

Therefore Naval Staff, Submarine Division is asked to order submarines operating in the south Atlantic to stop at the borders of route "Anton" as from 13 Nov. The blockade-runners have been informed accordingly. Section D of route "Anton" is closed as from 1 Dec.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmits the following report from Singapore regarding supply of the TANNE and the KIEFER:

1. Rendezvous and refueling point "Tannenwald" newly established between the Japanese and the BOGOTA at 28° S, 80° E.
 2. A second refueling with 80 tons at the second rendezvous "Kiefernwald" at 30° S., 50° E. is requested from Japan, in order to avoid refueling in the north Atlantic, which would otherwise be necessary.
 3. Times of refueling:
 - a. The TANNE: 28 Nov. and 4 Dec.
 - b. The KIEFER: about 25 and 31 Dec.
 4. The boats are to report refueling carried out three days' run after "Kiefernwald".
 5. The departure of the TANNE from Penang and the BOGOTA from Singapore is scheduled for 16 Nov.
 6. The program was worked out with the Chief of Japanese Naval Warfare in the Indian Ocean and can be carried out by the BOGOTA.
 7. From "Kiefernwald" the TANNE is to be dead-reckoned with 10 knots.
- Naval Staff, Submarine Division was informed accordingly.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio was instructed:

1. to have the FLIEDER informed of the approaching blockade-runners. The same has been done from here.
2. to inform the Japanese Navy that refuelling for the TANNE and KIEFER in the north Atlantic is probably impossible: Naval Staff asks that the TANNE and KIEFER modify their cruising speed accordingly.

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-five planes were observed on operation over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located at 1915 in AL 9930 and on 10 Nov. at 0319 in AM 7780. At 1300 locations were reported 30 miles northnorthwest of Bayonne that were possibly connected with the submarine that was detected by air reconnaissance on 8 Nov. at 1503 30 miles southwest of Cape Ferrat. So far submarine-chase has been without success. On 9 Nov. at 1100 our air reconnaissance sighted 3 landing craft on course 360° in CF 5378; at 1357 24 landing craft, 1 destroyer and 1 merchantman on course 330° in CG 1182; at 1132 a convoy consisting of 34 merchantmen with 7 escort vessels on northerly course in CF 2591 and at 1852 a convoy consisting of 34 merchantmen with 3 destroyers and 4 escorts on course 330° in CF 2342, evidently the unit already detected at 1132.

According to an intelligence report, "Ostrov" again confirmed on 22 Oct., on inquiry from Foreign Armies West and Air Force, Operations Staff, Foreign Affairs Section, that the harbors of southern England are empty. The transfer east of landing craft and troops from the area Salcombe-Poolè continues. The main body might be lying in the area of Portsmouth-Southampton.

According to a further intelligence report, six enemy freighters put into Lisbon at 0900 on 9 Nov. They were escorted by two destroyers and one plane up to the mouth of the Tagus.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Altogether five mines were cleared off Brest, Lorient and La Pallice. During the night of 10 Nov. the motor ship TANNENFELS will be transferred from Royan to Brest. Convoy traffic proceeded without incident.

Channel Coast:

Two mines were cleared northwest of St. Malo. At 1315 five French fishing cutters were attacked with machine-guns by British fighters off St. Malo without much effect. Southwest of Jersey, mines were probably dropped at 1630. On 8 Nov. between 1740 and 2045 the main supply cable to the radar station at Blanc Nez was cut by sabotage. The saboteur escaped

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Four mines were cleared in the Heligoland Bight. Convoy 1187 Hook-Elbe was carried out according to plan.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the north of Scotland/Faroes area 14 planes were observed on operation in the morning and 21 later. According to radio intelligence, a British warship searched the Swedish steamer NAGARA in position 80 miles west of Stadlandet at 2105.

According to detailed evaluation of photographic reconnaissance, the unit located on 28 Oct. at 1130 by reconnaissance of the 5th Air Force 80 miles eastnortheast of Vardoe consisted of 5 vessels, apparently escort boats of a new type, 1 vessel, apparently a minelayer, 1 motor minesweeper and 5 patrol boats. Thus, the 5th Air Force assumes that this was a Russian unit, and not, as previously presumed, relocation of a British unit with destroyers.

Photographic reconnaissance of Molotovsk on 2 Nov. showed a decrease of 17,000 BRT in merchant shipping as against 15 Sept. Due to lack of photographs for comparison it cannot be seen whether ships are being withdrawn to Archangel or Murmansk.

Own Situation:

Gun fire on both sides was reported from the Petsamo area on the morning of 8 Nov. Shipping in West Fjord and north of Bodoe is again permitted.

Destroyers Z "31" and the RIEDEL were transferred from Alta to Narvik.

By order of Group North/Fleet, the GALSTER and IHN will proceed from Kristiansand South to Kiel during the night of 11 Nov. (See teletype 1157).

Thirty-six ships were escorted north, and twenty-six south. Thirty-six ships remained lying in harbor.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the course of lively gun fire the direction-finding station in Peterhof Cathedral received four direct hits. Air activity was normal. While shelling Lavansaari Army Battery 688 was attacked by bombers and fighters.

2. Own Situation:

Near Anholt two mines were cleared. Otherwise nothing to report.

Naval Command, Baltic reported the state of construction for reinforcement of the Estonian and Latvian coast. For copy see teletype 1426.

Regarding movements of Battery "Bluecher" by rail, the Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff reports that this can only be carried out if it does not affect supply traffic to Army Group North. The decision on operational runs rests with the General, Transports North. (See teletype 1240.)

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report two escorted transports with 10,000 British infantry left Plymouth on the night of 6 Nov., bound for Sicily.

2. Own Situation:

The new manner in which our boats are disposed in the north Atlantic in 10 groups each of 3 boats with point of concentration in AK is to be considered as an emergency measure, in order to avoid as far as possible location in patrol lines that can easily be detected, and thereby maintain some prospect of detecting the enemy. However, the probability that the enemy will slip through the gaps is great.

In the area of the Azores the convoy awaited by Group "Schill" was detected in CF 2591 by our air reconnaissance at 1150. It must therefore have passed our reconnaissance lines during the night. Star shells and red lights were also sighted. In addition, submarine U "466" succeeded at 0602 in sinking a destroyer with T 5 torpedo in CF. A T 5 torpedo attack by submarine U "262" on a destroyer in CF 2658 was unsuccessful.

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Due to lively enemy air reconnaissance in the area of the Azores, the boats of the Group were forced to submerge in the morning, so that they dropped astern completely.

Detection of the enemy again at 1910 by a plane in CF 2342 was of no help to the group since direction-finder signals were not heard.

The operational failure of Group "Schill" is to be attributed exclusively to insufficient air reconnaissance. An improvement may be expected from employment of Ju 290.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has submitted a report on convoy operation No 5, in the course of which Group "Leuthen" employed "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes for the first time. Copy as per 1/Skl 31776/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

By day minor enemy forces attacked traffic installations in Belgium and Northern France. In the evening 35 planes entered the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area. Some damage was caused at Bochum.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes raided Teano, north of Naples, Naples and Maddalena as well as Porto Lago on Leros. Ninety-two bombers were sent in to attack Naples. The evaluation of photographs showing the effect of the attack on Naples on the night of 8 Nov. revealed that four enemy submarines were damaged.

The enemy carried out attacks in the area of Turin, on Genoa and Trieste. Our landing unit in the Aegean was attacked, one enemy plane being shot down, and one of our planes being lost. Further enemy attacks were directed against the harbor installations of Suda and fuel stores near Castelli in the eastern part of Crete. One plane was shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reported the sighting of four PT boats off Lysekil on course 300° at 0910, and on course 120° at 0930.

No important reports on operations received.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

In the morning one BIRMINGHAM class cruiser entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic. Seven freighters passed Cape Spartel heading for the Straits of Gibraltar.

In the sea area and in the coastal waters of Corsica and Sardinia no special shipping movements were observed. No particular concentrations of troops, materiel, ships or landing craft could be observed according to air reconnaissance. Only in Cagliari were nine freighters discerned.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

During the night of 8 Nov. torpedo boat T "24" and three PT boats carried out minelaying in the area of Elba according to plan.

Submarine-chase in the area off Genoa and Piombino was without success. Off Savona fast escort boat 'SG "15" was unsuccessfully attacked from the air with bombs.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Commanding Admiral, Adriatic reports that mopping-up of the islands by the Tank Army Command is making progress. The coastal route within the islands is still closed between Sebenik-Split and Dubrovnik. The outer route cannot be used due to the enemy situation. Shipping between Trieste and Sebenik is possible. Thus no change in bauxite transport has taken place.

Commander of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla reports that the operational time-limit for group S "30" and "33" only suffices for three torpedo operations against the east coast of Italy. After that the boats must be transferred for change of engines.

Group South suggests that in view of the weakness of our air reconnaissance, information on the enemy situation on the east coast of Italy be obtained by wider use of agents. (See teletype 1905).

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 2245 on 8 Nov. three destroyers coming in from the southwest were observed searching the north coast of Amorgos without re-

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sult. During the night of 10 Nov. 1 destroyer, 2 escort boats, 2 torpedo boats, 2 minesweepers, and 2 submarines were positively observed in the southern Aegean. Since reconnaissance of Turkish territorial waters was incomplete, the presence of further vessels is to be expected.

At 0110 submarine-chaser "2110" reported two destroyers near Amorgos. According to air reconnaissance two PT boats left Turkish waters at 1045. What was apparently a submerged submarine was near Lemnos at 1635.

Own Situation:

In view of the 18 hour passage from Amorgos to Kos and due to unfavorable weather, the landing unit, the main part of which had left Amorgos as scheduled, was divided into two groups that are to enter Stampalia and Levitha respectively during the night of 9 Nov. Thus arrival of the unit at its destination is not possible before the afternoon of 10 Nov.

No enemy objectives were sighted in the advance area in the course of reconnaissance early on 9 Nov. The group for Stampalia apparently entered the harbor at 1600 unobserved. The group for Levitha was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy torpedo planes at noon. Our air cover repulsed the attack. The group entered the harbor at 1415.

At 1445 submarine-chaser "2101" was unsuccessfully attacked by 6 torpedo planes while en route from Kalymnos to Stampalia. Our fighters succeeded in shooting down one plane.

Due to sea damage and engine trouble one naval landing craft and one combined operations boat remained in Amorgos.

Both landing unit groups are scheduled to continue their passage on the morning of 10 Nov.

Three of the original five motor minesweepers engaged in the operation are out of action up to now. Therefore, Commanding Admiral, Aegean requests that the promised motor minesweepers from the Adriatic area be brought up quickly. PT boat S "55", too, will be out of action for some days due to engine trouble.

The minelayer MOROSINI carried out minelaying according to plan. The mopping-up of Skiathos and Skopelos was started by Naval Shore Commander, Salonika in collaboration with the Army.

Submarine U "575" was assigned area of operations in the southern Aegean, limited in the north by the line Kos-Siryna, in the west by 26° E, in the east by Turkish territorial waters, and unlimited in the south. The submarine is to combat enemy surface forces and supply traffic, as well as submarines, until instructed otherwise. During operation "Taifun" point of concentration in the sea area in the entrance to the Gulf of Kos. Views by Naval Staff will follow.

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b. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No new information was gathered as regards the location of naval forces. According to a further statement by a prisoner of war, the Russians lost six to eight landing boats with 650 men through mines and gun fire in the crossing to the beachhead of Bakhchi during the night of 2 Nov.

Own Situation:

Minelaying in the northern part of the Strait of Kerch was carried out as planned during the night of 8 Nov. On return passage naval landing craft F "449" ran aground on the enemy coast in the fog and was lost.

A group of naval landing craft off Eltigen came into contact with an enemy landing unit three times. One motor gunboat was damaged; the unit was forced to withdraw.

The remaining groups of naval landing craft did not sight any enemy objectives. On the return passage at dawn the southern Group became involved in exchange of fire with naval landing craft group Eltigen in a heavy fog. F "419" received a hit in the ready-use ammunition, and put into Kerch, heavily damaged. The group commander was among the five men killed in action.

For defense against a large-scale landing expected on the night of 8 Nov. and on the basis of a bearing report from the radar station at Cape Tschaude, patrol line off Feodosiya was taken up by three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and off Eupatoria by four naval landing craft. Two unsuccessful submarine attacks were made on the Eupatoria group. Otherwise nothing special to report.

For the night of 9 Nov. 13 naval landing craft will be disposed in patrol lines in the Strait of Kerch and 3 PT boats will be lying at Ivanbaba in immediate readiness. In the Strait of Kerch minelaying operation K 18 will be carried out. In the area of Sevastopol the Rumanian destroyers ROMANIA and MURGESCU will lay barrage S 47.

Since 1930 several engagements with enemy gunboats have been reported from the beachhead of Eltigen. The enemy boats were driven off to the east.

Southwest of Otchakov two minesweeping planes cleared 28 mines in the morning.

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According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea the evacuation of Kherson is making good progress; the dispersal of Nikolayev has been carried out to a great extent and is progressing without disturbing the plans of the Army. The Naval Office at Odessa commenced its duties.

As to the land situation on the Crimea the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group A reports as follows:

No change at the enemy beachheads near Kerch in the area of the 17th Army.

Enemy attack at the Sivash beachhead north of Tarchan repulsed with heavy losses. Fighting west of Urshni continues. No attacks against the right sector of the Perekop isthmus, while fluctuating battles took place against the western pivot of the point of penetration. The situation continues to be critical owing to steadily increasing enemy pressure in this area as well as to our own considerable losses and insufficient bringing-up of forces as a result of bad weather."

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmits the following information from the Japanese Admiral's Staff:

"According to the latest reports

3 large cruisers
2 destroyers and
1 cruiser or destroyer were definitely sunk in the course of the naval battle west of Bougainville on the night of 1 Nov. Two U.S. destroyers engaged each other, one of them being set on fire. One cruiser and 2 destroyers were probably sunk; 1 of our destroyers was sunk, 1 of our cruisers remained lying out of control. The Americans claim to have sunk 1 Japanese cruiser and 4 destroyers in this battle.

On 5 Nov. 14 Japanese naval planes attacked an enemy unit shortly after sunset and sank

1 large carrier of the ISLAND class,
1 medium carrier,
2 large cruisers and
2 cruisers or destroyers.

On 1 and 2 Nov. American landings took place on the west coast of Bougainville, against which the Japanese concentrated all available forces on the island. Simultaneously with the landings there were heavy air raids on Rabaul and Buka. Of the attacking planes 174 were shot down near Rabaul, and 39 near Buka.

On 8 Nov. a second heavy air battle took place west of Bougainville.

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The Japanese Naval Air Force attacked a unit of 4 battleships, more than 8 cruisers and destroyers and 5 transports.

Sunk:

3 battleships
2 cruisers
3 destroyers and
4 transports.

Heavily damaged:

1 battleship
3 cruisers or large destroyers
1 transport.

About 12 planes shot down; own losses: 15 planes.

On 8 Nov. the Americans announced the sinking of 2 Japanese cruisers and the damaging of 8 further ones. It cannot be gathered from the press report during which of the battles this success was achieved."

An evaluation of these actions, which evidently caused heavy losses on both sides, is very difficult on the basis of the news so far available. (Tr.N.: Added personally by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:): Therefore the Naval Attaché in Tokio is asked to give a short report, since no clear picture of the actions can be gained here.

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Items of Political Importance.

In the course of the traditional Lord Mayor's Banquet on 9 Nov. Churchill made a speech. It did not contain any particular points that were not already known. He concluded with the statement that it could reasonably be assumed that 1944 would bring the culminating point of the war in Europe, unless a serious strategic mistake be made. Unless a miracle occurs, for which there is no reason to hope, 1944 will demand the greatest sacrifices of the British and the U.S. Army, and battles will have to be fought out that will be more extensive and costly than Waterloo and Gettysburg.

According to a Reuter report, Giraud resigned the presidency of the Committee for National Liberation, in order to make room for General de Gaulle. The functions of Giraud as Commander in Chief of the Army are not affected.

Turkish newspapers emphasize that Turkey will continue her policy of non-belligerence. With regard to this problem, the "Times" remarks that Turkey is in a position to grant the same concessions to her allies as those the Axis considers compatible with neutrality in Bulgaria, if Bulgaria does not revert to real neutrality. This refers to the concession of bases.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

In the penetration areas west of Kiev and west of Nevel the enemy again gained ground. The counter-attack by the 25th Armored Division was launched against Fastov. The attack near Vitebsk resulted in a breakthrough up to 12 km depth in our line. The withdrawal of the front into the Peipus line is intended as soon as the frosty weather improves road conditions.

In Italy heavy fighting continues. The Bernhard position is being held.

II. Report of Chief of Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. By order of Chief, Armed Forces High Command, Commanding General, Armed Forces, West is charged with responsibility for uniform preparation and execution of concentrated use of all special weapons.

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high Command, Navy, Naval Staff is to investigate in what form some of the heavy naval coastal guns can participate in long-range fighting, and to submit proposals.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will deal with the matter further.

b. The designation of transport submarines was changed from "Aquila" to "Merkator".

III. Quartermaster General:

The demand of Naval Staff for production of 60 naval landing craft (artillery), 30 of them by the end of this year, cannot be met without drawing upon current production. Some other projects of the Fleet Construction Program 1943 must be cancelled.

Chief, Naval Staff will not approve any measures that will aggravate the already unusual delay of submarines in the Baltic. On the contrary, Commanding Admiral, Submarines was ordered to speed-up their release by all possible means. This can only be achieved by smooth execution of outstanding dockyard work and organized training service. Anything that detracts from this must be rejected.

IV. An outline of the situation of 10 Nov. 1943 is submitted to Chief, Naval Staff.

Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. a.

Situation 10 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

As regards the loss of ship "28", the Naval Attaché in Tokio reports the following additional information in reply to inquiry:

1. Only the following got afloat:

a. Cutter BEHREND with 70 men

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- b. Rubber dinghy MECKMANN with 39 men
- c. Rubber dinghy MILITZER with 8 men
- d. Cutter VON SCHACK with about 80 men.
 - a. and b. landing after 33 hours
 - c. after 7 days, 2 men lost
 - d. was so overloaded, that the occupants had to swim by its side in turns; c. that was with d. on the first day, presumes that it was swamped on the second night in heavy seas and sank.

2. The Japanese Navy in Tokio ordered the Commander of station "Yokosuka" to carry out a search with planes. The minister personally assured me that everything possible would be done. Actually, a, b, and c sighted planes several times that were obviously searching for them but did not find them. After a heavy storm on 6 Nov. they broke off their search.

3. About one hour before the sinking, the rescued aft look-out reported to the bridge "streak of foam astern". On the bridge was reported among other things a "tree trunk astern" which was duly noted. The boat possibly approached the blockade-runner rapidly and fired from a blinding strip of moonlight.

4. The multi-unit hydrophones, too, were not manned. This, as well as other reported negligences by the ship's captain, was the subject of lively criticism among the junior officers.

5. More than 50 German blockade-runners, supply ships and auxiliary ships entered and left Kobe or Yokohama without any escort, unmolested up to now.

All ships in foreign waters were informed of the enemy situation by teletype 1927.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-seven planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay. Locations were made at 1329 in BE 6484, at 1948 in BE 7550 and at 0328 on 11 Nov. in BE 6420.

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2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On 8 Nov. a further mine was cleared off La Pallice and on 9 Nov. three mines each were cleared off Brest and Lorient. The submarine-chase in BF 9371 was broken off on 9 Nov. as there had been no clear locations since 1800.

One submarine was escorted in and three out of St. Nazaire. At 2230 on 9 Nov. the steamer FRISCO was unsuccessfully machine-gunned by an enemy plane in Blaye.

Group North/Fleet agrees with the proposal of Commander, Destroyers regarding the dockyard period of torpedo boats T "22" and T "23" from January to April 1944 in a German dockyard and agrees to earlier overhauling of the engines of torpedo boat T "25" in Brest from 15 Nov. - 15 Dec. (See teletype 1155.)

Channel Coast:

Lively enemy activity was reported in the coastal area of Dieppe to Zeebrugge. Bombs were dropped near batteries "Wissant", "Grosser Kurfuerst" and "Todt". The enemy apparently dropped mines southwest of Sark.

West of Guernsey tugs and boats were attacked with bombs and machine-guns, also boats in the harbor of Lezardrieux. Slight damage and casualties were sustained. Two of the planes were shot down.

At 2000 the mains cable for the radar gear at Blanc Nez was cut again by sabotage.

Patrol positions were not taken up because of bright moonlight. No convoy activity.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

At 0550 enemy PT boats turned away after being fired on by vessels of the 7th Minesweeper Flotilla north of IJmuiden. According to radio intelligence one enemy PT boat was sunk.

Five mines were cleared on the convoy route Elbe-Hook, and a further one southwest of Hanstholm.

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2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Thirty-seven planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. Three boats of the 30th PT Boat Flotilla were out at sea. At 0139 two PT boats were sighted near Ekkeroy. On 9 Nov. single planes entered the areas of Vardoe, Petsamo and near Stavanger.

According to an intelligence report from London dated 2 Nov., twelve British and U.S. vessels (totalling 86,500 BRT) left Northern Ireland, allegedly bound for north Russia.

Own Situation:

Forty-four ships were escorted north and nineteen south. Twenty-nine ships remained lying in harbor due to lack of escorts.

The BFITZEN turned back on her passage to Bergen owing to a heavy swell. The work to make her watertight in Haugesund will require a further 10 - 12 days.

At 1200 destroyers Z "31" and the RIEDEL left Narvik for the south.

On 9 Nov. Rear Admiral Bey took over the command of the Task Force in place of Commanding Admiral, Task Force.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Bomber formations of up to 20 planes unsuccessfully attacked Kurgolowo, Lippowo and the Luga bridge between 1000 and 1300. One of the attacking planes crashed.

At 0750 there was a convoy northwest of Seiskari on easterly course. According to a Finnish statement there was one submarine with the unit. Throughout the day there was very lively air activity in the area of Tyters. At 1250 nine planes sank an Estonian motor boat with four men, while transferring from Hungerburg to Aseri.

2. Own Situation:

Troop transport traffic with fast ships without escort was commenced at 1600 between Frederiksstad and Frederikshavn.

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One mine was cleared near Hela.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla laid the cutting float section of Barrage "Seehund Ia" according to plan.

In answer to a report of Naval Command, Baltic (see War Diary 6 Nov.) Naval Staff made the following decision:

"It has been pointed out to the Swedes on several occasions that their planes, just as our own, run the risk of being attacked when approaching German forces. Approaching planes are still to be attacked with all possible means unless their neutrality can be clearly recognized. At the time it is being investigated whether it is expedient that Sweden be again informed of this."

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reports that Finland is demanding the handing-over of three Estonian refugees who were captured when trying to return to Estonia in Finnish uniform (see teletype 2000).

Naval Staff is of the opinion that it is not worth while to antagonize the Finns with such a trifling matter.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, a convoy consisting of 40 - 50 freighters bound for the Mediterranean will leave the Bristol Channel on about 16 Nov.: eight steamers of this convoy carrying war materiel are to deviate to Portugal.

According to a further intelligence report, a large convoy of about 80 ships, including tankers, is to leave Norfolk at the end of October, bound for Gibraltar and Algiers. The cargo consists mainly of war materiel and food.

2. Own Situation:

At 1100 on 9 Nov. submarine U "288" of Group "Schill" sank a straggler (5,000 BRT) with air cover on course 350° in CF 2685 with a Zaunkoenig torpedo.

Submarine U "842" of the "Tirpitz" Group must be presumed lost, probably by air attack, as must submarine U "533" of the Monsoon boats, that was last operating in the Gulf of Oman.

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Five boats of the north Atlantic disposition (in AK) must start back ahead of time, so that two of the ten groups consisting of three boats each are out of action.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force, 10 bombers, 31 heavy fighters, 208 fighters and 21 reconnaissance planes were out on operation over the west area.

Northwest of Cape Ortegal one Sunderland was brought down by four Ju 88's.

Throughout the day strong enemy formations raided traffic installations, airfields and vessels in the coastal zone of the west area. Mines were dropped off the Atlantic coast.

During the night about 200 planes flew through to Italy and back. Attacks were directed against railway installations in the area of Susa-Turin and north of Nice. The attack was concentrated on the railway bridge near Recco (Genoa). One transport train was hit in Modena.

Only single planes were observed over German territory.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

One ship was sunk and four damaged in the course of an attack on Naples during the night of 9 Nov. Further details were not established due to artificial smoke. Six of our planes were lost owing to strong night-fighter activity.

During the day the following were out on operation: 24 fighter-bombers, 123 fighters and 11 reconnaissance planes of the 2nd Air Force; 85 bombers 64 of them against Leros, also 21 Stukas, 22 fighters, 19 reconnaissance planes and 11 transport planes of Air Force Command, Southeast.

By day the enemy attacked the Freya radar station near Nettuno in the Italian area, as well as traffic installations near Genoa, Brescia, and Bolzano. Three fortresses were shot down.

In the area of the Balkans, the harbor of Durazzo and, in the Aegean, one airfield each on Kos and Rhodes were attacked in the evening. Three enemy reconnaissance planes were shot down by our fighters.

In the course of armed reconnaissance in the sea area of Calino one destroyer and one escort boat were successfully attacked by seven of our bombers.

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3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

The eastbound convoy reported at 0935 on 9 Nov. from Cape Spartel entered Gibraltar at 1445 on 9 Nov. The following were observed in Gibraltar at 1930 on 10 Nov.:

1 WARSPITE class, 1 BIRMINGHAM class, 1 auxiliary cruiser, also 1 auxiliary cruiser in dock. Further, 52 freighters and 8 tankers were observed.

In the morning the following left Gibraltar bound for the Atlantic: 11 LCT's, 2 freighters, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette. Bound for the Mediterranean: a convoy consisting of 17 freighters, 1 tanker with 10 escorts.

At 0812 a convoy consisting of 36 freighters, 3 tankers with 5 escorts coming from the Atlantic passed Europa Point.

Only one LCI was seen in Ajaccio. 7 motor gunboats were lying in Maddalena. Air attacks on 9 Nov. on a convoy of barges between Piombino and Civitavecchia and on Genoa were unsuccessful.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

At 2200 - 2230 on 9 Nov. a group of Siebel ferries with infantry boats south of Valona was set on fire by what were apparently Italian destroyers. The crews reached the shore by swimming. Due to unfavorable weather conditions the departure of PT boats from Venice was postponed.

In the course of a low-level air attack on Saseno on 9 Nov. one tug was sunk and a further one was damaged. It is now presumed that the explosion aboard the steamer DIANA on 7 Nov. was caused by adhesive sabotage mines.

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The first group of Siebel ferries left Corfu for Piraeus by way of Patras on the morning of 10 Nov. and the third group left Bari for Durazzo in the evening. The cruiser CATTARO, commissioned on 8 Nov. in Pola, and torpedo boat TA "21" are reported ready to proceed to a limited extent.

Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas, Out-station Trieste requested the assignment of ten Siebel ferries from Armed Forces High Command for carrying out its own transports. Group South protested against this to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and requested that Siebel ferries becoming available be assigned to the Navy only, to cover urgent requirements. (See teletype 2025.)

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

Three destroyers were sighted off Levitha from 0130 to 0140. According to a report of Group South, air reconnaissance sighted altogether 2 destroyers, 4 escorts and 18 small war vessels in Turkish territorial waters on 9 Nov. A well camouflaged PT boat was lying on the south side of the Gulf of Mendelia.

Own Situation:

The Levitha Group of the landing unit was unsuccessfully fired on by guns of three enemy destroyers from 0130 to 0140. Towards midnight the Stampalia Group was located by enemy planes and continuously attacked from the air from 0015.

As, according to air reconnaissance early in the morning, the area of advance was clear of the enemy, both groups continued their passage to Kos by way of Calino as planned. In the afternoon the unit was again located by enemy planes, but there were no engagements.

The harbor of Calino was shelled by guns of enemy destroyers from 2040. Coast. patrol boat GA "54" is assembling stragglers near Naxos and Amorgos, in order to bring them up to the landing unit on 11 Nov.

Due to the delayed departure of the PT boat group from Venice, arrival of these in time for operation "Taifun" can no longer be counted on. In the morning PT boat S "55" entered Salonika for change of engine.

In the evening Commanding Admiral, Aegean reported that Army Group E ordered on 9 Nov.:

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"From 12 Nov. operation "Taifun" ready to start. To be carried out when special order is given."

In addition to this, Commanding Admiral, Aegean reported:

"Army Group E telegraphed: As the approach for operation "Taifun" was relatively undisturbed, it is hoped that tactical surprise as regards time and place will succeed. Thus, any warning of enemy occupation troops by intensified air attacks on 11 Nov. must be avoided. It is necessary that the Air Force maintain its previous operations on 11 Nov. and, further, that it protect the completed deployment with all its forces and, on the day itself, ensure strongest support for the landing operation.

Additional note of Commanding Admiral, Aegean:

"Do not agree with the views of the Army Group, since deployment for the operation is known to the enemy, and the harbor of Calino has been shelled by destroyers since 2040 today."

Four coastal defense boats were brought up from Naxos to complete the mopping-up operation on Amorgos. Subsequently, mopping-up on Ios, Diraklia, Schinusa, Karos and the Kuponisia islands is planned.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, destroyer "H" was in the area of Tuapse or north of it. At 2130 our air reconnaissance reported three vessels, presumably merchantmen, one tanker and three minesweepers on course 300°, 35 miles southwest of Tuapse. At 2315 the last position of the unit was reported to be ten miles south of the first position.

Own Situation:

Off Eltigen naval landing craft had repeated engagements with enemy PT boats and gunboats from 1745 to 2100 on 9 Nov. The enemy was driven off to the east and was in no case able to reach a landing place. From 2100 on 9 Nov., attempts at landing were stopped. On their return passage the naval landing craft, which had anchored until daylight off Eltigen because of fog, were fired on from the east bank by 15 cm guns.

By day the enemy continuously reinforced the beachhead of Mayak from Kossa Tchutka. Ferry traffic can no longer be reached by our coastal guns. Due to the great danger from both shores Commanding Admiral; Black Sea considers that operations by naval forces in these waters about 4,000 m wide, even at night, are not promising and regards minelaying as the only possibility of harassing enemy ferry traffic, aside from attacks by the Air Force.

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Up to now, LMA mines were laid in the areas east of Cape Fonar and east of the line from 45° 20' N 38° 38' E to 45° 21.6' N 36° 40' E.

The laying of a barrage with moored mines west of the above line is planned for the night of 11 Nov. In addition to this, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea considers additional minelaying by planes in the sea areas between the former cable railway and the communication line Cape Fonar - Achilleonski front light with LMB or PMA mines to be urgently necessary.

On the night of 10 Nov., 6 naval landing craft, 5 motor minesweepers and 3 PT boats were out on operation in the Strait of Kerch and south thereof. It is planned to lay a mine barrage in the central Strait of Kerch.

Minelaying unit ROMANIA laid barrage S 47 as planned.

With regard to the critical situation in the Crimea, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea issued the following orders:

1. Steamers are to be immediately so disposed that one third of them is always in readiness in Seva.
2. As soon as the code word "Sevastopol" is given, the second third of the steamers is to proceed to Seva at once.
3. The last third is to put out from the west when the first third leaves Seva. Further convoys are to be arranged in this sequence.
4. Escort vessels to operate accordingly."

On the land situation in the Crimea the following reports from Commanding Admiral, Black Sea have been received:

a. morning of 10 Nov.:

"Towards 2300 fire suddenly opened south of Perekop. The attack was repulsed with heavy enemy losses. During the night enemy attacks in the northern part of the beachhead of Bakhchi. Our front withdrawn up to the western edge Yurakov-Kut. Fresh attacks since dawn. All quiet on the beachhead of Eltigen."

b. evening of 10 Nov.:

"1. No special action on the Perekop front. The bringing-up of reinforcements and entrenching observed. Our own heavy losses (Germans only) during the fighting on the Perekop front from 1 to 7 Nov. totalled: 93 officers, 2,483 noncommissioned officers and men.

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2. On the beachhead of Eltigen enemy concentrations destroyed by gun fire.

3. On the beachhead of Bakhchi the enemy penetrated our main defense line up to about southern height 106.6, utilizing the foggy weather. The thrust was brought to a standstill by throwing in our last reserves and the gap closed. Since noon enemy attack on Bakhchi against the main defense line between height 129.6 and 115.4. Fighting continues.

4. During the last few days the partisan situation on the Crimea has become much more acute. Acts of sabotage and attacks on motor transport vehicles etc. are increasing considerably. Even by day the main lines of communication for single drivers are also endangered. Column traffic, therefore, ordered. Sharp reprisals against the civilian population ordered."

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

In a new joint declaration by Churchill and Roosevelt regarding submarine warfare it is asserted that from August to October of this year more German submarines were sunk in the Atlantic and Mediterranean than Allied merchantmen were sunk by submarines. The Germans had introduced new weapons and new methods; however, so far the Allies had succeeded in dealing with the constantly changing situation.

In a report reflecting the views of the British press, Reuter states that Churchill's speech in the Mansion House was intended to prevent a relaxation of the war efforts as a result of premature optimism.

A. Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation.

In the penetration area of Kiev our own attack for the recapture of Fastov was unsuccessful. The enemy gained further ground in the direction of Zhitomir. Our 7th and 13th Army Corps are very exhausted. Up to the 59th Army Corps there is a gap of 45 km. The situation in this sector is extremely unsatisfactory.

Near Gomel the enemy went over to the anticipated large-scale attack that resulted in a penetration of 12 km depth. On the whole the situation near Vitebsk and in the penetration area of Nevel remained under control.

On the Italian front heavy fighting continues, particularly on the western flank.

II. Naval Situation.

No particular conferences and decisions.

B. Conference of Naval Staff on the reinforcement of defensive power on our coasts in the west and north.

Present: Commanding Admirals of Group West, Group North/Fleet, Naval Command, North, Naval Command, Baltic, Naval Command, Norway; Commanding Admirals, Netherlands, Heligoland Bight, Denmark; from Naval Staff: Quartermaster General, Chiefs of Fleet Branch and Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division; Chiefs of the General Naval Administration Bureau, of Naval Ordnance Division and Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Bureau of Naval Armament; Chief of Staff, Naval

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Staff; Chief of Operations Division; Chief of Operations Branch, and Deputy to Chief of Operations Branch, Operations Division, and abstractors.

First the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51 was made known by reading its contents. After that, Commander in Chief, Navy gave a review of the situation from which the Directive resulted. (Copy as per I opa. 31403/43 Gkdos. dated 9 Nov., see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V) and gave as a guiding principle that all efforts for fulfilment of the new task were to be made without at present encroaching upon the Fleet Construction Program and the training requirements of the Navy. Only in the case of a decisive landing operation might all forces be committed without any other considerations.

Naval personnel must be adjusted to this new task.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Quartermaster General, reported on the intentions of Naval Staff and the situation as regards forces.

Operations Division, Mine Warfare Section gave a summarized report on the question of mines.

Chief of Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division gave information on the principles for establishing alarm units. The details and especially the data for the report to be made to Armed Forces High Command regarding Directive No. 51 would be settled in the afternoon in separate discussions.

Chief, Naval Communications Service considered his sphere to be specially endangered by:

1. The withdrawal of most of the emergency radio operators attached to naval artillery, who have been given lengthy training to make them key-men of radio groups scheduled to replace the land telegraph communications personnel. All experiences have shown that an instantaneous breakdown of telegraphy must be expected in case of enemy landings.
2. The probable total breakdown of radar locations because most of the gear is not sufficiently protected against gun fire and the enemy can jam the stations.

The requirements of the Commanding Admirals covered the following points:

1. Provision of the operational supply line carrying fuel and supplies for naval forces (Group North).
2. Closer approach of naval forces to the probable landing areas (Naval Command, Norway).

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3. Improvement of the personnel situation by stopping continual transfers, thereby raising the standard of training (Commanding Admiral, Netherlands).

4. Increase of the ammunition stocks, above all of ammunition for firing practice, since otherwise the readiness of the batteries, that has proven to be lacking, cannot be brought up to full capacity. (Naval Command, North and Commanding Admiral, Denmark).

5. The new task entails certain prerogatives for the Commanding Admirals as regards orders for preparations, e.g. training, equipment etc. Until now attempts in this direction have been frustrated by the resistance of the schools etc., whose crowded program did not allow of any additional tasks. However, some measures are now indispensable, because they would be too late if not introduced until enemy action begins.

6. The provision of arms as one of the main troubles especially for the alarm units.

The measures that are accordingly necessary will be initiated by Naval Staff, mainly by Quartermaster Division, through special orders. Some individual points will require the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy. More detailed handling of the individual points will arise as things proceed and as each case arises.

C. Special Items:

I. On the basis of preliminary discussions with Chief, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament, Commander in Chief, Navy transmitted to Reich Minister Speer a survey of new and additional construction requirements within the Fleet Construction Program 1943.

The new construction requirements contained in this survey are necessary, in conjunction with the Fleet Construction Program, for the growing number of surface and submarine units and troop and training units and for the increased tasks of naval warfare, over and above current construction projects. They have been thoroughly examined as regards their absolute military necessity and cut down strictly to the minimum, the most rigid standards being applied.

Not contained in the list are the constructions already approved and inserted in the priority list for defense orders, or those in progress.

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On the grounds of a rough estimate including the above projects, the requirements to be expected for the next eighteen months amount altogether to the following:

constructional iron: 40,000 tons quarterly;
construction workers: 30,000.

These figures do not include the construction projects which are being carried out and for which the quotas are obtained by Organization Todt, special Construction Organization Speer and the Army, according to agreement.

Details as per copy of letter l/Skl 34606/43 geh. in files l.Skl I II a.

II. On 6 Nov. Commander, PT Boats submitted his views on the defensive commitment of PT boats in the west area, concluding as follows:

In the knowledge that, with the present enemy situation and the further heavy losses to be expected, PT boats can only fulfill the task assigned to them by the Supreme Command - namely the fight against enemy merchant shipping - if they are controlled by one command, utilizing all available possibilities and being relieved from all tasks which divert them from this main objective, I request a basic order that will enable me to control them accordingly.

The views of Group North/Fleet are attached. The decision rests with Naval Staff. Copy as per l/Skl 31508/43 Gkdos. and l/Skl 3369/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. Based on detailed reports on the defensive power of the Navy in the west area submitted by Group West (see also War Diary, 3 Nov.), Naval Staff submitted a supplementary report to that of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. Copy as per l/Skl 3236/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, decided not to comply with the proposal of Commander, PT boats regarding the 4th PT Boat Flotilla (See War Diary, 8 Nov.). The transfer of PT boats S "131", "148", "149" is to be carried out as ordered. Commander, PT Boats was informed verbally in Berlin.

V. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South points out the fact that the boundary between the areas of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast as fixed by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on 6 Nov., does not correspond with the boundary between German Naval Command, Italy and Naval Group South running along the Isonzo. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South considers conformity between the command areas of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest and German Naval Command, Italy, imperative in view of defense of the Istrian area, the participation of

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Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest in traffic in the Adriatic, the control of dockyards, etc. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South hence requests Naval Staff to extend the area of German Naval Command, Italy accordingly and, in case separation of Naval Shore Commander, Adriatic from the area of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic should be undesirable, he proposes that the whole area of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic be joined with that of German Naval Command, Italy. (See teletype 1025).

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will deal with this matter further.

VI. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division has received reports from Portuguese consuls at Rabat, Oran and Tunis from the middle of October all of which deal with enemy intentions against the south coast of France. Bases of operations are said to be the African and Italian coasts, Corsica and Gibraltar.

It seems that these reports are based more on general rumors than on concrete facts.

VII. Radio Monitoring Report No. 45/43 contains a summary of enemy intelligence obtained by decoding of radio message and radio intelligence from 1 - 7 Nov.

Note:

For convoy traffic in the North Atlantic from 1 Sept. - 1 Nov. 1943 see Page 4 onwards.

Situation 11 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio requests advices for the RIO and ALSTERUFER on what points of their sailing orders correspond to "Offerte" and "Orange".

Regarding the loss of Ship "28", Naval Staff informed the following of the fate of her crew: Naval Command Baltic, Home Staff (Foreign Branch); Officer Personnel Department; General Naval Administration Bureau, Re-

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cruitment Division, with copies to Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section III, and Chief, Radio Monitoring Reports, Communications Intelligence Branch, Naval Communications Division. Home Staff (Foreign Branch) was ordered to inform relatives of the members of the crew that the ship was lost on 17 Oct. 1943 through enemy action and that only a part of the crew was saved. A few of the missing were possibly taken prisoner.

Order 1/Skl I k 31611/43 Gkdos.. in files 1/Skl Ik special file, Ship "28".

Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section III was informed that elimination of the auxiliary tanker OSTFRIESLAND from the blockade-runner program 1943/1944 is cancelled. The ship is to be transferred to the west coast of France.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 54 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel each was located at 1344 in BE 9890 and at 1840 in BF 1470.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared off Lorient. One submarine was escorted out and one in.

Channel Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared northwest of Jersey. From 1450 stray enemy bomber formations entered the area of Gris Nez. Bombs were dropped on Battery "Todt" and vicinity. No damage was caused.

Patrol positions were not taken up due to clear weather.

From the War Diary of Group West of 4 Oct. 1943 it is learned that the Group is not using the LM mine with the old type of firing in the shallow water off the coast. It is surprising that:

1. the order to this effect from Naval Staff issued in agreement with the appropriate Ordnance Division was forwarded by the Group to the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate for examination without informing Naval Staff.

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2. the views of the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate, which differed from those of Naval Staff, were not made known here.
3. the fact that no regard was paid to the order of Naval Staff only became known through the War Diary.

Ground mines were to be laid in case of a threatened landing and shorter endurance in this case had to be accepted; a steadier position was to be expected through the anti-rolling device. A fresh discussion with the Mining and Barrage Group of the High Command, Navy showed:

1. The question of the running-down of batteries is not considered decisive. Even in unfavorable cases a duration of at least 15 to 20 days is expected, though individual detonations in heavy seas running a particularly long time are possible. Even in future, absolute certainty against the running-down of batteries or self-detonation in heavy surf will scarcely be achieved. Up to now the running-down of batteries and self-detonations were always accepted in offensive operations in the enemy area. Therefore there is no reason why this risk should not be run in their defensive use off our own coast. Since areas with particularly heavy surf are unlikely as landing places, this risk is regarded as comparatively slight.
2. The additional protection by the make-shift anti-rolling device already accords a certain security; work on the improvement of the anti-rolling device is going on.

Therefore Naval Staff considers the use of ground mines of the old firing type as alarm barrages for defense against landings to be correct. At least it is to the point to use the stocks of LM mines stored in the harbors of the west area, as far as they are not needed for mining the harbors, in the case of an enemy landing in the sea instead of saving them for demolition operations on land.

Group West will be informed on these views of Naval Staff and ordered again to make preparations for use of the LM mines for defense against landings. Minelayers are to be selected, the mines distributed correspondingly to the harbors or stored in their vicinity, and minelaying orders prepared.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Operations by the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North were restricted owing to stormy weather. Westbound convoy 468 was delayed by 24 hours. One mine was cleared off Texel.

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At 1445 an enemy formation of four-engined bombers with British fighter cover flew over a unit of Commander, Motor boats at a height of 2,000 m south of Overflakkee. Instantaneous anti-aircraft gun fire by the motor boats dispersed the formation. Two planes blew up and a third crashed in flames. Further planes showed signs of having been hit. Our fighters made use of the dispersal of the formation and followed up individual planes.

As ordered, Naval Command, North reported on plans or views regarding the laying of ground mines for defense against enemy landings. On this, Naval Staff, Operations Division decided as follows:

1. In the case of plans for minelaying in the Dutch area, too little regard paid to the situation at sea (enemy mines, channel conditions, depths of the water etc.)

2. As far as priorities in the Dutch area are concerned, Naval Staff agrees in general. For details see Order 1/Skl 30875 Gkdos. in files 1/Skl IE.

3. As to the plan for the Heligoland Bight:

Plan for defense of the islands not urgent as long as only raids or diversionary attacks against individual installations and apparatus there to be expected (Roem). If there is a shortage of ground mines, necessary to concentrate on areas where enemy landings of an operational nature are possible (for instance airfields on Borkum and Sylt), with restriction to sections endangered by channel conditions and depths of water.

4. Jutland Coast:

It is considered possible that the enemy objective will be occupation of Esbjerg and Tyboroen; therefore concentrate safety measures accordingly.

5. Agree with the view taken by that office that laying of barrages only be carried out when the danger of a landing is imminent, especially as the duration of the mine is limited by movement in the current and surf. The provision of special naval landing craft impossible; the laying of LM mines possible by almost all defense forces in an emergency.

6. Plans are to be re-examined and new intentions reported; for the time being 500 LMB mines available for the Dutch area. Prepare minelaying orders, select appropriate minelayers, and store the mines accordingly, so that the operation can be carried out at short notice with the available minelayers when the code word is given.

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2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-three planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. Off Ofot Fjord mines were cut by a harbor defense boat. On 10 Nov., 13 single planes entered the area of Vardoe and Panak.

Own Situation:

At 0400 minesweeper M "401" went aground north of Namsos for several hours, at 0700 the tanker TAIFUN also went aground off Trondheim for a short time.

At 2115 destroyers Z "31" and the RIEDEL anchored off Aalesund.

Thirty ships were escorted north and nineteen south; twenty-eight ships were left lying in harbor due to lack of escorts.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The usual guardboat traffic and individual ships in tow were observed between Kronstadt and Oranienbaum.

Naval Harbor Battalion 531 successfully fought partisans in the area northwest of Kotly (Luga Bay).

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-two vessels were engaged on minesweeping in the Baltic Sea Entrances and nineteen in the Baltic Sea. One ELM/J mine each was swept off Anholt and Stevnes.

At 2345 the GALSTER and IHN left Kristiansand South heading east.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla laid barrage "Seehund Ia" as planned. As regards the Estonian refugees (see War Diary, 10 Nov.) Naval Command, Baltic was ordered by Naval Staff, Operations Division, to turn the refugees over to the Finns since, wearing Finnish uniforms, they are either Finnish deserters or are to be punished for unauthorized wearing of this uniform.

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V. Submarine Warfare.

The next operation by Group "Schill" against a northbound convoy is scheduled for about 18 Nov. The southbound convoy will not be attacked because of the full moon on 13 Nov.

Due to the fuel situation, five further boats are to be withdrawn from Group "Eisenhart" and, on return passage, temporarily used to reinforce Group "Schill".

No reports on successes have been received.

On 10 Nov. the Naval Attaché in Madrid reported:

"The whole crew of a submarine landed as survivors near El Barquero in Vivero Bay. The boat was sunk, apparently as a result of an attack by planes; anyway, one plane was shot down and six corpses salvaged from it. No further news can be given until to-morrow, since the connection with El Barquero is very bad."

According to later reports of 11 Nov., 42 survivors from the submarine of Commander Wolf were picked up alive along with five dead and brought to Ferrol.

The Spanish Navy informed the Spanish Foreign Office and suggested that the survivors be handed over to the German consul for repatriation.

On 10 Nov. at about 1400 the Spanish guardboat ARCILA observed a fight between a submarine and planes four miles north of Cape Ortegal, that seemingly was broken off before its conclusion. The boat then entered the Bay of Santa Marta (Carino), but shortly afterwards left again to the north. It sank north of Punta Estaca. It is not yet known whether its sinking was caused by a new attack or because it could no longer be kept under control.

Special Items:

Submarine strength 1 Nov. 1943 (in parentheses 1 Oct. 1943).

a. Operational Boats:

Atlantic	132	
Mediterranean	13	
Northern Waters	12	
Black Sea	<u>6</u>	
	163	(175)

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b. Submarine Acceptance Command and Operational training	175	(177)
c. Training and experimental boats	<u>85</u>	(69)
Total	423	(421)

During the month of October 1943

Commissioned	27	(21)
put into operation	12	(18)
missing	26	(10)
Decommissioned	8	(9)

Percentage of losses of submarines on operation during the month of October (monthly average) in:

North Atlantic	-	30 %	(9.8 %)
Northern Waters	-	0 %	(9.1 %)
Mediterranean	-	20 %	(25 %)
Black Sea	-	0 %	(0 %)

Percentage of losses of the total number of operational boats:

October 1943	-	16 %	(4.2 %)
Monthly average since the outbreak of war	-	6.1 %	(5.9 %)
" " " January 1943	-	10.5 %	(9.9 %)

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Our operational reports have not been received. The enemy attacked railway stations and traffic installations in Belgium and northern France by day. Around noon strong enemy forces with fighter cover entered the area of Cherbourg. Three hundred high explosive bombs were dropped on the construction site near Valognes, 30 % of which was damaged. Barracks were 100 % damaged, and building machinery 60 %.

A bomber formation of 25 Liberators again attacked the railway viaduct near Antheor without hitting it. Further attacks were directed against the area between the harbors of St. Raphael and Cannes and the coastal road.

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Shortly after noon strong formations carried out an attack on Muenster. Some damage was caused in the harbor.

Fighters numbering 250 were sent out on defense and shot down nine planes. Two further planes were reported shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. In the evening, minor enemy forces carried out nuisance raids over German territory as far as Berlin, over western Germany, as well as over Belgium and northern France. In addition to this about 250 planes were reported flying through to northern Italy. The railway line at Antheor was again the target of attack and was interrupted. Attacks were directed against Turin, Alessandria and Cuneo in northern Italy.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Sixteen Do 217's of the 2nd Group of Bomber Wing 100, 23 He 111's of the 1st Group of Bomber Wing 26, and 17 Ju 88's of the 3rd Group of Bomber Wing 26 were sent out against a convoy which was attacked by 48 planes at 1815. According to preliminary reports, hits were scored on 4 destroyers, 1 escort ship and 15 merchantmen totalling 112,000 BRT. Seven of our planes are missing.

During the night of 10 Nov. three planes of a squadron of Bomber Wing 100 each scored a hit on two vessels of a destroyer formation that had shelled Kalymnos and withdrawn to the west. At 0006 the unit was last sighted west of Nisiro on course 115°, proceeding at slow speed.

In the afternoon between 1850 and 1900 four Do 217's attacked an eastbound enemy unit in the area of Leros with 8 HS 293's. One fairly large vessel was probably sunk and a smaller one damaged.

Otherwise, our Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights.

By day the enemy unsuccessfully attacked the Freya gear near Nettunia and set a fuel dump near Durazzo on fire.

Twenty-five enemy planes, some on armed reconnaissance, were detected in the Aegean. In the evening Grosseto, Orbetollo and Taquinia were attacked. In addition nuisance raids were carried out in the area Verona - Padua.

3. Eastern Front:

The 4th and the 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance. At 0815 the 4th Air Force sighted 4 destroyers and 10 small naval vessels on easterly course near Trapezund; at 1410 the 5th Air Force sighted 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 12 small vessels, possibly patrol boats, in Thorshavn, as well as at 1400, 15 patrol boats off the east coast of the Faeroes.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Central and Western Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report the WARSPITE has severe engine damage caused by an aerial torpedo. This might imply a confirmation of our success of 16 Sept.

During the night of 10 Nov. 6 freighters from the Atlantic put into Gibraltar. Four freighters and 1 destroyer passed through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Atlantic; on the afternoon of 10 Nov. a convoy consisting of 38 merchantmen with 10 escorts and on 11 Nov. a convoy consisting of more than 50 merchantmen with 3 destroyers entered the Mediterranean. According to a report from Ceuta these are 63 loaded merchantmen, mostly large vessels. This convoy was last detected consisting of 48 merchantmen with 7 destroyers and 4 gunboats 50 miles west of Oran on course 100°.

A large convoy consisting of 52 vessels was reported 40 miles southeast of Crotona on southeasterly course. No time was mentioned.

According to an intelligence report from Lyons, the British and Americans intend to carry out small-scale attempts at landing near St. Raphael and Frejus during the night of 12 Nov. The attack in the area of St. Raphael will be directed against the railway viaduct.

According to a report from the British Admiralty, submarines have sunk altogether 7 ships in the course of the last patrol in the Mediterranean and Aegean; 3 ships were probably sunk and 6 damaged.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Torpedo boat TA "24" and three PT boats carried out minelaying in the area of Elba as planned. Partial demolitions in the harbor of Leghorn were carried out. The harbor is closed with the exception of one entrance.

In a teletype to Naval Staff, copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South refers to the order of Armed Forces High Command according to which Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest is charged with protection of the coasts on the Tyrrhenian, Ligurian and Adriatic Seas, concentrating on the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Gulf of Genoa; he refers to the fact that, contrary to this, transfer of all PT boats of German Naval Command, Italy and Adriatic has been ordered. According to the views of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the withdrawal of all offensive weapons at sea from such an important area as the west coast of Italy involves serious dangers. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South therefore requests that at least one PT Boat Flotilla be left on the west coast of Italy until the arrival of further boats from home waters.

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Views of Naval Staff, Operations Division will follow.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

At 1100 four PT boats left Venice via Pola bound for Cattaro. They will probably arrive at Cattaro at dawn.

Two auxiliary sailing vessels were damaged in Durazzo in the course of an enemy air attack on 10 Nov. At Split the steamer BALCIC burnt out as a result of a bomb hit.

The first group of Siebel ferries entered Patras, while the third entered Durazzo. Trogir (west of Split) was captured by Army units. A limited land communication Split - Sebenik was established.

The island of Trvanik was temporarily occupied by a battery of the Naval Artillery Battalion from Sebenik.

With regard to the situation as a whole and the lack of small ships in the Adriatic and Aegean, Group South requests re-investigation of the possibility of constructing naval landing craft in Adriatic dockyards. (See teletype 1615).

In view of the lack of other vessels that can be fitted up quickly, Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic made preparations for commissioning of the cruiser CATTARO on 15 Oct., which was carried out on 8 Nov. The cruiser will operate for mopping-up of the islands. Armament consists of 6 8.35 cm anti-aircraft guns, 4 4.7 cm guns, 4 2 cm Oerlikons, 2 1.32 cm Breda twin-mount guns, 4 medium machine-guns, and 10 light machine-guns. The ship has coal firing.

Further, the following were commissioned by Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic: Torpedo boats TA "21" and TA "22" (ex INSIDUOSO and ex MISORI). Preparations are being made for commissioning of torpedo boat TA "20" (ex AUDACE) as well as of three coastal defense boats in Venice.

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At noon on 10 Nov. there was sudden fire from Leros against the island of Telemos west of Kalymnos without special effect. On 10 Nov. two to three destroyers shelled the harbor of Kalymnos from 2100 to 2137. The steamer TRAPANI, that had already been damaged previously, was again set on fire and capsized. Three submarine chasers received splinter damage. The unit withdrew to the west and was successfully attacked by our Air Force.

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Three destroyers shelled the harbor and town of Kos at 0257 on 11 Nov. The Navy did not suffer any losses.

According to radio intelligence, the unit which attacked Kalymnos apparently came from Turkish Waters.

On 11 Nov. exhaustive reconnaissance of the Turkish coast was carried out by our planes. According to photographs 1 destroyer and 2 escort vessels, presumably those damaged in the area of Kalymnos during the night of 10 Nov., were lying in the Gulf of Mendelia. A new unit consisting of 1 destroyer and 2 escort vessels was sighted in the Gulf of Kos. At 1700 2 destroyers were off the northeast point of Kalymnos on southerly course. Lively air reconnaissance was observed in the whole Dodecanese area.

Own Situation:

Four boats of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla left Piraeus for Syra. Torpedo boat TA "14" went out of action in Syra due to condenser trouble. The remaining three boats left Syra at 1530 and will be in the operational area about 2300.

The code signal for operation "Taifun" is ordered for the night of 11 Nov.

Group South transmitted the plan for carrying out operation "Taifun". Teletype as per 1/Skl 3374/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

According to this plan, the landing unit is scheduled to leave the harbors of Kos, Marmari and Kalymnos between 2000 and 2200. The boats will proceed in two groups east and west of Kalymnos - Leros. They will each be protected by two boats of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. The first wave will land in the northern part of Alinda Bay, Palma Bay and to the east between Leros and Gurna Bay at 0330. After the coast of Alinda Bay has been occupied, the second wave will put in and disembark with heavy equipment. At 0500 and 0700 parachutists will land in two waves in the central part of the island.

There was an explosion in the Italian salvage dump on Skarpantos on 10 Nov. The three steamers bound for the Black Sea entered the Dardanelles. Two steamers bound for Suda did not leave Piraeus, since most of the Greek crew of one steamer deserted shortly before departure. Other convoy traffic was carried out without special event.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was a convoy,

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presumably consisting of 7 merchantmen with an escort of 9 fighters, 40 miles south of Tuapse on course 310° at 2100 on 10 Nov. Presumably the same convoy was again detected at 2340 on 10 Nov. consisting of 1 tanker (7,000 BRT), 3 merchantmen and 3 escorts.

Three battleships were sighted off the north coast of the Taman Peninsula on westerly course. With the exception of one destroyer in the area of Tuapse, radio intelligence did not detect any large vessels at sea.

Own Situation:

On the night of 10 Nov. patrol lines in the Strait of Kerch were taken up by 5 motor minesweepers, 2 PT boats and 6 naval landing craft. Motor minesweepers and PT boats hindered enemy supply traffic to Eltigen in the course of seven engagements. Each time the enemy was forced to withdraw. In the course of these actions one enemy motor gunboat was sunk by a torpedo hit from PT boat S "51". Guns of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla scored hits on several motor gunboats and PT boats. When proceeding back to Feodosiya the motor minesweepers were attacked by enemy planes with bombs and machine-guns. R "204" was brought into Feodosiya, heavily damaged. Casualties were sustained.

According to radio intelligence it was confirmed in a Russian radio message that our patrol forces in the Strait of Kerch have almost completely prevented supplies from reaching the beachhead at Eltigen.

For the night of 11 Nov., operations are planned in patrol lines in the southern part of the Strait of Kerch by five PT boats and four motor minesweepers and south thereof by seven naval landing craft. In addition, the mining of Kerch Bay by naval landing craft is planned. Since, due to the development of the situation on land, Kerch cannot be used as a base for naval landing craft, five of them will be transferred temporarily to Feodosiya. The remainder should use Kamysch Burun as their base.

Submarine U "23" put into Constanta from operations. Submarine U "19" put out into the operational area.

The steamers BURGAS and ZAR FERDINAND were transferred to the Dardanelles for further passage to the Aegean.

As regards the situation on land, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports:

a. early in the morning:

"1. On the beachhead of Bakhchi heavy fighting continues. Southern flank withdrew to the line: eastern edge of Koloska, Height 104.3, Adshin - Ushkas and Emirowo Hill, Height 106.6. In the morning enemy broke through near Adshin - Ushkas.

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2. All quiet on the beachhead of Eltigen. Here rations cut by half, since supplies were interrupted through operations by naval forces.
3. South of Sivash enemy assault detachment destroyed. At dawn our own attack against the enemy who had landed near Novy - Chuvash.
4. On the Perekop front probably our own attacks near Nikopol. Situation north of Kerch critical for the harbor of Kerch due to withdrawal of the front and penetration near Adshin - Ushkas, since reserves are no longer available; the loss of Kerch as a base for naval landing craft must be expected."

b. in the evening:

- "1. On the beachhead of Bakhchi enemy attacks with entire infantry of the four divisions so far transferred and 20 to 25 tanks on a wide front. Our new main line of defense, occupied on the night of 10 Nov., pushed back to line Ostra - Kerch - eastern edge of Bullgansk, heights 113.3 and 71.3. Enemy continues attacks against new main line of defense which is only occupied at strong points. Kolonka with jetty in enemy hands. Therefore the harbor of Kerch under direct fire from enemy guns and eliminated as a base for our naval landing craft.
2. All quiet still on the beachhead of Eltigen.
3. Enemy who landed near Novy - Chuvash (east of Perekop) destroyed in counter-attack. Peninsula cleared. Gun fire on the Perekop front."

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

In the course of reports on the Moscow Conference, Eden stated in the House of Commons that the European Commission in London would be established at once. Its task will be to submit joint recommendations to the three Governments.

In a message to the Polish Foreign Minister, Eden stated that the day of the restoration of Polish independence is approaching.

According to Reuter, preparations are being made for the meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, probably in Canada.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Naval Staff, Operations Division proposed that the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South for a PT boat flotilla to be left on the west coast of Italy be rejected. Chief, Naval Staff, agreed.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South received the following decision, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and German Naval Command, Italy:

"Naval Staff has again thoroughly examined the disposition of forces in the Mediterranean. For the time being, the danger of a large-scale enemy landing in the west area, combined with our present weakness, particularly of Army forces, renders a withdrawal of PT boats from the Channel to **the western** Mediterranean impossible. On the other hand, the tasks in the Adriatic and Aegean are of extreme urgency. Supplies for the 2nd Tank Army Command by sea have still not commenced, since most of the islands off the Dalmatian coast are still in enemy hands. There are almost no naval forces in the Adriatic; thus, a bringing-up of PT boats, that can only be effected from the western Mediterranean, is extremely urgent. The situation in the Aegean is similar; here an early occupation of the remaining islands which are still in the hands **of the** enemy is a necessary condition for holding our present position. Compared with this, operations by PT boats in the western Mediterranean are not of the same urgency. Therefore, Naval Staff finds it impossible to leave a PT boat flotilla in the western Mediterranean or to bring up new PT boats."

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II. Report of Quartermaster General.

a. The time fixed for the TIRPITZ can probably be adhered to. The ship will be ready for steam trials the middle of March.

b. The draft by the Army of the dual-purpose barge as a substitute for naval landing craft, naval artillery lighter, Siebel ferry and PT boat has been received. The vessel can be transported by land. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division agrees on condition that the vessel proves satisfactory before the construction of naval landing craft is concluded. A further condition is approval by the Army and Air Force.

c. According to a statement of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division, the fitting up of the 60 naval landing craft (artillery) will cause a delay in the completion of ten VII C-type boats of about 4 weeks.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that the naval landing craft be converted. However, this must not have an adverse effect on the times set for the electric submarines. If unavoidable, a slight delay in the completion of other types can be borne. The Naval (Ship) Construction Division was ordered to examine previous statements again and, if possible, to submit more favorable proposals.

d. Owing to shortage of ammunition on the part of the Army, the Navy has agreed to hand over 15 million cartridges of rifle ammunition; 60 million were requested. Out of a standard stock of 290 million the Navy has 180 million cartridges. The handing-over of 60 million would have increased the deficiency to 50 %, which had to be rejected. One standard unit = 99 cartridges for each rifle and 3,500 cartridges for each machine-gun.

III. Regarding Report of Chief, Intelligence Division:

A Russo-Chinese agreement on delivery of war materiel for Tchiang Kai Chek was concluded on 10 Oct.; it provides, among other things, for the sending of German ordnance instructors from Russian captivity.

IV. The creation of an Italian Republican-Fascist flag will not be discussed until 15 Dec., thus making necessary a provisional flag for the Navy until then. A proposal will be submitted to German Naval Command, Italy accordingly.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Army Situation:

For situation on the Crimea see Own Situation Black Sea.

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Fighting in the southern part of the eastern front from Kherson to Kiev was comparatively slight. The attack in the Kiev area continues with unabated intensity. The enemy advanced up to 30 km from Zhitomir. Also at the points of penetration near Gomel, Vitebsk and Nevel the situation is still critical.

In Italy hard fighting continues in front of and in the Bernhard line.

Special Items:

I. The Foreign Office made known the report of the Ambassador in Ankara on information from a reliable source regarding the Cairo Conference. Commanding Admiral, Group South was given the following excerpt from this report:

1. In view of Great Britain's difficult tactical situation in the Aegean, Eden demanded at Cairo the availability of Turkish airfields for operations by fighters. Upon the Turkish Foreign Minister's rejection of this demand on the grounds that this would lead to a state of war between Turkey and Germany, Eden pointed out that refusal would cast a shadow on Anglo-Turkish relations. Furthermore, Germany's military situation was so weak that only a formal protest, as in the case of Portugal, was to be expected. In addition, American shipments would be discontinued in the future in case of a refusal.

2. The Turkish Government decided to have the Prime Minister present the situation to the People's Party and ask for their decision. The Turkish Government obviously desires to gain support in its weighty decision as regards the Allies by the vote of the people. It is to be expected that the People's Party also will reject the British demand. The Russians are said to have agreed to the British demand with regard to the possibility of bombing Rumanian oil fields.

Note by Naval Staff:

"It is assumed that at present Turkey will not comply with the British demand."

II. The Air Force is following up the question of the long-distance flight Germany-Japan. (cf. War Diary 3 Nov., Special Items V). As a precaution, Naval Staff, Operations Division pointed out to Air Force Operations Staff that the situation regarding all planes suited for warfare in the Atlantic is so unsatisfactory that on no account can planes be withdrawn from there for traffic to Japan.

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III. Now that trials with models on underwater tows have proved satisfactory, Naval Staff, Operations Division has requested from Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division construction of at first ten underwater tank lighters and ten underwater supply lighters, that are intended chiefly for supply purposes in the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Sea. The possibility of using them for supplying submarines in the Atlantic is to be investigated by Submarine Division, Naval Staff.

For details see files 1/Skl III a.

Situation 12 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-nine planes and two air-sea rescue planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay.

One British vessel, each was located at 0902 in BE 3538, at 1214 in BE 3291, at 1837 in BE 3310 and at 2006 in AL 9160.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four submarines were escorted out and two in. Thirty miles west-southwest of Arcachon a Spanish fishing vessel from San Sebastian sank at 0556 on 10 Nov. after a collision with minesweeper M "444". The crew was saved and taken on by another Spanish fishing vessel.

On 11 Nov. at 1655 fighter-bombers attacked patrol boats "708" and "710" with bombs and machine-guns. The Commander of "708" was killed. One plane was shot down. At 1944 a further plane was shot down near Lorient by minesweepers M "4040" and "4044".

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After a search in BF 9100/9200 of Spanish fishing vessels suspected of carrying radar, the steamer PANSEMKA is being brought into the Gironde for search. (See teletype 1950).

Channel Coast:

Due to stormy and also clear weather no escort and patrol duties were carried out.

Regarding the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51, Group West reported on plans for speedy laying of the defensive flanking barrage system and requirements.

On this Naval Staff, Operations Division decided as follows:

"1. The advance in the date planned for the barrage system off the coast consisting of EMC mines with time-setting (N-barrages) and LMB mines with AA 1 (L-barrages) from the spring to the new-moon period at the end of November and end of December, is approved. Investigate whether, in lieu of tactical barrages for protection of the convoy route off Barfleur and Cape de la Hague, reinforcement of the flanking barrages in the Seine Bay to cover the east coast of Cotentin and the area south of the mouth of the Seine, which are vulnerable to landings, is more appropriate.

2. The following allocation is made with identification number KA 14: 1,100 EMC's with chain, 100 m of mooring rope and time setting 80 days, as well as 812 LMB's with AA 1. 1,000 EMC's will be supplied at once, the rest in the first half of December. About 150 LMB's will be supplied every week. For preparation of the LM's it must be stated in advance whether they are to be laid from a narrow or a normal mine gauge.

3. For the time being, no further moored mines can be allotted; further supplies of LMB's are currently possible to a small extent.

4. For renovation of the barrage system after the time-setting has run out, it is intended to provide 800 EMC's with chain and time-setting each in February and March."

Order as per 1/Skl I E 3310/43 Okdos. Chefs. in files 1/Skl I E.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Due to weather conditions, minesweeping activity was restricted. On 10 Nov. harbor defense boat DB "45" was damaged while sweeping a mine north of Wangerooge. On 12 Nov. four mines were swept north of Vlieland and Terschelling. West of Heligoland a mine-exploding vessel was damaged by a mine.

Convoy 468 Hook - Elbe was again delayed.

Altogether 34, 570 BRT were escorted in the IJssel Meer and Zeeland waters. The transfer of freight traffic to this inland waterway, which Naval Staff and Naval Command, North have requested from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping for a long time, has gradually assumed considerable proportions and led to a great relief of the sea traffic with Rotterdam.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twelve planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. Very lively radio traffic was observed between England - Murmansk - Archangel throughout the day; it decreased in the evening.

Own Situation:

Thirty-five ships were escorted north and thirty-three south. Twenty-four ships remained lying in harbor.

The 5th Air Force informed Group North that the FW 200 transferred to Petsamo to supply meteorological operation "Schatzgraeber" will be transferred back to Trondheim, since favorable weather conditions for the operation are no longer to be expected until the middle of January. Group North/Fleet reports that Admiral, Northern Waters, takes the same view regarding the development of the weather.

As ordered, Naval Command, Norway submitted a report dated 30 Oct. on sailing directions on the Arctic coast. (cf. War Diary, 25 Oct.). In addition to previous prescribed routes, Naval Command, Norway intends to establish the following convoy routes:

a. Route off the coast:

The convoys escorted by minesweepers will proceed on long zig-zag courses without fixed sailing directions in the area between the coast and the southern limit of the declared area.

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b. Route at sea:

Above all, fast warship convoys will proceed on alternating long zig-zag courses three miles north of the northern limit of the declared area. Passage through the declared area and over our own minefields is permitted only in an emergency with minesweeper escort with 8 m depth-setting.

Admiral, Arctic Coast has been ordered to have runs made over our UMB barrages with cutting kite sweeps minus 8 m. to investigate them for deficiency.

Naval Staff, Operations Division agrees to the intended introduction of routes off the coast and at sea. An investigation of the UMB barrages with cutting kite sweeps minus 8 m. is inadvisable and unnecessary, since passage over our barrages will only take place in cases of emergency and with minesweeper escort.

Later: On 7 Nov. Naval Command, Norway reported that in the course of action against agents off the Varanger coast, an enemy submarine was lured near Pers Fjord by deceptive radio on the part of our intelligence and successfully engaged. Its destruction is confirmed. For details see teletype 1/Skl 3311/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

This unusual success by our intelligence was reported to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy by Naval Staff.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Minesweeping and escort service as well as troop transports were carried out in the whole Baltic area according to plan and without incident.

On 4 Nov. Naval Command, Baltic gave a review of the month of October 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 30978/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

As regards the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic it is gathered from this report that transfer of the extended command area took place smoothly and without any difficulties regarding operations.

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An increasing Polish resistance movement is reported from the area of Coastal Defense Commander, Central Baltic. Formation of gangs is reported in the area of Karthaus.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States: the morale in Estonia is still sinking, though divided.

The attitude of the educated circles is more positive. At Reval the number of assaults and robberies, probably with the participation of infiltrated partisans, is increasing. The transport and fuel situation is still very critical.

V. Submarine Warfare.

No important reports from the boats on operation have been received.

The crew landed on the north coast of Spain is that of submarine U "966" that had been missing since departure from Trondheim on 5 Oct. The boat was attacked by an enemy plane with seven bombs 65 miles off the coast in BF 7423 at 0300 on 10 Nov. but was still able to dive. From 0830 the attack was renewed. Fresh damage was caused. One Consolidated was heavily damaged. In the course of further attacks the boat became unable to dive. Towards 1400 it left the Bay of Santa Marta and was attacked with machine-guns by planes that approached from land. When a corvette came in sight, the boat was blown up two miles southeast of Punta Estaca at 1600 at a depth of 55 m, an unexploded depth-charge lying in the external fuel tank detonating thereby. The crew was saved except for eight dead or missing.

The considerable increase in enemy air activity in the Atlantic renders the problem of detecting enemy convoys more and more difficult. The enemy holds all the trump cards: a farreaching air reconnaissance continuously covering all areas and using location methods that cannot be detected by us, thereby enabling establishment of our boats and their dispositions, furthermore, the possibility of avoiding action and maintaining control of convoys in vast sea areas.

As against this, we do not have any adequate air reconnaissance up to now. The submarine must carry out its own reconnaissance; it does not have any effective new location method and its freedom of movement is considerably limited by enemy air superiority by day and night.

From this arises the following very urgent requirement:

Our own farreaching air reconnaissance and combat of enemy air force; improvement of our own active and passive methods of location.

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VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force, 32 bombers, 46 fighters and 43 reconnaissance planes were out on operation. No special reports on our operations have been received.

By day single enemy planes carried out machine-gun attacks in Holland, Belgium and northern France; the airfield near Lille was attacked by fighter-bombers. Near Amiens one Typhoon was shot by mobile railway anti-aircraft guns. In the evening about 15 planes entered the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area and dropped some high explosive bombs on Bochum, Recklinghausen and Crefeld from a very high altitude.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The two convoys in the western Mediterranean were again detected by our air reconnaissance in the morning. The convoy attacked near Arzeu on 11 Nov. was seen to consist of 24 steamers, including 1 tanker with 3 destroyers. As a final result, 4 steamers totalling about 29,000 BRT and 2 destroyers were reported sunk, while 11 steamers totalling 84,000 BRT, 2 destroyers and 1 escort were reported damaged. The group commander of the 1st Group of Bomber Wing 26 was killed in action; for details of the attack see Daily Situation.

On 12 Oct. the operation by twelve bombers against the second eastbound convoy was unsuccessful since the enemy was not detected.

Otherwise, there was reconnaissance activity in the Italian area.

Air Force Command, Southeast had 122 bombers, 48 Stukas, 18 heavy fighters, 34 fighters, 30 reconnaissance planes and 60 transport planes out on operation, the main target being Leros. In the course of reconnaissance, photographs were taken of Alexandria.

By day the enemy attacked airfields near Valona. Three Me 109's were damaged. Further attacks were directed against the airfield near Ancona, against Civitavecchia, Padua as well as against the airfield of Maritza near Rhodes. At noon one of our convoys in the Aegean was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs and torpedoes. Altogether two enemy planes were shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

In the morning a BIRMINGHAM class cruiser left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. Nine LCT's from the Mediterranean put into Gibraltar.

At 0810 our air reconnaissance located an eastbound convoy consisting of 24 steamers, including 1 tanker with 3 destroyers 55 miles west of Cape Tenes. These were probably parts of the large convoy successfully attacked on 11 Nov. near Arzeu. At 0915 an eastbound convoy consisting of 45 merchantmen, including numerous very large ones, with 8 destroyers, was also located 16 miles north-northwest of Oran.

This convoy was last located at 1712 northeast of Arzeu, consisting of 52 steamers with 7 escort vessels. This was probably the second large convoy that passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on the morning of 11 Nov.

At 1930 a WARSPITE class was detected in dock in Gibraltar.

Photographic reconnaissance of Maddalena showed the presence of 14 gun- and 11 torpedo PT boats. At noon there were seven vessels, apparently minesweepers, in the Gulf of Gaeta.

During the night of 11 Nov. 4-6 PT boats were operating south of Elba. One of our northbound convoys was attacked first by 4, and later by 2 PT boats. The attack was repulsed by motor minesweepers.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On the night of 10 Nov. minelayer KEHRWIEDER with motor minesweepers carried out minelaying off the mouth of the Tiber as planned. On the night of 12 Nov. torpedo boat TA "24" is to carry out further minelaying in the area of Elba.

3. Area Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The island of Trvnik and the opposite shore were cleared by Army troops. Trvnik Channel is open for shipping. Trojir and Rogoznica may be entered.

According to an intelligence report the island of Korcula has, since the end of October, been supplied every second night by a British ship from Bari.

Submarine U "453" carried out minelaying off Bari as planned and is returning to Pola.

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Due to breaking of the crank-shaft PT boat S "61" had to interrupt its passage in the Aegean and entered Dubrovnik with S "54".

Group South has suggested using the CAVOUR as a mobile, floating anti-aircraft battery, reinforcing the anti-aircraft armament and at present only manning the anti-aircraft armament and guns of medium caliber, as well as manning the ship with technical personnel to such an extent that a cruising speed of 12 - 15 knots is ensured.

The following are the reasons for the proposal:

- a. Removal and emplacement of guns of heavy caliber on the coast cannot be carried out within the near future.
- b. Removal of guns of medium caliber and anti-aircraft guns and their emplacement on the coast is possible, but will take months. With regard to the length of the coast, concentrated action by moving the ship is more expedient.
- c. The only possibility of operations against the islands occupied by the enemy or by partisans and against an enemy operation on the coast is with a navigable ship.
- d. The ship's batteries need less personnel than do land batteries.
- e. The protection of batteries aboard the armored ship is greater than on land.
- f. Danger from the air force is decreased by the possibility of moving the ship and reinforcement of our anti-aircraft guns.
- g. Finally, maintenance of the ship in operation will give the enemy the impression of a battleship ready for action, with corresponding strategic effects. (See teletype 2020.)

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 0600 photographic reconnaissance by our air force detected in Alexandria: 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 8 escort vessels, 15 small war vessels, the WOOLWICH, 16 small landing boats, 12 transports, 24 fighters, 6 tankers (totalling about 240,000 BRT of merchant shipping) as well as 1 vessel, presumably a destroyer, in the floating dock.

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Throughout the day no surface forces were sighted in the Leros area of operations. However, air activity was lively. At 1845 one of our submarine chasers reported that 2 destroyers had passed through the Strait of Kos to the north. Air reconnaissance reported: at 1925 2 vessels southwest of Kos on northwesterly course; at 2135 3 destroyers off the east coast of Leros, course not given; at 2335 1 destroyer and 2 guard-boats 5 miles northwest of Symi on westerly course.

Own Situation:

Operation "Taifun".

As planned, the advance to Leros started in two groups east and west of Kalymnos on the night of 11 Nov. Motor minesweeper R "195", damaged by an air attack at 0124, is taking further part in the operations. At 0210 a small enemy craft was destroyed near Telendo by motor minesweeper R "210". At 0200 a British patrol vessel of a new type with 2 officers and 14 men was captured by submarine chaser "2101" after an engagement near Telendo and brought into the harbor of Kalymnos.

Under heavy defensive fire the eastern group began the landing at 0521, which was completed by 0554 with the exception of the most northerly group.

The western group turned away at 0543 five miles southwest of the island under heavy fire from land; at 0540 parachutists were called back.

The western group, which had withdrawn, was ordered to enforce the landing under the Commander of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. At 0900 Stukas were sent out against the 21 cm battery on the southwestern corner of Leros and the landing of the western group was ordered for 1245. However, due to heavy enemy fire from the coast, it was impossible to carry out the landing. The speed of torpedo boat TA "18" was reduced to twelve knots by a hit in the boiler. The guns of torpedo boat TA "17" were put out of action. The attempt at landing was broken off, but is to be repeated on the west coast by dark. All torpedo boats have put into Syra for refuelling. Naval landing craft F "370" was towed in with engines out of action.

Parachute troops were landed at 1330.

According to radio intelligence, our movements were detected by the enemy and reported to Alexandria. Air operations were requested.

On account of strong enemy defense, the western group was ordered to carry out the landing on the eastern part of the island, making full use

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of submarine chasers.

Naval Staff informed High Command, Army, Army General Staff, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, on the situation of operation "Taifun" as follows:

1. Due to enemy defense the northern group did not land and was diverted to the southern point.
2. The second attempt of the western group likewise failed. Torpedo boat TA "18" put out of action, after receiving a hit in the boiler. Must return to Piraeus.
3. Parachutists landed at 1330.
4. All torpedo boats withdrew in the afternoon for refuelling. They will arrive again in the operational area after about 18 hours.

Owing to weather conditions mopping-up operations on the islands of Skropelos and Skiathos were broken off.

The first group of Siebel ferries from Patras arrived at Piraeus.

Regarding the operational order for submarines in the southern Aegean:

Naval Staff sees better operational possibilities for submarine U "565" in the direct area of Leros than in the present area. Group South and Commanding Admiral, Aegean are ordered to investigate the possibilities and, if agreed, to act accordingly and to report intentions.

To this Commanding Admiral, Aegean reports that operational possibilities in the area of Leros were thoroughly investigated, but rejected for the following reasons:

- a. Restricted by our own barrages and Turkish territorial waters.
- b. Activity by our bombers.
- c. Operations by our destroyers and torpedo boats.
- d. Our own submarine hunt.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean intends to have submarine U "565" remain in the present operational area.

Regarding this, Group South informed Naval Staff for information of the following order to Commanding Admiral, Aegean:

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"On the basis of experiences so far gained the operational area of submarines is to be extended to the area of Leros, particularly east of Leros."

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 11 Nov. the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla sank 2 ammunition lighters of about 200 BRT and 2 small vessels, set on fire 1 fuel lighter and damaged 2 motor gunboats by gun fire, off the beachhead of Eltigen.

Kerch Bay was mined according to plan.

On 10 Nov. the 1st battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 613 scored a hit on a loading position on the Taman Coast thereby causing an extensive fire. The 1st and 3rd Battery each scored a hit on a motor gunboat. On 12 Nov. the 3rd Battery blew up an ammunition lighter near Kossa Tschuschka.

At 0300 six naval landing craft transferred from Kerch to Feodosiya.

On the night of 12 Dec. seven naval landing craft were out on operation in Kerch Bay and south of it five PT boats were out in the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch, the focal point of the operation being off Eltigen.

At 1200 the steamer THEODERICH (4,000 BRT) belonging to the convoy Constanta - Odessa was sunk by an enemy submarine 35 miles south-southwest of Odessa.

Minelaying unit consisting of the ROMANIA, MURGESCA, 2 steamers, 1 tanker, 2 Rumanian destroyers and 2 gunboats as well as 4 motor minesweepers and armed fishing vessels is on return passage from Sevastopol to Constanta in two convoys.

According to a report of Army Group A, the enemy break-through northeast of Kerch has led to considerable aggravation of the situation as a whole. The enemy bridgehead has now reached such proportions that it allows of the assembly of strong penetration forces. By using our last reserves, including shore-based alarm units of the Navy, we succeeded in repelling the attack of four enemy divisions, supported for the first time by tanks. This attack was stopped only by the utmost determination of our troops using every ounce of will power. Five tanks were destroyed in the course of this. The enemy forces landed north of Novy - Chuvash were destroyed.

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VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

The disturbances which broke out in Beirut led on 12 Nov. to de Gaulle troops' firing on the demonstrating population. The British Ambassador in Beirut has protested against this action on the part of the French authorities, since, in view of the strategically important position of Syria, the British Government cannot allow conditions to arise that would contradict the promise of independence given by her to Syria and Lebanon. At any rate, Great Britain is trying to exploit all advantages arising from a development in which she herself is probably not entirely blameless. British interference is expected.

According to Allied reports the abdication of Victor Emanuel is imminent and a regency will be formed. Count Sforza is mentioned as Prime Minister. The removal of General Roatta from his post as Chief of the General Staff of the Badoglio Army was officially announced in Algiers.

It is impossible to gain a clear idea as to the attitude of Turkey. British pressure and the fear of Russia are making it difficult for the Turkish Government to adhere to its previous foreign policy, much as it may wish to.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Subject: Conversion of Naval Landing craft in accordance with Directive No. 51:

Chief, Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Bureau of Naval Armament: the first series to be converted by the end of December comprises 26 naval landing craft. The Main Committee for Ship Construction and the Naval (Ship) Construction Division have each submitted a proposal for allocation to capable firms of the conversions, which will require about 1 million working hours.

The first proposal avoids to a great extent drawing upon repair capacity and avoids completely any interference with the prefabrication of submarines, which is just commencing.

The second proposal arose from the demand to avoid completely any detriment to construction of submarines, including the VII C-type boats, which are being put out.

In the view of the Main Committee on these proposals, it is stated that in any case the construction of the 26 naval landing craft (artillery) will interfere with the whole warship construction program.

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Though the first proposal stipulates a delay in the completion of submarines type VII C for some weeks, it is considered more advantageous, since the much more important repair capacity remains substantially unaffected by it. In order to avoid a belated commencement of prefabrication, the delay in the completion of submarines will probably require laying up four boats. As the Main Committee is constructing twelve more submarines type VII than at first planned, the loss of four boats and postponement of the remaining eight boats is considered bearable.

In any case, the conversion of eight naval landing craft in the Dutch area makes a new plan necessary, as the Dockyard Control Staff has demanded three months for construction, which is impossible.

As far as the second proposal is concerned, the Main Committee considers drawing upon repair capacities of Blohm & Voss and of the Naval Dockyard at Wilhelmshaven inadvisable.

For these reasons the Naval (Ship) Construction Division has worked out a third proposal which avoids curtailment of the submarine construction program. The proposal provides for:

at Deschimag dockyard	ten naval landing craft; construction of destroyers will be delayed by four weeks,
at Unterweser dockyard	two naval landing craft; the construction of submarine-chasers will be delayed by two weeks,
at Rickmers dockyard	two naval landing craft; the construction of mine-sweepers will be delayed by two weeks,
at Neptun dockyard	four naval landing craft; the construction of one submarine-chaser and one minesweeper will be delayed by four weeks,
at Dutch dockyards	eight naval landing craft.
Altogether:	26 naval landing craft.

Chief, Naval Staff, decided that however regrettable the postponement in the construction of surface vessels may be, the third proposal will be adopted.

II. Chief, Naval Staff orders that a second submarine not be sent to the southern Aegean, as the commitment of one boat is already leading to difficulties.

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III. Chief, Naval Staff agrees that the following statement be issued to the survivors of ship "28":

"I have ordered that the families of the crew of the MICHEL now be informed of the fate of their men. The loss of this glorious ship and a great part of her crew fills us all with grief. With the two long voyages which the ship completed under her two excellent commanders, she belongs to the most successful of German warships. Far from home, hold fast to the glorious deeds of your ship and your comrades, keep the spirit of this proud German raider alive and protect the honor of the flag wherever you have to fulfill your duty as German sailors for the Fuehrer, the German people and the Reich until you return home after battle and victory."

IV. The unchaining of British prisoners of war is now ordered.

V. Report of Quartermaster General: Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has requested the extension of the area of German Naval Command, Italy, in order to make it correspond with the border of the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast. (See War Diary 12 Nov.) In addition, Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast has requested the assignment of a German naval artillery battalion for the Croatian area.

Neither request can be met. Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

VI. Report of Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division:

a. The exchange of notes with Spain regarding the handing-over of the crew of the submarine "Blum" is not yet concluded. At present the unobtrusive replacement of the submarine men to be released by other men who may require recuperation is being considered.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees to any methods that will lead to the desired result as soon as possible.

For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

b. As regards the attack on submarine WOLF in Spanish territorial waters (see War Diary 11 and 12 Nov.) a sharp protest was addressed to the Spanish Government. A forceful request is being sent to Madrid for release of the survivors.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

VII. Army Situation:

In the course of the break-through near Kiev, Zhitomir was partly captured

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by the enemy. Our defense in the focal points of attack of Gomel, Vitebsk and Nevel was successful.

Regarding the situation in Italy, Foreign Armies West takes the view that the enemy is trying by every possible means to gain possession of Rome before the winter.

VIII. In order to prepare the required report regarding the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51, Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff obtained the decision of Chief, Naval Staff on the following problems:

a. With regard to the present situation, it seems to be advisable that a small group of destroyers be stationed in the Skagerrak. Since new ones will not be available until the middle of next year, it is proposed that a sub-division of destroyers be detached from the SCHAFFHORST. Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

b. As regards operations by submarines in the Skagerrak and in southern Norway, no change will be made in the decision already taken that an assembly of submarines in this area will only come into question if the situation becomes acute. At the moment no submarine can be spared in the Atlantic, also with regard to the fact that the Ju 290's are now being put into operation for the first time, from which an improvement in anti-convoy activity is anticipated.

c. Regarding the question of providing operational commanders, the transfer of Commander, Submarines, Norway to southern Norway is planned as soon as the situation calls for this. The appointment of a special submarine operational commander in southern Norway is not necessary. Until the arrival of Commander, Submarines, Norway, in the south, operational control can be exercised temporarily by Submarine Division, Naval Staff. Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

IX. On 11 Nov. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy sent a situation report in letter form to Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff, describing the situation on the eastern front. The report is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. a.

Special Items.

I. The following survey of shipping in the western Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas based on data available to Naval Staff is contained in a list from the Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division dated 6 Nov.:

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a.	in the western Mediterranean 118 ships totalling	401,564 BRT
b.	in the Adriatic 56 ships totalling	63,172 BRT
	55 auxiliary sailing vessels "	<u>4,452 BRT</u>
	Total	67,624 BRT
c.	in the Aegean 38 ships totalling	85,357 BRT
d.	in the Black Sea 32 ships "	40,417 BRT
	27 auxiliary sailing vessels totalling	<u>3,164 BRT</u>
	Total	43,581 BRT

II. In Brief. Intelligence Report on the Enemy Situation No. 23/43, Enemy Situation Branch, Naval Intelligence Division reports, among other things, on: an Anglo-American report of October on submarine warfare; a declaration of the British and American naval secretaries regarding submarine warfare and naval warfare; details regarding enemy losses in warships and new warship constructions.

In the October declaration on submarine warfare it is stated that the following factors above all have contributed to defensive success:

- a. the great progress made in detection of submarines,
- b. closing of the gap in the central Atlantic by use of the escort carrier type WOOLWORTH,
- c. use of the Leigh searchlight for the anti-submarine air force, the latter having made the night almost as dangerous for the Germans as the day.

Copy of report as per 1/Skl 35147/43 Gkdos in War Diary, Part D "Data on the enemy situation."

Situation 13 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifty planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay, mostly between 1400 and 1700. One British vessel each was located

at 0725 in BC 6110,
at 1214 in BE 3291,
at 1840 in AM 7831,
at 1837 in BE 3310,
at 1858 in AM 7943,
at 1954 in BE 2890, and
at 2008 in AM 5440.

2. Own Situation:

One ELM mine each was swept off Brest and off Lorient.

Five Spanish fishing vessels were brought into the Gironde for search. In addition, numerous further boats were searched at sea. Apart from normal radio sets, nothing was found.

Channel Coast:

Harbor defense boat FO "12" sprang a leak in heavy weather and was a total loss. Due to weather conditions there was no escort and minesweeping service and patrol positions were not taken up. At 1930 lightning blew up eight ammunition stores of the Naval Depot Zedelghem near Bruges.

Special Items.

A. Group West reports as intentions for the new-moon period November/December:

1. Beginning of fresh laying of mine barrages in the Channel with available ground mines; beginning with L 2 and L 3.

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2. For this, transfer of three boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla to Le Havre starting on 22 Nov. (five minelayers, one combat and command boat). Under Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.
 3. Two boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will remain at Brest for submarine aid.
 4. During the transfer a feint operation off the coast of northern Brittany will be carried out by the steamer RECUM and the 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla as detached flank escort and the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla as detached close escort.
 5. The RECUM will transfer to Brest by 15 Nov.
 6. After minelaying has been carried out, the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will return to Brest.
 7. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will remain at Le Havre after minelaying has been carried out for operations against enemy PT boats.
- B. According to a discussion by telephone with Commander, Destroyers, the destroyers Z "23" and Z "24" must commence their dockyard period about February 1944. It is desired that it take place at a German dockyard. Until now Naval Staff intended that destroyers in the west area should undergo their long dockyard period there, as the considerable risk of proceeding through the Channel from west to east and the increased requirements of furnace oil for two transfers are factors against a transfer to home waters and back. Considering the urgency of the demand of Commander, Destroyers, Group West is asked to submit its views on the possibility of the passage of the two destroyers through the Channel to the east. Copy as per order 1/Skl I op 31764/43 Gkdos in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort, minesweeping and patrol duties were interrupted because of continuous storms. Five further ground mines were reported swept in the Heligoland Bight on 12 Nov. On the morning of 13 Nov. about 200 enemy planes flew over the Heligoland Bight into the area of Flensburg - Kiel, and 100 further planes into the Bremen area. Ineffective bombing attacks were made near Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbuettel. One plane was shot down by naval battery Sylt, and a further one by River Minesweeping Flotilla Moordijk. In addition, an enemy fighter

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that had carried out an attack on patrol boat "2014" was destroyed by naval anti-aircraft guns in the Hook of Holland.

Five convoys totalling 52,572 BRT were carried out in Zeeland waters.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Thirty-three planes, probably concentrating in the sea area of the Shetland Islands, were detected over the North Sea. There was slight gun fire in the Petsamo area on 11 Nov. On 12 Nov. one Boston was reported in the Barak area and four planes in the Vardoe area.

Own Situation:

On 12 Nov. the tanker BANKO (461 BRT) ran aground off Berlevaag after a collision with a patrol boat.

According to a report of Admiral, Northern Waters, armed reconnaissance for weather operation "Bassgeiger" started out at 0712.

Thirty-two ships were escorted north and sixteen, south.

Sixteen further ships remained in harbor due to lack of escorts.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Direction Finder Station Baltic was shelled by enemy batteries from Leningrad.

Own Situation:

Twenty-seven planes were engaged in minesweeping in the Baltic Sea Entrances, and sixteen in the Baltic. One mine each was swept east of Halsbarre and west of Anholt. Escort duties in the Baltic area were carried out according to plan.

Minesweeping in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic was affected by weather conditions.

The 12.8 cm battery position at Voeltzendorf has been ready to fire since 12 Nov.

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V. Submarine Warfare.

Submarine U "155" sank the steamer SIRANGER (5,393 BRT) off the north coast of Brazil.

While on return passage, submarine U "592" encountered a group of steamers with escort on course 330° in BD 6723, but lost contact after three misses.

In the area of the Azores (CE 1339) submarine U "536" sighted a destroyer on easterly course. Otherwise nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force flew 22 bombers, 20 fighters and 18 reconnaissance planes. No bomber missions were carried out.

By day there was lively enemy air activity, mainly by fighter-bombers and fighters, over the west area. In the areas of Antwerp and Cherbourg machine-gun attacks were carried out. One Liberator was shot down near Dortrecht.

In the course of the flight of strong bomber formations into German territory, about 1,000 incendiaries were dropped at noon on Flensburg, 500 of which did not explode. On their return flight several incendiaries were dropped on the Air Force Station at Husum. No appreciable damage was caused either in Flensburg or at Husum.

The formation of 150 bombers that flew into the area southwest of Bremen joined up in the area of Oldenburg with altogether 200 fighter planes which flew in an isolated groups. On the return flight the formation was picked up by a further 200 fighters at the German border. Bombing by this formation is not reported. For defense 200 fighters and 115 heavy fighters were sent out. According to reports so far, 8 bombers and 6 fighters were shot down; however, an increase of this number is to be expected.

In the evening 30 enemy planes flew into German territory, 20 of them into the area of Eberswalde - Prenzlau. On the return flight one plane crossed Berlin. A further 25 planes flew into the Rhine - Westphalian industrial area. Some bombs were dropped on Bochum.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the Italian area our own planes carried out reconnaissance.

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At noon 50 - 100 enemy planes were over Turin in several waves. Bombing is not reported. Twelve planes attacked the airfield of Frosinone near Rome. In the evening the enemy carried out armed reconnaissance on the coast from Ostia to Civitavecchia. One ship was set on fire.

Air Force Command, Southeast had 68 bombers, 62 stukas, 24 fighter-bombers, 12 reconnaissance planes and 20 transport planes out on operation, the focal point being Leroc.

By day the enemy carried out armed reconnaissance as far as Zagreb and Tirana. In the evening Los was attacked by five planes without substantial effect.

In the Aegean one enemy plane was shot down by fighters near Levitha.

3. Eastern Front:

Of the 5th Air Force, 41 planes were out on operation. No special reports received.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

At 1745 2 tankers, 2 destroyers and 1 gunboat were reported north of Tres Forcas heading for the Atlantic. At 1915 a convoy consisting of 20 freighters, 2 tankers, with 1 destroyer and 2 corvettes passed Gibraltar, westbound. Ten further freighters and one corvette from the Mediterranean put into Gibraltar. At 1430 six LCT's of a new type put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

At 1600 1 transport of 20,000 BRT with troops, 1 auxiliary cruiser of 15,000 BRT, 2 destroyers of the "H" class and 1 corvette, passed Tangiers bound for the Mediterranean.

At 1815 a convoy consisting of 11 freighters, and 1 tanker, escorted by an auxiliary cruiser and 7 corvettes, left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

One minesweeper was sighted in the Strait of Bonifacio. In the area of Sicily - Naples only a southbound convoy consisting of 3 merchantmen and 10 landing craft was sighted 70 miles north of Palermo at 0915.

At 1100 eleven ships were in the Gulf of Gaeta near the front. Since an increase of freighters and landing craft was detected at Naples, preparations for an enemy landing behind our front are not out of the question.

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Five LCT's were sighted in Bari and nine LCT's in Barletta.

According to radio intelligence, the enemy intends to carry out an operation from Bastia on the night of 13 Nov. in spite of the unfavorable full-moon conditions. No further details are known.

According to an intelligence report, four British submarines with machine-guns and rifles of Italian origin, as well as with food and propaganda material, left Catania for Bari on 11 Nov. The boats are to maintain communication with partisans in Albania and Greece.

According to a very reliable intelligence report, an intensification of the Allied offensive in southern Italy with simultaneous landing operations in the harbors of Tuscany is expected very soon, now that military agreement has been reached in Moscow. After this has been successfully carried out and bases established, a second landing operation with minor forces is planned along the French Mediterranean coast in the area of Cannes and Toulon for the purpose of tying down German forces. At present the 7th U.S. Army is ready in Sicily for the first operation. For the operation on the French Mediterranean coast combined U.S. and French troops are being assembled on Sardinia and Corsica.

For the time being, plans for landing on the Atlantic and Channel coasts have been postponed indefinitely, since the Russians did not insist on the opening of a front in that area.

In the area of the Balkans only commando raids on the islands and mainland of the Adriatic coast to support partisan units are intended. For the time being no large-scale landing operations are intended on the Balkans, since Russia has reserved for herself the occupation of these states as her operational area by means of a coup d'état in Bulgaria.

According to the same report Turkey is not endangered by either British or Russian attacks at the moment, since in Moscow the integrity of Turkish neutrality was deemed appropriate and desirable in order to avoid tension between the Allies.

How far this report, which is said to have originated in the British Embassy in Madrid, in the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon and the Dissenters' Committee in Madrid and Algiers, merely recounts the substance of unofficial conversation, or how else it is to be evaluated, remains to be seen.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Up to 12 Nov. eleven French ships totalling 51,704 BRT were sent back from Italian harbors to Marseilles without losses. Torpedo boat TA "24" carried out minelaying in the area of Elba according to plan. When approaching the area, three vessels, apparently enemy PT boats, were sighted south of Leghorn. No engagement took place.

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On 12 Nov. at 0445 enemy PT boats unsuccessfully attacked the convoy of steamer GIORGIO west of Orbetello. Otherwise convoy service was carried out according to plan. Enemy air activity in the area of Ancona - Pescara increased. The attack was concentrated on Benedetto, now our southern-most harbor, on the east coast of Italy.

German Naval Command, Italy suggests that since German and Italian orders are overlapping in the field of ship construction, armament and war industry, a fundamental ruling should be provided, according to which all building projects of ship construction are to be reported exclusively to the Speer Ministry, to the Italian Ministry of Armament and War Production and to the Dockyard Control Staff, and that orders of all German and Italian offices for Italian industry should be passed without exception through the staff of General Leyers. (See teletype 2245).

This question will be settled by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

The suggestion of Group South that, in view of the weakness of our Air Force in the Italian area, the agents' network in southern Italy should be quickly built up or completed, (see War Diary 9 Nov.) was transmitted by Naval Operations Division to Naval Intelligence Division, with copy to the Liaison Officer of Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, with Naval Staff.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

The hospital ship GRADISCA entered Trieste according to plan with 702 wounded.

During the night of 12 Nov. torpedo boat TA "21", the steamer RAMB III and small craft left Pola for the operation against the islands. The operation began early on 13 Nov. according to plan. Landings were carried out on Veglia, Cherso and Lussino. Army landing troops were embarked aboard the steamer RAMB III, three Siebel ferries and numerous small vessels. The ships were escorted by the cruiser CATTARO, torpedo boat TA "21", coastal defense boat NAJADE and seaplanes. Until now resistance on the islands was only slight. The CATTARO and torpedo boat TA "21" captured several auxiliary sailing vessels which were trying to flee and took prisoners, including eight British. In the evening the RAMB III put into Pola. On Lussino two 15 cm guns will probably be ready to fire on 14 Nov. At the urgent request of the Army, occupation is planned by Naval Artillery Battalion 621 from Pola.

During the night of 13 Nov. PT boats S "30" and S "33" left Cattaro for an operation against the east coast of Italy. There are no detailed reports yet.

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On the evening of 12 Nov. PT boats S "57" and S "61" left Dubrovnik southbound.

Enemy submarines were reported southwest of Pola in the morning and between Veglia and Cherso in the afternoon. On 12 Nov. at 2340 a submarine was located by our own submarines 50 miles south of Pola.

b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to our air reconnaissance a unit consisting of one destroyer and two escort vessels passed through the Strait of Rhodes into the Aegean during the night of 12 Nov. Towards 2400 on 12 Nov., two vessels, probably PT boats, joined this unit in the area of Nisoro. While proceeding on northerly course to the east of Kos this unit was successfully attacked by one of our planes. Until 0210 on 13 Nov. one vessel, burning heavily, lay stopped northwest of Kos. The unit probably entered the Gulf of Kos later.

On the morning of 13 Nov. altogether three destroyers and four escort vessels were sighted in Turkish territorial waters. A further destroyer was detected northeast of Rhodes, outward bound.

Own Situation:

Operation "Taifun":

As has already been reported, the western group was ordered to carry out the landing at the landing point of the eastern group during the night of 12 Nov., after its attempts on the previous day had failed. The northeastern group was instructed to land on the peninsula east of Leros during the night of 12 Nov. The objective of the task force is the occupation of Alinda Bay.

At 2330 the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla began coaling at Syra.

The landing of the troops of the western group on the east side of Leros was carried out at about 0600 under heavy fire in an all-out operation by submarine chasers and motor minesweepers. Meanwhile the weather conditions have considerably deteriorated, thereby paralyzing traffic of light naval forces and sea planes. Owing to this a remaining group of 28 men could no longer be landed from motor minesweeper R "195".

At 1030 when entering Kos, motor minesweeper R "102" picked up on the roads a British radio operator and a sailor from the destroyer DALVERTON which was sunk by a mine or by a torpedo at 0030 on the night of 12 Nov. Since there is no barrage of ours in the said area and the destroyer damaged by the Air Force was still sighted burning at 0210, a successful attack by submarine U "565" is not out of the question.

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The 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had to go on from Syra to Piraeus since no suitable boiler feed water was available at Syra.

As soon as weather conditions allow, the flotilla will leave for Syra with two companies of Regiment "Brandenburg" and equipment, in order to search out the operational area.

According to a further situation report from Commanding Admiral, Aegean of 1950, the eastern group has cleared the north coast of Alinda Bay. On the south shore an important height east of the city of Leros was reached. Further mopping-up of Alinda Bay is intended in order to render the disembarkation of heavy weapons possible.

Up to now the eastern group has captured 2 PT boats; 1 coastal defense vessel, 3 15.5 cm guns, one light anti-aircraft as well as heavy and light machine-guns. According to a report of Army Group F, our parachutists are facing strong resistance in the center of the island.

PT boat S "55", the screws of which were damaged when leaving Salonika, will sail to Piraeus for docking as soon as the weather allows. Due to heavy seas, torpedo boat TA "18" has not yet been able to go into dock.

At noon on 12 Nov. one of our convoys consisting of 2 freighters escorted by 3 auxiliary patrol boats, was attacked by 12 low-flying enemy planes with bombs, torpedoes and machine-guns. We sustained only slight casualties. One of the attacking planes was shot down for certain and a second one probably destroyed.

After entering Suda the steamer PIERRE LUIGI of this convoy caught on fire before the cargo was discharged. The reason is so far unknown.

The Bulgarian steamers ZAR FERDINAND and BURGAS, transferred from the Black Sea, entered Mudros according to plan.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean reports that the operational area of submarine U "565" was extended as ordered to the area east of Leros up to the northern limit 37° 30' N.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to location and radio intelligence, there were five PT boats in the northeastern part of the Black Sea up to the Kerch peninsula. A further PT boat and a minesweeper were off the southern part of the east coast. Three submarines were detected at sea in the area west and southwest of the Crimea.

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Own Situation:

During the night of 12 Nov. until dawn the 1st PT Boat Flotilla sighted nothing off the beachhead of Eltigen, and naval landing craft in Kerch Bay and south of it also sighted nothing. The 9th battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 613 scored a hit on an enemy motor gunboat that was towed off.

Naval artillery lighter MAL "4" was put into service as a floating battery off Perwomaisk.

The two convoys from Sevastopol to Constanta were carried out according to plan. The steamer SANTA FE and the tanker BACCHUS sailing in convoy from the Bosphorus entered Constanta on 12 Nov.

At 1045 Ship "19" was unsuccessfully attacked by torpedo by an enemy plane south of Tendra.

Group South points out the inadequacy, after the withdrawal of Anti-aircraft Regiment 202 from Constanta, of anti-aircraft defense in this vital supply harbor whose importance is increasing further in view of the development in the situation. Group asks that re-assignment of sufficient anti-aircraft forces be obtained from Commander in Chief, Air Force as soon as possible.

No report on the land situation on the Crimea has been received.

Group South has requested that it be sent continuously the evaluation by Naval Staff of the situation regarding the southern half of the eastern front, in view of the effect on naval measures. Commanding Admiral, Group South was informed as follows:

"Our plan to clear the situation at Melitopol by the use of strong reserves to the extent that land communication with the Crimea might again be established had to be given up for the present, as the troops assembled had to be used in the area of Kiev - Zhitomir. For the present, Naval Staff no longer expects establishment of land communication with the Crimea. The development in the area of the lower Dnieper is dependent on the forces expended by the enemy. The Army has limited reserves available, so that for the time being the front is stabilized."

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio, in his capacity as Armed Forces Attaché, transmitted the following information from the Chief of the Operations

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Division of the Japanese Admiral's Staff on the situation in the southwest Pacific to Armed Forces High Command and Naval Staff:

"1. The focal point of the whole defense in the southern area to the east is Rabaul, which has been expanded to a fortress of the first order with five airfields and all installations for an efficient base. Bougainville and Buka are to be regarded as outposts. If these islands are lost then Rabaul will come into the pincer between Finschhafen and Bougainville and could not be held very long. Therefore, when it became obvious after the loss of Guadalcanal, that owing to enemy air superiority the supply problem for the more remote islands could not be solved, Bougainville was expanded and is to-day supplied for at least six months. There are two airfields in the south, two in the north, including one on Buka. The total strength of the Japanese troops amounts to one division, which is mostly stationed in the south, in addition to about two battalions of naval landing groups in the north and on Buka. Additional supplies are brought continuously by small motor vessels that leave Rabaul by day and arrive at the islands by night. Supplies to Rabaul are in turn protected by two airfields with fighters on New Ireland.

2. The Japanese Armed Forces are determined to hold Bougainville in an all-out operation and think they can force troops which have landed to surrender by cutting off their supplies.

3. After heavy American air attacks on Rabaul in October which indicate an imminent landing, the strongest air formations of the Navy were transferred from home bases to the combat area. They achieved the great successes."

The Japanese Admiral's Staff informed the Naval and Air Force Attachés in Tokio, as follows on the second air battle near Bougainville:

"On 7 Nov. after midnight the Japanese landed 1,000 men near the American landing point. On the morning of 8 Nov. a new American supply convoy was reported near Gazellenhafen (west coast of Bougainville) by an observer on land. Carrier-borne planes, Stukas and fighter-bombers were sent out against this and at 1030 a reconnaissance plane sighted a unit of enemy battleships, proceeding 50 miles off Bougainville on course 220°. A formation of 18 twin-engined bombers and nine carrier-borne torpedo planes sent out in the afternoon against the landing point could not attack there due to rain; it turned away to sea and encountered the unit of battleships which was attacked from 1800 to 1820 local time in poor visibility and at dusk. The successes announced are based on reports of two reconnaissance planes which shadowed the enemy. The Admiral's Staff attributes this extraordinary Japanese success to the element of surprise through bad visibility, inaccurate fire by American anti-aircraft guns in the dusk, and lack of fighter cover. Reports on the outcome of the battle still somewhat obscure."

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According to the announcement of the Japanese Headquarters, Japanese forces have sunk 1 enemy cruiser or large destroyer, 1 battleship, 2 aircraft-carriers, 1 large and three small cruisers or destroyers and damaged 1 destroyer. Thirty enemy planes were shot down as against 2 Japanese losses.

The Allied Headquarters, however, report that in the course of the new battle near Rabaul, Allied planes have sunk 1 Japanese cruiser and 2 destroyers, and damaged 1 cruiser and 11 destroyers. The attack is said to have been launched from a carrier. Sixty-four Japanese planes were shot down, while 17 Allied planes were lost. A further 24 Japanese planes are said to have been shot down near Rabaul.

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Items of Political Importance.

Information from Moscow again reports Russian pressure on Washington to drop Finland entirely.

Reuter utilizes the discussion on the conference planned between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin to expose the Russian breach with Japan by propaganda and to intimidate Spain with the threat of a belligerent Allied attitude towards the Franco regime.

On 9 Nov. the German Ambassador in Lisbon reported the statement of a high-ranking U.S. officer who passed through Lisbon on his way from Moscow, as follows:

"Nothing was undertaken by any of the participants at the conference, and for the moment only unimportant resolutions with regard to Austria were made. The British and American military participants agreed that it must be the main objective to stop the Soviets. Therefore, attempts will be made to gain a footing on the Balkans as well as in Norway and Finland as soon as possible. The Anglo-American politicians were of the same opinion. A landing in western Europe was tactically uninteresting for the future situation. The Americans wish to set up an army of 10 million in order to check the Bolshevist danger and to guarantee a democratic Europe for times to come. The Free French intelligence organizations in France have been ordered to carry out urgent uncovering and combat of communistic organizations."

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

The situation in the penetration area of Kiev is very critical. In the Gomel area the enemy succeeded in making new penetrations which are at present still limited.

II. Chief, Naval Staff approved the final wording of the report on the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51. Copy as per 1/Skl 3403/43 Gkdos, Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. a.

Otherwise no special reports and decisions.

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Situation 14 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio received the following instructions:

"1. In the course of next week the next-of-kin of the crew of the MICHEL will be informed in the usual manner about the loss of the ship and survivors.

2. Starting 25 Nov., the survivors may send home telegrams under the censorship of the Naval Attaché in Tokio."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-one planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located at 1227 in AL 9494, at 1535 in BD 3583, at 2035 in AM 7280; at 1100 radio intelligence detected one British submarine chaser-trawler in BF 1520.

The Intelligence Service submitted a supplementary detailed report from "Ostrov" dated 22 Oct. 1943, regarding the disposition of a reserve transport fleet ready for operations in Scottish waters. Copy as per 1/Sk1 34459/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Data on the enemy situation".

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM mine each was swept off St. Nazaire and La Pallice.

Channel Coast:

Owing to weather conditions there was no patrol, escort or minesweeping activity.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

On 13 Nov. one enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns near Lemmer. On 14 Nov. patrol and escort service in the North Sea and Dutch area was carried out by day according to plan, while during the night it was restricted as a result of weather conditions.

In the Ijssel Meer and Zeeland waters 17,937 BRT were escorted.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Ten planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. On the afternoon of 12 Nov. there was exchange of fire in the area of Petsamo during the passage of one of our convoys to Kirkenes. Slight material damage and a few casualties were sustained on the steamer CHIOS and in batteries "Petsamo" and "Sensenhauer".

On 13 Nov. at 2000 two PT boats were sighted near Godoey.

Own Situation:

Thirty-one ships were escorted north and twenty-nine south. Twenty-nine ships remained lying in harbor.

Special Items.

Regarding the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51, Group North/Fleet submitted the following proposal on 8 Nov.:

"1. Transfer of the West Wall in the sea area off the coast between Bergen and around Ameland to the nearer coastal waters and abandonment of the improvement and reinforcement of the former West Wall, that can no longer be controlled by us. Control is facilitated by such a transfer, particularly if there are new barrages within the area of existing or newly installed location gear, and it will at the same time be made more difficult for the enemy. The narrowing of our own coastal routes is a disadvantage which must be accepted with regard to the situation as a whole, especially as alternative routes between the old and the new West Wall will remain intact in a broad strip. In any case, the previous protection of these routes by the old West Wall has always been a problem, as proven by

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British minesweeping in the past month. The density of the new West Wall must depend on the focal points, i.e. first off the Skagerrak and then off the coastal sector where a landing is to be expected first or is most likely. A "Seeigel" type of reinforcement is to be attempted at focal points. A restriction of fishing in the comparatively narrow strip must be accepted especially if, as a compensation, areas of the old West Wall are opened to fishing. The fishing vessels will be escorted through the barrages at fixed points which are well guarded and in case of alarm the gaps will be closed by alarm barrages.

2. In accordance with the possibilities for the establishment of the new West Wall it is to be investigated whether the previous Skagerrak barrages are to be further reinforced in order to serve as a second barrage line; supplementary barrages against vessels with shallow draught are urgently desired.

3. The projects in accordance with 1. and 2. cannot be provided as alarm barrages, as they would otherwise come too late in every case. Alarm barrages can be provided for closing the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea entrances. Alarm barrages can likewise also be prepared in those areas where even a surprise appearance by the enemy on the coast would leave enough time for the laying of such barrages, for instance in the area of the Norwegian skerries and in harbors and mouths of rivers of the Heligoland Bight and of the west coast of Denmark. Where a surprise appearance immediately off the enemy target area is possible and where protection by the new West Wall cannot be extended so far that an enemy surprise would appear impossible due to the halt required at the new West Wall, mining of the waters or the beach with ground mines must be carried out, if necessary, in addition to land mining on the beach itself."

On this Naval Staff decided as follows:

"1. West Wall:

a. The establishment of the new barrage system demands distribution of mines over at least 25 miles. Thereby operational freedom of light naval forces and submarines off our coast or between the two barrage systems is greatly hampered and our own routes confined to depths endangered by ground mines. Furthermore, the fact that we have to pay due consideration to the interests of fishing argues against this proposal. The lack of mines excludes a new large-scale plan.

b. Therefore, restriction to reinforcement and improvement of the old system at gaps which the enemy is known to penetrate, with large-scale use of anti-sweeping devices. Focal point to be the Great Fisher Bank; attempt an extension to the south up to the latitude of Hornsriff and to the north up to the latitude of Kristiansand South. Also in the

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southern part of the old West Wall area the use of anti-sweeping devices is to be investigated, in order to dissuade the Danes from sailing and fishing in this area and to feign intensification of mining. Owing to the lack of mines the possibility of execution is momentarily limited.

c. Allocation N 4 and N 5 is hereby increased by 250 EMC mines and 200 m mooring rope, and allocation of anti-sweeping devices doubled to 880. For the time being further supplies are impossible.

2. Skagerrak:

Furthermore, a reinforcement of the Skagerrak barrage is planned. Mines with snaglines to be used against vessels with a shallow draught (landing craft and merchant PT boats) as well as against attempts to break-through. Use of anti-sweeping devices.

For the time being there are only 300 UMB with 300 m mooring rope and 200 EMF with 300 m mooring rope, as well as about 500 anti-sweeping devices

available for this purpose. Since the life of both the shallow-laid mines and of the snaglines particularly is greatly limited during the winter, laying will be held up for the time being.

3. a. The protection of coastal sectors particularly vulnerable to landings by laying ground mine barrages in the immediate coastal waters is intended and Naval Command, North is asked to submit plans.

b. The proposal regarding special mines for defense against landings for shallow coastal waters will be dealt with separately.

4. Naval Commands concerned will be informed by Naval Command, North.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Group North/Fleet; Commanding Admiral, Cruisers; Admiral, Northern Waters; Commander, Destroyers, received the following instructions from Naval Staff with copy to Naval Command, Norway, Naval Command, Baltic:

"1. Two destroyers of the task force are to be transferred immediately to the Skagerrak area. (For details see Instructions to the Fleet, Winter 43/44, which will be issued shortly.)

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2. They will be sent out on operation by Group North/Fleet itself or they will be placed at the disposal of Naval Command, Norway or Naval Command, Baltic (Commanding Admiral, Defenses North) for special tasks as each case arises.

3. The main base for these destroyers will be Oslo Fjord. Frequent change of location is planned."

Otherwise nothing special to report.

V. Merchant Shipping.

Intelligence on shipping in Turkish harbors, on new British constructions and on refrigeration ships of enemy powers is contained in report No. 10/43 of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch. Copy as per 1/Skl 35279/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Volume "Foreign Merchant Shipping."

VI. Submarine Warfare.

The convoy awaited by group "Eisenhart" is expected to be in BD 28 right edge at 0800 on 15 Nov. The route of stragglers of convoy SC passes over BD 83 and AL 66. The group moved 125 miles in direction 145°.

No reports on successes were received.

From brief report of submarine U "692" on break-through operation in the Mediterranean from 18 Oct. to 13 Nov.: The boat proceeded close to the Spanish coast and, contrary to all other boats, carried out the break-through in the northern part of the Straits.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force, 19 bombers, 23 fighters and 26 reconnaissance planes were out on operation.

No special operational reports were received.

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2. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance flights were carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Air Force in the western and central Mediterranean.

Of Air Force Command, Southeast, 80 bombers, 77 Stukas, 45 fighters, 22 reconnaissance planes and 23 transport planes were out on operation.

The reported success of Bomber Wing 100 during the night of 12 Nov. was confirmed by statements of prisoners. During the night of 14 Nov. Bomber Wing 100 reported one hit by HS 293 on an enemy vessel, probably an escort boat or destroyer in the Leros area.

By day the enemy carried out machine-gun attacks against points on Crete. Two planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and a third made a forced landing.

At 1225 60 Liberators escorted by 30 Lightnings attacked Sofia. The railroad Sofia.- Istanbul was interrupted. Seventeen Bulgarian fighters achieved no successes and suffered three losses.

In the area of Leros two Beaufighters were shot down by our fighters.

During the night of 14 Nov., 7 enemy planes were reported supplying partisans on the Balkans, 13 on reconnaissance over the Aegean and 10 to 12 over Rhodes. No bombing is reported.

3. Eastern Front:

Of the 5th Air Force, 50 planes were out on operation. Nothing special to report.

Special Items.

On 12 Nov. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, issued the following order to the 3rd and 5th Air Forces, with copy to Commanding General Air Force Group Command, Central Area and General, Air Reconnaissance, in view of the "threat of danger in the north and in Jutland:"

"1. Effective at once, 55° N is declared the new boundary for reconnaissance between the 3rd and 5th Air Force Commands.

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2. Increased reconnaissance, if possible daily, in the sea area north of this boundary up to the latitude of Trondheim, to the west up to the British east coast and covering the Shetland Islands and the Faroes is to be ensured by Air Force Command 5. Points on which to concentrate in this area are our own mine barrages southwest of Cape Lindesnes as well as the sea area around the Shetland Islands and the Faroes, here particularly the known shipping berths.

3. For this purpose the reconnaissance forces of the 5th Air Force are to be so disposed that at least two squadrons are available for reconnaissance according to 2. and one squadron for reconnaissance of the Russian harbors in Northern Waters. The fact is accepted that reconnaissance in the direction of Iceland / Strait of Denmark as well as in Northern Waters must be carried out mostly by sea reconnaissance planes.

4. Special reference is made to close collaboration and quick exchange of the results of reconnaissance with the 3rd Air Force and the Naval Offices."

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed Groups North/Fleet, West, Naval Commands Baltic, North, Norway and Admiral, Northern Waters accordingly.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On 13 Nov. towards midnight a convoy consisting of about 20 freighters, 1 tanker and 7 transports with 11 destroyers and 2 gunboats left for the Atlantic. On the morning of 14 Nov., 4 freighters and 2 escort minesweepers and at noon 1 FIJI class cruiser from the Atlantic put into Gibraltar; in the morning 1 cruiser of the BOISE class and in the afternoon 2 LCT's from the Mediterranean put into Gibraltar.

At 1600 1 cruiser of the LEANDER class put out into the Mediterranean.

Photographic reconnaissance of the North African coast showed:

At 1420 a convoy of 11 freighters on westerly course 40 miles east of Alboran, 1 battleship of the KING GEORGE class and 3 destroyers on the same course four miles away, at 1445 a convoy of 10 LST's with 2 patrol boats putting into Oran; at the same time 7 freighters and passenger ships with 2 destroyers and 9 patrol boats 15 miles northeast of Oran on easterly course,

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in Mers el Kebir: 1 light cruiser, 4 destroyers, 9 LCT's, 8 of them laden with LCT 120's, 1 tanker, 4 freighters, 1 repair ship,

in Oran: 5 submarines, 2 LST's (1 in dock), 2 tankers, 29 freighters and passenger ships.

Reconnaissance in the area of Corsica - Sardinia showed:

at 0809 in Bastia: 2 motor gunboats, 4 small naval vessels, 1 tanker, 2 freighters,

at 0923 in Maddalena: 4 PT boats, 8 small naval vessels, 1 tanker, 3 freighters etc.

at 0910 in Olbia: 2 tankers, 3 coastal freighters,

at 2145 30 miles south of Salerno 6 southbound merchantmen with 3 escort vessels.

According to radio intelligence, it is gathered from radio messages between Bastia and Ajaccio that the operation planned from Bastia (see War Diary 13 Nov.) is a reconnaissance raid against Elba, the occupation force of which is given as 1,000 Germans and 500 Italians. The operation with parts of an assault battalion has been postponed to a time when the moon is more favorable.

The Intelligence Service transmitted a detailed report from "Ostrov" on Allied intentions in the Mediterranean theater. According to this report, the Allied High Command in Italy considers its position extremely uncertain and British attaché circles in Lisbon assume that before any new operations commence Italy must first be either conquered or the position secured.

Copy of report as per I/Skl 34459/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Data on the Enemy Situation".

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

In the evening and during the night of 13 Nov. the enemy dropped bombs on San Benedetto and Civitavecchia. The steamer LM RUSS (1,448 BRT) and two patrol boats were sunk, quay installations damaged and two berths rendered useless.

On account of stormy weather projected minelaying was postponed.

Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports from the first conference between the Italian Under secretary of State of the Navy and German Naval Command, that until now the Italian High Command has not yet received any basic instructions on reorganization of the Armed Forces according to the order of Armed Forces High Command dated 19 Oct. The seat and organization of the Navy Department is not yet definitely fixed.

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Captain Ferrini laid great stress on an early settlement of the construction program for Italian transport and midget submarines. The question of crews remains open. On the question of recruiting Italian volunteers for incorporation in coastal defense etc., there is as yet no clear understanding. The Officer Corps is still divided as regards willingness to collaborate and take its place in the projected reorganization. Investigation of officers at present on service has only just commenced. Changes are to be expected. Further questions will be discussed from here with the German General, in the course of the next few days. The impression is still that positive collaboration of the Italian Navy is not yet to be expected in the near future. Operations by the first vessels of the 1st Italian PT Boat Flotilla, now in preparation, are also still hampered by many restrictions. It is necessary that clear directives for the reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces be issued by the Italian operational control, referring to the above mentioned order of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance reported 17 small naval vessels off Vasto and 17 vessels, apparently LCM's and 12 small vessels, north of Termoli. According to the views of German Naval Command, a landing operation north of Termoli is unlikely. On 13 and 14 Nov. there was only a small number of vessels in Termoli. No changes are reported in Apulian harbors, except in Taranto, where 17 large transports are presumed.

Own Situation:

The operation against the islands was continued according to plan, the Army suffering only slight losses.

A report on the operation of PT boats S "30" and S "33" during the night of 13 Nov. has not yet been received.

PT boat S "61" has orders to proceed from Cattaro to Salonika for engine repair. On 12 Nov. four harbor defense boats were put into service at Pola.

Torpedo workshop Gimovec at Cattaro started working.

Commanding Admiral, Adriatic instructed Naval Command, North Adriatic that through commissioning of the anti-aircraft cruiser CATTARO, commissioning of other naval vessels may on no account be delayed due to personnel difficulties.

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b. Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

After a heavy explosion the sinking of a vessel was observed at the northern end of "Drache" barrage G 102 at midnight on 12 Nov.

At 1910 on 13 Nov. three vessels, presumably destroyers, were sighted by one of our planes, making circles east of Calino.

From a further interrogation of prisoners it is learned that the destroyer DALVERTON was probably not sunk on 13 Nov. at 0130 by one of our submarines, but by a plane. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters was informed in time for his report on the situation.

On 14 Nov. at 0328 the naval radio station at Kos reported six unknown vessels proceeding from south to north. No details were given.

During the night of 13 Nov. two destroyers or escort vessels transferred from the Gulf of Kos into the Gulf of Mendelia. The airfield of Antimachia (Kos) was continuously attacked by enemy planes from 1910 on 13 Nov. until 0245 on 14 Nov.

One of the three radio stations on Leros transmitted in plain language at 0227 and 0329: "All radio messages destroyed. No code. Everything destroyed. Radio station continues working." As an exception to the jamming of radio traffic Leros - Alexandria according to plan, this radio traffic in plain language was allowed to pass by the Naval Communications Officer, Athens, in agreement with the Army.

Four of the nine enemy planes which entered Mirabella Bay (Crete) at 0925 were shot down by Army coastal batteries.

According to radio intelligence, the unit NIPPER (reported on 9 Nov. as two destroyers) reported one air attack each at 1630 eleven miles northeast of Leros, at 2116 nine miles north of Leros and at 2150 at the northwest point of Leros.

Own Situation:

Owing to tenacious enemy resistance, the situation on Leros has become more critical.

At 0918 the Commander of the Submarine Chaser Flotilla reported a sudden improvement in the weather so that operations by small vessels are again planned as from 1600. Since 2000 on 13 Nov. no news has been received of the whereabouts of 4 naval landing craft, 8 combined operations boats,

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1 combined operations command boat and 1 combined operations minesweeper as well as of 2 infantry boats. Some of them were presumably sunk by the enemy, and some put in under protection of the coast.

Due to prevailing weather conditions the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla could not reach Piraeus until noon and reported all four boats out of action due to hits and sea damage. The commander of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla received the following order from Commanding Admiral, Aegean: "With regard to the situation of operation "Laifun", the flotilla must go into action. Attempt to leave Piraeus again as soon as possible."

As a result torpedo boats TA "17" and TA "16" were scheduled to put out with 160 men of Regiment "Brandenburg" at 2400.

At 1750 Task Force "Mueller" reported:

"In view of the present situation, disembarkation of heavy weapons in Alinda Bay is impossible. The enemy is superior between Griffio Bay and the beachhead in Alinda Bay. New plan: The bridgehead in Alinda Bay must be held under all circumstances. After strongest support by the Air Force on Leros penetration at Monte Mera - Viglia and Monte Viglia on 15 Nov. At about noon Pandeli Bay. Form a new bridgehead there. Capt. Doerr with 120 men must land during the night to reinforce coastal riflemen and capture Castell Lero."

In the course of the day Air Force, Command, Southeast sent out 96 Stukas against the island for relief of the Army troops.

The steamer PIER LUIGI completely burnt out on Suda roads and sank. This is thought to be the result of sabotage, as all members of the old crew deserted on the day before the ship was scheduled to leave Piraeus.

At 1645 PT boat S "54" coming from the Adriatic arrived at Piraeus. The boat is scheduled to leave for the operational area of Leros of 15 Nov., if possible with S "55".

Naval Staff was given the following numbers of occupation forces on Crete by Army Group F:

- aa) 31,500 of the German Army, 15,000 Italians.
- bb) 173 immobile guns, 153 mobile guns, 52 infantry guns, 175 anti-tank guns.
- cc) 1,817 horses and mules.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, the following were

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detected: 8 PT boats and 2 minesweepers on the east coast; 5 submarines in the western part of the Black Sea; 2 on return passage to the east; 1 outward-bound to the west; 2, position unknown.

Own Situation:

Due to a strong southeasterly storm the operation by naval forces in the Strait of Kerch had to be broken off during the night of 13 Nov. The 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla put into Feodosiya with sea damage.

During the night of 14 Nov. the patrol line in the Strait of Kerch will be taken up by four PT boats and seven naval landing craft. In addition, two PT boats have been sent out between Balaklava and Cape Sarytsch, on the basis of a Rumanian report of the sighting of unidentified vessels.

At 0720 naval landing craft on the Dnieper were unsuccessfully shelled by enemy batteries from Skadovsk. The vessels returned fire.

In the morning, the minelaying unit left Constanta for operation S 50.

On 12 Nov. Ivanbaba as well as the towed convoy Sevastopol - Odessa were subjected to two heavy enemy air attacks off Tendra.

As to the land situation on the Crimea in the morning, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reported as follows:

"1. At the beachheads in the Strait of Kerch only scattered activity by guns and scouting forces.

2. Enemy attacks to the south from Ashkadan. Enemy who broke through south of Ashkadan thrown back. Our own counter-attack southwest of Ashkadan unsuccessful. New counter-attack on the evening of 14 Nov. Enemy attack at Armiansk repulsed.

3. Heavy traffic before the northern front and on Taman as well as agents' reports indicate simultaneous large-scale attack imminent from north and east as well as a landing near Feodosiya. The enemy has concentrated strong forces on Taman and in the north."

IX. Situation East Asia.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmits the following information from the Japanese Admiral's Staff:

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"On 7 Nov. after midnight the Japanese landed 1,000 men near the American landing point. On the morning of 8 Nov. a new American supply convoy was reported near Gazellenhafen (west coast of Bougainville) by an observer on land. Carrier-borne planes, Stukas and fighter-bombers were sent out against this and at 1030 a reconnaissance plane sighted a unit of enemy battleships proceeding 50 miles off Bougainville on course 220°. A formation of 18 twin-engined bombers and nine carrier-borne torpedo planes sent out in the afternoon against the landing point could not attack there due to rain; it turned away to sea and encountered the unit of battleships which was attacked from 1800 to 1820 local time in poor visibility and at dusk. The successes announced are based on reports of two reconnaissance planes which shadowed the enemy. The Admiral's Staff attributes this extraordinary Japanese success to the element of surprise through bad visibility, inaccurate fire by American anti-aircraft guns in the dusk, and lack of fighter cover. Reports on the outcome of the battle still somewhat obscure."

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

I. Army Situation:

In connection with the new break-through, the blocking of which is being attempted, a large-scale enemy attack with thirteen rifle divisions and three armored corps was launched against the north flank of our own eastern wedge in the sector of Army Group South. South of Gomel also the enemy carried out heavy attacks. North of Gomel our main defense line was moved back some kilometers. On both sides of Smolensk our troops achieved a full defensive success against the 17th Rifle Division and 200 tanks. In the penetration area of Nevel the enemy gained slight advantages on the west and north flank.

II. In December the Torpedo School will have all 15 torpedo boats requested by it. Group North/Fleet has requested permission to carry out an exploratory sweep for mining operations in the West Wall with torpedo training boats during the period between firing practices. In addition, the assignment of four escort vessels for carrying out the mining operations themselves is only possible by drawing upon torpedo training boats during a firing practice. Otherwise mining operations cannot be carried out. Chief, Naval Staff decidedly rejects any interference in firing practice by the Torpedo School. The standard of training of submarine commanders and officers does not allow the slightest curtailment in the program. The submarine situation in the Atlantic calls for the immediate use of every boat upon completion. The momentary delay of boats in the Baltic Sea must not be made even worse. The operation must, therefore, be postponed until January. However, exploratory sweeps should be carried out now.

Group North/Fleet, therefore, received the following directive; copy to Commander, Destroyers, Torpedo Inspectorate and Torpedo School:

"1. Operations by four boats of the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas during the pause in firing practice from 19 - 28 Nov. is permitted. Training must not be affected by these operations.

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2. Moreover, no recourse to boats of the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla available to the Torpedo School. Torpedo boat T "28" likewise at the disposal of the Torpedo School as long as torpedo boat T "19" is not yet ready.

3. Even if, under these conditions, none of the projected mining operations can yet be carried out in the new-moon period of November, the exploratory sweeps at least should be carried out in any case according to the views of Naval Staff."

III. Director General Merker (Main Committee) has sent a letter to Commander in Chief, Navy criticizing the demands of Naval Staff for the Fleet Construction Program 1943.

The letter is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. e Ap. A. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff stated that the letter - which, by the way, should have been directed first to him and not at once to Commander in Chief, Navy as the highest officer of the Navy - does not make allowances for the points of view dictated by the war, which are in duty bound advocated by Naval Staff according to its responsibility and based on its whole experience.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff furthermore points out that the new demands to which objection is raised by Director General Merker, with their disturbing effects, mostly concern submarine construction. The letter from Merker exclusively objects to the demands regarding surface forces for obvious reasons.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees that the letter from Merker is contrary to usual military form, but takes the view that Director General Merker has served the interests of the Navy more than anybody else and afforded it most valuable assistance. He is, therefore, justified in pointing out that carrying out of the old projects is affected by making new demands.

It would be an error to oppose such a man. In order to bring about full mutual understanding it is necessary that personal contact be established between Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Director General Merker, which has not been the case until now. For the moment Chief, Naval Staff will reply to the letter himself.

Special Items.

I. On 14 Nov. Group North/Fleet expressed its views on the withdrawal of destroyers from the northern area. Copy as per 1/Skl 3412/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in files 1/Skl I op IX, 2.

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After additional information by telephone from Chief of Staff, Group North on 15 Nov. the following instructions were issued to Group North/Fleet with copy to Task Force; Admiral, Northern Waters; Commander, Destroyers:

1. Agree to the transfer of the LODY and STEINBRINK to the Skagerrak area. Destroyers Z "31" and the RIEDEL are not to be withdrawn from the Skagerrak area before arrival of the LODY and STEINBRINK, unless the interval can be tided-over by torpedo boats operating in that area.
2. For the time being, mining operations in Northern Waters must be postponed. Their execution by four destroyers is not approved. Moreover, it is to be taken into consideration that the Skagerrak destroyer group is to be increased to four by the next two destroyers that become ready for action (see Instructions for Fleet Forces, Winter 43/44). The number of destroyers with the Task Force can probably, therefore, not be increased again before February.
3. Until then, the five available destroyers should be held in readiness for operation "Scharnhorst". Torpedo boats T "28" and T "29" are not to be transferred to the west area, but are likewise to be transferred to the Skagerrak area with further boats of the 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla becoming ready for action. Torpedo boat T "28" will remain at the disposal of the Torpedo School as long as torpedo boat T "19" is not yet ready for action."

II. As to the question of organization of destroyers, comments by Group North/Fleet dated 28 Nov. have been received. Commander, Destroyers is of the opinion that a change in the attachment to different fleets according to location of the destroyer has more disadvantages than remaining attached to the old fleet as before. Group North/Fleet does not appreciate the reasons detailed by Commander, Destroyers in support of his views, points out, for its part, the disadvantages of the previous organization not mentioned by Commander, Destroyers and suggests the following organization:

" a. One destroyer flotilla command in the west area, all those destroyers which are operating in the west area being attached to this and under its command.

b. Two destroyer flotilla commands in the northern area, to which all destroyers operating in the northern area are attached. Commander, Destroyers will order the assignment of destroyers to the individual fleet commands.

c. One destroyer flotilla command in home waters, having full control over all destroyers which stay in home waters probably more than four weeks. These include new constructions, destroyers on trial

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or training, destroyers attached to schools in home waters and destroyers laid up for a dockyard period in home waters. This flotilla commander will likewise control training, exercises carried out together with the Training Unit etc. and is the officer in charge of operations in case those destroyers in home waters which are ready to proceed are used for special tasks (for instance "Wallenstein", Gulf of Finland etc.)

This arrangement will allow from time to time exchange of the flotilla commanders on operations with the commander of the home flotilla."

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff agrees with the view taken by Commanding Admiral, Fleet and does not see any disadvantages therein for Commander, Destroyers to whom the suggested organization will bring relief without limiting his independence.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch also commented and expressed agreement with the views taken by Group North/Fleet.

All correspondence as per 1/Skl 32236/43 Gkdos. and previous data in files 1/Skl III a.

III. The question raised by Admiral, Norway regarding operations by fleet forces in case of enemy operations against Norway (see War Diary 9 Oct.) was taken up again in further comments of Commanding Admiral, Cruisers, Admiral, Northern Waters and Naval Command, Norway and discussed thoroughly in those made by Group North/Fleet. The project of investigating location and command by a map maneuver in case of an invasion in Norway and Jutland was generally acknowledged.

On 13 Nov. Naval Staff definitely decided as follows:

"1. Naval Staff fully agrees to the basic operational considerations of Group North/Fleet.

For the rest, reference is made to the instructions for operations by naval forces which will be issued shortly.

2. The proposed map maneuver is to be carried out under the command of Group North. It is being investigated whether Vice Admiral Weichold can be placed at the disposal of Group North for this map maneuver. For the rest it is left to Group North temporarily to attach officers from the front to Group North/Fleet for this purpose.

All correspondence as per 1/Skl 31998/43 Gkdos. and 3331/43 Gkdos. Chfs. and previous data in files 1/Skl I op VIII, 1.

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Situation 15 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reports that agreement was made to the request of the Japanese Navy that, in case of the loss of the BOGOTA, this be replaced, if necessary, by the BRAKE for supplying the KIEFER.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty planes were detected on operation in the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located between 1147 and 1806 in six positions in BE, BF and AM.

One U.S. steamer was in AM 6410 (in the North Channel) at 1105.

During its first operation a Ju 290 sighted at 1733 a convoy consisting of 67 merchantmen, 4 escorts and 3 destroyers in CG 7919 on course 290°, presumably convoy MKS 30, which left Gibraltar on 13 Nov. and joined convoy SL 139.

From 2255 until after midnight unidentified targets were located southwest of Brest.

Naval Staff, Intelligence Division transmitted a number of questions of the enemy intelligence service regarding the Navy in the west area. Copy as per 1/Skl 35149/43 Geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Off St. Mathieu two patrol boats were attacked at noon by enemy fighters with bombs and machine-guns. The boats shot down one Typhoon and put into Brest with casualties.

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Channel Coast:

Group West advised Naval Staff for information of the instructions to minelayer BORDEAUX that after passing Royan out to sea, the TANNENFELS, PIETRO ORSEOLO and HIMALAYA will bear cover names TAUNUS, EIFEL and SPESSART within the command area of Group West.

Stormy weather prevented operations by naval forces.

Considering the present situation, Group West is of opinion that passage of the destroyers east is still possible, but is more risky than passage west. It is still uncertain, particularly with regard to the mine situation off the coast of Flanders, whether further development of the situation will still allow a break-through in February. For necessary purposes of blockade-running Group considers that during the dockyard period of destroyers Z "23" and "24", their replacement by two destroyers is necessary, and requests a further investigation, in view of the great danger entailed in passage east, as to whether the dockyard period of destroyers Z "23" and Z "24" is really not possible in the west area by supplying German workers. Passage east can only be justified in case of absolute necessity which, according to the views of Group West, is not really the case.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy 468 Elbe-Hook, consisting of four steamers, left the Elbe at 1600.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty planes were detected on operation over the North Sea in the morning and five later on. On 14 Nov. single flights were reported in the area of Vardoe and Bergen and on 15 Nov. over berths in Alta Fjord.

Own Situation:

Thirty-six ships were escorted north and fourteen south. Twenty-one ships remained lying in harbor.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, a Swedish pilot stated that the steamers RAPID and REALF II have left their berth near Lodoese and are lying in the skerries near Halloe together with the DICTO and LIONEL.

2. Own Situation:

At 0630, when leaving Copenhagen, minesweeper M "445" was heavily damaged by a bomb fixed over the side and docked at Copenhagen.

The German steamer DETLEF ran aground at 0642 near Kvarsten in the Bothnian Sea and sprang a leak.

A Swedish salvage ship left Holmsund.

Naval Command, Baltic received the following instructions from Naval Staff, with copy to Group North/Fleet and Naval Command, Norway:

"1. It is confirmed by l/Skl I c 31497/43 Gkdos. dated 9 Nov. that German naval forces and merchantmen with anti-aircraft guns are to fire on any plane approaching them, unless it can be recognized without doubt as one of ours or a neutral one.

2. Following the discussion with Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic it is now stated that in accordance with the above order anti-aircraft on land is to open fire when planes approach the German coasts and cannot be recognized without doubt as our own or neutral ones.

3. If the planes are over German territory, including German territorial waters, they are to be fired on with every means until they withdraw, even if they are recognized as neutral.

4. The above regulations (under par. 3) do not apply to the approved Swedish civil airlines, for instance Stockholm - Berlin." (see also War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII).

Special Items.

As ordered by Naval Staff, Operations Division (see War Diary 29 Oct.) Naval Command, Baltic submitted on 10 Nov. suggestions and requests by Admiral, Denmark regarding necessary reinforcements for the defense of the Danish area, with its own comments.

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The requests, insofar as they concern the setting-up of coastal guns, as well as technical means for defense against landings, coastal watch and personnel for harbor defenses, will be dealt with by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

As far as mine barrages are concerned, Admiral, Denmark now requests in addition to those for Esbjerg, Hirtshals, Thyboroen and Frederikshaven, also a further barrage for the entrance of Skagen and considers tactical barrages at the limit of the range of heavy ship's guns off the coast of Esbjerg - Hanstholm as highly desirable.

Naval Command, Baltic does not object, but attaches no special importance to this barrage.

Naval Staff, Operations Division then decided as follows:

"1. Agree to further barrage in Skagen harbor, but only in second priority.

2. Extensive mining project off the coast between Esbjerg and Hanstholm not possible in view of material available. The following is planned:

a. Reinforcement of the West Wall, concentrating on the Great Fisher Bank; if possible, extension to the south up to latitude Horns-riff (initiated by Group North/Fleet).

b. Laying of ground mines in coastal waters in stretches particularly vulnerable to landings (Naval Command, North is requested to submit plan)."

V. Submarine Warfare.

According to radio location convoys HX and SC were in about BD 82 and 83, that is further to the south than estimated. Boats of Group "Eisenhart" were ordered to advance to the southeast at high speed. Should the enemy not be detected it is intended to disperse the Group on 16 Nov., in order to send in all boats against the MSK convoy detected by a Ju 290 in CF 7919 (see Enemy Situation West Area). An operation is planned in three groups subdivided into groups of three, each disposed further north by one day's run. The southernmost group will be Group "Schill" in CF 27 - 29.

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In DP 2220 submarine U "129" fired a spread of four which missed, against a carrier on westerly course. Area of operations: submarine U "530" off Colon, submarine U "193" in the Gulf of Mexico, submarine U "129" in the northern part of the Florida Strait.

According to a statement from Naval Staff, Submarine Division, a new "Monsoon" operation is under way with submarines U "510", "508" and "172". Supply for these boats is necessary in KS 30, where the boats are scheduled to arrive on 16 Jan., 26 Jan., and 9 Feb. 1944.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force, 19 bombers, 18 heavy fighters, 40 fighters and 22 reconnaissance planes were out on operation. The first operation by a Ju 290 in the southern part of the north Atlantic started at 0830 (see situation West Area.)

On 16 Nov. at 0400 46 bombers will start out against Plymouth.

By day the enemy refrained from activity in the west area; in the evening, also, only minor forces entered the Ruhr area and Belgium and France. Some bombs fell on Recklinghausen, Gladbeck, Oberhausen, Duesseldorf and Neukirchen.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force mainly carried out reconnaissance. In the course of operation "Taifun", Air Force Command, Southeast sent out 102 bombers, 86 Stukas, 49 fighters, 24 reconnaissance planes and 22 transport planes. No special combat reports have yet been received.

Major enemy forces attacked the airfields of Eleusis, Calamata as well as Maritza and Gadura (on Rhodes). Altogether fourteen planes were shot down by our fighters and two by anti-aircraft guns. Eighteen of our planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground. At the moment only one torpedo bomber of Bomber Wing 100 is in action readiness; two others will be ready by 17 Feb.

3. Eastern Front:

In the Black Sea an aerial torpedo attack was carried out by two planes and another by six planes against our convoys.

Otherwise nothing to report.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, there are four buoys near Gibraltar and Europa Point, and three further buoys in the channel, which automatically report the approach of submarines to receiver stations on land and vessels in the vicinity. According to a further report, a convoy with French and Moroccan troops is scheduled to leave Casablanca for Italy on 15 Nov.

Evaluation of photographs revealed that on 14 Nov. at 1920 40 miles east of Alboran there was not a KING GEORGE Vth class but a RICHELIEU class on westerly course.

The following are reported from the Gibraltar area, bound for the Atlantic:

at 0545: 1 troop transport, 1 auxiliary cruiser,
at 0740: a convoy consisting of 18 freighters, 4 transports and
6 destroyers near Terifa,
at 0840: off Tangiers the same convoy consisting of 16 large transports
and 15 freighters with 10 destroyers and air cover,
at 0800: off Tangiers 1 battleship, probably of the NELSON class,
1 cruiser and 4 destroyers and
at 1900: off Gibraltar: the RENOWN, 1 cruiser of the FIJI class,
3 destroyers.

The following are reported bound for the Mediterranean:

at 1640: leaving Gibraltar 1 FIJI class
at 1640: near Cape Spartel 2 cruisers, probably of the EXETER and
BIRMINGHAM class, with 3 destroyers.

One cruiser of the CAIRO class entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

The number of ships in the harbors of Bastia and Maddalena as well as in Sardinia is substantially unchanged. The following were established: in Taranto the arrival of 2 vessels, apparently Italian light cruisers from Brindisi, and of 1 monitor; from Brindisi departure of 4 destroyers.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Due to continuous bad weather we had no ships at sea.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South transmitted the following telegram to Naval Staff and to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping:

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"As I was informed by Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy, 150 men of the crews of merchantmen are to be transferred immediately from the western Mediterranean to the Aegean Sea, according to an order of the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean; as a result of this measure, at least eight of twelve steamers on runs in the western Mediterranean will be laid up. I must protest against this measure as it will practically paralyze supplies for the front and transport and return stowage of valuable war materiel amounting to 300,000 tons to the north. At this time of the year the large ships could only be replaced in part by small vessels. Moreover, most of the naval landing craft are in need of repair as they have been on intensive operations for months."

The teletype will be answered by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Since 9 Nov. two destroyers have been observed each night patrolling between Porto Palermo and Strade Binahe (25 miles north of Corfu). During the night of 13 Nov. one PT boat was in waiting position one mile southeast of Cape Ploce.

During the last few days air attacks have been intensified against airfields and supply units in the coastal sector of the Adriatic Sea.

b. Own Situation:

On the evening of 14 Nov. the cruiser NIOBE (ex CATTARO) and the torpedo boat TA "21" entered Pola. Thus, the operation against the islands was successfully completed after having proceeded quickly and as scheduled, according to the report of Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic Sea. For details see teletype 0220.

PT boats S "30" and "35" did not carry out their operation during the night of 13 Nov., as the fuel in Cattaro proved to be useless. During the night of 14 Nov. the boats were transferred to Dubrovnik in order to carry out from there an operation against the east coast of Italy during the night of 15 Nov.

On 12 Nov. the Naval Transport Office at Zara commenced operations. Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea points out that the almost complete lack of fighter planes and the insufficient number of anti-aircraft guns continue to endanger the sea transport situation very much, even after occupation of the islands.

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Four drifting mines were observed on 15 Nov. inside and outside Cattaro Bay.

Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea asked Air Force Command Southeast to have torpedo planes and bombers operate against enemy destroyers. It is planned to lay a flank barrage for protection of the coastal route, as soon as a mine carrier is available.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to observations of our Air Force, there were two formations in the area of Leros/Samos on the evening of 14 Nov. The first, consisting of one destroyer and one escort vessel, was sighted for the first time at 1915 southeast of Samos and contact was continuously maintained while passing through the Strait of Samos to the north; at 2200 it was off the north coast of Samos and was attacked at 2330 by a Do 217 between Samos and Nikaria, on southerly course. The formation continued its passage to the south towards Leros. Possibly it was transporting troops and ammunition from Samos.

The second formation (Nipper) was 12 miles northeast of Leros at 2125 on 14 Nov. and was likewise attacked by our planes. One bomb hit was observed on a destroyer or escort vessel and one burning vessel was sighted later.

On 15 Nov. at 0626 one submarine was off Naxos; it shelled the town unsuccessfully with 10 rounds. The boat sank one auxiliary sailing vessel in the Naxos area. An auxiliary sailing vessel was also sunk between Mudros and Mytilene by a submarine at 2030.

Own Situation:

Operation "Taifun":

The enemy apparently landed reinforcements during the night of 13 Nov. Task Force "Mueller" estimates the losses of our own troops at 35 - 40 %. On 14 Nov. at 2015 Task Force "Doerr" with 120 men landed on the peninsula east of the town without loss. On 15 Nov. the situation continued to be critical all day. Our beachhead between Grifo and Via Bellini was split by a successful enemy thrust to Alinda Bay. Our counter-attacks were unsuccessful. In the evening it was intended to land heavy weapons on the north side of Pandeli Bay using smoke screens on a large-scale.

Only one naval landing craft, three combined operations boats and three infantry-landing boats of the landing vessels remained ready. The

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rest were damaged or missing. In spite of numerous hits the submarine chasers remained operationally ready; "Q" ships CA "44" and "42" are not ready to proceed and motor minesweeper R "195" is temporarily put out of action.

Two Siebel ferries, three infantry boats and one combined operations boat were proceeding to the operational area.

At 0205 the torpedo boats T "17" and "16" with about 150 men of the regiment "Brandenburg" left Piraeus and landed troops in Atti Bay (Kalymnos) at 1330. The boats will return to Piraeus for refuelling. The unit was unsuccessfully attacked by eleven enemy planes at 1232 southwest of Calino.

In the morning of 15 Nov. PT boat S "54" left Piraeus and was awaited in the operational area east of Leros at 1430. It entered Isolavecchia at 1500.

Torpedo boats T "14" and "15" are to leave Piraeus in the evening of 15 Nov. Torpedo boat TA "15" went out of action for two days in the course of steam trials. Torpedo boat TA "14" will proceed to Calino alone and will transport 50 naval gunners and supplies to Kos; Army troops are not available. The first contingent of naval gunners was flown over.

Situation on the island: At 1445 Castell Lero was captured by coastal infantry. According to the report of Task Force "Mueller" at 1630, strong enemy attacks on the bridgehead of Alinda continued. The situation there appears critical in view of our heavy losses. According to a further report at 1834 Task Force "Saldern" cleared up the situation by 1630, repelling a strong enemy attack and carrying out the task of establishing a bridgehead in Pandeli Bay. Regiment "Brandenburg" will land by 2100 either in Pandeli Bay or east of Leros, depending on the situation, with the task of clearing Pandeli Bay and joining up with Task Force "Saldern". Subsequently a landing with five combined operations boats with heavy weapons is intended during the night.

The dropping of ammunition on Kalymnos, carried out on the night of 14 Nov. by mistake, indicates that the enemy situation there is also tense.

Regarding the mopping-up of Nios, it is now reported that, according to the statement of an Italian captain, the occupation forces on Nios were called upon to come to Santorin. It is said that the commander of the southern Cyclades (an Italian colonel) with 800 Italians, as well as one battery and one radio station are at Santorin. The Italian colonel, when called on to surrender, refused.

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Five coast patrol boats put into Piraeus from the Cyclades area.

At 0010 PT boat S "55" arrived at Piraeus from Salonika. After mopping-up operations Assault Division Rhodes reported the island of Nisirio cleared of the enemy.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 1530 submarine U "19" sighted eight smoke plumes 50 miles southwest of Tuapse on course 210°. The unit was lost from sight at 1705. According to radio intelligence, continuous PT boat activity is to be observed in the northeastern part of the Black Sea. Seven PT boats, one minesweeper and three submarines were detected.

Own Situation:

During the night of 14 Nov. the 1st PT Boat Flotilla encountered no traffic off Eltigen; it shelled landing places and scored hits on boats. While on return passage the boats were unsuccessfully attacked by four planes and shot one of these down. Barrage S "50" was laid as planned.

During the night of 15 Nov. the patrol line in the Strait of Kerch was taken up by four motor minesweepers and seven naval landing craft. At 2300 the motor minesweepers were attacked simultaneously by naval and air forces and coastal guns off Eltigen. At 2340 the enemy attacked with ten boats each from the south and ? (erasure Tr.N.). Motor minesweeper R "207" was hit heavily by gun fire and had to be under-slung. At 0045 on 16 Nov. the boats started their return passage to Feodosiya.

On the morning of 15 Nov. naval landing craft in Kamysh Burun were continuously attacked by ground-attack planes, but suffered no damage.

Naval landing craft F "592" of convoy Sevastopol - Odessa was torpedoed by an enemy submarine four miles west of Tarjankutsk at 0455 and sank. Nineteen men are missing.

At 0900 convoy MT "1" and three fighters were unsuccessfully attacked by 20 torpedo planes 35 miles west of Tarjankutsk. At 1230 20 planes carried out a low-level attack on the KT convoy Odessa - Sevastopol, which was unsuccessful. One of the attacking planes was shot down. Evidently these are the same attacks reported by the 4th Air Force in the Situation Report of the Air Force General Staff (Daily situation). It is remarkable that the number of the attacking planes mentioned in the two reports differs so greatly.

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Group South was ordered by Naval Staff to investigate whether, with the present organization of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea, all transportations which may suddenly become necessary in connection with the evacuation of the Crimea, can be carried out or whether the establishment of a Special Staff (similar to Staff Scheurlen) is necessary and advisable.

Regarding the land situation on the Crimea, Army Group A reports in the morning:

"In the area of the 17th Army, apart from steadily growing enemy pressure on the beachhead front of Kerch, the north-south traffic off the Perekop and Sivash front, which is again increasing, shows that here also the resumption of strong attacks is to be expected soon. After three attacks with tanks and infantry northeast of Balgansk the enemy succeeded in making a breach south of height 133.3. The breach was blocked. Seven tanks were destroyed. The situation on the beachhead of Eltigen is unchanged. Here the enemy is bringing up supplies by air. On the Sivash beachhead enemy guns are getting the range on the spit of land northeast of Tschutschak. Enemy entrenchments are going on in the area of Ashkaden - Perekop."

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report to-day.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Chief, Naval Staff proceeded to the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

Army Situation:

A large-scale enemy attack from the area of Krivoi Rog in the direction of Nikolayev was broken. Our attacks against the Kiev - Zhitomir road have started from the south. North of Kiev there is an encircled gap as far as Korosten.

At the focal points of Gomel, Vitebsk and Nevel the situation is obscure.

As far as the evacuation of the Crimea is concerned, considerations are being worked out in draft form. The problem lies in the difficulty of protecting the evacuation against enemy interference. The order for evacuation has not yet been received. The Fuehrer is still relying on being able to carry out an operation for the opening of the entrance to the Crimea from the bridgehead of Nikopol after the situation at Kiev has been cleared up.

Otherwise no special reports and decisions.

Situation 16 Nov. 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Naval Staff has no information on the enemy ships on operation in the southwest Pacific, including Hawaii.

According to the numbers of British, New Zealand, Australian and U.S. troops presumably in this area, about 2 million BRT of freightage (circulating tonnage) is theoretically assumed needed for supplying the fighting troops at the fronts and the replacement armies in Australia and New Zealand as well as for imports and exports from Great Britain and the United States; not included are the necessary numbers of tankers and troop transports, as they cannot be estimated.

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Therefore Naval Staff asks the Naval Attaché, Berlin to have the following questions answered by the Staff of the Japanese Admiralty :

1. What estimates are made there regarding:

a. freighters necessary for supply purposes in the area of the southwest Pacific including Hawaii,

b. tankers in the same area,

c. troop transports tied down in the same area?

2. Are all troops supplied only from the U.S.A. or are, for instance, British troops supplied from Great Britain?

3. What shipping (troop transports, tankers and freighters) is tied down in particular for Hawaii?

4. To what extent are the troops, including the replacement armies, supplied with materiel and food from Australia and New Zealand?

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Extraordinarily heavy reconnaissance activity of 74 planes was detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located:

at 0632 in CE 8360 (120 miles southwest of Sao Miguel)
at 1018 in AM 7720 (110 miles south-southwest of Porcupine Bank)
at 1141 in CF 9390 (300 miles west of Cape Vincent)
at 1200 in BE 1870 (460 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank)
at 1754 in BE 1321 (300 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank)
at 1826 in BE 3190 (190 miles south of Porcupine Bank)
at 1755 in BE 1960 (380 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank).

At 1025 our air reconnaissance again detected the convoy of the previous day in CG 7494 on northerly course and sighted a convoy consisting of 44 merchantmen with 8 escort vessels at 1135 in CG 7411 on course 135°. At 1231 1 battleship with 2 destroyers was sighted in CG 4558 on course 320°. The latter were apparently searching a Spanish ship of 10,000 BR.T.

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Our Ju 290, using the enemy recognition signal, was only seen very late to be an enemy plane and fired on only at a distance of 3,000 m, when approaching the battleship.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine was swept off La Pallice. Off Brest two submarines were escorted out and one in.

Channel Coast:

Due to stormy weather, patrol positions were not taken up. No minesweeping activity and convoy duties.

At 1443 twelve Typhoons attacked two suction dredgers off Trouville. One of them was brought in damaged and salvaging of the second ~~one~~ is being attempted. There were considerable casualties.

Commander, Destroyers does not consider the dockyard period of destroyers Z "23" and "24" in the west area promising, since the withdrawal of workers from German dockyards will very much weaken the latter and, also, since the same efficiency cannot be achieved in the west area as in Germany.

Dockyard periods will be prolonged considerably by this, without there being any guarantee for sufficient execution of the work and restoration of necessary war readiness, so that the return of destroyers Z "23" and "24" to home waters appears to be a matter of urgent necessity.

Destroyers Z "23" and "24" will be replaced by destroyers Z "25", "28" and "39".

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy 468 Elbe-Hook was carried out.

In the Ijssel Meer and in Zeeland Waters 70,412 BRT were escorted.

A patrol boat off Ijmuiden reported PT boat noises at 2100.

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2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twelve planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

On 15 Nov. four planes entered the area of Vardoe and one the area of Petsamo. At noon one Mosquito was over Sola and one over Bergen. In the afternoon three planes came in near Sandoe and in the evening one came in south of Stavanger.

From 1040 to 1300 on 16 Nov. strong enemy formations, consisting in part of four-engined bombers, entered the area between Lindesnes and Skudesnes in several waves for an attack on Rjukan and Knabengrube as well as on industrial plants. The hydrogen plant was destroyed. The dam was undamaged. In passing, the convoy of the MONTE ROSA (accomodation ship for operation "Paul") and PERNAMBUCO was unsuccessfully bombed near Lister. Patrol boat "5311" shot down one plane. The convoy with three minesweepers put into Hitteroeyssund in the morning hours of 17 Nov.'

Own Situation:

Forty-three ships were escorted north, and twenty south. Nineteen ships remained lying in harbor.

Otherwise no special events are reported, except those under Enemy Situation.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Several unidentified ships were observed in Luga Bay north-northwest of Cape Kolgampia. In the morning two planes were over the coastal area of Oesel/Pernau.

At 0700 an aerial torpedo was dropped on the outer harbor of Libau. The torpedo ran ashore.

According to a Finnish report, on 15 Nov. a minesweeping force was engaged in sweeping with remote mine-destroyer gear southwest of Tolbuchin. One minesweeping barge was damaged.

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2. Own Situation:

Destroyer Z "31" and the RIEDEL entered Kristiansand South.

The Swedish schooner TURO sank off Grena after striking a mine. On 15 Nov. the Swedish steamer MAIFRIED was damaged by striking a mine near Viken within Swedish territorial waters, and was brought into Trelleborg.

The Swedish steamer LESTRIS, en route for Lulea, was stopped at the instigation of Naval Command Baltic, Intelligence Section, on suspicion of carrying foreign refugees, and was brought into Warnemuende.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to intelligence reports, the following entered Reykjavik: on the afternoon of 1 Nov. 4 heavily laden freighters (5 - 6,000 tons capacity); on the afternoon of 14 Nov. a convoy of 11 ships in ballast, including 2 tankers, with 2 destroyers and 2 trawlers.

2. Own Situation:

Three groups are to carry out an operation against the north-bound convoy detected in CG by a Ju 290 on 13 and 16 Nov. The first patrol line will be taken up in CF 25 by 8 boats on the evening of 18 Nov., the second in BE 87 by 9 boats on the evening of 19 Nov. and the third in BE 57 by 10 - 12 boats on the evening of 20 Nov.

At 0818 submarine U "542" reported one steamer in BD 3917 and the probable sinking of a destroyer by a T-5 torpedo, as well as premature detonation of a T-5 during an attack on further destroyers of a search group.

At 0835 submarine U "964" reported one destroyer in BD 3971.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For results of long-range reconnaissance in the Atlantic see Enemy Situation, West Area.

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By day the enemy attacked the synthetic fuel plant east of St. Nazaire and the advanced airfield at Brest, without special success. The attack against the dredger off Trouville has been reported.

At noon 130 Flying Fortresses and Marauders flew in over Toulon to the area of Sâlons west of Marseilles. Eighty planes attacked the airfield of Istres. One Do 217 and one He 111 were destroyed and one Ju 87 and one Ju 52 were damaged. In the course of the attack on the airfield of Sâlons seven He 111's were damaged. Our Flying Fortress was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and two by fighters.

In the evening minor Forces (about 30 Mosquitoes) attacked points in the Rhineland. Single bombs were dropped on Cologne, Recklinghausen and Crefeld.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes carried out reconnaissance in the western and central Mediterranean and in the Aegean Sea.

In connection with operation "Taifun", 89 bombers, 81 Stukas, 30 fighters, 16 reconnaissance planes and 20 transport planes of Air Force Command, Southeast were out on operation.

At noon a strong enemy formation with fighter escort carried out an attack against the airfield of Eleusis. One Lightning was shot down. Two Ju 88's were damaged.

In the morning our convoys in the area of Leros were unsuccessfully attacked in three waves by eleven planes. Our fighter escort shot down six Beaufighters.

During the night of 16 Nov. 20 bombs each were dropped on the airfields of Maritza and Gedura (Rhodes).

3. Eastern Front:

Evaluation of photographs of the Black Sea harbors has not yet been received.

The 5th Air Force reports:

At 1330 17 merchantmen escorted by 3 destroyers 90 miles west of the Shetlands on course 135°; at 1421 two PT boats 35 miles east of the North Shetlands on course 90°, which turned away to course 60° when the planes approached.

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According to a report of the Commanding General of the German Air Force in Finland, there is only a small number of ships in Belushya harbor. The northeastern sea route is beginning to freeze up. Yugor Strait has a closed covering of ice.

For report on the large-scale flight in southern Norway see Enemy Situation, Norway.

In addition to the plane shot down by a patrol boat, further enemy planes were shot down by fighters and one by anti-aircraft guns.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

The formation consisting of the RENOWN, one FIJI class and three destroyers, reported leaving for the Atlantic on 15 Nov. at 1900, was not detected again. According to a report from Algeciras, the turrets of the cruiser are said to be different from the usual type.

Contradictory reports have been received on the eastbound cruiser formation reported near Cape Spartel on 15 Nov. at 1640. The vessels reported as one of the EXETER and one of the BIRMINGHAM class are said by Spanish and by our own observers to be one of the RENOWN class and one cruiser of an unidentified type. They left Gibraltar again before dawn after a short stay. Clarification is being sought.

Tangiers now reports that at 2015 on 15 Nov. a convoy consisting of 28 ships or even more including large transports, passed Tangiers bound for the Mediterranean.

At 1800 on 15 Nov. two fast passenger steamers with 1625 French refugees are said to have left Malaga for Oran. The steamers (the SIDI BAHIA and N "152") were picked up by two escort vessels and one torpedo boat.

At 0935 on 16 Nov. a large westbound convoy consisting of 65 merchantmen and 5 escort vessels was 30 miles northeast of Cape Tenes.

At 0852 our air reconnaissance sighted 2 destroyers 15 miles north of Arzeu on course 80° and southeast thereof 2 destroyers on course 75°. At 1330 8 empty landing craft were sighted 25 miles southeast of Cape Spartivento on course 30°.

Our reconnaissance in the sea area of Sardinia, Corsica and in the central Mediterranean was incomplete.

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2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

The enemy carried out a heavy air attack on the town and harbor of Benedetto.

Due to engine damage on the LIDO, the minelaying operation had to be postponed.

According to a report of German Naval Command, Italy, dated 10 Oct., the Italian special hydroplane now under construction deserves attention.

An investigation by Naval (Ship) Construction Division has shown that the experimental vessel functioned well.

The matter will be followed up.

3. Area Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 15 Nov. at 1330 the enemy carried out an air attack on the shore battery and torpedo depot at Durazzo. Slight damage and casualties were caused.

Siebel ferry SF "108" was damaged in the course of an enemy air attack against the Bay of Sibenik at noon on 14 Nov.

According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea at 1740 on 16 Nov. the mopping-up of Peljesac is completed. The enemy deviated northward to the mainland. The Army is calling for occupation of Curzola, which offers a hiding place for partisans. The operation will be carried out from Peljesac. The port commander of Dubrovnik has been ordered to send out all available small ships.

During the mopping-up operations on the islands in the area of Pola (Quarnero) 1 U.S. and 3 British naval officers, 3 British marines and 16 Croat partisans were taken prisoner by naval forces. The Mining and Barrage Command, Split, and the Naval Control Office, Rogonica arrived on 15 Nov.

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Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea urgently demands the bringing-up of the twelve tanker-barges and twenty freight-barges from the western Mediterranean allocated by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. In order to prevent a serious transport crisis it will be necessary to speed up the conversion of naval landing craft.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, five ships with American war materials will leave Suez for Bari on 17 Nov.

On 15 Nov. no naval forces appeared in the Leros area of operations throughout the day. Anti-aircraft defense was weak.

On 16 Nov. at 1220 eleven planes carried out a low-level attack west of Calino on one Siebel ferry and two torpedo boats proceeding from Amorgos to Calino. The Siebel ferry was set on fire and sunk. Until now seven planes are reported shot down by fighter cover.

According to air reconnaissance there were at 1600: 1 destroyer and 2 escort vessels in Kuelluck; 1 destroyer, 1 escort vessel in Turkish Bay; 3 motor gunboats and 5 PT boats in Karilia Bay.

Two destroyers which approached from the southeast shelled the town and harbor of Kos from 1940 to 1945. The Navy did not suffer any casualties.

According to a report from Task Force "Salden", Leros offered to surrender at 1800.

Own Situation:

On 15 Nov. at 1730 submarine U "565" probably sank an enemy submarine by T-5 torpedo in CO 3381 (off the southeast coast of Kos).

At 0350 the clearance of Pandeli Bay had not yet been carried out as planned. The landing of heavy weapons was, therefore, postponed.

Army Group E ordered the immediate preparation of a further battalion of regiment "Brandenburg" for transfer by sea to Kos.

The landing of 280 soldiers on the peninsula south of Alinda Bay was carried out, resistance being remarkably weak.

At 0725 Leros reported to Cairo:

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"Situation very critical. Enemy landed reinforcements. Defense on Maerviglia put out of action by Stukas. Troops exhausted and demoralized. Little hope."

With regard to our own difficult situation, Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea believed that this might apply to part of the enemy situation only.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea intends to carry out the ordered transfer of the "Brandenburg" battalion to Calino on the evening of 16 Nov. with torpedo boat TA "17", proceeding alone, (torpedo boat TA "16" being out of action for one week) and the DRACHE and motor minesweeper R "211" sailing in company. At 1000 the towns of Leros and Pandeli as well as battery positions on Monte Mereviglia were captured by battalion "Brandenburg".

Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea has charged the Commander of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla with the command of landing craft on the night of 16 Nov., in order to carry out the landing of heavy weapons at all risks; he intends to fly to Calino personally, where a staff officer of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea has been stationed since 15 Nov.

Unfortunately the engines of the torpedo boats are not equal to the demands of the operation, so that the boats must be used mainly as fast transports.

PT boat S "54" (without Flotilla Commander) will afford the landing craft flank protection during the night of 17 Nov.

The offer of surrender by the enemy at 1800 did not come to the knowledge of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea until 2400, through a report of the Commander of the 21 Submarine-Chaser Flotilla. Troop transport consisting of torpedo boat TA "17", the DRACHE and motor minesweeper R "211" was cancelled. TA "17" and R "211" left Piraeus at 2340 with materiel and supplies for Leros and Amorgos.

No other reports from the Aegean Sea.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance a convoy consisting of 1 tanker, 1 destroyer, and 5 patrol boats was 40 miles south of Adler on course 330° and was attacked at 2138 by submarine U "19" with a spread of three torpedoes which missed.

Six submarines were detected at sea in the central and western part of the Black Sea and also two submarines proceeding east and one proceeding west.

In the eastern part of the Strait of Kerch a formation consisting of one destroyer and 30 small vessels in line ahead was observed lying off the coast.

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Own Situation:

Regarding engagements in the Strait of Kerch during the night of 15 Nov., it is now reported that eight enemy attempts to break-through to Eltigen were repelled. At 0620 motor minesweepers along with underslung motor minesweeper R "207" put into Feodosiya.

The patrol line off Eltigen was taken over by naval landing craft from the Kamysh Burun patrol line.

Two naval landing craft were badly damaged by continuous enemy air attacks on Kamysh Burun on 15 Nov.

At 1145 four naval landing craft left Feodosiya for the patrol line off Eltigen. One naval landing craft was damaged by air attacks and returned to Feodosiya.

One of the four PT boats that left Ivanbaba for the southern part of the Strait of Kerch in the afternoon also had to return due to engine trouble.

The patrol line in the Strait of Kerch was taken up by altogether six naval landing craft on the night of 16 Nov.

Two damaged naval landing craft were brought into Odessa with the help of tugs.

During the enemy air attack on Ivanbaba on 15 Nov. Naval Artillery Battalion 601 suffered casualties and damage to anti-aircraft weapons. One plane was reported definitely shot down and three probably shot down.

Regarding the situation on the Crimea in the morning of 16 Nov., Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports:

"Several enemy assault parties were repelled on the beachhead of Eltigen. No special events to report from the northern front and landing corps "Bakhchi".

As regards the enquiry of Naval Staff (see War Diary 15 Nov.), Group South reports that the establishment of a special staff for transport in case of the evacuation of the Crimea is not necessary, and that the task can be carried out by Commanding Admiral, Black Sea with Commander, Convoys, Black Sea, and Chief, Supply and Transport; the necessary preparations have already been made.

Regarding the request of Group South for bringing-up of sufficient anti-aircraft forces to Constanta, Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison states that the German Air Force Mission in Rumania was ordered to request the necessary reinforcements from the Rumanians.

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VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Japanese Naval Liaison Officer reported that, according to the announcement of Japanese Headquarters at 1630, 1 large enemy aircraft carrier, 2 medium-sized aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers and 1 large warship of unidentified type have been sunk by naval/air forces near Bougainville since dawn on 16 Nov. Four Japanese planes were lost.

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Items of Political Importance.

"Isvestija" states that the Russian people rate very highly the assistance rendered to the Red Army by the United States and Great Britain in the fight against Germany. The Military tasks which the Allies are now facing are of the utmost importance. The forces of the anti-Hitler coalition are actually superior to those of Fascist Germany and her satellites. The day of victory now depends on how soon and how completely this superiority will be exploited in order to destroy the enemy by joint military action.

In the course of a speech the Russian Ambassador in Mexico stated Russia's claim to Poland up to the demarcation line of 1939. No comments on this can be obtained in Washington.

According to "Exchange Telegraph", it was agreed in principle at Moscow that an Allied council from Great Britain, the United States and Russia is to govern Germany through the armistice period, i.e. the period between the cessation of hostilities until the final settlement of peace terms. Such a period could last one and a half to three years, according to the length of time necessary until there are positive proofs of a change of views by the German people.

A Swedish report from London states that there are clear indications that the Allies are changing the time-table of their large-scale offensive against western Europe. Diplomatic circles in Washington are expecting a speeding-up in the completion of invasion plans. In the course of the next few weeks Allied strategy and policy may finally emerge. A new declaration on the peace aims of the Allies, particularly with regard to Germany, is, therefore, also to be expected. All these plans may form the subject of a new conference to take place shortly between Roosevelt and Churchill, in which Stalin also will possibly participate. No large-scale actions are to be expected before this conference.

The military abstractors of the British newspapers express their impatience on the slow action of the Allies which allows the Germans to recover and to deal new blows. (Leros, Italy, second front).

In the newly constituted Badoglio Government, Admiral de Courten has retained his portfolio as Secretary of the Navy. Marshal Messe is nominated Chief of General Staff in succession to General Ambrosio.

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Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

Army Situation:

At the new breach near Dniepropetrovsk the situation is unchanged. Our own operation against Zhitomir is proceeding favorably. Korosten was captured by the enemy. In the area of Nevel and Vitebsk the enemy widened his penetration.

Otherwise no special reports and decisions.

Special Items.

I. Regarding the question of operational organization of the Navy in the Mediterranean, Naval Staff came to the following decision on 15 Nov., after examination of the views submitted by Groups South and West:

"The following organization of naval warfare will come into effect:

A. Division of the Mediterranean, including the Adriatic Sea, into three operational areas or areas of responsibility:

1. Group West: The western Mediterranean west of the line which runs from the boundary between the areas of Group West and German Naval Command, Italy, to point 40° N, 6° E and from there on the 6th degree of longitude to the south. This line corresponds at the same time with the boundary between the areas of the 2nd and 3rd Air Force.

2. German Naval Command, Italy: The western Mediterranean between the line under 1. and the line that runs from Cape Passero over the northwest corner of the island of Gozo (Malta) on the 14th degree of longitude to the south. This line corresponds at the same time to the boundary between the areas of the 2nd Air Force and Air Force Command, Southeast.

3. Group South: The whole Adriatic Sea including the coastal waters off the Italian coast, the central Mediterranean east of the line under 2. and the eastern Mediterranean.

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Insofar as the interests of the Balkan area (Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, Naval Group South) and the Italian area (Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest, German Naval Command, Italy) are simultaneously involved in the Adriatic Sea, Naval Staff will make the necessary decisions.

B. In the coastal waters of all sea areas, the Commanders or Commanding Admiral responsible for the coastal area will be in charge of operations, with the following exceptions:

1. In coastal waters off the south coast of France, Commanding Admiral, Defenses West (6th Coast Patrol Flotilla) will be in charge of operations.

2. Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea will be responsible for operations in the coastal waters of the Adriatic area of German Naval Command, Italy. He will use the patrol forces (11th Coast Patrol Flotilla) under his command likewise in these coastal waters.

C. In order to bridge-over the points of intersection between the individual sectors of coastal waters as well as between the area control of the Italian Adriatic coast and naval control in the Adriatic Sea, there must be close collaboration between the commanders directly concerned, Group West, Group South and German Naval Command, Italy will inform each other of the results of reconnaissance in the sea areas assigned to them.

D. The orders already issued will be valid for organization of operational control in submarine warfare.

E. As far as necessary, the times when the arrangements are to come into force are to be agreed on in detail between Group South, Group West and German Naval Command, Italy and reported to Naval Staff."

Copy of order Skl. QU II 4313/43 Gkdos. as per 1/Skl. 32747/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV.

II. As regards the withdrawal of torpedo boats "35" and "37" from the Torpedo School and their replacement by converted minesweepers, Naval Staff, Operations Division states:

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"Altogether 15 boats are needed by the Torpedo School. This number will be reached for the first time in December, as at the moment the state of readiness of the boats of the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla is particularly favorable. This number is likely to decrease again in January.

Since the request of the Torpedo School was acknowledged by Commander in Chief, Navy, the first converted minesweepers which become ready will only serve to make up the deficit still existing so that for the time being a withdrawal of torpedo boats is not yet possible.

Considering a suitable space of time for trials and testing of the converted minesweepers, Naval Staff, Operations Division, does not expect the first torpedo boats "35" and "37", to be withdrawn from the Torpedo School until April or May 1944 at the earliest."

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division was instructed and asked to inform Group North/Fleet and Commander, Destroyers accordingly in reply to the request made.

III. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Mine Warfare Section has prepared a table which shows the losses and damage to our ships or those in the service of Germany by enemy action in October 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl IE 31886/43 Gkdos., which will be distributed in the usual way in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Own shipping losses 1943".

IV. Regarding the maintenance and reinforcement of coastal defenses, the previous order has been amended, inasmuch as only 250 naval gunnery officers will be transferred to the naval officers' branch up to 1 Jan. 1944. Order of Officer Personnel Division as per 1/Skl 35335/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol X.

Situation 17 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

A radio message from Cairo to London, Cape Town, Djibuti and Beirut, which was obtained by radio decoding on 2 Nov., gives an insight into the Allied supply situation. In this message London is

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asked to send a decision by radio as to whether Madagascar rice is to be delivered to Syria; it is pointed out that military shipments to Beirut are more important than the usual shipments of the British military authorities. (see teletype 1520).

2. Own Situation:

On 15 Nov. at 1839 the Naval Attaché in Tokio reported that the TANNE was sunk off Penang probably by an enemy submarine. The new Naval Attaché for Berlin as well as other passengers were not aboard this submarine. On 17 Nov. at 1647 the Naval Attaché in Tokio reported that Admiral Kojima with twelve other Japanese officers and three officials set out aboard the KIEFER. Among the officers there are Commander Muchaka, Attaché for Madrid and Commander Oogi, first assistant for Berlin. The whole cargo reported, as well as a large amount of courier mail was lost aboard the TANNE.

On 14 Nov. the FLIEDER reported to the Japanese Naval Attaché that radio messages will no longer be sent to Norddeich, but only to Tokio. Chiefs, Naval Communications Division and Submarine Division were informed accordingly.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Sixty planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay.

The large number of planes on missions during the last few days may be connected with the enemy's assumption that the season and the phase of the moon are favorable to the departure of blockade-runners.

One British vessel each was located:

at 1000 in CG 7570 (240 miles southwest of Cape Vincent),
at 1249 in AM 5448 (120 miles northeast of Porcupine Bank),
at 1722 in BE 9385 (200 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal),
at 1831 in BE 1236 (340 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank),
at 2143 in AL 9131.

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At 1313 our air reconnaissance again detected the northbound convoy (Flore), sighted yesterday, in CF 9217 proceeding at 8 knots.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two mines were swept off Brest and one off the mouth of the Gironde. At 0840 a buoy-layer was attacked in the harbor of Lezardrieux with machine-guns by four enemy planes. The ship was damaged. A smoke-laying barge sank south of Brest.

Four submarines were escorted out and two in.

Group West reports that six boats of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are to carry out exercises in the Bay of Biscay beyond the outer points from 20 Nov. until noon of 21 Nov. The Flotilla will come under Group West, as regards operations, on passage on the routes and directly under Group West beyond the outer points. The transfer of the RECUM from Foyan to Brest is to be carried out during the night of 17 Nov.

Channel Coast:

Due to stormy weather patrol positions were not taken up.

At 0910 four enemy planes probably dropped mines in the area between the Channel Islands.

Group West advised Naval Staff for information of the instructions to Commanding Admiral, Defenses North regarding the laying of flank barrages in the sea area north of Dieppe and in the Seine Bay in the next new-moon period. The barrages concerned are "L2", "3", "4", and "L 5", "6", "7" as alternatives. Three boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla under the Commander of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will be used as minelayers. The 5th PT Boat Flotilla will afford remote flank escort, under Commander, PT Boats. Copy as per 1/Skl 3431/43 Gkdos., Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

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Minesweeping, sweeping of channels and escort duties were carried out as planned and without special incident.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Eleven planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. On 16 Nov. three planes entered the area of Vardoe, and a Spitfire entered the area of Banak.

According to a U.S. press report the Germans are intending to transfer the TIRPITZ from Alta Fjord to Germany. A number of light German vessels is said to have arrived in the vicinity of Alta Fjord as protection for the TIRPITZ. In case the transfer takes place the battleship will probably be pursued as was the BISMARCK.

At 1341 air reconnaissance sighted 2 destroyers 60 miles west of the Shetland Islands on course 330°, and at 1400 8 to 10 ships, type and size not identified, 25 miles northeast of Newcastle on northerly course.

On 16 Nov. 3 destroyers, 6 vessels, probably minesweepers, and 2 escorts were sighted 120 miles northeast of Kanin Noss on southwesterly course.

Own Situation:

Due to communication difficulties it has not yet been possible to ascertain the damage caused during the air attack to the molybdenum plant near Knaben and to the saltpetre plant near Rjukan in Southern Norway. According to a report of the 5th Air Force, no effective resistance could be made to the attack owing to lack of anti-aircraft guns and fighters. Four planes were probably shot down.

Thirty-six ships were escorted north and 35 south. Due to lack of escort vessels 26 ships remained in the harbor.

Group North/Fleet reports that the Commander of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla plans to transfer with the LODY and STEINBRINCK from Alta to Kristiansand South on 20 Nov. and advises Naval Staff for information of the instructions to Task Force and Admiral, Northern Waters that minelaying operations in Northern Waters are cancelled. Copy as per 1/Skl 3424/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

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Admiral, Northern Waters reports that the supply flight for weather operation "Bassgeiger" started out as planned.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

From 1400 the Oranienbaum pocket was subjected to a heavy gun barrage. Eight kilometers south of Oranienbaum the enemy achieved a penetration to the depth of 1 km. The fight continues. The infantry defense of the naval batteries has been put in an increased state of readiness. Combat installations in the area of the 20th and 26th Army Corps are being subjected to harassing fire.

2. Own Situation:

One ELM/A mine each was swept in the northern outlet of the Sound and in Mecklenburg Bay.

Due to heavy weather the naval landing craft and motor fishing vessels of the submarine, net and barrage patrol could not go out. Minesweeper M "3121" ran aground near Porkalla and was towed off by M "19". M "3139" sprang a leak and was underslung. Naval landing craft MFP "511" ran ashore on the west coast of Hogland; the crew was saved.

In the whole Baltic area transport and convoy duties were carried out as planned and without incident.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The convoy detected by air reconnaissance at noon in CF 9217 was in CF 9551 according to radio intelligence. On 18 Nov. at 1800 "Schill", consisting of seven boats, will be in two patrol lines from CF 5516 to 5367 and on 19 Nov. at 1800 from CF 1338 to 2238. Our evening reconnaissance has orders to guide the submarines by means of direction-finder signals.

Otherwise nothing to report.

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IV. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

By day there were only single flights into the occupied west area, with machine-gun attacks. During the night of 17 Nov. strong forces entered German territory and attacked points in the southwest. Damage was caused in Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and in the I.G. Farben plant at Oppau. A further attack was directed against Duisburg. Four to six Mosquitoes entering northeastern Germany also flew over Berlin. Up to now only one enemy plane was reported shot down by the 206 of our night-fighters put into action.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report from the western and central Mediterranean.

In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast our planes carried out reconnaissance in the Southern Aegean Sea. Altogether 41 bombers and 35 Stukas were sent out against Samos.

The enemy carried out reconnaissance over the Straits of Otranto and in the area of Salonika and Larissa. The airfields of Calamaki and Eleusis were attacked by strong forces. On the return flight the formation that had attacked Calamaki was joined by fighters south of Corfu. Altogether ten enemy planes were shot down. A considerable number of our planes were destroyed or damaged on the airfields.

3. Eastern Front:

A BV 222 plane carried out supply operation "Bassgeiger". Results of reconnaissance of the 5th Air Force are reported under "Enemy Situation, Northern Waters."

Otherwise nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy the task force, consisting of 1 battleship of the RENOWN class, 1 cruiser of the FIJI class and 3 destroyers, reported by Cape Spartel at 1640 on

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15 Nov., was sighted putting into Gibraltar. Departure during the night was not observed. It is assumed that the vessels put out into the Mediterranean, as there are no reports on vessels sighted from Ceuta and Tangiers during the night of 15 Nov., and in the morning of 16 Nov. A report from Algeciras at 1900 on 15 Nov. on the passing of 1 battleship of the RENOWN class, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers bound for the Atlantic probably refers to the same formation before its arrival in Gibraltar. On 17 Nov. 6 freighters with 2 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Atlantic; in the afternoon 1 U.S. cruiser of the BOISE class, with 2 U.S. and two Italian destroyers put out again into the Mediterranean.

The large westbound convoy reported near Cape Tenes on 16 Nov. was again detected by our air reconnaissance in the morning 32 miles northwest of Oran, consisting of 60 merchantmen. Parts of the convoy apparently entered Oran.

At noon on 16 Nov. there were six landing craft 20 miles southeast of Cape Spartivento on northeasterly course, probably bound for Apulian harbors.

Due to unfavorable weather our air reconnaissance in the area of Sardinia - Corsica was incomplete.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean.

Torpedo boat TA "24" carried out minelaying operation "Fuchs" as planned. Two further operations are planned for the night of 17 Nov.

Due to sea damage one steamer was lost in the harbor of Leghorn on 15 Nov. Two other steamers were damaged.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 16 Nov. at 1010 an enemy plane coming from the north

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approached the steamer GIGLIOLA on passage from Trieste to Pola. When fired on by the ship's guns the plane turned away to the north.

PT boats S "30", "33" and "61" will be transferred from Cattaro to Dubrovnik for refuelling at 0440. Group South reports that PT boats S "30", "33" and "61" require an immediate change of engines, which is to be carried out in the Adriatic Sea area. Consequently only PT boat S "54" is available for operations at present.

As far as Bauxite transport is concerned, Commanding Admiral, Adriatic reports that the shipping route within the islands is not yet cleared of the enemy. Mopping-up of the islands has made good progress and justifies the assumption that shipping can start in about two weeks. Passage from the Istrian harbors to Dubrovnik is probably only possible by night in view of the serious threat of enemy air attacks. Small ships are to be used from Dubrovnik to the south. During the day harbors and targets afloat are regularly attacked by enemy planes. At night the sea area, particularly off the south coast of Albania, is continuously controlled by enemy destroyers. Even after the islands are cleared of the enemy, therefore, shipping to the south will only be possible at night and by stages from harbor to harbor.

At the request of Group South, High Command, Navy, Naval (Ship) Construction Division stated that the construction of 110 naval landing craft Type D at Adriatic dockyards is planned. For the time being the order has been given to assemble 50 naval landing craft. The completion of the first naval landing craft is not to be expected before March 1944. It is estimated that at least ten naval landing craft will be completed per month. In addition overland transport to the Adriatic Sea will go on.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0200 two destroyers entering Mandelias Bay were unsuccessfully attacked by our planes. At 1010 there was a small warship north of Rhodes on westerly course. At 1240 two submarines were sighted off the southeast coast of Crete. At 1900 Kos was shelled from the sea by a destroyer. According to radio intelligence, Alexandria transmitted the codeword "Blaze" with top priority at 2235.

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Own Situation:

On the evening of 16 Nov. PT boat S "54" brought into Calino a motor boat with Italian officers and men escaping from Leros. The freeing of a German officer and 176 parachute and Army troops on Leros is also reported. Commanding of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla put into Porto Lago at 0530. The harbor was flying the white flag. In Parteni Bay 1 large tug, 1 steamer (500 BRT), 2 auxiliary sailing vessels, 1 fuel barge, 330 Italian mines and a food dump were captured. Commander of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla reports that Parteni Bay is suitable as a base for PT boats.

On 15 Nov. at 1727 submarine U "565" sank an enemy submarine off the southeast point of Kos. The Italian radio station on Leros was taken over intact.

According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, 3,000 British and 5,000 Italians as well as 130 guns were captured on Leros.

The prisoners and wounded will be taken away by torpedo boats TA "17" and "14" as well as by the DRACHE. They will be transferred as far as Syra by quick transport and from there collectively to Piraeus. Torpedo boat T "15" will follow on the morning of 18 Nov. Motor minesweeper R "211" entered Porto Lago with supplies from Piraeus.

The following vessels were engaged in the Leros operation:

3 submarine chasers, 4 "Q"-ships, 5 motor minesweepers, 3 armed fishing vessels, 1 patrol boat, 5 naval landing craft, 4 torpedo boats, 1 PT boat, 1 Siebel ferry, 11 combined operations boats and 7 infantry boats. One "Q"-ship and one Siebel ferry were totally lost during transport to the island. Three motor minesweepers, one of which is already ready for action again, were damaged by bombs. Corresponding entry I m 32370/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The Fuehrer expressed his appreciation on the execution of the operation by the following order to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast; copy to Naval Staff, etc.:

"The capture of Leros, embarked on with limited means but with great courage, carried through tenaciously in spite of various set-backs and bravely brought to a victorious conclusion, is a military accomplishment which will find an honorable place in the history of this war.

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The military and political importance of this victory is great and cannot yet be assessed.

I express my full appreciation to commanders and troops, and particularly to Lieutenant General Mueller."

According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, Task Force "Mueller" plans to mop-up the island and to move units up quickly to the islands north of Leros in order to mop-up Samos as soon as possible.

During the night of 17 Nov. PT boat S "54" is operating east of Leros.

At 2315 three motor vessels approached the harbor of Kos at high speed, and, when fired on by us, turned away using smoke in the direction of the Turkish coast. Minelaying is suspected.

At 0150 the steamers BURGAS and ZAR FERDINAND arrived at Piraeus from the Black Sea.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The tanker convoy reported proceeding northeast on 16 Nov. apparently entered Tuapse.

According to air reconnaissance the following were lying in Tuapse: 5 freighters, 1 tanker, 3 coastal vessels, 4 commando boats; in Gelendzhik: 2 large, 3 medium, 2 small coastal vessels.

According to radio intelligence, destroyers "H" and "C" were detected in the southeastern part of the Black Sea.

Own Situation:

During the night of 16 Nov. our naval landing craft in the patrol line in the Strait of Kerch had a short engagement with enemy gunboats which were apparently advancing cautiously. At about midnight three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla drove off an enemy PT boat and a commando boat to the east in the southern part of the Strait of Kerch, without suffering damages. No supply traffic to Eltigen was observed.

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During the night of 17 Nov. the patrol line in the Strait of Kerch will be taken up by eight naval landing craft, three PT boats and two motor minesweepers.

At 1330 on 16 Nov. Ivanbaba was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes. The same day convoy MT "1" was unsuccessfully shelled by an enemy submarine near Cape Tarchankutsk at 1222. On 17 Nov. at 0700 Convoy KT "25" and the tug DANUBIUS were also unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine off Eupatoria.

Five naval landing craft were transferred from Sevastopol to Feodosiya for operations in the Strait of Kerch.

The transfer of five assault guns to Ak Mechet by naval landing craft was delayed by fog.

As far as the situation on the Crimea is concerned, Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports only slight harassing fire on both sides as well as smoke screens on the northern front and continuous enemy reinforcement on the beachhead of Bakhchi.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

In reply to an enquiry from Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, the Naval Attaché in Tokio reports that the Japanese command of naval operations rests exclusively with the local commander. The latter is stationed at Rabaul, and allegedly reports no more than is announced in the press, so that the Admiral's Staff in Tokio is said to have no clear picture of the situation in the south. However, in spite of the great successes the Admiral's Staff does not view the situation without misgiving, since losses in planes are obviously so high that it is impossible to replace them in the near future. In addition, a landing from Finschhafen against New Britain is feared.

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Items of Political Importance.

The Allies have established an Information Bureau of the United Nations (Unio) which up to now the Russian Government has not joined.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Chief, Naval Staff returned from the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

Army Situation:

A favorable development is expected regarding operations west of Kiev. The situation in the area of Gomel and Nevel still remains tense.

Otherwise no special reports and decisions.

Special Items:

Radio monitoring report No. 46/43 contains a survey of enemy intelligence obtained by radio decoding and radio intelligence during the period 8 - 14 Nov.

No special references are necessary.

Situation 18 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-one planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay. British vessels were located between 0515 and 2359 in BE 6740, 3320, 5190, 3290, in AM 4851, AL 6510 and in CF 2480.

Our air reconnaissance again detected the large northbound convoy at 0945 in CF 5636. At 1001 the convoy reported a shadower.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One mine each was swept off Lorient and the Gironde. Five submarines were escorted in.

Throughout the day the RECUM convoy anchored at Tudy and continued its passage to Brest in the evening.

Torpedo firing exercises by torpedo boats T "24", and "26" were carried out according to plan.

Channel Coast:

No substantial damage was caused by enemy air attacks on Battery "Todt" and the command station at Cape Gris Nez. Our anti-aircraft defense reported hits observed.

Otherwise nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy 1189 Hook - Elbe, consisting of five steamers and strong escort, left at 1700. Two mines were swept in front of the convoy near Scheveningen.

Altogether about 74,000 BRT were convoyed in the Ijssel Meer and Zeeland Waters.

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2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Thirty-one planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. At 1012 enemy reconnaissance detected one of our north-bound convoys near Haugesund.

Own Situation:

On 16 Nov. during the passage of our Kirkenes convoy in the area of Petsamo there was an exchange of gunfire, no damage being sustained. On 17 Nov. at 1700 the troop transport GORDIAS ran aground southwest of Tromsø. Salvage is proceeding. At noon single enemy planes probably dropped mines in the coastal area of Bergen and Feiesteden. An investigation is being made. In the morning of 17 Nov. a strong enemy formation attacked industrial targets in southern Norway. For details see Aerial Warfare.

Forty-nine ships were escorted north, and thirty-five south. Due to lack of escort eleven ships remained lying in harbor.

Regarding the projected visit of the cruiser NURNBERG to Oslo, Naval Command, Norway points out that on 16 and 18 Nov. strong enemy air formations entered the area of Oslo Fjord and that Horten has no anti-aircraft defense, while that in Oslo is insufficient; fighter forces in this area are quite inadequate. The provision of fighter cover by the 5th Air Force while the NURNBERG is there is impossible.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1047 a formation consisting of six guard boats and two motor minesweepers was shelled by Battery "Bismarck" south of Seiskari. One vessel was sunk and a second damaged. The unit withdrew behind a smoke-screen.

The enemy penetration reported on 17 Nov. was mopped-up after heavy fighting. The old main defense line has been in our hands since 1200. Lively action on the part of the enemy was reported on the Leningrad front. Planes apparently dropped mines north of Hungerburg and over Narva Bay.

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2. Own Situation:

Southeast of Larvik a patrol boat shot down a Liberator and damaged a second one at 1101. At 1220 another patrol boat reported that about 40 - 50 bombs were dropped 20 miles southeast of Larvik. At 1230 an enemy plane was shot down by our fighters southeast of Arendal. One of our fighters crashed 30 miles southeast of Larvik. Boats in the patrol line were ordered to render assistance. Several rubber dinghies with no occupants were sighted 40 miles west of Harsthalm.

Radio direction-finder beacon "Aarhus" was destroyed by sabotage.

Two ground mines were swept near Seelandsrev.

Escort duties in the Baltic Sea area, which also covered the cruiser NURENBERG, were carried out as planned.

Enemy torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the steamer BREMERHAVEN north of Baltic Port at 0958 and the steamers MELPOMENE and UNITAS west of Pernau at 0910.

Net and barrage patrol as well as minesweeping were carried out according to plan.

On the morning of 18 Nov. submarine U "718" was rammed by submarine U "476" 20 miles northeast of Bornholm in the course of exercises. U "718" was sunk and U "476" damaged.

Up to now seven men, including the commanding officer and the first and second officer of the watch, have been saved from U "718".

V. Submarine Warfare.

In the north Atlantic Group "Schill" is proceeding to the patrol line ordered. The convoy sighted was again reported by our air reconnaissance in CF 5369 at 1400. At 1200 Group "Schill I" was ordered to proceed submerged to the northeast and at 1800 it was ordered after surfacing to search on long zig-zag courses to the northeast and at 2400 to take up a new narrow patrol line from CF 2981 to 3782.

Evening reconnaissance again detected the convoy in CF 5232 and corrected the position report to CF 5318 at 2020. Direction-finder signals sent out between 1930 and 2020 were heard by one boat only. This boat,

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U "262", reported the bearing at 2017 from CF 5259 on a true course of 15°.

At 2300 submarine U "515" reported that it had sighted the convoy in CF 5340 at 1309. The late transmission of this important report is to be attributed to enemy anti-submarine activity.

From this situation it is concluded that radio intelligence, which had reported the convoy to be in CF 6477 at 1000, was obviously incorrect. As compared with the sighting reports of the boats, the reports of air reconnaissance were obviously wrong by 20 - 40 miles. The existence of more than one convoy is improbable.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmits proposal of the former commander of the "Monsoon" boats from Singapore, that the appointment of Dommes as commander is not promising for reasons of health, as he is unfit for service afloat. It is therefore suggested that the command of submarine U "178" be taken over by Spahr. In case no further operations are planned for submarine U "178" the boat will have an additional 180 cbm loading capacity due to saving of fuel if the torpedoes are allotted to the "Monsoon" boats. Thus the Japanese transport submarine that was put out of action would be made up for to a great extent. A decision must be made by 21 Nov.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day enemy air activity over the west area was only slight.

In the evening 450 - 500 planes entered German territory in three groups. One group of 20 planes, probably Mosquitoes, operated over the industrial area of Westphalia. A second group consisting of 400 planes carried out an attack on Mannheim and Ludwigshafen; the third group of 250 - 300 planes attacked the area of Berlin. For details see Daily Situation. About 110 fighters were sent out against the last group; according to reports so far available 17 enemy planes were shot down.

Six of our bombers attacked London.

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2. Mediterranean Theater:

The enemy attacked the airfields of Larissa, Eleusia and Candia. Nothing further to report.

3. Eastern Front:

Eighty-five planes of the 5th Air Force were out on operations, mainly for the purpose of close escort and for providing fighter cover. At 1140 a strong four-engined enemy formation attacked the industrial plants of Fjeller in southern Norway. Considerable damage was caused. In addition, the airfield of Fygge was attacked. According to reports so far at hand seven planes were brought down.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On the afternoon of 17 Nov. 38 freighters and 1 tanker with 4 destroyers and 2 gunboats passed Tres Forcas bound for the Atlantic. At 1155 on 18 Nov. this convoy was reported by Punta Carnero consisting of 46 freighters, 3 tankers, all vessels in ballast, with 1 destroyer, 1 corvette and 2 submarine chaser. At 0550 Tangiers sighted 10 vessels on westerly course; details could not be obtained.

At 1130 1 cruiser of the DELHI class and at 1200 a convoy consisting of 10 freighters escorted by 2 corvettes entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. Further, 1 submarine of the ILTIS class and 1 of the PEDOUTABLE class put in from the Mediterranean. At 1000 2 freighters in ballast put out into the Atlantic.

In the evening of 17 Nov. the following were sighted in harbor: 1 CAIRO class, 1 BOISE class, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 WAPSPITE in dock, and 1 U.S. hospital ship, 1 French and 1 Belgian transport, 49 enemy freighters, 8 enemy tankers, and 4 neutral freighters.

During the night of 17 Nov. a great deal of shipping was observed en route from and to Naples. At 2300 on 17 Nov. there was a northbound convoy, consisting of 60 ships, and a southbound convoy, consisting of 20 ships, 60 miles southsoutheast of Salerno.

Three destroyers and one vessel, probably a repair ship, were lying in Ajaccio.

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2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Minelaying operation "Iltis" in the Ligurian Sea was broken off due to bad weather. Minelaying operation "Notung" was carried out as planned by six boats of the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. Flank escort by PT boats was not carried out on account of the weather.

Activities of small vessels were also impeded by the weather.

According to instructions of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Commanding General, Armed Forces, West will take over the uniform supreme command in Italy, effective midnight on 21 Nov. according to order of 6 Nov.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Interrogation of prisoners after the Quarnero operation revealed that at the beginning of November a group of British commando troops under an American naval lieutenant arrived on Lussin from Termoli with two auxiliary sailing vessels. The Army captured a valuable military geographic description of the coast. According to an Army statement, a British submarine is said to have taken aboard in the northern Adriatic sea twelve British officers who escaped from captivity about two weeks ago. A further submarine is said to be under way for the same purpose. On 16 and 17 Nov. single enemy planes approached Sibenik and Durazzo. One floating crane and two vessels were sunk at Sibenik. Naval installations suffered damage as a result of blasts. No attacks were reported from Durazzo. According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea there is no reason to believe that mines were dropped.

In addition, the Freya gear at Bar was attacked with machine-guns by two enemy planes at noon on 17 Nov. and damaged.

Own Situation:

On 17 Nov. the islands of Arsinello, Sansego and Unie were occupied without any fighting. The island of Prvic is reported clear of the enemy. Two further Siebel ferries arrived at Trieste. Personnel of the Port Commander of Lagosta were temporarily transferred to Lopud as occupation forces.

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In view of our own weakness in the air and the necessity of keeping open the Straits of Otranto, Group South considers use of Italian midget submarines against enemy patrol advisable, but possible only with German crews. The inclusion of a certain number of scrutinized, reliable Italian personnel is possible. The CB-boats (Italian midget submarines Tr.N.) in the Aegean Sea are faced with the same tasks as in the Straits of Otranto. In view of the urgency of these tasks, Group South adheres to the necessity of using CB-boats in the Adriatic and Aegean Sea (see teletype 2145.).

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, the transfer of enemy forces from the area of Leros to the area of Samos was observed. One destroyer and two escort vessels left Kueluek and one destroyer and one escort vessel apparently left Turkish Bay. According to air reconnaissance there was no longer any large enemy naval vessel in Turkish territorial waters.

Own Situation:

At 0550 the Commander of the 21st Submarine-Chaser Flotilla left Leros with three submarine-chasers and three motor minesweepers for combing-out of the island group north of Leros. At 0800 Lipso was in our hands. Forty Italians were taken prisoner. Subsequently 30 Italian prisoners were taken on Patmo's. At 1100 the island of Phurni was reported clear of the enemy. At 1300 the Italians stationed at Nikaria surrendered. A British captain, who has organized weak bands of partisans, has not been found up to now. The radio station, ammunition dump and telephone communication to Samos were blown up; 240 prisoners and captured weapons are being transferred to Syra. According to the report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, Samos is thus the only island in the Aegean Sea occupied by the enemy.

Coastal defense of Leros is ensured by the Army. Battery "Porto Lago" is manned by the Navy and ready for action. The radio station on Leros is also ready.

At 0650 torpedo boat TA "17" arrived at Piraeus with wounded and prisoners. At 1600 torpedo boats TA "14" and "17" left Piraeus for Leros. Torpedo boat TA "15" followed at 1920.

The DRACHE, naval artillery lighter MAL "12" and three coast patrol boats have been sent out to cover the transfer of the lifting gear

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from Piraeus to Salonika.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence there were: 3 PT boats, 4 minesweepers, 1 gunboat, destroyers "H" and "C" off the central to southern part of the east coast; 5 submarines at sea in the northwestern part of the Black Sea and 1 in the eastern part.

Own Situation:

At 1715 submarine U "18" sank a steamer of 1,500 BRT 10 miles south of Tuapse.

During the night of 17 Nov. no special events are reported from the patrol lines off Kerch and Kamysh Burun. Naval landing craft operating off Eltigen shelled a landing place and at 1837 on 17 Nov. destroyed a small enemy landing craft. Otherwise no supply traffic was observed.

Motor minesweepers and PT boats did not come into contact with the enemy; off Cape Tula they sighted two PT boats and small vessels that withdrew to the east.

At 1900 15 Russians who landed south of Eltigen from a small craft were annihilated by the searchlight crew of the 2nd battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 613 and Rumanian sentries.

In spite of bad weather ten naval landing craft with 16 assault guns, 17 trucks and 80 tons of ammunition left Odessa for Ak Mechet at 0330. The force was unsuccessfully attacked by six torpedo planes at 1547.

Naval Artillery Lighter MAL "4" is not ready to proceed and is lying near Pervomaisk as a floating battery for defense of the Dnieper - Liman, and Naval Artillery Lighter MAL "2" is lying in Feodosiya ready for operation in Feodosiya Bay and east thereof in case of expected enemy landings.

During the night of 18 Nov. the following were out on operation: 4 naval landing craft off Kerch Bay, 2 off Kamysh Burun, 5 off Eltigen, 3 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch. At 2000 the PT boats returned owing to a northeast wind, force 6. Departure of the naval landing craft from Kamysh Burun was also prevented by the northeast wind.

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Regarding the situation on land on the Crimea, Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group A reports that the enemy is regrouping for the attack against our right wing; the thrust to be directed at Kerch. Ferry traffic on the Sivash beachhead as well as the ranging of enemy guns indicate an imminent attack there also.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Regarding the air battles near Bougainville on 11 and 17 Nov. announced in the press, the Japanese Admiralty states:

"Sunk on 11 Nov. 43	:	1 cruiser or destroyer
damaged	:	1 battleship, 2 large carriers, 1 large cruiser
	:	3 cruisers or destroyers, 1 destroyer.
 Sunk on 17 Nov. 43	:	 1 large carrier, 2 medium-sized carriers, 3 cruisers, 1 warship of unknown type."

After a sharp denial by the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Knox, the enemy has not made any statement on the reports of the Japanese, so that no clear picture on the progress of the battles can yet be gained. The Allies, in turn, report numerous air attacks on various Japanese bases in New Guinea and the Solomons, in the course of which numerous Japanese planes were reportedly shot down.

Burma Front: Up to now fighting on the Burma front was limited to scouting activity. On 16 Nov. the Royal Air Force carried out a large-scale attack on important points in the Japanese hinterland.

On 14 Nov. the U.S. Navy Department announced the sinking of seven enemy ships, being successes of American submarines in the Pacific Ocean.

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Items of Political Importance.

The Russian press strictly opposes the opinion that the joint declaration of the Three Powers regarding Austria could signify Russia's agreement to the establishment of an alliance of the states of central or eastern Europe. As a matter of course Russia rejects all tendencies aimed at the creation of a barrier to the west.

The Turkish Foreign Minister is said to have declared that Turkey will cede bases to the Allies only if her coasts and seaports are protected against attacks. Airfields and landing places are already established. Turkey will not have an opportunity before spring to put her Army into action. However, a provocation of Germany should be avoided.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Rear Admiral Topp reports that the Army and Air Force have not agreed to the proposal of the Chief Committee for the creation of a uniform type of landing boat. Therefore the conditional approval of the Navy also becomes unnecessary. (Note by Chief, Naval Staff: Question mark, "wrong").

II. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the conference with Minister Speer regarding special priority protection for the communications industry; the provision of a rolling platform for "Hannover" tanks and the request for a quota of iron according to the letter of Commander in Chief, Navy, etc.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Report of Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division, on:

a. organization of operations in the Mediterranean according to copy in War Diary dated 17 Nov.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

b. establishment of a "Naval Operational Division" (N Operational D). To be carried out by Group North/Fleet.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

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IV. Report of Auxiliary Cruiser Section, Operations Division on the resumption of blockade-runner traffic.

Though the difficulties of the break-through in the Atlantic have increased with the occupation of the Azores, Naval Staff, Operations Division is of opinion that an attempt should be made to resume the traffic. Even if only one or two ships are successful in breaking-through, this success will be of greater importance to the armament industry than all shipments by transport-submarines put together at present. The serious situation as a whole makes it necessary also to run the greatest risk.

As far as the carrying out is concerned, Naval Staff, Operations Division does not consider it right, with regard to the change of situation, that the attempt of the past year should be repeated and incoming and outgoing ships brought through in one combined operation. Rather, for the present, two fast ships should be brought in. Only then will it be decided whether or not the operation will be continued. The third ship on homeward passage would have to wait in the southern Atlantic. It is intended to have the two incoming ships proceed at an interval of four days between them on the known enemy route for single ships in the north Atlantic towards England and, after reaching the north-south route Great Britain - Gibraltar, to have them make for the Bay of Biscay. Naval Staff, Operations Division will try to have the ships proceed in such a way that they could possibly appear to be stragglers of convoys, thereby least awakening the interest of the unavoidable air patrol.

Chief, Naval Staff acknowledges the basic necessity of this measure and agrees with the plan.

V. Report of Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division on the new German/French relations regarding the former Toulon Fleet, according to copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees though it is not an ideal solution.

VI. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic intends also to pay a visit to Field Marshal Mannerheim apart from Army Command 18, in the course of his trip to the east.

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Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

b. Group South transmitted instructions from Army Group E regarding the operation for the occupation of Samos. General Mueller is again in charge of this operation. The instructions attach special importance to careful preparation. In its comments Group South emphasizes that, with regard to present conditions, the speediest action appears more advisable and promising than loss of time as a result of preparatory measures.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the view of Group South.

Special Items:

I. In the present situation Naval Group West considers a transfer of the destroyers to home waters through the Channel still possible, but is of the opinion that passage east is far more risky than passage west. Group West therefore asks for an investigation again as to whether there really is no possibility of carrying out the dockyard period of destroyers Z "23" and "24" in the west area by transferring German workers. The transfer of the destroyers into home waters would only be justified in case of absolute necessity and this does not really exist according to the views of Group West.

Commander, Destroyers does not consider carrying out of the dockyard period in the west area promising, as a withdrawal of workers from German dockyards will weaken these too much and, also, in the west area the same efficiency could not be attained as in Germany. The dockyard periods will thereby be prolonged considerably without there being any guarantee for sufficient work and restoration of necessary war readiness. In the opinion of Commander, Destroyers it is, therefore, absolutely necessary to return destroyers Z "23" and Z "24" for the dockyard period.

As far as it is known to Operations Division, Quartermaster Division and Naval (Ship) Construction Division agree fundamentally with the views of Commander, Destroyers and would request a transfer of the destroyers back for their dockyard period in Germany if this is possible from the operational point of view.

Naval Staff, Operations Division therefore intends to send the two destroyers back to Germany about February, if the situation permits.

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The final decision as to whether the transfer will be possible in February can only be made shortly beforehand. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and Naval (Ship) Construction Division are therefore asked to state by when, at the latest, a decision must be made whether the dockyard period of the destroyers will be spent either in the west area or in Germany.

Copy as per 1/Skl I op 32396/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

II. Regarding the Crimea, Group South received the following instructions:

"A. 1. Though it is still intended to hold the Crimea, preliminary plans must be made in case evacuation is necessary at short notice. The knowledge of these considerations and measures is to be restricted to the smallest possible circle of persons.

2. The objective must be to recognize in good time what measures (for instance establishment and organization of the loading points) are to be taken in advance.

Unless the enemy situation forces us to proceed otherwise, it must be assumed that Perekop and the Parpatsh Pass will be held until our units from the south, west and northwest coast are evacuated by way of the western harbors. Then transport of troops from the Parpatsh Pass by way of Feodosiya and from the northern front by way of the northwest coast or Ak Mechet must be carried out about the same time by sea. For transport from Feodosiya transfer to large vessels at Sevastopol must be considered in order to enable use of landing transports without delay for evacuation from the northwest coast.

B. 1. Group South will send an officer to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea as soon as possible, who is to transmit the above verbally. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea is to be ordered in this connection to carry out the preliminary work according to A) quickly and to report intentions in the same way.

2. The right is reserved to send a representative of Naval Staff for discussion with Group South and Commanding Admiral, Black Sea. Place for discussion Sofia or the Crimea."

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III. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has sent Lt. Col. Rohrbeck of the General Staff to the southeast area, in order to gain information on the supply situation in Dalmatia and Greece, with special consideration to land and sea transport conditions in the Adriatic and Aegean Sea.

On 13 Nov. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted the report on the assignment carried out from 2 to 7 Nov. Copy as per l/Skl 32237/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has worked out with Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, to which the report was also sent, further procedure on the items contained in the report, as far as they are to be taken up or rectified by the Navy.

On this subject Group South and Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea receive the following teletype from Naval Staff, Operations Division:

1. Which islands off the east coast of the Adriatic Sea must, after clearance, definitely remain occupied in order to maintain sea traffic?
 2. What can the Navy contribute to the occupation of these islands?
 3. Can the Navy undertake altogether the occupation of some islands and, if so, which ones?"
-

IV. Group West reports:

"At a conference of the Armed Forces Committee of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West on 17 Nov. the prospect of only 400,000 to 600,000 cbm. of concrete was held out at present for naval war constructions, in view of the Atlantic Wall. On the basis of this figure the following construction projects could be continued, some of them with a delay.

Submarines:

1. Power stations 58,000 cbm. of concrete.
2. Completion of workshops.
3. Surrounding walls for Brest, Lorient, La Pallice and Bordeaux, 108,000 cbm.
4. Submarine sluices 37,000 cbm.
5. Construction project at Marseilles 280,000 cbm.
6. Addition to workshop at Bordeaux 20,000 cbm.

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PT boats:

1. Building project at Cherbourg 30,000 cbm.
2. Building project at IJmuiden/Rotterdam 130,000 cbm.

Communications:

1. Radar stations only, 15,000 cbm.

Command Shelters:

1. Command shelters and shelters for firing control panels for controlled mine-barrages 47,000 cbm.

Altogether: 725,000 cbm. of concrete.

All other constructions must be postponed, including expansion of the submarine pens of the 3rd construction sector Brest - Lorient. The Navy's Construction Program for naval war constructions in France was submitted to High Command, Navy, General Naval Administration Bureau, Naval Shore Construction Division under reference No. Mar. Baudir. 949 Gkdos. of 16 Nov. With this intended allocation of concrete, the following two orders cannot be complied with:

1. The Fuehrer's order: In the autumn of 1944, if more than 96 submarines are laid up these must be repaired without concrete protection.

2. Order of Commander in Chief, Navy: PT boats have been put in importance on the same level as submarines. However, some PT boats will still have to lie unprotected. Decision requested as to whether priority should be given to the construction of submarine pens or to PT boat pens."

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will deal with this matter further.

Situation 19 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters,

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation:

The OSOPNO and ALSTERUFER received the following radio order from Naval Staff, Operations Division:

"1. The fast ships OSOPNO and ALSTERUFER will be the first to attempt the break-through. The PIO GRANDE is waiting in the southern part of the south Atlantic.

2. This task is an all-out operation and demands the utmost of the captain and crew. Naval Staff is confident that they will carry out this task with success and courage and in the knowledge of their responsibility.

3. It is intended to have the two ships proceed at an interval of four days between them on the known enemy route for single ships in the north Atlantic towards England; after reaching the north-south route Great Britain - Gibraltar, they will make for the Bay of Biscay. Details will follow."

Special sailing instructions for the OSORNO and ALSTERUFER as per order 1/Sk1 I k 3461 and 3462/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-two planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. Between 0635 and 2159 seven radar locations were reported in BF, CF and AM.

At 1015 our air reconnaissance again detected convoy "Flore" in CF 2639 on northerly course. Our shadowing plane was reported at 1031.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

At 0830 the tanker RECUM entered Brest.

Channel Coast:

One mine each was swept near Dunkirk and Jersey.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Strong forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North were out on escort and minesweeping duties. One mine each was swept near Borkum and off Scheveningen.

One patrol boat ran aground off the Hook in the fog.

Up to now convoy 1189 Hook - Elbe proceeded according to plan.

About 35,000 BRT were escorted in the Ijssel Meer and Zeeland Waters.

During the night of 18 Nov. and on the morning of 19 Nov. strong enemy bomber formations were fired on by naval anti-aircraft guns when crossing the Dutch and North German coastal area. One plane was reported shot down near Texel.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Sixteen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. On 18 Nov. and during the night single planes entered the areas of Stavanger and Bergen.

Own Situation:

Twenty-nine ships were escorted north and sixteen south.

Due to the lack of escorts four ships remained lying in harbor. No reports yet from the area of Admiral, Arctic Coast.

At 2100 "Bassgeiger" reported that the ship ran into pack-ice and has a 31⁰ list. Part of the equipment was lost, otherwise all is well.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay heavy gunfire was directed against direction finder station Baltic and harassing fire from Kronstadt and Lissi Noss against our coastal area, particularly Peterhof. Damage was slight. Single planes dropped bombs in the coastal area. Air activity was also observed over Luga Bay and in the area of Tyters. Enemy planes

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dropped bombs on the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla northwest of Hogland and two were shot down. Hungerburg again reported dropping of mines.

Heavy gunfire was directed against Army gun positions in the Otanienbaum pocket. Lively enemy activity was observed on the Leningrad front. According to the views of Army Command 18, preparations for attack may be substantially completed. It is expected that this will be carried out when heavy frost sets in or when our own withdrawal movement is recognized. Army Command 18 is very confident about the situation although a division is being withdrawn from the area of the 15th Army Corps.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-five vessels and four minesweeping planes were engaged on minesweeping in the Baltic Sea Entrances and 26 vessels in the Baltic Sea for the same purpose. No minesweeping successes are reported. Escort duties were carried out as planned.

At 2225 the weather station of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic in Copenhagen, as well as the sergeants' quarters of Admiral, Denmark, were extensively damaged by sabotage.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, five coastal minelayers carried out minelaying in the sea area northeast of Schepel. Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Operation against Convoy "Flore":

Our air reconnaissance reported the enemy on northerly course in CF 2639 at 1015. A sighting report of submarine U "262" at 0800 in CF 2642 gave a position 40 miles further west. At 1815 evening reconnaissance detected the enemy in CF 2322, i.e. only 15 miles east of the position estimated according to submarine reports. Direction-finder signals sent out at about 1900 were heard by six boats of group "Schill". The point of intersection lay in an area of 15 miles diameter at the most, therefore excellent from the navigation point of view. Thus the convoy could be definitely established in

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BE 8780 at 1900. All boats were sent out against the convoy which they will be able to reach by 2400 according to dead-reckoning. From further submarine reports up to midnight it is learned that the convoy has maintained its northerly course. Further reports are not yet in.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Northwest of Cape Ortegal two enemy planes were shot down by one of our Ju 88's during free-lance fighter patrol. In the evening London was raided by six heavy fighters. At noon 150 enemy Fortresses entered the Rhine province in two groups, escorted by fighters as far as the Dutch frontier. However, they carried out no attack. Forty-eight of our fighters did not contact the enemy. In the evening about 300 planes attacked the Rhine Westphalian industrial area. Aerial mines, high explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on altogether 82 points. Of our fighters 32 went up for defense. Up to now four planes are reported shot down. For details see Daily Situation.

Ten further planes approached the coastal area of northern Germany, apparently on minelaying.

During the day airfields in France were attacked and in the evening the areas off Lorient and the Gironde were mined.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the afternoon a formation consisting of a cruiser and two destroyers was attacked by 26 of our bombers in the area north of Alexandria. Four or five hits by light bombs were scored on the vessels. The exact result could not be observed. In the areas of the Adriatic and Aegean Sea the enemy carried out reconnaissance flights and attacks against airfields. Nothing special to report.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On the morning of 18 Nov. a convoy, consisting of 28 freighters and 1 tanker, passed Ceuta bound for the Mediterranean. Six freighters had previously turned off for Gibraltar. From Gibraltar 11 freighters, 1 transport and 1 tanker, escorted by 2 cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 destroyer and 3 escort vessels, joined the convoy. Further, 1 U.S. cruiser of the BOISE class and 2 destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. On the afternoon of 18 Nov. 1 large transport, 1 auxiliary cruiser and 1 destroyer put in from the Atlantic.

At 0415 on 19 Nov. there were 15 merchantmen and 3 escorts south of Salerno on easterly course. German Naval Command, Italy is of the opinion that increased supply traffic during the last few days is for reinforcement of the front or preparations for an outflanking landing on the west coast of Italy.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

On 18 Nov. submarine U "81" sank a transport of 7,500 BPT in the Gulf of Taranto.

Minelaying operation "Iltis", broken off on 18 Nov., was carried out by torpedo boat T "24" according to plan. At 0300 the boat was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy PT boats and planes north of Elba.

Our coastal traffic was further delayed by unfavorable weather. South of Leghorn one freight-barge ran ashore and was lost.

Regarding the withdrawal of German seamen from Italy for the southeast area, German Naval Command, Italy, German Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy, Group South, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean via Group South, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in Italy via German Naval Command, Italy and Commanding General, Armed Forces, South received the following instructions, with copies to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas and to Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping:

"1. According to the decision made by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, sea transport is concentrated at present on the east coast of the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea.

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2. The situation as regards crews in the areas of concentration requires the withdrawal of 150 men. The intended withdrawal meets this situation and is necessary.

3. As 35 officers and 115 seamen have in the meanwhile been sent by Admiral, Naval Office, Hamburg; to the Aegean Sea, as many more men are to be withdrawn from Italy from the remaining 96 (as per teletype Essen 1238) as the urgency of the situation demands. Any that may remain are to be left in Italy. The decision rests with Group South. The number are to be reported.

4. Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping - Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean must try by all means possible to fill up quickly the gaps which have arisen. Even Italians and French must be drawn upon.

5. German Naval Command, Italy will report which ships are laid up due to the withdrawal of crews".

3. Area Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

A submarine was sighted 30 miles southeast of Ancona. At noon there were seven large transports with four escorts off Brindisi on northerly course. It is now reported that on 17 Nov. an auxiliary sailing vessel was destroyed by surface forces 40 miles south of Ancona.

Own Situation:

In the course of the last heavy air attacks on Split, the steamer BALCIC was completely destroyed, and the steamer MARCO sunk. During a fighter-bomber attack on Sibenik at noon and on the afternoon of 18 Nov. the steamers MILANO and RENELLA were damaged. Port Commander, Sibenik reports that as a result of increased air attacks and nervousness, the performance of harbor workers is practically nil. Group South reports in this connection that the enemy has recognized and is utilizing the lack of defense along our coasts; therefore considerably more anti-aircraft guns of all calibers are again requested. In addition, the Group supports the requests made for reinforcement of reconnaissance, bomber and fighter forces of the Air Force.

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The shooting-down of one of our seaplanes by seven British fighters in the area of Cattaro, and, at the same time, minelaying at sea by 15 - 20 enemy planes were observed.

No damage was caused to the Navy during the attack on Valona with bombs and machine-guns on the afternoon of 18 Nov.

The Army intends to evacuate the islands of Novi and Zirkovenizza due to lack of forces, and to replace the occupation forces of Krk by a small police command. Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea expresses his support to Group South of the request made by Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic to demand from Army Group B one reinforced company as a minimum occupational force for each of the islands of Krk, Cherso and Lusino.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No forces were sighted in Turkish territorial waters on the evening of 18 Nov. and morning of 19 Nov. Minesweeping is being continued by small vessels from Samos to the south. According to radio intelligence, over 70 refugees from Samos arrived in Turkish territory.

At 0808 a submarine unsuccessfully attacked an auxiliary sailing vessel in Siteia Bay (Crete) with gunfire and torpedoes and sank two auxiliary sailing vessels and coastal defense boat MOEVE in the same area at 1400; 100 Italians drowned.

At 1545 a submarine torpedoed and sank the steamer BOCCACIO (3,140 BRT), lying in the harbor of Monemvasia, on the southeast coast of the Peloponnesos.

According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, the island of Symi was captured by British commando troops in a surprise raid on 18 Nov. The guard consisting of 14 men was overpowered.

Own Situation:

The mopping-up of Leros is being continued by Task Force "Mueller". During the conquest of the island 5 naval landing craft, 2 combined operations boats, 2 infantry boats and 1 small assault boat were lost through enemy fire during the landing. Casualties are not yet known.

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According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, the following are ready for action: 3 submarine chasers, 1 "Q"-ship, 2 naval landing craft, 7 combined operations boats, 1 combined operations assault boat, 6 infantry boats, 2 armed trawlers and 3 motor minesweepers. Further, the following are not ready for action: 1 Siebel ferry, 1 combined operations boat, 2 combined operations command boats, 1 infantry boat and 2 "Q"-ships.

During the night of 18 Nov. PT boat S "54" penetrated into Vathi harbor on the north coast of Samos. The boat was fired on with small arms by a British officer on land. Otherwise no defense was observed. The harbor seems to be completely unfortified. During the night of 19 Nov. PT boat S "54" was on patrol east of Leros.

During the night of 18 Nov. minelayer ZEUS (ex MOPOŠINO) left Piræus for minelaying, was detected by enemy air reconnaissance and therefore broke off the operation.

In the morning torpedo boats TA "14", "15" and "19" entered Leros and returned in the afternoon to Piræus with 400 prisoners. Two steamers, escorted by two submarine chasers and one motor minesweeper, are en route to Leros and one steamer to Syra for further transport of prisoners.

One of our auxiliary sailing vessels sank in the Patras Channel, having struck a mine.

Group South transmits a report of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla which observed a new type of weapon, apparently a gun of 7 cm caliber, in the course of low-level attacks by enemy planes of the Hudson type.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence increasing movements of small vessels were detected, as well as the presence at sea of a cruiser of the KRASNY CRIMEA class. In addition, four submarines were established by radio monitoring.

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Own Situation:

Commanding Admiral, Black Sea, Vice Admiral Kieseritzki, was killed at noon in the course of an enemy air attack on Kamysh Burun. The burial will take place at Simferopol on 22 Nov. Naval Shore Commander, Crimea, Captain Schulz, has taken over the post until further notice. During the air attack on Kamysh Burun three naval landing craft were hit by bombs; others were damaged. Southwest of Tendra there was another unsuccessful attack with aerial torpedoes on the war freighter KT "25" at 0906; at 0955 there was also an unsuccessful air attack on one of our convoys eastsoutheast of Sulina. At 0400 on 18 Nov. convoy MT "1" with the XANTEN and three submarine chasers was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine 80 miles west of Eupatoria.

After a stormy passage six naval landing craft put into Ak Mechet and four into Eupatoria from Odessa, with altogether 10 assault guns, 21 trucks and 80 tons of ammunition. Due to sea damage two naval landing craft had to return to Odessa with the assistance of tugs.

On the evening of 18 Nov. the 1st and 3rd battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 613 shelled motor gunboats and small vessels off the west coast of the Taman peninsula without observing the effect.

During the night of 18 Nov. five naval landing craft were operating in patrol lines in the Strait of Kerch, and eight were operating during the night of 19 Nov. No enemy objectives were sighted. No PT boats and motor minesweepers were out on operation during the night of 19 Nov.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff, reports that the water level of the Danube is the lowest in 60 years, so that the transfer of the three newly constructed PT boats will not be possible at once. It is being investigated whether removal of fittings will alleviate this, as lightening in itself is not sufficient.

Quartermaster General furthermore reports that an organizational order for alarm units has been laid down. In this connection it is remarked that the courses of training for recruits can only include a makeshift firing training of three weeks, and that schools and courses of instructions will have to provide for half a day's training weekly at the cost of athletic training. Submarine training must not be affected by this.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

II. Army Situation:

The operation against Zhitomir was successful; the place was recaptured. The road to Kiev is in our hands on a broad line. In the remaining sectors of the eastern front the situation is generally unchanged.

III. Naval Staff, Operations Division asks for a decision whether submarines can be used to pick up returning blockade-runners and whether recourse may be had to long-range reconnaissance to the extent necessary. Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

There are no further important reports and decisions.

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Special Items:

I. On 8 Nov. Group North/Fleet submitted a number of proposals for carrying out the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51. Copy of letter as per 1/Skl 3369/43 Gkdos. in files 1/Skl I op. The suggestions are as follows:

1. Transfer of the West Wall between Bergen and Ameland to the nearer coastal waters and abandonment of improvement and reinforcement of the previous West Wall that can no longer be controlled by us.

2. Investigation as to whether the Skagerrak barrages should be reinforced as secondary barrage lines.

3. As projects 1) and 2) cannot be regarded as alarm barrages, vulnerable shore waters must be mined with ground mines.

4. Naval Forces:

a. Establishment of a permanent submarine group consisting of 20 operational boats in the area of the Skagerrak and of the harbors of western and southern Norway.

b. Stationing of two groups of torpedo boats in a Skagerrak harbor.

c. Transfer of a PT Boat Flotilla to a Skagerrak harbor.

d. Stationing of a Motor Minesweeper Flotilla in a harbor of southern Norway.

e. Establishment of groups of naval landing craft as guncarriers or floating torpedo batteries.

5. All remaining naval forces, particularly those in the Baltic area, must be made operationally ready after preparations for operation "Wallenstein" are completed. In case of alarm a floating supply line is to be provided.

6. Actual naval forces, such as destroyers, torpedo boats and PT boats should, if possible, not be engaged in the defense of the shore, but in operations at sea against rear communications of the enemy. The prevention of the landing itself must be left to coastal defense,

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minefields and the Air Force. Arrangements with regard to the operational harbors for the units are to be made accordingly.

II. Chief, Naval Staff approved the following directive from Naval Staff, Operations Division on operations by forces of the Fleet during winter 1943/44. Thereby a large part of the proposals under I) made by Group North/Fleet is complied with:

I. Tasks and Distribution of Forces:

1. The situation forces us to take into consideration that our enemies will in the near future attempt a large-scale landing on the European continent.

The west area must be considered most vulnerable, since the coast of northern France, Belgium and Holland from the Cotentin peninsula up to Helder offers possibilities to the enemy of landing strong units from small and medium-sized landing vessels and is within direct range of his air forces, particularly of his fighters. After the formation of strong bridgeheads, the numerous efficient harbors in this area will permit the quick transfer of whole armies and continuous bringing-up of supplies necessary for a large-scale campaign.

However, a large-scale attack against the area Denmark - southern Norway is not out of the question. Here the difficulties for the enemy are greater, but the result can be decisive in case the operation succeeds.

In addition to this, the possibility of an enemy landing with a limited objective must still be reckoned with. While, in the case of landing operations in the west area, it will at first be difficult to recognize whether they are the beginning of a large-scale operation, aimed to be decisive, or only pursue a secondary objective, such attempts at landing in the northern area are possible for the following purposes: on the west coast of Norway, to interrupt our communications to northern Norway and seal off the Shetland Channel; on the north coast of Norway, to paralyze our supplies to the Arctic area and our

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ore shipments from Narvik; in the area of Kirkenes - Petsamo, to capture the nickel mines.

In the west area the task of fighting off enemy attempts at landing in the narrower Channel area and off the Dutch coast will fall to coastal patrol units but mostly to PT boats. In the central and western part of the Channel there will be operations by destroyers and torpedo boats also.

In the case of a large-scale attack against Denmark and southern Norway it is most important that the enemy be prevented from penetrating into the Skagerrak. Landings only on the west coast of Denmark or only in the area of the west coast of southern Norway are not sufficient for a large-scale attack, as Denmark has no efficient harbors and southern Norway no efficient communication routes into the hinterland. In case of a large-scale attack, therefore, the enemy must try to capture the harbors on the east coast of Denmark and south coast of Norway. This, however, means the penetration into the Skagerrak.

It is the decisive task of the Navy to prevent this as far as possible in the case of a large-scale enemy attack against the area of Denmark - southern Norway.

Up to now the Navy had, for this purpose, provided and prepared operations by the Task Force from the north and by the Training Unit with all destroyers, torpedo boats and PT boats in training or attached to schools in home waters.

In addition thereto, destroyers and torpedo boats are now to be stationed permanently in the area of the Skagerrak for operations against enemy minesweeping forces in the North Sea and for reinforcement of our mine barrages.

2. Apart from this task of defense against enemy attempts at landing, which is now becoming of primary importance, the former tasks of the surface forces remain substantially the same as before.

a. In Northern Waters it is to be expected that during the period of darkness the enemy will try to resume traffic to Russia, at least with single ships. In addition to submarines, the Task Force should likewise be sent out against this sea traffic.

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The task of impeding local traffic in the Russian area by laying mine barrages and by operations against harbors and bases plays a secondary role.

The tying-down of heavy enemy forces and of the light forces necessary for their protection in British home waters, achieved by the stationing of the Task Force in Norway, assumes less importance than hitherto after the release of heavy enemy units in the Mediterranean, but is still of value in view of our Japanese Ally.

b. In the Skagerrak the prevention of enemy blockade-running is a task which can no longer be solved by defense units only, since the enemy has established traffic with freight PT boats to Sweden.

c. In the west area the most important task of PT boats is still the attack on convoy traffic on the English coast with torpedoes and mines. Apart from the direct successes of these offensive operations, their indirect effect is to be rated highly. The tying-down of light enemy naval forces thus achieved entails the most effective relief for our own convoys. With regard to this, operations by PT boats for defense and escort purposes must be limited to a minimum.

In addition to defensive operations against enemy attempts at landing the most important task for destroyers and torpedo boats during the coming winter is the escort of incoming and outgoing blockade-runners.

As before, incoming and outgoing submarines are also to be escorted by destroyers and torpedo boats should special circumstances make this necessary.

In the Channel torpedo boats are also to be used for minelaying operations, combat of enemy PT boats and escort of particularly valuable convoys.

Operations by destroyers and torpedo boats for combat of enemy groups of submarine chasers in the outer Bay of Biscay, for attacks on lightly escorted enemy north-south convoys west of the Bay of Biscay, and for attacks on enemy convoys and minelaying operations in the western part of the Channel may be considered when conditions are favorable for such operations, which is not the case at present.

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d. In addition to these tasks, which are assigned to the surface forces and are mainly defensive, submarine warfare should be continued with utmost energy as the only offensive means of naval warfare and as the most important task of the Navy. It is therefore necessary that the expansion of the submarine arm be continued according to plan. Thus a considerable number of the vessels of the Fleet must still remain in the service of training for the submarine arm.

The expansion of the PT boat arm, which, in offensive operations, supplements the war against merchant shipping by submarines, is also to be continued without restriction. This makes necessary until further notice detachment of a comparatively large number of PT boats for training purposes.

3. In accordance with these tasks the following disposition of forces is intended:

a. In the Northern Area:

The Task Force, consisting of the SCHARNHORST, TIRPITZ and at least five destroyers: the PRINZ EUGEN will join this group later. It is not expected that the TIRPITZ will be ready for action again before April 1944.

b. In the Skagerrak:

Four destroyers and the 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. For this purpose two destroyers are now to be transferred at once from the northern area to the Skagerrak. Their number is to be increased to four by the next destroyers becoming ready in home waters and this number is to be maintained. Additional destroyers available are again to be assigned to the Task Force.

c. In the West Area:

Six destroyers and the 4th and 5th Torpedo Boat Flotillas. An assignment of further forces to the west area is not intended, not even as a replacement for destroyers and torpedo boats which are to be transferred to home waters for their dockyard period.

d. PT Boat flotillas will all continue operating for the present in the west area. The transfer of PT boats to the area of

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the Skagerrak - southern Norway is intended in case of a large-scale enemy landing in this area and will then be ordered by Naval Staff. Otherwise, a withdrawal of PT boats to other areas will only be carried out to the least, unavoidable extent.

e. The 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas must continue to be used for submarine training in the Baltic Sea.

II. Instructions for Operations:

The Chiefs and Commanders must continually be informed of the intentions of the Command regarding operations by naval forces in defense against enemy landings and of the individual tasks assigned to them, so that they can act independently in accordance with the intentions of the Command, should communications be interrupted. They must be aware of the decisive importance which their operations assume in defense against an enemy attempt at landing. Any interruption or delay at landing can be the decisive factor in defense against the landing on the coast. Thus any possibility of attack, even though slight, is to be exploited.

1. Task Force:

The main duty of the Task Force consists of operations in the case of enemy attempts at landing. For this purpose the Task Force is to be fully utilized within the possibilities arising from the situation.

In any case, regardless of where the enemy lands, it will be most appropriate that it operates into the landing area from outside, or against enemy supply lines. Only if the ships have absolute freedom of movement can their fighting-power be made fully effective.

The Task Force is, therefore, to be stationed where no enemy landing is to be expected, where the least danger of blockading exists. These demands are best met in the Alta Fjord; at the same time the danger of the Task Force being destroyed beforehand by air attacks is less here than anywhere else.

Moreover, the further duties assigned to the Task Force can best be carried out from here.

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The assignment of operations against the single enemy ships or convoys - insofar as the enemy resumes traffic through Northern Waters at all - is to be adjusted to the low strength of the Task Force during winter. Operations by the SCHARNHORST are also possible in the Arctic winter. (In this case Commander in Chief, Navy, personally reserves the right to decide with regard to operations by the SCHARNHORST. Commanding Admiral, Group North/Fleet was personally informed by Chief, Naval Staff.- (This passage added in pencil by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.)

Minelaying operations and operations against enemy harbors and bases are to be limited to particularly promising occasions. They are to be suggested by Group North/Fleet as each case arises. As long as the Task Force has at its disposal not more than five destroyers, these are to be kept in readiness for operations by the SCHARNHORST.

Without detracting from the responsibility of Naval Command, Norway it is the special task of Commanding Admiral, Task Force to see to the safety of the formation at its berths and to ensure that repair work on the TIFPITZ is carried out as planned. The action readiness of the TIFPITZ is always to be maintained to the extent ordered, in case, contrary to expectation, the enemy should make an attempt to penetrate into Alta Fjord with surface forces.

2. The destroyers and torpedo boats provided for operations in the Skagerrak will be assigned to Group North/Fleet. They are to be sent out by Group North/Fleet itself, in accordance with the situation, or placed at the disposal of Naval Command, Norway or Naval Command, Baltic (Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic) as each case arises, for special tasks.

The main base for these vessels is to be Horten. However, a frequent change of berth is advisable. The harbors in southern Norway (Kristiansand South - Stavanger) as well as the Danish harbors, can be considered for this purpose.

The operational possibilities for the naval forces to be transferred from the Baltic Sea in case of an enemy penetration into the Skagerrak, will be seen from the situation. Preparations for these operations are to be made in the manner provided for by Group North/Fleet.

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Operations by the PT Boat flotillas, which are brought up from the west area, will probably be most advantageous if carried out in the same way as operations by the Task Force, i.e. from outside against the landing area and enemy supply lines. The operational area of these PT Boat flotillas will then cover the whole northern part of the North Sea and the Skagerrak. The necessary bases and operational harbors for these operations are to be prepared; floating bases (PT boat escort ships) can only be relied upon if these are transferred to the areas in question now.

3. West Area:

In the west area all questions regarding operations by PT boats, destroyers and torpedo boats for defense against enemy landings must be clarified, all necessary preparations made and instructions for operations issued.

Even if the command of the battle in coastal waters must, to a great extent, be left to the local authorities, primarily to the coast patrol forces, it is still necessary to limit the right of these offices in regard to the use of the naval forces lying in their areas, so that the possibility of controlling operations by these forces is retained by the supreme command. This applies particularly to PT boats which may not be wasted in individual actions but which can be most effectively put into operation if controlled as a whole by Commander, PT boats in accordance with the instructions of Group West.

With regard to remaining tasks, the previous instructions for operations by PT boats and destroyers and torpedo boats in the west area remain fundamentally unchanged.

The above instructions for operations by surface forces of the Fleet are to be made known to the Chiefs and Commanders of the vessels concerned.

Proper assignment of vessels that become ready later and instructions to newly appointed Chiefs and Commanders must be assured.

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III. Report on the Enemy Situation No. 22/43 of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division (Copy as per 1/Sk1 40251/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part D, "Enemy Situation Reports of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division") sums up the situation in the European area as follows:

"The enemy is still concentrating his forces on the Italian theater of operations, without bringing-up more than the necessary supplies.

The expansion of the base in England is being continued. The time and direction of the operations to be expected from this area cannot yet be judged. In the Russian text now available of the speech which Stalin made after the Moscow Conference it is stated that the establishment of a real second front "is not behind the mountains". (See also under "Items of Political Importance", 7 Nov. "r. N.") This wording, therefore, gives even less indication of the date than was to be assumed according to the texts of the speech first transmitted."

Regarding the Pacific Ocean:

"After the enemy had penetrated into the right flank of the Japanese key position of Rabaul on 2 Oct. 1943 by the capture of Finckhafen on New Guinea, he tried to break open the left flank of this position by his landing on Bougainville on 31 October. Japan - fully aware of the seriousness of the situation - is carrying on the defensive fight against American naval forces covering supply traffic by sea and is drawing on experienced naval / air formations from home for this purpose. The fate of Rabaul depends on the outcome of these battles which have been in progress since the beginning of the month."

Situation 20 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation:

The RIO GRANDE received the following instructions by radiogram 0945:

"On account of the enemy situation, which has become more acute, the break-through will be attempted at first by the OSORNO and ALSTERUFER. The RIO GRANDE must wait in the southern Atlantic. The waiting areas assigned are grid squares GN, GO, GV, GW and GX and the sea area south of these squares. The ship will patrol in this area according to the weather situation, using as little fuel as possible. Reckon to wait about four weeks. If, for any reason, the waiting period cannot be carried through, Naval Staff is to be informed promptly by radio."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-five planes and one air-sea rescue plane were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. At 0911 our air reconnaissance reported a flying boat in BF 7587.

At 0718 a plane was located in BE 8578 near convoy "Flore".

Our air reconnaissance detected the convoy at 1815 on northerly course 440 miles west of Cape Finisterre.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four submarines were escorted in.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of destroyers Z "23", "24", "27", "32", "37" and ZH "1" left for exercises which are to be carried out in the area between 44°30' and 45°20' N., 02°20' and 03°50' W. They are scheduled to enter Concarneau, Benodet or Ile de Croix according to weather conditions at noon on 21 Nov.

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Channel Coast:

At 0945 a French fishing vessel was sunk by an enemy plane off Calais. In the afternoon there were ten enemy air attacks, some dive-attacks, on the battery in the Calais area, without special damage. From 1702 to 1739 an enemy vessel $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles northwest of Dunkirk was shelled by one of our coastal batteries with 149 rounds. One hit was observed.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

One ground mine each was swept west of Foehr and southwest of Heligoland and two northwest of Scheveningen. Patrol boat "1308" struck a mine southwest of Helder and was beached. Convoy 1189 Hook - Elbe was carried out without interruption.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1600 on 19 Nov. a PT boat was sighted on the west side of Froeyen. On 18 Nov. two planes entered the area of Vardoe; on 19 Nov. one plane entered the area of Vardoe, three planes the area of Bergen and one plane each the areas of Stavanger, Nord Fjord, and Bergen.

2. Own Situation:

On 19 Nov. the Norwegian steamer KAMOEY (2,498 BRT) and the steamer DENEK (856 BRT) ran aground on Bodoe roads and near Aalesund respectively.

Thirty-four ships were escorted north and twenty-six south. Twenty-four ships remained lying in harbor.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During gunfire against the coastal area in Kronstadt Bay there was a direct hit on the command post at Peterhof which caused slight material damage. Between Leningrad and Kronstadt and west of Kronstadt the usual tug and guard boat traffic was observed. Slight air activity is reported in Luga Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Command, Baltic reports that there is no longer much furnace oil available in the Danish area and supplies by the Naval Arsenal, Kiel are impossible, so that escort and patrol tasks can only be carried out to a limited extent. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will deal with this matter further.

On 18 Nov. at 0010 the minelayer DIETER KOERNER was unsuccessfully attacked by a torpedo plane in Riga Bay. Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Operation against Convoy "Flore":

Unfortunately the favorable prospects of attacking the convoy in a pack, expected on the basis of the course of the operation up to now, did not materialize. Although a number of boats succeeded in approaching the enemy there was no engagement during the night of 19 Nov. or during the following night. Only one frigate and two planes were destroyed. Unfortunately our reconnaissance plane equipped with search gear was shot down. The bad visibility played its part in preventing the sighting of the convoy. As the boats had no more prospects of reaching a position for attack, the operation was broken off.

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VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Forty-three planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation.

In the evening 2 bombers, 8 heavy fighters and 4 fighter-bombers were sent out against London and 6 fighter-bombers against Brighton.

In the occupied west area single enemy planes flew over the coast without attacking. At noon a formation of 100 planes flew into the area of Calais, Amiens and Dieppe and attacked Audingham southeast of Cape Gris Nez with about 120 high explosive bombs. No damage to military installations was caused. In western France gun positions near Fécamp were attacked without damage being caused.

No enemy planes entered German territory.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nineteen planes - 16 of them reconnaissance planes - of Air Force Command, Southeast were out on operations. In the Gulf of Gaeta 6 fighter-bombers attacked 2 enemy motor minesweepers which were damaged.

The enemy carried out armed reconnaissance in the Aegean Sea with 17 planes during the day.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports four planes out on operations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

In the morning two destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean and 20 landing boats left for the Atlantic.

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According to an intelligence report from Spain, 2 large warships, said to be 1 battleship and 1 carrier, as well as 1 freighter and four destroyers passed Tangiers bound for the Mediterranean in the evening of 19 Nov. No other observations in regard to this information have been received.

The large convoy which entered the Mediterranean on 18 Nov. has not yet been detected again.

Reconnaissance in the area of Corsica and off the west and east coasts of Italy was greatly hindered by bad visibility; no observations could be made. Off Gaeta coastal batteries forced three vessels, probably minesweepers, to turn away. According to an intelligence report, there is continuous traffic from Algiers and Oran to Corsica, and also to Naples and Salerno. Some of the ships are sailing alone.

Night reconnaissance reported in the evening of 19 Nov. that Brindisi, Taranto and Naples were not blacked out.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Minelaying operation "Ritterschlag", which is to be carried out by torpedo boat TA "24" and six motor minesweepers, was postponed on account of the weather. In the evening a freighter was unsuccessfully attacked by one of our submarines east of Catania.

When setting out for minelaying on the evening of 19 Nov., harbor defense boat LIDO and naval landing craft MFP "483" had an engagement with enemy destroyers south of Benedetto. Both vessels were heavily damaged and beached. One definite hit was observed on the enemy. (see teletype 1230).

German Naval Command, Italy transmits a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, that some of the Italian volunteers have already deserted during transport and bombing attacks and that only a very small number of them can be regarded as reliable. An increased watch is necessary. Since, in addition, under existing conditions the danger of going-over to the enemy and betrayal of military secrets is even greater than in Russia, the unlimited enlistment of Italian auxiliary forces appears inadvisable.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The destroyers which attacked the I.I.D.O and naval landing craft MFP "483" shelled Benedetto at 2220 on 19 Nov., without effective damage.

At 1400 on 19 Nov. an enemy plane was shot down by our naval forces south of Pola.

On 18 Nov. a column of nine trucks of the 3rd detachment of the 1st Naval Motor Transport Battalion was attacked by low-flying enemy planes on its way from Durazzo to Tirana. Several trucks were damaged.

If the weather is favorable, it is intended to transfer PT boats S "30", "33" and "61" back from Dubrovnik to Pola in the night of 20 Nov. At the same time the boats are to carry out reconnaissance south of Mljet and Lagosta as well as around the island of Vis, and are to penetrate into the harbors of Komaza and Vis and destroy vessels. Subsequently, on further passage, the boats are to harass enemy ferry traffic from Brac to the mainland.

One radio station at Fiume was put into service on 19 Nov.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The following were sighted by our reconnaissance: at 1539 on 19 Nov. 3 PT boats 10 miles west of Castellrosso on course 300°; at 0622 on 20 Nov. 1 vessel, probably a cruiser, and 2 destroyers 65 miles south of Rhodes on course 110° and at 1228 1 destroyer and 1 escort boat in the Bay of Kos.

During the night of 19 Nov. submarine U "565" sank an enemy submarine northwest of Rhodes. At 1120 on 20 Nov. an enemy submarine sank a sailing vessel by gunfire in Suda Bay.

The report on the commando operation against Symi, which was gathered from a radio message from Cairo, was not confirmed by Assault Division Rhodes.

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During a reconnaissance thrust in the night of 19 Nov., PT boat S "54" observed that there were no ships in Tigani Harbor (Samos). According to statements of refugees, no enemy naval forces have been sighted in Vathi for days. There are said to be about 100 British still on the island but no heavy weapons. The Italian divisional commander is said to be willing to negotiate. In spite of the use of searchlights off Vathi and in the vicinity of the coast, PT boat S "54" was neither spotted nor shelled.

PT boat S "55" left Piraeus and took up waiting position at 1900 east of Leros up to the north coast of Kos.

Commander, Submarine Chasers has ordered that available and suitable vessels be disposed in the sea area of Samos, with focal point north of Vathi and south of Tigani Bay, during darkness, until the Army is ready for the operation against Samos (code word "Damokles").

A steamer with 400 tons of supplies put into Rhodes from Piraeus. Return passage with prisoners is postponed owing to danger of submarines.

After carrying out escort operation, the minelayer DRACHE returned to Piraeus in the evening of 19 Nov. The convoy carrying the lifting gear arrived at Khalkis in the morning.

In view of the new situation Group South requests the establishment of a Naval Shore Command for the Dodecanese, with headquarters on Leros. This requires two naval artillery battalions for manning twelve medium batteries and fifteen light batteries on Leros, Rhodes and Stampalia. This cannot be carried out with the means at the disposal of Group South. (see teletypes 2055 and 2110).

The matter will be dealt with further by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance of the harbors of the Caucasus shows that the center of enemy warship and merchant shipping movements has shifted from Batum to Poti.

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Radio intelligence gave no further facts as to the cruiser which appeared in the area of Tuapse on 19 Nov. On the afternoon of 20 Nov. Destroyer "F" was detected to be probably in the southeastern part of the Black Sea.

Own Situation:

On the night of 20 Nov. three naval landing craft each were in position off Eltigen and Kerch. Off Eltigen the boats had an engagement at 1910 with several gunboats, which turned away.

Kapkani east of Kerch was shelled by Naval Artillery Battalion 613. In addition, one plane was shot down. At noon there was a heavy enemy air attack as well as gunfire on Kamysh Burun. On naval landing craft was destroyed and another damaged. In the evening eight damaged naval landing craft left Kamysh Burun for repair at Sevastopol.

After an improvement in the weather, three PT boats left Ivanbaba in the evening for operations off Eltigen. Eight naval landing craft are out in the patrol line in the Strait of Kerch.

At Odessa the steamer SANTA FE is loading fifteen newly-arrived assault guns and three others unloaded from naval landing craft. Three further assault guns were put on board of two naval landing craft.

Regarding the death of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea and the second officer of the Admiral's Staff near Kamysh Burun, Admiral, Black Sea reports that the bombing and machine-gun attack was carried out on the car, which was doubtless recognized and which could not reach the nearest shelter in time.

As regards the situation on land, Admiral, Black Sea reports that the enemy attack on the beachhead of Bakhchi was repulsed with the exception of a slight penetration, which was sealed off. The counterattack from Kerch to the north is in progress. There was slight gunfire on the northern front.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Situation 21 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-four planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay. At 1841 a British unit, presumably consisting of PT boats, was located in BF 3810 (south of Jersey). In the course of the day there were numerous further radar locations in the usual rendezvous area.

Our air reconnaissance reported: at 1015 a cruiser and a destroyer in BE 5898, on course 330°; at 1550 two corvettes in BE 5583 on course 30°. It is possible that the vessels detected here can be regarded as the remote escort with convoys SL 139 and MKS 30.

At 1220 the northbound convoy, consisting of 50 ships and 6 escort vessels, was again detected in BE 5588. According to radio intelligence the convoy was attacked by our Air Force at 1620.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

After completion of exercises, which were carried out according to plan, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla anchored in Concarneau

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and on Benodet roads. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla consisting of the KONDOR, MOEVE and FALKE left La Pallice for day and night firing practices. Torpedo boats T "24" and "26" put into Brest.

Two mines were swept southwest of Brest. One submarine was escorted out of St. Nazaire.

During the night of 20 Nov. a clumsy act of sabotage was carried out aboard a harbor defense boat off St. Nazaire, presumably by two members of the crew, which caused considerable casualties. Further details are not yet available. A court-martial investigation has been started.

Channel Coast:

One mine was swept northeast of Dunkirk. During the evening a further act of sabotage was carried out against the radar installation near Blanc Nez. The shelter for Diesel engines was blown up. Enemy targets in the area of Gris Nez were located from 2200 until after midnight. They were fired on by our batteries without results being observed.

The operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla planned against the westbound convoy in Plymouth Sound was cancelled owing to bad visibility.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

One mine each was swept northwest of Terschelling, north of Ameland and north of Norderney. Patrol boat "1308", which was beached after striking a ground mine, was refloated and towed into Helder.

During the day patrol and minesweeping duties were carried out as planned, but during the night of 21 Nov. they were cancelled on account of fog.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Eight planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. On 20 Nov. one flight each was observed over the area of Bergen and south

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of Stavanger: A British midget submarine was taken in prize towards 2000 after being fired on by armed trawler NB "59" off Westby Fjord near Bergen. The boat is 7 to 8 m. long, and has no periscope. The bow consists of a detachable adhesive mine of 350 - 500 kg explosive charge. The operator of the boat was a Norwegian cadet who stated that it was towed up to the coast by a gunboat and had then made for Bergen through Solvik Sound - Hjelte Fjord, in order to look for a worthwhile target in the harbor. The boat was towed into Bergen.

2. Own Situation:

On 20 Nov. at 2000 the LODY and STEINBRINCK left Alta to be transferred to the Skagerrak area.

Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 36 south. Due to lack of escorts 15 ships remained lying in harbors.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to intelligence, the Norwegian steamers RAPID and REALF II are lying with the DICTO and LIONEL in the skerries near Halloy. However, according to reconnaissance by our camouflaged motor fishing vessel, the ships were not sighted in the harbor of Halloy.

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Baltic States, Perelissie (20 km southwest of Oranienbaum) was captured by the enemy. A counterattack is in progress.

2. Own Situation:

Convoys in the Baltic Sea entrances were delayed by fog. The steamer LIPPE collided with the steamer TREPANUM. The latter sank. The LIPPE put into Copenhagen with damage to her bow.

In the morning submarine, net and barrage patrol in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic was carried out according to plan.

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V. Merchant Shipping.

Group South has issued executive instructions on the order of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff dated 31 Oct. regarding sea transport in the areas of the Black Sea, Aegean and Adriatic Sea, and submitted them for information. Copy as per l/Skl 50220/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

Air reconnaissance against the southbound convoy presumed to be in BE was without result. On the evening of 22 Nov. 16 boats will be disposed in patrol line from BE 7869 to 8768. Further boats are to operate south of this patrol line. No position reports have yet been received, though ordered, from three boats in this area. On the night of 21 Nov. submarine U "212" reported two destroyers in BF 7986.

Otherwise no reports.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force sent out five FW 200's and three Ju 290's for long-range reconnaissance against the northbound convoy, which was first detected at 1020.

Towards 1700 the first operation by a formation of He 177's against the large convoy took place. The distance from their base was 1400 km. Therefore the range of 1200 km for this type was exceeded by 200 km. The engines worked excellently. The range is now extended to 1900 km. Weather conditions during the first attack were moderate to bad. Twenty of the twenty-five bombers reached their target, three He 177's were lost and two had engine trouble. Forty HS 293's were dropped, eleven of which did not explode. As the clouds were low, bombs were dropped from between 400 and 600 m. Two merchantmen totalling

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18,000 BRT were probably sunk and three merchantmen damaged by near-misses. The poor results are attributed by Air Force, Operations Staff to insufficient training of the crews. The attacks will have surprised the enemy. It is possible that he will move his shipping route to the west out of the range of the He 177's. Operations by the formation will then be limited to the Mediterranean, but will extend there to the eastern part, thereby creating new possibilities against the Gibraltar - Suez traffic.

No air operations of note were carried out by the enemy in the area around Great Britain.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the Italian area only reconnaissance activity was carried out by our planes. At noon the enemy attacked the railway bridge at Fano north of Ancona as well as the town and harbor of Civitavecchia. Four of the attacking planes were shot down. Our ships were not damaged.

In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast, 52 of our planes were out on operations. Eleven enemy planes attacked the airfield of Candia; 15 other planes carried out reconnaissance over the Aegean Sea and three carried out reconnaissance in the Strait of Otranto. In the area of Durazzo - Tirana several of our trucks were damaged by heavy fighter patrols.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports three planes out on operations without special incident.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Central and Western Mediterranean:

At noon a cruiser of the PHILADELPHIA class with five destroyers put into Gibraltar from the Atlantic; in the morning a cruiser of the BIRMINGHAM class left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

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An eastbound convoy consisting of 42 freighters and 6 tankers, reported from Tangiers at 1450, entered the Mediterranean. In the afternoon 2 loaded tankers as well as 1 CAIRO class cruiser and 1 auxiliary cruiser joined the convoy at Gibraltar, while 1 tanker of the convoy put into Gibraltar towards evening.

The large convoy which entered the Mediterranean on 18 Nov. was again detected at 0845, consisting of 60 merchantmen with 3 tankers, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 2 corvettes, 30 miles northeast of Cape Tenes.

In the morning our air reconnaissance in the sea area of Sardinia - Corsica and in the central Mediterranean was incomplete. At 1000 2 destroyers, 1 PT boat and 1 minesweeper were sighted in the Bonifacio Strait. It was observed that the number of PT boats in Maddalena had increased again, while the number of freighters had decreased. Twenty PT boats were lying in the harbor. The number of ships in Bastia was unchanged.

Repeated agents' reports on transports from Oran and Algiers to Corsica have not yet been confirmed by air reconnaissance. During the night of 20 Nov. a convoy consisting of 40 merchantmen and escort vessels was observed 60 miles south of Salerno proceeding on course 30°, probably bound for Salerno or Naples. According to an intelligence report, there is an aircraft-carrier in the eastern Mediterranean, which is said to have left Suez for Cyprus on 18 Nov. This report has not been confirmed by air reconnaissance.

2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean.

Field Marshal Kesselring took over command in the whole Italian area as Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest and Commanding General, Army Group C.

Torpedo boat TA "24" with four PT boats and six motor minesweepers left St. Stefano for minelaying operation "Ritterschlag". Our convoy traffic was delayed by the weather. At 1725 a freight-barge sank southeast of Piombino due to sea damage.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the handing-over of all vessels of the 11th Coast Patrol Force to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea is completed.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On the afternoon of 20 Nov. a submarine was reported off Lussin. No vessels in action readiness were detected during reconnaissance of the berths near Markaska (southeast of Split). On the morning of 19 Nov. the command boat of the Naval Shore Commander put into Split from Sibenik. The escorting Italian PT boat is missing and obviously went over to the enemy.

During the night of 20 Nov. two destroyers were patrolling on the east coast off Benedetto. In addition, continuous air attacks were carried out. In the morning the coast south of Benedetto was shelled, presumably by these destroyers. Nuisance raids were observed in the area of Ancona and agents were presumably landed. Two vessels, apparently minesweepers, were observed in Termoli.

Own Situation:

The torpedo battery at Kabala near Cattaro is ready for firing with two tubes and two torpedoes.

Tank Army Command 2 adheres to its previous intentions for mopping-up the Dalmatian islands. The troops for the capture of Korcula are in readiness. Mopping-up will be carried out of:

1. the islands of Zara
2. the island of Solta
3. the islands from Brac to Mljet.

Baab and Bag will be mopped up first, as soon as the coast of the mainland is occupied by our forces, in order to prevent partisans escaping to the mainland.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The unit consisting of a destroyer and an escort boat sighted in Kos Bay on 20 Nov. was confirmed by our air reconnaissance at 0755 at the same point.

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An attempt at sabotage, presumably by a British sabotage group, on the southern point of Symi was repelled by a Fascist detachment. According to radio intelligence, about 2,000 refugees from Samos landed on Turkish territory up to and including 20 Nov.

Two submarines were located west of Nikaria.

The attack on the auxiliary sailing vessel in Suda Bay on 20 Nov. by an enemy submarine was carried out in the declared mine area.

The auxiliary sailing vessel was not sunk, but was towed in floating on her cargo.

Own Situation:

In the course of operation "Damokles" PT-boats S "54" and "55" were sent to Samos with a truce officer. His reception and the surrender of the island were refused. The PT boats were shelled and returned to Leros. Operation "Damokles" then commenced. Detailed reports have not yet been received.

In the afternoon torpedo boats TA "14" and "15" left Leros for Piraeus with parachutists.

Until now the submarine chase by our planes in Suda Bay has been without success. Due to the danger of submarines, all harbors on the north coast of Crete are closed. In addition, passage of auxiliary sailing vessels between Crete and Rhodes was stopped. According to the statement of a coastal sailing vessel, altogether three coastal sailing vessels were sunk by enemy submarines in the course of the last few days.

Convoy "Schiaffino" left Leros for Piraeus with 2,700 prisoners. Two motor minesweepers left Leros for Levita and Stampalia, carrying supplies to the islands.

During the night of 20 Nov. the minelayer MOROSINI put out to sea for a special operation.

The convoy carrying ship's lifting gear left Khalkis in the evening, northbound.

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Operation "Damokles": According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, Army Group E issued the following order:

"The weather demands immediate action. Serious resistance is not expected. According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, shipping for operation "Damokles" is ready to put out immediately. I order:

1. Immediate departure of a truce officer to Samos,
2. Surprise landing on Samos in the morning of 22 Nov.,
3. The 1st Battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment and Parachute Company "Brandenburg" are to be transferred or flown over to the mainland without delay. High Command, Army Group E, will be in charge of operations."

(see teletype 1118).

For order to Task Force "Mueller" regarding operation "Damokles" see teletypes 2048 and 2142. Should the enemy refuse to surrender, the landing is scheduled to take place on 23 Nov. at 0100. if the weather is favorable.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No shipping was observed off the east coast. At 1030 a submarine was located and attacked 10 miles north of Sevastopol. It was probably damaged.

Own Situation:

Off Cape Lukull one of our convoys, consisting of auxiliary sailing vessels, was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes. One plane was shot down. In the afternoon ten planes carried out an air attack on Ivanbaba, of which three were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. No damage was caused.

In the patrol line off Eltiger three naval landing craft hindered enemy supplies in several engagements between 1900 and 2135 on 20 Nov. Only three enemy vessels reached the beachhead. A fully loaded landing boat was destroyed and a further one probably destroyed. The enemy vessels, which were driven off, withdrew eastward. Three boats of the

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1st PT Boat Flotilla south of Eltigen did not contact the enemy until dawn; at 0446 they had an engagement with a landing unit consisting of eight landing boats and two motor gunboats. Two medium-sized landing boats were sunk. One boat attempted a break-through using 4.5 cm guns and machineguns and supported by a heavy enemy coastal battery. The attempt was frustrated. The rest of the landing unit was driven off, with the exception of probably three vessels, which were shelled by our coastal battery. The success of our coastal fire was not observed. The PT Boat Flotilla broke off the engagement on account of enemy air attacks. On return passage the unit was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs and machine-guns by ground-attack planes, fighters and bombers.

During the night of 21 Nov. six naval landing craft and four motor minesweepers were out on operation in the Strait of Kerch. Five motor minesweepers were damaged in an air attack near Cape Chauda.

During a sweep on the harbor of Tuapse submarine U "18" was heavily depth-charged; the boat was damaged and forced to return.

The former Chief of Staff of Group South, Rear Admiral Brinkmann, was appointed Commanding Admiral, Black Sea.

Regarding the land situation on the Crimea, the Naval Liaison Officer with Army Group A reports that the enemy commenced the expected attack on the beachhead of Bakhchi. South of Bulganak the enemy achieved a break-through with 25 tanks. Concentrated gunfire forced the tanks which had broken through to withdraw. Preparations are being made for a counter-thrust. On the morning of 21 Nov. the main defense line was again completely in our hands after fierce fighting. Eighteen tanks were destroyed.

All quiet on other fronts. The beachhead of Eltigen is being supplied by the enemy from the air.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The following report on the battles near Bougainville has been received from the Naval Attaché in Tokio:

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"a. 5 Nov.: After an air attack on Rabaul Japanese reconnaissance planes sighted towards noon 2 carriers, 5 cruisers and 7 destroyers southeast of Rabaul. Fourteen carrier-borne torpedo planes sent out against the enemy at dusk sank 1 carrier and set a second one on fire, which sank later. In addition, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers were sunk.

b. 8 Nov.: 27 carrier-borne Stukas and 71 fighter-bombers were sent out against a unit consisting of 4 cruisers, 7 destroyers and 16 transports escorted by 60 fighters; 3 destroyers and 2 transports were sunk and 2 cruisers damaged. Five further transports burnt out later. Twenty-one enemy fighters were shot down as against our loss of 15.

At 1020 reconnaissance planes reported 3 battleships and 4 cruisers southwest of Gazellenhafen and at 1445 4 cruisers, 5 destroyers and 30 transports also southwest of Gazellenhafen. Thirteen carrier-borne torpedo planes sent out did not find the convoy owing to bad visibility, but the unit of battleships was attacked in the twilight and 1 battleship and 2 cruisers sunk. Another formation of torpedo planes also attacked the battleships. At 1745 two battleships were sinking and a third one was burning brightly. It is assumed that she sank as she could not be found again later by reconnaissance planes. Eight of our planes were lost. During a night attack on the convoy no success was observed.

c. 10 Nov.: The enemy convoy which entered Gazelle Bay was attacked by night in bad visibility. One transport was set on fire and five of our planes were lost.

During the night of 10 Nov. 10 transports and 10 destroyers were sighted west of the Mono Islands and, somewhat later, at a distance therefrom 2 large carriers, 1 small carrier and 20 other vessels southwest of the Mono Islands; likewise, early in the morning, another 4 battleships and 3 cruisers with fighter cover. At 0700 there was a large-scale attack on Rabaul by 60 carrier-borne Stukas and 70 carrier-borne fighters which was intensified later by another 60 bombers and 20 flying boats. Japanese fighters, numbering 103, and Japanese anti-aircraft guns shot down 71 of the attacking planes.

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Eleven of our fighters were lost. One Japanese destroyer sank in the harbor. At noon 14 carrier-borne torpedo planes, 25 carrier-borne Stukas and 35 carrier-borne fighters attacked the enemy carrier unit. Two hits by 60 kg bombs were scored on a large carrier, probably the ESSEX. One cruiser or destroyer was sunk by a torpedo and three further destroyers hit. Heavy Japanese losses: all torpedo planes, 17 Stukas and 4 fighters.

In the afternoon 3 battleships of the NORTH CAROLINA type, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers were detected southeast of Gazelle Bay. Torpedo planes attacking in a rainstorm scored one hit each on a battleship and a cruiser and sank one destroyer.

d. 11 Nov.: 12 heavy naval bombers attacked a base on the Ellice Islands (south of the Gilbert Islands), and 8 bombers attacked Port Darwin.

12 Nov.: Several task forces were sighted in the course of the day. One consisted of 3 cruisers and 5 destroyers, a second of 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 8 transports, a third of 2 carriers, 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers. The last group was attacked by 12 torpedo planes on the morning of 13 Nov.; they reported hits on a carrier and a battleship (not reported as yet by reconnaissance.) The next day the battleship was sighted with a large oil trace, proceeding at five knots and the carrier was not detected again. Possibly she went down. In addition 2 cruisers were sunk and 1 destroyer set on fire. Two of our planes were lost.

e. 16 Nov.: 18 enemy ships, including 2 carriers, were sighted west of Shortland in the afternoon. During the night 17 torpedo planes carried out an attack. One carrier, 2 auxiliary carriers and 3 cruisers were sunk. Five of our planes were lost. During the same night Buka was shelled from the sea.

At dawn on 17 Nov. 10 Stukas and 55 fighters attacked a convoy off Gazelle Bay; the result was not clearly observed. Subsequently there was an aerial battle with 110 enemy fighters and dive-bombers. Fourteen of our planes were lost and five enemy planes were shot down.

f. Japanese observations:

1. According to radio intelligence, British ships also were engaged in the battles.

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2. The successes were particularly favored by attacks in the twilight, at night and by taking advantage of tropical rainstorms. Recent training was particularly concentrated on this. The torpedoes were fired at a distance of less than 1,000 m. The hits were mostly scored amidships, thereby increasing the effect.

3. The torpedo of the carrier-borne planes has an explosive charge of 235 kg, and that of the land-based torpedo planes of 370 kg.

4. On account of the darkness, errors in identification of the different types are possible.

5. The Japanese anti-aircraft guns near Rabaul achieved great successes, as the training of the U.S. flyers "mostly 20 year-old students" was insufficient, and the planes flew carelessly within favorable range of anti-aircraft guns.

g. Views taken by the Naval and Air Attachés in Tokio:

"It seems that the Americans want to force an early decision in Rabaul, using all available naval forces and superior air forces. In spite of their losses they succeeded in bringing-up supplies to Gazelle Bay. For the time being U.S. troops - in the strength of a division - which landed are tied down to their landing place and cannot move far. New landings in another vicinity are expected. At present the situation is still obscure; in comparison with the fighting on the Solomons the supply situation for the Japanese is easier."

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that the Fuehrer is awaiting a report from Minister Speer regarding the present state of radar location by submarines. Minister Speer will report on the state of work by the Research Council.

Today Chief, Naval Staff will discuss this problem with the Reich Marshal and Field Marshal Milch. The aim must be to have radar gear of our own as soon as possible so that we have at least the same equipment as the enemy. Our submarine, too, must be able to locate the enemy.

II. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division reports on the request of Group South regarding the establishment of a Naval Shore Command in the Dodecanese (see War Diary 20 Nov.). Army Group, Southeast has asked the Navy to appoint the fortress commander for Leros. It is intended to attach the area of the Cyclades to the area of Naval Shore Commander, Attica, if necessary to establish an individual Coast Patrol Flotilla for this area. Quartermaster General suggests that the requests of the Group be agreed to basically, on condition that it is possible to provide the forces. Armed Forces High Command and Admiral at the Fuehrer Headquarters are to be informed that only a limited number of forces can be made available by the Navy.

Chief, Naval Staff is of the opinion that the appointment of the island commander should be left to the Army and orders an investigation as to whether the establishment of the Naval Shore Command, Dodecanese is superfluous.

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III. Commander in Chief, Navy answered the letter of Director Merker (see War Diary 15 Nov.). Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. e A.p.A.

IV. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division: The tension in the enemy camp as the result of the development of the situation in Lebanon and Syria was removed by the complete withdrawal of the French.

A new diplomatic representative of the United States, sent to Lisbon, is said to be an enthusiastic supporter of the policy of bases. According to information available to Naval Intelligence Division, the news regarding alleged Anglo-American differences of opinions, spread in connection with the question of occupation of the islands, is in no case authenticated.

According to information of the Turkish Ambassador from Moscow, the Russian winter Army is said to have the task of reaching the frontier by the end of the year. No details are given as to where this frontier runs.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Army Situation:

In the sector of Mikopol - Dnepropetrovsk our troops achieved considerable defensive successes. In the area of the 8th Army the enemy achieved new successes near Bereshevka. The situation near Cherkazy is still obscure. In the area of Gomel our lines were withdrawn further, under heavy pressure. The defensive battle west of Orsha, which lasted twelve days, is to be regarded as finished.

Note:

Due to the fire at High Command, Navy on the evening of 22 Nov. (see Aerial Warfare, Special Items) most of the teletypes and radio messages received in the course of the day were destroyed. There are therefore only incomplete reports from the different theaters of operation.

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Situation 22 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio was asked in telegram 1615 whether the Captains of the blockade-runners at sea are thoroughly familiarized with the recognition signals known to us, which are used between enemy merchantmen and warships. The data available to Naval Staff are based on interrogations of crews by Ship "28" on 29 Nov. 1942 and 2 Jan. 1943.

II. Situation West Area.

No special incidents are contained in the reports received.

Group West reported on the preliminary result of the investigations regarding events aboard the patrol boat FN "05". After five months in dock, the boat had for the first time taken up its position again in the course of 20 Nov. and lay at anchor there. The mutineers surprised the three sentries on the upper deck and locked the crew up in the hold. When they were able to free themselves after two hours, two of the sentries had been shot and the third one was missing. The commander was killed in his cabin obviously by a hand-grenade. Altogether seven men were killed and one man is missing, presumably one of the two perpetrators. The other was shot when acting suspiciously in the engine room. Copy of report see teletype 0440.

Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, has made a chart summarizing the positions of enemy planes detected in the north Atlantic by radio intelligence and sighting during the month of October 1943. Compared with the previous month no essential change is to be seen apart from an increase in the activity of the Iceland squadrons. Copy as per 1/Skl 40154/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Minesweeping was not carried out due to fog. Nothing special to report.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence a PQ convoy, which at present is still west of Bear Island, is expected.

2. Own Situation:

Four submarines, constituting Group "Eisenbart", have taken up a patrol line from AC 1968 to 4365. Three further submarines were ordered to put out quickly in order to extend the patrol line to the north and south.

At 1145 one of our convoys was attacked by eight enemy planes. Two steamers were set on fire.

Naval Command, Norway reports that during the season from January to April several vessels of the patrol forces in the Norwegian area can be provided for protection of fishing off the Lofoten islands, in spite of the disadvantages entailed for escort operations; in addition, Naval Command, Norway requests that submarines passing West Fjord be ordered to show themselves in the fishing grounds as often as possible. For further control of the fishing areas Naval Command, Norway is investigating with Intelligence the use of camouflaged radio personnel on fishing vessels. Negotiations with Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway are under way regarding temporary reinforcement by Army troops of the places and islands that are of particular importance for preserving the catches. In addition, attempts are being made to obtain extended reconnaissance of coastal waters from the 5th Air Force.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Nothing special to report.

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V. Submarine Warfare.

In the evening a group of destroyers was detected by two submarines in CF 2150 and 2135 and was unsuccessfully attacked by one boat.

Air reconnaissance within the line connecting BE 1280, 3750, 9750 and 7530 against the expected southbound convoy was incomplete and without result. It is possible that the convoy proceeded west of 23° W. Group "Weddigen" has orders to take up quickly new patrol line from CF 1291 to 2272.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 7 bombers, 32 fighters and 19 reconnaissance planes were out on operation during the day.

At 1022 the northbound convoy, which was attacked on 21 Nov., was again detected, consisting of 70 ships, 560 miles west-northwest of Brest.

During the day minor enemy forces flew into the area of Morlaix - Guernsey without attacking.

From 1835 strong enemy air formations flew into the area of Berlin by way of Holland. Due to completely overcast weather, drizzle and a strong wind, fighters could not be sent out for defense. According to reports so far available it is estimated that about 1,000 aerial mines and high-explosive bombs, more than 100,000 rod-incendiaries and at least 5,000 phosphorus bombs were dropped on Berlin. This attack was the heaviest yet directed against Berlin and was concentrated on the old western part. Extensive fires were caused. The number of buildings and houses destroyed or damaged is considerable. For details see Daily Situation.

Special Items:

The building of the High Command, Navy is one of those that was destroyed in the attack. Present impression is that the whole building was hit by a heavy high-explosive and numerous incendiary and phosphorus bombs. The fighting of the fire was made difficult by the burning of the wooden administration barracks in the large central courtyard. The main part of the building burnt out.

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Immediately after the outbreak of the fires telephone lines snapped. Already at 2330 it was no longer possible to reach that part of the building which contained the offices of Naval Staff, Operations Division. Therefore emergency offices provided in Tannenbergallee were then occupied by the personnel on watch, after attempts had been made in vain beforehand to carry on from the neighboring Shell building. The plotting-room officer on watch, Lt.Cdr. Schmitt, and an orderly were seriously wounded. After midnight Chief, Naval Operations Division established contact in the office of Commanding Admiral, Submarines at Steinplatz with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Chief, Naval Staff.

Reports about the remaining offices and departments affected by the destruction of the building are in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Ten fighter-bombers, 132 fighters and 12 reconnaissance planes of the 2nd Air Force were out on operations. For evaluation of reconnaissance see Enemy Situation, Western and Central Mediterranean. During the day the enemy attacked the town and harbor of Civitavecchia, as well as the airfields of Folgino, southwest of Ancona, and Ciampino, south of Rome. Altogether five of the attacking planes were shot down.

In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast 12 of our bombers and 7 reconnaissance planes were out on operations. Fifteen enemy planes carried out reconnaissance over the Aegean Sea. In the evening 4 enemy planes were observed in the area of Ploesti.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports 42 planes out on operations. At noon the enemy attacked one of our convoys in Nord Fjord. The steamer ARKTURUS was sunk, the steamer SOL was slightly damaged and was able to proceed further. Further planes were reported in the area of Arendal - Egersund - Gossen - Stavanger.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Western and Central Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation Western and Central Mediterranean.

In the course of an enemy air attack on Gaeta and Civitavecchia on 21 Nov. the harbor of Civitavecchia was heavily damaged. No shipping losses were caused.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean received the following instructions on 20 Nov.:

"1. Investigate whether it would be wise to send out another submarine between Sicily and Naples. The Air Force is in a position to attack successfully convoys along the African coast; however the area between Sicily and Naples is unfavorable for this. Therefore the use of a further boat seems to be justified.

2. Until completion of mopping-up on Samos, submarine U "565" will remain in the present operational area. The boat will remain stationed in the eastern Mediterranean."

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

On 19 Nov. three HZ boats (Dutch Zuider Zee boats. Tr.N.) carried out a reconnaissance thrust against Uljam to seek out a suitable landing place, and had several engagements in the course of this search. The transfer of the hospital ship GRADISCA from Trieste to the Aegean Sea was scheduled for 21 Nov. An Italian PT boat is overdue in Zara. It is assumed that it made for the coast of Italy which is in enemy hands.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 0100 torpedo boats TA "15" and "14" put into Piraeus with parachutists and equipment aboard. An enemy submarine located by them near Nikaria was attacked with depth-charges.

At 0415 PT boats S "54" and "55" left Porto Lago to take a truce officer again to Tigani. In case Samos surrenders, negotiations are scheduled for 0600. Torpedo boats TA "15" and "19" will leave Piraeus for Porto Lago at 0600.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea transmitted brief reports dated 11 and 12 Nov. of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla on operation "Taifun", with

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his comments. Copy as per l/Sk1 40109/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Military Attaché, Tokio reported on 15 Nov.:

"1. In spite of the great successes achieved on Bougainville by the Japanese Naval/Air Force, the Japanese General Staff still considers the situation in the South Seas serious. For continuance of his attacks the enemy will take advantage of the fact that the proportion of the two air forces has again moved to the disadvantage of the Japanese, as a result of their losses in planes. Bougainville, which is at present occupied by 14 battalions and which is supplied for six months, is not immediately endangered although the enemy in that area has been reinforced. After the development of the situation in Lae Bay and Finchhafen, however, an enemy landing on the west point of New Britain is likely in December. Therefore a new Japanese division is just arriving there. At the same time an enemy operation from Port Darwin against Timor etc. is now conceivable. Japanese must send reinforcements there also. The Japanese General Staff is determined to hold the South Seas area, replacing continuous heavy losses there.

2. The British preparations for the attack against Burma are apparently not yet complete. The General Staff expects enemy attempts at landing to take place on the west coast of Burma at the end of December, this area being difficult for the Japanese to supply by land. Landings are likewise expected on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, both adequately occupied by six Japanese battalions and air forces. Japanese reinforcements must also be sent to North Malaya and Sumatra."

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Special Items:

I. A discussion between Naval Staff, Operations Division and Chief of Staff, Naval Staff at the headquarters of Commanding Admiral, Submarines at Steinplatz revealed that the Operations Division has no facilities for operational control, as communications at Steinplatz are already barely sufficient for the requirements of Commanding Admiral, Submarines. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff therefore instructed Chief of Staff, Group North/Fleet in a teletype conversation at 0230 (telephone connection was out of order) temporarily to take over control of the affairs of the Operations Division until further notice. The Group was ordered to inform Group Commands and High Commands accordingly and to transmit a summary of the most important current events to Berlin, Steinplatz, twice daily by teletype. Group North has direct communication with Group West, but not with Group South. Group North will, therefore, try to establish teletype as well as radio communication with Group South. An Admiralty Staff officer of Naval Staff will arrive at Kiel on 23 Nov. in order to assist in compiling reports on the Armed Forces High Command situation.

At 0325 Group North informed Groups West, South, Naval Commands, Baltic, North and Norway and German Naval Command, Italy as follows:

"Due to the destruction of the offices of the High Command, Navy by air attack, the temporary command of Naval Staff will be taken over by Group North. All reports usually directed to Naval Staff are to be sent to Group North in the briefest possible form and restricted to the most essential facts. The receipt of this order and establishment of communications are to be confirmed by teletype or radio. The command post of Commanding Admiral, Submarines will remain at his headquarters in Berlin."

Further, Group North was ordered to take over the task of informing Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on the situation as regards naval warfare. For this purpose, a daily situation report is to be transmitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, if possible by 1000, and preliminary reports on important event are to be continuously transmitted if necessary by telephone.

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The Fuehrer Headquarters were informed by telephone.

In the course of the morning Chief, Naval Staff ordered the immediate occupation of emergency office "Bismarck". The first sections of Naval Staff, Operations Division were moved by truck already at noon. In addition, the emergency office in Fannenbergallee has been completely taken over by Naval Staff, Operations Division, the moving to "Bismarck" being directed from there. A room at the headquarters of Commanding Admiral, Submarines at Steinplatz has also been occupied, all news concerning naval warfare being received here.

By order of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief, Naval Communications Division transmitted the following instructions to Groups North, West and South, and to German Naval Command, Italy:

1. The main telephone connection of High Command, Navy is completely out of order and an emergency service is being established. The teletype center of High Command, Navy is in operation.
2. Immediate restriction of teletypes for lines to and via Berlin. Only emergency (SSD) and top priority (KR) teletypes will be transmitted.
3. Teletypes for the following will be accepted by Naval Staff, Submarine Division: Naval Staff; Operations Division; Quartermaster Division; Chief, General Branch and Radio and Visual Signals Branch, Naval Communications Division.
4. Chief, Radio Monitoring Reports, Naval Communications Division will report from his new office as soon as the proper operational set-up has been completed.
5. Teletypes for offices of High Command, Navy not mentioned above or not directly within reach by teletype connection of High Command, Navy will not be accepted for the time being."

Naval Staff, Operations Division explained par.3. to the recipients as follows:

"As ordered, operational control will be taken over by Group North as "Group North/Naval Staff" until further notice.

Therefore, all information regarding operations must be directed to Group North and only the most important information, directed to Commander in Chief, Navy, at the same time to Naval Staff, Operations Division (by way of Naval Staff, Submarine Division.)".

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An examination of the rooms of the Operational Division in the building of High Command, Navy, which it was possible to enter again in the meantime, has revealed that a number of rooms were spared by the fire. Thus the most important operational records could be salvaged from the safe in the office of the Fleet Operations Section though it was otherwise burnt out completely. In addition, all records of the Deputy to Chief, Operations Branch, the whole War Diary as well as the records kept in the rooms of Operations Branch, North, Operations Branch, West, Submarine Operations Section, Foreign Affairs Section, Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section, and International Law and Prizes Section remained intact. Salvage and transport of the records and furniture to "Bismarck" is being effected. This will be carried out by 30 Nov.

II. At 0918 Group North/Fleet transmitted the following situation report:

"Naval Staff put out of action by air attack during the night of 22 Nov. 1943.

At 0245 on 23 Nov. Group North/Fleet took over the operational duties of Naval Staff.

a. Group North/Fleet: According to radio intelligence a PQ convoy can be suspected. Four submarines have been sent out to occupy a patrol line from AC 1968 lower center to 4365 center. Three further submarines will leave Narvik or Hammerfest on 22 and 23 Nov. to reinforce the operational group. Task Force on three hours alarm. Planned to send it out if the situation warrants it. Air reconaissance started.

b. Naval Command, Norway:

1. British one-man submarines captured by guard boat off Knarrevik; they tried to penetrate into the harbor of Bergen, and were towed into Bergen undamaged.

2. At 1105 on 22 Nov. a northbound convoy consisting of three steamers was bombed by eight Blenheims off Stadlandet. The steamer ARTURUS was set on fire and sunk. The steamer GOL was hit but continues passage.

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c. Naval Command, Baltic:

1. Skagerrak is patrolled by three patrol boats.
2. At 0800 on 22 Nov. the steamer FUHRPOFT reported that the Danish steamer JAFOS (480 BRT) struck a mine in AO 7611 (southern outlet of the Sound).
3. On 17 Nov. occupation forces of Little Tyters withdrawn.
4. On 22 Nov. at 1730 dredger off Gdynia rammed by submarine U "961". Submarine damaged.
5. Submarines U "59" and U "339" hit a wreck and were towed away by tugs. Damage to boats not yet established.
6. Torpedo boats, T "2" and T "12" on way out to Kristiansand South rammed near black buoy 14. Both boats damaged. Returning to Kiel.
7. Evening of 22 Nov. fire in the hangar of the Orlogs dockyard in Copenhagen. Planes and parts destroyed by fire. Sabotage.
8. Convoys and minesweeping according to plan.

d. Naval Command, North:

1. Eleven mines swept off the Hook.
2. Convoys and minesweeping according to plan.

e. Group West:

1. Three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are being transferred from La Pallice to Brest.
2. Up to now operations by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and tanker RECUM according to plan.

f. Group South:

1. At 1100 on 22 Nov. the steamer SANTA FE with 12 assault guns left Odessa for Sevastopol; escorted by 2 destroyers, 3 motor minesweepers.

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2. Situation on Samos: 22 Nov. at 1130 landing flotilla left Leros for Samos. South group Tigani, North group Vati. 1501 two PT boats put into Tigani with General Huller. Signs of disbanding on land. No resistance. Still about 6,000 Italians on the island. PT boats and motor minesweepers took over patrol of the Strait of Samos and north coast of Samos. During the night two torpedo boats between Leros and Gaidaronisi.

g. Report of German Naval Command, Italy not yet received."

Following a short conference on the situation with Chief, Naval Staff, Group North/Fleet received the following instructions:

"Commander in Chief, Navy reserves the right to decide on the intended operation by Hintze" (Captain of the SCHAFFHOFFST. Tr.N.).

Teletype 1/Skl 3516/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

III. At 2219 Group North transmitted the evening situation report as follows:

"a. Group North/Fleet:

1. Air reconnaissance against suspected PQ convoy without result. Four submarines at assigned position, three proceeding into the operational area.

2. The Minelayers BRUMMER and ELSASS proceeding to Kristiansand South for minelaying operation in the Great Fisher Bank for reinforcement of the West Wall. Two torpedo boats and two destroyers carrying out exploratory sweep for minelaying operation.

b. Naval Command, Norway:

1. Afternoon of 21 Nov. and morning of 22 Nov., in connection with Petsamo convoy, exchange of fire between coastal batteries without result.

2. 23 Nov. escort duties according to plan.

c. Naval Command, Baltic:

Patrol of the Skagerrak by four patrol boats from AO 4185 to 4152.

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d. Naval Command, North:

The tanker WEISSENBURG was attacked in square 8265 lower left by 20 planes. Damaged by aerial torpedo hit. Towed into Helder. Five planes shot down.

e. Group West:

1. Six vessels of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, five boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and the steamer RECUM on special operation; there was no engagement with the enemy. Destroyers Z "37", Z "32", ZH "1" anchored on Concarneau roads at 1100. Destroyers Z "24", Z "25", Z "27" returned to the Gironde. Torpedo boats T "23", T "27", T "22" entered Cherbourg at 0800. Torpedo boats T "26" and T "24" put into Brest at 0830. The steamer RECUM (5,500 BRT) entered Brest at 0850.

2. Lighthouse at Cape Gris Nez was damaged by machine-gun attack.

3. The Swiss steamer AMBULA coming from Lisbon entered Marseilles.

4. Planned for night of 23 Nov.: transfer of torpedo boats T "23", T "27", T "22" from Cherbourg to Le Havre and of the KONDOR, MOEVE and FALKE from Brest to Le Havre.

5. Submarines escorted: one in and one out of Brest; one out of St. Nazaire; one into La Pallice.

f. Group South:

1. Black Sea: the steamer SANTA FE with twelve assault guns aboard was hit forward by torpedo from a submarine in CL 5246 and sank.

2. Aegean Sea: auxiliary sailing vessel PANAGIA CHIOS sunk 17 miles off Skopelos probably by enemy submarine. Crew rescued. Samos surrendered at 1000 on 22 Nov. Negotiations with the senior officer at present on Samos, Lt. Col. Ungaro, completed at 1000. Impression of rather extensive military disbanding. Only half of batteries manned, but blown up when the island surrendered with the exception of two guns. According to statements of escaping soldiers

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about 2,000 refugees ferried over to Turkey on 21 Nov. and during night of 21 Nov. About 1,500 partisans on the western shore of the island. Italian divisional commander escaped. About 700 British presumably withdrew to Leros on 14 Nov. Remainder escaped to Turkey during the last few days. About 6,000 Italians still on the island.

3. Adriatic Sea: Sailing restrictions: ships over 1,000 tons only as far as Zara, trans-shipment from there into coastal motor sailing vessels; ships under 1,000 tons as far as Sibenik, there trans-shipment to coastal motor sailing vessels for further transport."

IV. Reports of the Air Force General Staff:

The 3rd Air Force sent out 17 bombers, 75 fighters and 45 reconnaissance planes on operations. A convoy consisting of 40 merchantmen was detected at 03° E. 27°11' (obviously meant to read 37°11' N. Tr.N.) on course 80°, in the Mediterranean at 0910. At 1715 a convoy was detected leaving Algiers, eastward-bound.

In the area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France single enemy planes flew over the coast without carrying out attacks. At noon two bomber formations with fighter cover attacked airfields in the area of Lille. In addition, the building site and railroad southeast of St. Omer and the building site at Audingham were attacked. Here eleven barracks were destroyed. Altogether three of the attacking planes were shot down. Single planes approached the coast of western France without carrying out attacks.

From 1810 weak enemy forces penetrated into the Duesseldorf and Fifel areas and carried out minor attacks. A strong formation once more attacked Berlin from a height of 6,000 m in bad visibility from 1926 to 2120. The attack covered about the same parts of the city as on the previous day with a certain extension to the north, so that the industrial installations situated in the north of the city were more seriously affected. For details see Daily Situation. Although 193 fighters were sent out for defense, according to reports so far available only seven enemy planes were shot down. Anti-aircraft guns had permission to fire only up to 5,000 m, so were ineffective.

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According to information from Air Force, Operations Staff, the fact that the enemy carried out the heavy attack on 22 Nov. with such precision, without ground visibility, has made a strong impression. It is clear that he owes the finding of the target to the excellent navigation of his pathfinders who are equipped with all technical devices. Apparently the concealment of various conspicuous Berlin lakes against detection by the Rotterdam gear is not yet sufficient. At any rate it is certain that in spite of weather conditions which formerly excluded any attack, the enemy was able to carry out a heavy, accurate attack.

Surprisingly, the map firing of the anti-aircraft guns on 26 Nov. resulted in the bringing-down of 26 planes. The success of the night fighters on the evening of 23 Nov. is disappointing, being seven planes shot down for certain and four possibly shot down.

V. German Naval Command, Italy reports that Monte Catini west of Firenze is proposed as its new location.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Chief, Naval Staff proceeded to the Fuehrer Headquarters.

I. A. Situation reports of Group North:

Morning situation:

1. No further signs of the suspected PQ convoy.
2. Two destroyers and two torpedo boats on exploratory sweep for minelaying operation.

B. Naval Command, Baltic:

The NUERNBERG put into Oslo on the afternoon of 23 Nov.

C. Naval Command, North:

1. Mine check and patrol activity hindered by stormy weather.
2. The tanker WEISSENBURG ran aground in the area of Engelmangatt and was abandoned after crew had been taken over.

D. Group West:

1. Destroyers Z "24", Z "23", Z "27" entered Royan or Le Verdon roads at 1815.
2. Torpedo boats T "23", T "24" and T "22" put into Le Havre.
3. The KONDOR, FALKE and MOEVE put into Brest at 1600. Report of arrival at Le Havre not yet received.
4. In the afternoon enemy air attacks on batteries "Todt", "Grosser Kurfuerst" and "Gris Nez". Slight damage. One enemy plane probably shot down.

E. Naval Command, Norway, Group South and German Naval Command, Italy:

No new reports. Delayed by line faults.

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Evening Situation:

1. Baltic: Nothing to report.
2. Norway: 1517 on 24 Nov. German steamer (887 BRT) struck a mine in the Bred Sound (near Aale Sound) and sank.
3. - 4. North Sea, Channel: Nothing to report. Stormy weather.
5. Atlantic/south coast: On 24 Nov. towards 1315 large-scale air attack on Toulon. Hits in the dockyard and harbor. No details yet.
6. Mediterranean: No reports due to line faults.
7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea: According to statements of prisoners on Lussin, establishment of an air and naval base is planned. Army considers permanent occupation for Cherso and Lussin necessary. Due to the lack of Army forces a naval artillery battalion is requested. Captured so far on Samos: 50 guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns (2 cm) 10 heavy anti-aircraft machine-guns, 1700 Italian prisoners, including 15 officers.
8. Black Sea: No new reports.
9. Additional report on the Situation in the Mediterranean: at 1800 on 23 Nov. second wave with further heavy weapons landed on Samos. In the course of coastal patrol, motor minesweepers R "211" and R "195" destroyed 14 floats and craft with escaping enemy soldiers. Mopping-up of the island continues today. Up to 1300 on 24 Nov. 800 further Italians disarmed. One battalion of Blackshirts of 500 men remains under arms.

As regards 7. Chief of Staff, Group North/Fleet was informed by Quartermaster General, Naval Staff that a naval artillery battalion will not be provided.

Night Situation:

1. Baltic Sea: Situation in Kronstadt Bay unchanged. At 1135 on 24 Nov. five minesweepers northwest of Seiskaari on westerly course. Submarine-net and barrage patrol according to plan. No motor minesweepers out due to unfavorable weather conditions. Anti-aircraft

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defense in the Irben Strait by heavy guncarriers. Two steamers escorted from Gdynia to Riga, one from Reval to Libau. Near Bogskaer one steamer in distress. Ice-breaker CASTOR put out to render assistance. Patrol of the Skagerrak against blockade-runners by 4 patrol boats, 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats; 3 mine-sweepers in readiness in Kristiansand South.

Twenty-three vessels on minesweeping in the Baltic Sea entrances. Two minelayers and two submarines escorted. Convoy anchored near Seelandsrev due to weather conditions.

2. Norway: at 1631 on 23 Nov. during passage of Petsamo convoy, exchange of fire in the area of Petsamo. No damage. At 1517 on 24 Nov. one steamer (887 BRT) struck a mine and sank in the Bred Sound (near Aale Sound). Escorted: Arctic coast, 10 ships north, 14 south, 9 remained lying in harbor; North coast, 11 north, 16 south; West coast, 6 north, 4 south.

3. North Sea: Possibilities of salvaging the grounded tanker WEISSENBURG are being investigated. Due to continuous stormy weather no escort and minesweeping activity. Patrol positions not taken up. 3,000 BRT escorted in the Ijssel Meer, 2,118 BRT in Zeeland Waters.

4. Channel Coast: At 0315 on 23 Nov. attacks with bombs and machine-guns on two patrol boats southwest of Berk-sur-Mer; on patrol boats and buoy-layers in Lezardrieux at 1038 on 24 Nov. One plane shot down for certain, a second one probably. Slight casualties.

5. Atlantic- south coast: Serious damage in dockyard and harbor through air attack on Toulon at noon on 24 Nov. (Details of damage will be reported later).

6. Mediterranean: No reports due to line faults.

7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea: According to a report from Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic, withdrawal of Army troops from Krk making control of shipping difficult.

24 Nov. enemy attacks with machine-guns in the area of Durazzo. Slight casualties. Own convoy traffic: nothing to report. Captured up to now on Samos: 50 guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns (2 cm), 10 heavy anti-aircraft machine-guns, 1700 Italian prisoners, including 15 officers.

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In the course of coastal patrol 72 Italians brought in by two motor minesweepers in the Strait of Samos. Shipping in the area of Crete suspended owing to danger of submarines.

8. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea: No new reports received.

Additional report from the Aegean Sea: At 1800 on 23 Nov. second wave with further heavy weapons landed on Samos. Mopping-up of the island in progress. By 1300 on 24 Nov. 800 further Italians disarmed. 500 Blackshirts remain under arms. Evening of 24 Nov. two torpedo boats with 100 parachutists put into Piraeus from Portolago.

II. Naval Communications Officer, Berlin received the following instructions from Naval Staff, Operations Division:

"The following reports, otherwise directed to Naval Staff, Operations Division, are to be sent directly to Group North:

1. Situation reports of the Groups, Naval Commands and Naval Command, Italy; Armed Forces High Command, High Command, Army, Commander in Chief, Air Force.

2. Reports from offices of the Navy on the most important events of the war.

All other teletypes directed to High Command, Navy which are not called for in person by Berlin offices etc. are to be sent to Steinplatz (Commanding Admiral, Submarines), Room 17, (on no account to be transmitted by teletype)."

III. Submarine Warfare.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division intends to have Group "Weddigen" operate against the next northbound convoy from patrol line from about CF 8350 to 6850. The patrol line is to be taken up in the night of 26 Nov.

Submarine U "542" was chased by destroyers in CF 2417 at 0300.

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Regarding the enemy air attack on Toulon, Naval Staff, Submarine Division reports submarine base "Mourillion" completely out of action. "Missyessi" can be used to a limited extent. The dockyard was heavily damaged. The power supply is completely interrupted. Casualties of submarine personnel are slight. One submarine was heavily damaged and three others less heavily damaged.

According to a report from the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, two motor minesweepers were heavily damaged and one slightly damaged. The crews were not injured.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Chief, Naval Staff returned from the Fuehrer Headquarters. Notes on the Conference as per l/Skl I b (space left. Tr.N.) Gkdos. Chfcs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

Telephone connection with emergency office "Bismarck" was established for the first time.

I. Situation Reports of Group North/Fleet:

Daily Situation:

1. Baltic Sea:

High Command, Army ordered reinforcement of the coastal front west of the Cranienbaum area as well as on Narva Bay. Available forces of Admiral, Baltic States were put into the front line. If weather conditions are not too unfavorable, available naval forces of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic will be able to repulse enemy landings south of our mine barrages in Narva Bay, as large enemy formations are probably not to be expected in this area. Sufficient fighter protection is a necessary condition. Without that, stocks of ammunition for combat against naval targets will be quickly exhausted in case of air attacks, in addition to the boats being put out of action. The steamer reported in distress in the area of Bogskær in the morning situation report sank. Fate of the crew unknown. Air-sea rescue plane only detected wreckage.

2. Norway:

Nothing to report. Our air reconnaissance in the central North Sea, area of the Faeroes, east of Iceland and in Northern Waters on 24 Nov. was without tactical result.

3. North Sea:

Due to continuous stormy weather, no escort and minesweeping activity apart from one tanker convoy Elbe/Weser. Patrol positions were not taken up except position west of Sylt. No escort and mine-

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sweeping activity planned for night of 25 Nov. owing to the weather.

4. Channel Coast:

Morning of 25 Nov. several bombing attacks on batteries in the area of Calais/Gris Nez. No damage to batteries or casualties. Two planes shot down. During bombing attack on Cherbourg at 1627 three planes shot down. No important military damage.

5. Atlantic/South Coast of France:

Nothing to report.

6. Mediterranean:

23 and 24 Nov. increased traffic, mostly westbound, in the Straits of Gibraltar. Afternoon of 23 Nov. 13 freighters and - for the first time - 12 LST's as deck cargo from the Mediterranean entered the Straits of Gibraltar bound for the Atlantic. One LST and 12 freighters joined the convoy from Gibraltar. Morning of 24 Nov. 13 freighters left Gibraltar, westbound. Slight shipping off the north coast of Africa. No further reports due to line faults.

7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea:

According to report of the Naval Liaison Officer with Tank Army Command, mopping-up on the islands will be carried out in the following new sequence: Ugljan, Murter, Pasmán, Kurnat, Dugi-Otok, Zut, Solta, Korčula, Brač, Hvar, Mljet, Lagosta, Lissa. Focal point of enemy resistance with strong air support expected near Korčula. According to report of Task Force "Mueller", heavy detonations on Nisyros at 1510 on 23 Nov. Since then telephone communication Kos - Calino interrupted.

8. Black Sea:

During night of 24 Nov. none of the patrol lines in the Strait of Kerch had any engagement with the enemy. No supply traffic. Naval landing craft off Kamysh Burun unsuccessfully shelled by shore battery. Morning of 25 Nov. air attack on own convoy in CL 2670. No damage.

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During the night of 24 Nov. only scout and assault troop activity on both sides on the land fronts in the Crimea.

Night Situation:

1. Baltic Sea:

In Kronstadt Bay situation unchanged. Submarine-net and barrage patrol according to plan. Due to bad weather naval landing craft and armed trawlers not in position. The 1st Motor Minesweeping Flotilla not out on operation. Anti-aircraft defense and relay escort between Backofen and Kolkas by heavy gun carriers. At 1530 on 25 Nov. net tender, rammed by transport on the coal pier at Reval, sank. The steamer reported yesterday in distress near Bogskær sank. Fate of the crew unknown. A Swedish destroyer and a Swedish salvage steamer left to render assistance. Escorted: one tanker from Gdynia to Reval via Riga; one hospital ship from Neufahrwasser to Turku; one troop transport from Neufahrwasser to Turku.

Twenty vessels on minesweeping in the Baltic Sea and twenty-two in the Baltic Sea entrances. Patrol of the Skagerrak as usual. Convoys: fast convoy Frederikshavn/Frederiksstadt and Frederiksstadt/Frederikshavn. Due to the weather two minelayers entered Frederikshavn and two submarines Frederikshavn roads.

2. Norway:

Escorted: Arctic Coast: 11 ships north, 8 south, 9 remained lying in harbor; North Coast: 13 north, 15 south; West Coast: 5 north, 7 south. Otherwise nothing to report.

3. North Sea:

25 Nov. one tanker escorted from the Elbe to the Weser. Otherwise no escort and minesweeping activity due to stormy weather. During night of 25 Nov. also patrol positions not taken up.

4. Channel Coast:

Morning of 25 Nov. several bombing attacks on batteries in the area of Calais/Gris Nez. No damage to batteries or casualties.

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Two planes shot down. During bombing attack on Cherbourg at 1627 three planes shot down; no serious military damage.

5. Atlantic/South Coast of France:

Afternoon of 24 Nov. an auxiliary minesweeper near Cape Lardier sprang a leak and sank due to engine trouble in the course of an attempt at towing it off.

6. Mediterranean:

23 and 24 Nov. increased traffic, mostly westbound, in the Straits of Gibraltar. Afternoon of 23 Nov. 13 freighters and - for the first time - 12 LST's with 8 LCT's as deck cargo entered the Straits of Gibraltar from the Mediterranean, bound for the Atlantic. One LST and 12 freighters joined the convoy from Gibraltar. Morning of 24 Nov. 13 freighters left Gibraltar, course west. Slight shipping off north coast of Africa. Otherwise nothing to report.

7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea:

Three of our PT boats in Dubrovnik did not put out on 24 and 25 Nov. on account of the weather. Island operation continuing according to plan. Uljan occupied. Bridgehead established on Pasman. Mopping-up of Rivan and Sestrunj in progress.

One steamer proceeding from Pola to Zara. One steamer ran aground south of the Strait of Pasman and sank. No details. No new reports from the Aegean Sea area.

8. Black Sea:

On 24 Nov. there were eleven naval landing craft in the Strait of Kerch, off Kerch Bay, Kamysh Burun and Eltigen. None of the patrol lines had any engagement with the enemy. No supply traffic. Naval landing craft off Kamysh Burun unsuccessfully shelled by shore batteries.

Morning of 25 Nov. air attack on own convoy in CL 2670. No damage. Up to now search for moored mines at the point where the SANTA FE blew up south of Cape Eupatoria without result. Work broken off on account of the weather. Route closed for steamers over 2 m. draught.

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Planned for night of 25 Nov.: 4 naval landing craft off Kerch Bay, 2 naval landing craft off Kamysh Burun, 3 motor minesweepers and 2 PT boats in the southern Strait of Kerch. All quiet on the two beachheads of the Crimea on 25 Nov.

II. The Naval Attaché in Tokio received telegraphic instructions from Naval Staff, Operations Division regarding planned refuellings. Copy of order 1/Skl I g 2501/43 geh. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

III. Submarine Warfare.

Submarine U "625" sighted a heavy British cruiser in AL 3960 proceeding at high speed on southeasterly course. Two boats of Group "Weddigen" were attacked in CF 5136 and 5227 at 0150 and 0517 by enemy planes. On 26 Nov. our air reconnaissance planes will be sent out for the first time against the MSK convoy.

At the end of November an operation is planned in area AL 10 to AL 40 in conjunction with our air reconnaissance. The submarines at present in AE and south thereof as well as four boats coming from France will make for this area. Complete radio silence was ordered between 51° and 56° N, with the exception of reports of tactical importance.

IV. Aerial Warfare.

During the day single enemy planes carried out attacks in the area of Flensburg - Hamburg - Bremen. In the evening ten nuisance planes were operating over northern Germany as far as the area of Berlin - Magdeburg. From 0115 - 0415 on 26 Nov. a heavy enemy air attack was directed against Frankfurt. According to reports so far available, 10 - 15 of the attacking planes were shot down by 263 of our fighters. Considerable damage was reported in Frankfurt.

Thirty of our planes were out on operations against London and Dover.

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V. In the Mediterranean: submarine U "453" left Pola for minelaying operation.

Group South advises Naval Staff for information of the view taken with regard to the statements of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea on the occupation of the islands in the southern Adriatic Sea. The Group supports the request for manning of the batteries on the islands but not the request for two naval artillery battalions to be permanently stationed on the islands. The necessity of extending the existing network for observation and report posts is acknowledged. However, occupation of the islands with military personnel and defensive installations and observation posts there are actually affairs for the Army. Even compared with the small number of Army forces in the Dalmatian area, the Navy's personnel situation is much more serious and it is necessary that this personnel be concentrated on purely naval tasks.

These views agree with those held by Naval Staff.
Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division was informed.

According to a report from Air Force, Operations Staff, the Rumanians have reinforced the anti-aircraft defense of Odessa by two heavy and two light anti-aircraft batteries. The 4th Air Force is trying to transfer another Rumanian anti-aircraft battalion to Odessa.

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Items of Political Importance.

At present nothing special to report.

Chief, Naval Staff will be in France until 29 Nov. inspecting the submarine flotillas in St. Nazaire and Lorient.

Special Items:

Chief, Naval Communications Division will have established the essential communication connections at Headquarters "Bismarck" by 27 Nov.

The transfer of personnel of Naval Staff, Operations Division to "Bismarck" is substantially completed. Emergency office "Tannenberg" will be discontinued in the evening.

Situation 26 Nov.

I. Situation Reports of Group North:

a. Daily Report:

1. Baltic Sea:

Fins report dropping of mines by plane southeast and south of Borga, south of Lovisa and in the southern entrance to Ejoerkoe Sound on 24, 25 and 26 Nov. Two of the crew of the steamer CASABLANCA which sank off Bogaskaer were rescued by a Swedish destroyer.

2. Norway:

In the morning of 25 Nov. bombs were dropped in the area of Kirkenes. No damage. One of our convoys in the Maasoey Sound (west of Mageroey) was unsuccessfully attacked with aerial torpedoes at 0951 on 26 Nov. After collision with the steamer SAMEV, the destroyer STEINBRINK put into Trondheim on 26 Nov. at 1430. Steamer SAMEV was beached near Fosoe. Salvaging under way. In the evening of 25 Nov. submarine was rammed by packet-steamer while leaving Bergen. Boat had to be docked.

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3. North Sea:

In the morning of 26 Nov. enemy formations flew into the Heligoland Bight. Attack concentrated on the center of Bremen. Reports on damage and planes shot down not yet available. Several bombs dropped in the area of the Frisian Islands, without appreciable damage. Two planes were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the area of Wilhelmshaven. Due to continuous stormy weather, no escort, minesweeping and patrol activity.

4. Channel Coast:

In the morning of 26 Nov. repeated bombing attacks on batteries at Gris Nez and Audighen (near Calais). No damage. At noon air attack on Cherbourg. Slight damage. Night of 26 Nov. laying of mine-barrage by six torpedo boats, and minelaying by nine FT boats planned.

5. Atlantic/South Coast of France:

Nothing to report.

6. Mediterranean:

At 0750 on 26 Nov. 15 ships and 8 escort vessels north of Algiers on easterly course. In the evening of 25 Nov. 18 transports, 4 destroyers north of Carbon (near Bougie) on easterly course.

7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea:

Further parts of Task Force "Mueller" transferred from Leros to Samos. Capture of weapons and equipment as well as mopping-up of the island is being continued. So far no partisans observed.

8. Black Sea:

At 1336 on 25 Nov. own convoy Constanta - Sevstopol again attacked from the air. No damage. At 1720 steamer sank in CL 2687 after being torpedoed by a submarine. Six naval landing craft, four motor minesweepers and three FT boats in the Strait of Kerch since dark. During the night of 25 Nov. naval landing craft sank one landing boat in the Strait of Kerch and three off Kamysh Burun. Four other boats were driven off. No supplies came through to the

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beachhead of Eltigen. Morning of 26 Nov. nothing to report on the land situation on the Crimea.

b. Night Situation:

1. Baltic Sea:

Finns report dropping of mines by plane southeast and south of Borga, south of Lovisa and in the southern entrance to Bjoerkoe Sound. Submarine-net and barrage patrol, nothing to report. Due to weather, naval landing craft and armed trawlers not in position. No motor minesweepers out on operation. All observation posts of Coastal Defense Flotilla, Baltic States manned. Anti-aircraft defense and relay escort Backofen - Kolkas by heavy gun-carriers. Two of the crew of the steamer CASABLANCA which sank near Bogaskaer rescued by a Swedish destroyer. Patrol of the Skagerrak as usual. On minesweeping duty in the Baltic Sea, 25 vessels, in the Baltic Sea entrances, 24 vessels and 3 minesweeping planes. Convoys: 3 submarines, 1 mine transport, 1 tanker, 1 transport, 2 torpedo boats, unit Oslo- Aarhus, Aarhus - Oslo, Frederikshavn - Frederiksstadt, Frederiksstadt - Frederikshavn.

2. Norway:

In the morning of 25 Nov. bombs were dropped in the area of Kirkenes. No damage. At 0951 on 26 Nov. own convoy in Maasoe Sound (west of Mageroey) unsuccessfully attacked with aerial torpedoes. After collision with the steamer SAMEV, destroyer STEINBRINK put into Trondheim at 1430 on 26 Nov. SAMEV beached near Rosoe. Salvaging under way. Submarine rammed by packet-steamer while leaving Bergen. Boat had to dock.

Escorted: Arctic coast: 12 ships north, 8 south, 12 remained lying in harbor; North coast: 18 north, 15 south; West coast: 7 north, 10 south.

3. North Sea:

In the morning of 26 Nov. strong enemy formations flew into the Heligoland Bight. Attack concentrated on Bremen. Report on damage not yet received. Single bombs dropped in the area of the Frisian islands, without appreciable damage. Several minelaying planes

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approached in the evening. Mines suspected to have been dropped on convoy routes in the area of Borkum - Terschelling. According to reports so far, four planes shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the morning and evening. Due to continuous southwesterly storm no minesweeping on the Dutch coast. Only one patrol position taken up. 58,909 BRT escorted in Zeeland waters.

4. Channel Coast:

Morning of 26 Nov. repeated bombing attacks on batteries at Gris Nez and Audighen (near Calais). No damage. During air attack on Cherbourg at noon slight damage. Night of 26 Nov. six torpedo boats laid two flanking barrages as planned. Nine PT boats left Cherbourg at 1800 for minelaying operations and put in again at 2300.

5. Atlantic/South Coast of France:

At 1347 on 26 Nov. 35 merchantmen, 5 escorts were 240 miles west of Cape Vincent on course 270°.

6. Mediterranean:

On 24 Nov. and in the night of 24 Nov. no large-scale actions on the entire Italian front. Afternoon of 24 Nov. the west wing was shelled from the sea by five vessels, probably destroyers, which withdrew under cover of a smoke screen when our guns went into action. On 24 Nov. owing to stormy weather coastal traffic was almost paralyzed. One naval landing craft ran aground near Sestri Levante. No reconnaissance in area of Sardinia, Corsica and the entire Mediterranean owing to the weather. In the night of 24 Nov. own air attack on harbors of Maddalena and Bastia. In Maddalena one ship (2,000 - 3,000 BRT) hit. Fires and explosions in the harbor installations of Bastia.

Enemy shipping: at 0750 on 25 Nov. 15 merchantmen and 8 escort vessels north of Algiers on easterly course. Number of ships in Gibraltar shows strong decrease of merchantmen; otherwise unchanged.

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At noon on 25 Nov. 16 large transports (about 20,000 BRT each) and five destroyers northwest of Oran on easterly course. (Air reconnaissance.) Evening of 25 Nov. 1 transport and four destroyers north of Cape Carbon (near Bougie) on easterly course.

7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea:

On 26 Nov. lively fighter patrols with low-level attacks in the area of Durazzo - Elbasan - Valona. In the morning of 25 Nov. a torpedo boat touched ground northwest of Kherso. When proceeding to Pola for docking, boat put into Lussin - Piccolo in the afternoon owing to heavy seas. On 26 Nov. further parts of Task Force "Mueller" transferred from Leros to Samos. Seizure of captured weapons and equipment, as well as mopping-up of the island continued; so far no partisans observed. On 25 Nov. a minesweeping plane swept three mines in the harbor of Candia.

8. Black Sea:

At 2150 on 25 Nov. naval landing craft off Kamysh Burun sank an enemy landing boat. At 2250 six further landing boats were driven off, two of them sunk. Enemy's intention is according to all indications a surprise attack on base of Kamysh Burun or attempt to reach the beachhead of Eltigen from the north under cover of the coast, avoiding our patrol forces. One naval landing craft suffered underwater damage and casualties. Motor minesweepers and PT boats off Eltigen.

Eight enemy vessels made a reconnaissance sweep from Taman; withdrew to the north out of range. At 0230 motor minesweepers and PT boats shelled the enemy beachhead. Morning of 26 Nov. nothing to report on the land situation on the Crimea.

II. Additional Reports:

a. Foreign Waters:

Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division transmitted an agent's report from the American Embassy "Metro" via "Felipe" dated 25 Nov.:

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"1. United States Government intends the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the continent and their replacement by British colonial troops within the next three months. The reason for this measure is the excessive demand on available means of transport for supply purposes, particularly since supplies to U.S. troops require much more shipping space than for the same number of British colonial troops. North Africa, however, will still be occupied by U.S. troops.

2. In connection with the above it is planned to transfer U.S. warships operating in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. These forces will be replaced by increasing the number of Italian and French fleet units under Allied command.

3. The successes in Italy, particularly in view of the high losses, are quite unsatisfactory; an attempt is therefore intended in December to achieve success by landing in Northern Italy.

4. The last convoys to the Mediterranean transported considerable numbers of guns to Tobruk, Benghazi and Alexandria for reserve purposes."

The reason for the intentions according to 1 and 2, are much more likely to lie in the plans of the United States in the Pacific than in the demand for shipping space.

b. Norway/Northern Waters:

Our air reconnaissance sighted three destroyers west of the Faeroes on course 120° in the morning. Otherwise reconnaissance did not achieve any tactical result.

c. Submarine Warfare.

At 1350 Air Commander, Atlantic Coast detected a convoy consisting of 25 merchantmen, 13 landing craft and 5 escorts in CG 7434 on course 270°.

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Group "Weddigen" was ordered to take up patrol line from CF 8521 to 6516 with 16 boats at 1800 on 27 Nov. Air reconnaissance is planned for the morning and afternoon of 27 Nov.

From the area of Group "Weddigen", submarine U "864" reported an attack by surface forces in CF 5690 at 2214 and an air attack in the same area at 0525 on 27 Nov.

In the Mediterranean, submarine U "593" was sent out on a short operation against enemy submarines off Toulon.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division transmitted a report on experiences of convoy operation No. 6 (Schill convoy).

Copy as per 1/Skl 40375/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

d. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. German Naval Command, Italy informs Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea that MS "75" and "76" of the 10th Italian PT Boat "Borghese" Flotilla are ready for operation at Venice. Operation is planned against enemy forces off the east coast of Italy. Codeword "Teppich". Base Senigallia.

2. According to instructions of Naval Staff regarding command organization in the Mediterranean, Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea is also responsible for mine defense in coastal waters of the western Adriatic Sea.

Group South, German Naval Command, Italy, and Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea were, therefore, instructed that mines provided for defense of coastal waters of the western Adriatic Sea are at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea. Naval Command, Italy will arrange details directly, and ensure that Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea is informed of completed or outstanding barrage projects on the east coast of Italy.

3. According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, the steamer SALOMEA was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine off Lemnos at 0954. A minesweeping plane swept three mines in the harbor of Candia on 25 Nov.

The hospital ship GRADISCA is proceeding from Trieste to Rhodes.

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e. Group South reported urgent need of mines by Commanding Admiral, Black Sea for operations in the western and eastern sector of the South Wall.

Additional defense of supplies to the Crimea and evacuation transports is, of course, desirable by reinforcement of the South Wall. However, attacks by surface forces against our convoys are scarcely to be expected in view of the slight activity of the Russian fleet; an effective defense against submarines can only be achieved by a large-scale use of mines and the necessary number of these is not available. The barrage plan must, therefore, take second place to minelaying for defense of the west area and the Gulf of Finland. If circumstances permit an adjustment is possible in the barrage projects of Group South by shipping mines provided for the Aegean and Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea.

Group South received the following instructions:

"1. For the time being allocation of mines for the South Wall in the area of the Black Sea impossible, as available stocks are to be used entirely for defense of the west area in accordance with the Fuehrer Directive No. 51 and new deliveries must be kept in reserve for closing the Gulf of Finland in spring 1944.

2. It is left to Group South to make adjustments within its area with allocations for the Aegean Sea and Adriatic Sea, which may still be expected for the time being, though with slight restrictions; views to be stated."

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Items of Political Importance.

Today also no political news has been received.

Special Items:

At 1100 on 28 Nov. Naval Staff intends to take over control at Headquarters "Bismarck".

The Groups, Naval Commands, German Naval Command, Italy, Commander, Submarines Mediterranean, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, High Command, Army General Staff, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Communications Officers, Berlin and Bernau received the following instructions:

"1. Sunday, 28 Nov. at 1100 Naval Staff will take over control at emergency Headquarters "Bismarck". The following are at "Bismarck": Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: Operations Division; Intelligence Division; Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Coastal Defense Branch, Shipping and Transport Branch, Submarine Branch; Chief, Naval Communications Division.

2. Submarine Division, Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch and Hydrographic and Meteorological Division will remain in Berlin.

3. In order to ensure reliability of communications, the sender is, from now on, to give the exact division of the receiver in the address.

4. For the time being, the restriction of teletypes as ordered remains effective.

5. Orders for technical procedure on communications will be issued by Chief, Naval Communications Division."

Chief, Naval Staff received a report to this effect through Group West.

Copies of this order will be sent to Submarine Division, Chief, Naval Communications Division, Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch, and Hydrographic and Meteorological Division.

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Situation 27 Nov.

I. Situation Reports from Group North:

a. Daily Situation:

1. Baltic Sea:

Situation in Kronstadt Bay unchanged. At 1200 on 27 Nov. patrol boats shot down a Russian plane east of Duénamuende. North of Lyserort unsuccessful enemy attack on heavy guncarrier with aerial torpedoes. Altogether seven mines swept southeast of Langeland and in Gulf of Danzig.

2. Norway:

No reports received.

3. North Sea:

In the course of enemy air attack on Bremen at noon on 26 Nov. no major damage in dockyards and industrial installations. Small vessels and barges in the harbor sank.

4. Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

5. Atlantic/South Coast of France:

At 0850 on 27 Nov. 8 ships of up to 10,000 BRT. 52 of up to 5,000 BRT and 5 escorts 240 miles west of Lisbon (CG 4478), course 350°, speed 7 knots. At 0905 3 cruisers 270 miles west-southwest of Lisbon (CF 6935), course 150°, speed 10 knots.

6. Mediterranean:

On 26 Nov. at noon air reconnaissance detected a transport convoy (no details) north of Cape Bengut, and in the afternoon northeast of Bougie. Five merchantmen northwest of the Liparian Islands, course northeast (probably bound for Naples or Salerno). According to rough evaluation of reconnaissance no changes in Maddalena. No reports from the area of Sardinia, Corsica and the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Sea. (morning of 27 Nov.)

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Due to the weather intended minelaying operation postponed.

7. Adriatic - Aegean Sea:

Mopping-up on Samos continued until evening of 26 Nov. 4,000 prisoners. One steamer and three escorts left Syra for Nios on 27 Nov. at 0500 for mopping-up of the island of Santorin.

8. Black Sea:

When leaving Bugaz, at the entrance of the Dniester Liman, for Odessa, submarine chaser of the towed convoy ran aground. So far attempts at towing-off without success. In the course of these an air attack. One vessel sunk and a further one heavily damaged. Casualties. On 26 Nov. at noon gunfire on Kamysh Burun. Slight damage.

Since 1100 on 26 Nov., patrol line in the Strait of Kerch by ten naval landing craft; one naval landing craft sank off Eltigen after a detonation; probably struck a mine.

Land situation on the Crimea: No important actions. Beachhead of Eltigen supplied from the air.

b. Night Situation:

1. Situation in Kronstadt Bay unchanged. Submarine-net and barrage patrol according to plan. One motor minesweeper flotilla engaged in minesweeping south of Kalbadagrund. Net group carried out work on the net. Anti-aircraft defense and relay escort Beckofen - Kolkas by heavy gun-carriers.

At 1200 on 27 Nov. patrol boat shot down a Russian plane east of Duenamuende. North of Lyserort unsuccessful attack on heavy gun-carrier with aerial torpedoes. One torpedo exploded 20 m from the side. One surface runner. Two steamers proceeding from Riga to Gdynia. On minesweeping duty in the Baltic Sea: 22 vessels; in the Baltic Sea entrances: 25 vessels and 3 minesweeping planes. Altogether seven mines swept southeast of Langeland and in the Gulf of Danzig. Patrol of the Skagerrak as usual. Convoys: 1 mine

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transport, 2 minelayers, 2 submarines, units Aarhus - Oslo, Frederikshavn - Frederiksstadt, Frederiksstadt - Frederikshavn, 1 tanker, 2 salvage ships, 1 refrigerator ship.

2. Norway:

At 2240 on 27 Nov. destroyers Z "31" and the RIEDEL left Kristiansand South for Stavanger. At 1400 the LODY left Aalesund for Stavanger.

Convoys: Arctic Coast: 8 ships north, 4 south. North Coast: 36 north. West coast: 5 north, 8 south.

No further reports.

3. North Sea:

In the course of the air attack on Bremen at noon on 26 Nov. no major damage in dockyards and industrial installations. Some small vessels in the harbor sank. One steamer (3,697 BRT, ballast ship) with seven escort boats and barrage escort left the Hook on 27 Nov. at 1630 for the Elbe. Escorted one steamer from Esbjerg to the Elbe, one net-tender from the Elbe to Esbjerg. Eight convoys in Zeeland Waters (92,713 BRT), two convoys Ijssel Meer (10,798 tons). On 27 Nov., much minesweeping; discontinued to some extent during the night owing to heavy swell.

4. Channel Coast:

During the night of 27 Nov. minelaying planned by six torpedo boats. Report on execution of operation not available.

5. Atlantic/South Coast of France:

At 0850 on 27 Nov. 8 merchantmen of up to 10,000 BRT, 52 ships of up to 5,000 BRT and 5 escorts 240 miles west of Lisbon (CG 4478), course 350°, speed 7 knots. At 0905 3 cruisers 270 miles west-southwest of Lisbon (CF 6935), course 150°, speed 10 knots.

6. Mediterranean:

On 26 and 27 Nov. Gibraltar, slight shipping in both directions. On 26 Nov. one LCT entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. Air reconnaissance detected a transport convoy (no further details) north of Cape Bengut at noon on 26 Nov. and northeast

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of Bougie in the afternoon. Morning of 27 Nov. 20 merchantmen, mostly medium-sized, between Malta and Benghazi, course southeast. According to rough evaluation of reconnaissance no alterations at Maddalena. No reports from the area of Sardinia, Corsica and the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Sea. During air attacks near Genoa, on Ancona, Pescara and Pimini scattered damage. Due to the weather our minelaying operation postponed. On 26 Nov. as a result of bad weather 1 transport ran aground near Stefano and 2 naval landing craft, 1 motor minesweeper and 1 harbor defense boat in the Gulf of Genoa.

7. Adriatic/Aegean Sea:

Mopping-up on Samos continued until evening of 26 Nov. 4,000 prisoners. At 0500 on 27 Nov. one steamer and three escort boats left Syra for Nios for mopping-up of the island of Santorin. Santorin surrendered at 2300 on 27 Nov. Was occupied and prisoners evacuated on 28 Nov.

8. Black Sea:

In Gelendzik: 3 freighters (1,500 BFT each), 6 coastal vessels (altogether 2,000 BFT), 1 torpedo boat. One torpedo boat and one minesweeper off the harbor, course 130°. Only a few ships in Novorossisk and Anapa. Nothing sighted in the central and southeastern part of the Black Sea. While leaving Bugaz (entrance of the Dniester Liman) for Odessa a submarine chaser of the towed convoy ran aground. Bombing attack during attempt at towing-off. One vessel sank, another was heavily damaged. Casualties. On 26 Nov. at noon gunfire and air attack on Kamysh Burun. Slight damage.

Since 1630 patrol line in the Strait of Kerch by ten naval landing craft. After a detonation one naval landing craft sank off Eltigen; probably struck a mine. On 26 Nov. and night of 26 Nov. no important actions on the land fronts in the Crimea. Beachhead of Eltigen supplied from the air.

II. Additional Reports.

a. War in Foreign Waters:

The blockade-runners OSORNO and ALSTERUFER were ordered to proceed from FS 14 by way of ES 98, EH 45, DD 36, CO 62, BD 86, BD 69, BE 24, about BE 52 to about BF 47.

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The OSORNO should reach ES 98 on 9 Dec., DD 36 on 17 Dec. and BE 24 on 23 Dec.; the ALSTERUFER should reach ES 98 on 13 Dec., DD 36 on 21 Dec. and BE 24 on 27 Dec. 1943.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division was informed to this effect and ordered to close the sea areas in question to attacks against single ships in time, i.e. six days before and seven days after the above times of passing, so that the blockade-runners have a margin of 14 days.

Further details on passage from DD 36 by way of BE 24 to BF 47 will be given later.

The ALSTERUFER received the following radio instructions:

"In order to steer the ALSTERUFER through the convoy gaps "Uschi" must be reached on 21 Dec. and "Lore" on 27 Dec. Accordingly "Album" is to be passed on about 13 Dec. Between "Akzent" and "Uschi" you may proceed at cruising speed. From "Uschi" proceed at maximum continuous speed such as maintained by fast, single enemy ships on this course."

The OSORNO received the following order:

"In order to pass the gaps in the convoys, the OSORNO must reach "Uschi" on 17 Dec. and "Lore" on 23 Dec. Accordingly, pass "Orgel" on about 9 Dec. You may proceed at cruising speed between "Orkan" and "Uschi". Proceed from "Uschi" at maximum continuous speed, such as maintained by fast, single enemy ships on this course."

Copies of orders l/Skl I k 3501 and 3502/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

b. Situation West Area:

A very reliable agent reported on 25 Nov. regarding the invasion situation in Great Britain:

Reports on a large-scale imminent invasion from Great Britain, some of which were also circulated in the international press, are an intentional deception. In circles of the F.A.F. and the Army as well as in the Foreign Office, it is still believed that the large-scale

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invasion will not be started until spring 1944. It is expected that minor operations as at Dieppe may be carried out. In Great Britain troops are being concentrated in the area south of Bristol between Warminster, Bridgewater and Gillingham as well as near Taunton, Wellington and Exeter. There are altogether three new tank divisions in the above area of Cornwall and Devon. Troop training grounds and military camps in the area of Hull, Nottingham and Lincoln which have been for the most part empty since September are now fully occupied again. No special troop concentrations in the north of England and Scotland.

Additional remark: Naval Group, North receives an extract by teletype. Air Force has this report.

As regards the defense of our PT boat operations in the Channel area by night fighters, according to War Diary of Command, PT boats of 16 - 31 Aug. 1943, Air Force, Operations Staff submitted the following after thorough investigation:

"1. For the time being, support of PT boat operations in the entire Channel area by night fighters is impossible for technical reasons. In the present state of development of search gear on planes, a location of very low-flying enemy planes cannot be made near the ground or near the water. Special gear is not yet available for this purpose.

2. A certain support for PT boat operations on the Channel coast will be possible after the completion of the expansion of night-fighter areas 115 and 116 (in the area of Ostend, Boulogne, Dieppe, Le Havre) to be expected shortly. The defensive success achieved by our night fighters against British minelayers on the Danish coast in the night of 4 to 5 Nov. 1943, when seven planes were shot down, shows that successes can definitely be expected from this measure."

Naval Staff, Operations Division informs Commander, PT boats and Group West to this effect.

c. Norway, Northern Waters:

The Intelligence Service transmits the following report of the Security Police and the Security Service:

"The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service states:

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According to a report from Stockholm, a telephone conversation between two unknown points was intercepted, in the course of which mention was made of an Allied invasion to be made in northern Norway shortly before Christmas. The necessary preparations are being made by all organizations involved. At the same time it was learned that the Norwegian refugee camps along the Swedish/Norwegian frontier - most of these are situated there - are being organized and equipped with arms by the Swedish Home Defense Force. These Norwegian emigrants are to be prepared in case of an Anglo-American invasion in Norway.

Additional Note: Extract sent to Group North by teletype. The Army and Air Force have this report.

d. Baltic Sea:

At the wish of the Fuehrer and in the interests of submarine training, Naval Command, Baltic requested from Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch a deep-set and magnetic minesweeping gear with a sufficient width of sweep. It asked that such gears be developed and supplied in order to guarantee even in deep water absolute freedom from mines in the submarine area of the Front-line Training Group.

Thereto Naval Staff, Operations Division makes the following comments to Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch:

"This demand is in itself justified, but no possibility can be seen of sweeping large training areas (surface) and keeping them clear of mines, since for this - even if gear with a wide sweep were available - there are not the necessary vessels. However, for clearance of routes (tracks) and possibly smaller areas for the grounding of the submarines, the creation of a suitable deep cable-gear is necessary."

High Command, Army General Staff informed Naval Staff of the following instructions to Army Group, North by way of Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Army:

"Apart from reinforcement of the front in the Oranienbaum pocket, which has been ordered and is to be reported to High Command, Army, the Fuehrer has ordered reinforcement of the coastal front west of the Oranienbaum area as well as on Narva Bay speedily and with all possible

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means. In order to accomplish this, all military institutions (schools, courses of instruction etc.) situated in the interior and suited in an emergency for defense of the coast, as well as any rear services and units available are to be transferred to the coast. The enemy must be prevented at all costs from making any landing. According to experience it is extraordinarily difficult to drive him off again once he has gained a footing on land.

The Army Group will report intended measures by 24 Nov., stating the date when preparations can be completed."

Answer sent by Group North directly in agreement with Naval Staff, Operations Division.

e. Submarine Warfare.

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from a diplomatic source in Lisbon, 18 transports are at present lying in Brooklyn Navy Yard which are to transport about 25,000 men to Great Britain. The Convoy will join another one consisting of 45 ships coming from Norfolk and New Port News. Probable date of departure from New York 30 Nov.

Own Situation:

According to radio intelligence, an unknown U.S. steamer reported from DB 3674 that she was being pursued by a submarine (probably submarine U "129").

Convoy Operation in CG:

On the basis of air reconnaissance of 26 Nov., which reported the awaited convoy at 1345 in CG 7434 on course 270°, it was presumed that the westerly course would be maintained until 27 Nov. However, reconnaissance on the morning of 27 Nov. detected the convoy at 0830 in CG 4478 on course 350°. The change of course to the north was, therefore, made already on the afternoon of 26 Nov. In consequence the patrol line ordered for 1800 on 27 Nov. was considerably on the lee side. Group "Weddigen" therefore proceeded from 1000 to the northeast at a submerged speed of three knots and received orders to

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surface from 1830 and proceed at high speed. At about 2030 a BV plane of the evening reconnaissance detected the enemy in CF 6539. The direction-finder signals transmitted were reported by five boats at 1235. However, only one boat was far enough ahead for a point of intersection to be obtained. Therefore, the boats were ordered to operate on courses from 350 - 290°. Our own plane shadowed the enemy until one hour after midnight.

The patrol line in Northern Waters was dispersed, three boats were sent out on patrol up and down from AB 3568 to AB 3973. Two boats have taken up position in AB 6352 and 6397.

f. Aerial Warfare.

British Isles and Vicinity:

According to investigations so far made, 2,500 high explosives, 1,000 aerial mines and 350,000 incendiaries were dropped in the air attacks on Berlin on 22 and 23 Nov.; about 2,000 persons were killed and about 500,000 rendered homeless.

No special reports were received on 27 Nov.

Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 26 Nov. 86 Ju 88's attacked Naples. Eleven of our planes were lost. The effect of the attack could not be observed clearly, as the town and harbor were well hidden by a smoke screen.

In the course of the attack against an enemy convoy northeast of Algiers on 26 Nov., two Mosquitoes and four Spitfires were shot down by our bombers. Due to strong enemy fighter defense some of our planes were lost, because the attack was carried out when it was still too light. The enemy carried out an attack in Italy, in the area south of Bologna as well as on the town and railroad station of Rimini. Two Fortresses were shot down. Enemy air reconnaissance was observed in the Straits of Otranto and in the Aegean Sea.

Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

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Special Items:

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Aerial Mine Inspectorate informs Naval Staff of a letter to Air Force, Operations Staff regarding the use of mine-firing units with pressure-firing device, in which it is stated that Naval Staff agrees to the use of the pressure-firing devices provided that they are definitely used by large forces (at least 100 planes every second night) over a lengthy period (at least two months); occasional operations by a few planes cannot be approved in view of the possibility of disclosure and resultant consequences as regards our convoy routes and training areas.

The third condition laid down by Naval Staff, i.e. concentration off the harbors of the west coast of England, is not mentioned in the letter. For the time being there will be no operations as the conditions stated by the Aerial Mine Inspectorate cannot at present be met by the Air Force.

g. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. The Naval Attaché in Madrid reports that the British intend to tow-off the Italian tanker FULGOR to Gibraltar during the night of 27 or 28 Nov.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that coastal traffic was resumed according to plan. Due to the improvement in the weather, enemy air activity in central and northern Italy was intensified. On 26 Nov. one Siebel ferry received a direct hit by a bomb at Ancona and sank. In the course of the enemy air attack on Toulon at noon on 25 Nov. four naval landing craft were sunk and nine barges heavily damaged.

2. According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea, three enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns in the coastal area of Scutari - Valona.

The operation on the island of Zara is making progress.

After mopping-up of the island of Fava an all-round defense will be established on the island of Grossa, Smaller islands near Murter are

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cleared of the enemy. The route from Zara to Šibenik by way of the Pasma Channel is open. Therefore the route from Fiume to Split is open.

3. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea requests from the 4th Air Force immediately strong attacks on the enemy operational airfields north of the Crimea and speedy assignment of sufficient fighter forces for protection of convoys in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, as our own supply situation is greatly endangered by the development of the situation on land. According to the information from Air Force, Operations Staff, everything possible will be done. Orders were given for an attack against enemy air bases.

Otherwise no additional reports from the Aegean and Black Sea.

h. The Naval and Air Attachés in Tokio report:

"In order to tie down and scatter Japanese forces, the U.S. Fleet started an operation from Hawaii co-ordinated with that against Bougainville. On 19 Nov. over 700 carrier-borne planes and four-engined bombers attacked the islands of Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands as well as Auru and on 20 Nov. 200 planes carried out attacks. On 21 Nov. about 6000 men were landed on Tarawa, Makin and on the island of Apoeama, not occupied by the Japanese. For defensive successes of the Japanese see report of Headquarters dated 23 Nov. Two Japanese torpedo planes crashed on the deck of one of the heavily damaged aircraft-carriers. Subsequently the carrier was seen burning; flames rose as high as 300 m. Further details are not yet in. The Admiralty views the situation with confidence since Makin and Tarawa are well fortified and will be defended to the last man; relief operations have been started. Gronau, Wenneker."

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Items of Political Importance.

A (certain) considerable (the latter word inserted by Chief of Staff Naval Staff. Tr.N.) stir was caused by a speech which Smuts made in London on 25 Nov., in which he stated that after the Allied Nations had conquered Germany and Japan there would only be two great powers in Europe, namely Great Britain and Russia. Russia is destined to have a dominating position on the continent.

Special Items.

I. As planned, Naval Staff took over control from Headquarters "Bismarck" at 1100.

II. At the beginning of November, the Shipbuilding Commission - Sub-Commission Destroyers - was concerned with the question of torpedo boat and destroyer types within the Fleet Construction program. Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted views to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division in which the transition to the eight-engined destroyer is advocated; thereby the speed is increased by 1.5 knots. Moreover, there is the possibility of increasing the fire-power of the destroyer considerably. The additional displacement of 500 tons must be accepted.

III. Group North/Fleet reports that in working out the plan for operation "Wallenstein" the necessity arose of storing up 50,000 cbm of furnace oil by 1 May 1944, distributing it to the decisive bases and operational harbors. In view of the lack of reserves, the Group suggests, as a precautionary measure, saving 10,000 cbm per month as from 1 Dec., cutting down consumption accordingly and storing it in bomb-proof depots at home and in Norway.

Situation 28 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reports that: the BURGENLAND left Singapore

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on 19 Nov. and entered Jokjokarta on 21 Nov.; Admiral Koyima will leave Tokio on 10 Dec.; appearance of enemy submarines off Penang; destruction of the TANNE is attributable to activity of the Italian supply ship ERITREA.

Naval Staff informed all ships in foreign waters of further sighting reports in the southern Atlantic by teletype 1620 (see War Diary 8 Nov.).

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were reported on operation over the Bay of Biscay. Our air reconnaissance detected the large convoy consisting of 60 merchantmen, reported in CG on 27 Nov., at 0130 in CF 6265 on course 350°. Our planes were heavily fired on by anti-aircraft guns of the convoy.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One mine was swept off Brest, and two off St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

The 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla carried out minelaying as planned in the night of 27 Nov. The Flotilla entered Le Havre at 0530.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Minesweeping and escort duties were carried out without special incidents. Three mines were swept near Borkum and Terschelling. Convoy 1191 Hook - Elbe is nearly through. Convoy 470 Elbe - Hook started at 0800.

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About 20,000 BFT were escorted in the Ijssel Meer and in Zeeland Waters.

In the course of the air attack on Bremen at noon on 26 Nov. no serious damage was caused in the dockyards and industrial installations. Some small vessels sank in the harbor.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

Own Situation:

The ELSASS and BRUMMER, coming from the east, put into Kristiansand South. The LODY entered Stavanger at 0630.

Fifty ships were escorted north and fifty-one south.

Group North/Fleet reports that minelaying operation "Fridolin" will not be carried out before 29 Nov. The destroyers are lying at six hours' notice.

The STEINBRINK transmitted a brief report on the collision in the night of 25 Nov. Repairs will probably take three weeks at Oslo. (see teletype 1735).

No special reports received from submarines in Northern Waters.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sent out against blockade-runners in the Skagerrak was without result.

According to a Finnish report, planes dropped eight aerial mines in the area 20 miles north of Hogland.

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2. Own Situation:

The cruiser NUERNBERG is proceeding alone from Oslo to Copenhagen. Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff for information that, in spite of the present state of emergency, the cruiser NUERNBERG may enter Copenhagen and stay for two days, in agreement with Admiral, Denmark. The ship must be so protected that no sabotage is possible.

One mine was swept northeast of Danzig.

No special reports from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers and Admiral, Baltic States.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The operation by Group "Weddigen" was continued. The convoy was reported by air reconnaissance in CF 6292 on course 350° at 0100. In the course of the rest of the night thirteen reports were received from submarines on starshells sighted and three reports on air attacks. At 0724 submarine U "262" reported the enemy in CF 6223. It is possible that further boats approached the convoy without being able to transmit a report. At 0815 the boats were ordered to submerge at daybreak as strong air defense is to be expected. Radio intelligence revealed that sixteen planes and six escort planes started from the Azores on 27 Nov. and that during the night strong air forces were operating over the convoy.

At 0721 submarine U "262" attacked three ships which are assumed probably sunk. Another submarine observed that two planes crashed after attacks on submarines. A radio operator and a pilot were taken prisoner. Zaunkoenig torpedoes were fired at several corvettes and destroyers but missed their targets.

There are no indications as yet of our submarine losses.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

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1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the night of 28 Nov. four heavy fighters of the 3rd Air Force carried out nuisance raids on London.

During the day there was only moderate enemy air activity in the west area. Around noon 150 planes entered the area of Toulon - Marseilles from the south and dropped 20 high explosives on Sanary Bay (west of Toulon). One plane was shot down.

Around noon 40 planes entered the area of Bruck on the Mur also from the south and flew back to the south without attacking. Our fighters numbering 251 did not contact the enemy.

In the evening 15 - 20 enemy planes attacked the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force only carried out air reconnaissance. The enemy carried out attacks with 60 four-engined planes and fighters on roads and a railroad section in the area of Udine. One plane flew into Croatia as far as Brod without attacking. In the course of an attack by ten fighter-bombers on Nettunia, one of our PT boats was hit. Dubrovnik was attacked without damage. Fighters and bombers carried out armed reconnaissance on the west coast of the Adriatic and over the Straits of Otranto. During the night of 28 Nov. the airfield of Ciampino near Rome was attacked. Anti-aircraft guns shot down one plane.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

Special Items:

According to a report of Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, the attention of the 4th Air Force was drawn to the necessity of using the six reconnaissance planes of the 1st Air Corps equipped with Hohentwiel gear for submarine chase by night and for escort in the Black Sea. In addition, the 1st Air Corps has been ordered to attack the base of the enemy planes which on 26 Nov. attacked our convoy off Odessa, sinking one tug and one motor minesweeper.

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After mopping-up of the islands in the Aegean Sea, Air Force, Operations Staff intends gradually to withdraw forces of the formations of Air Force Command, Southeast. However, prior to this action the PT boat base of Castellrosso is to be attacked heavily once again.

Finally, it is intended to transfer a Stuka group and probably a bomber group to the Adriatic Sea for attacks on partisans or for night attacks against enemy harbors on the east coast of Italy.

The Rumanians reinforced the anti-aircraft defense of Odessa by bringing-up two heavy anti-aircraft batteries and the defense of Constanta by bringing-up a fighter squadron.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Area Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

On 26 Nov. 2 British auxiliary cruisers, 11 destroyers, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, 40 freighters, 7 tankers, 41 small vessels and 1 WARSPITE class in dock were detected in Gibraltar.

The number of ships in harbor is, therefore, small.

On 27 Nov. at 0830 2 destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean and at 1410 6 freighters left for the Atlantic.

At 0815 on 28 Nov. 1 aircraft-carrier and 1 gunboat were sighted off Cape Tres Forcas on easterly course. At 1515 Cape Tres Forcas reported 1 battleship (REPULSE class) and 2 destroyers.

According to intelligence reports, large-scale Allied landing operations in Italy will take place shortly. During the last few days altogether 8,000 men were shipped from Gibraltar on destroyers and freighters, allegedly for a landing operation north of Rome.

According to a report of the Naval Attaché in Madrid, the transfer of the FULGOR from Cadiz roads to Gibraltar has been postponed to 29 Nov. at 1600. Two Spanish tugs will tow the tanker from the dockyard at San Fernando to the roads, where she will be handed over to British tugs.

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According to information from the Spanish Attaché Group Leader, Italian merchantmen in Spanish harbors are permitted by the Spanish Foreign Office to put out.

Own Situation:

Minesweeping was carried out off the south coast of France without special incident.

7,000 BRT were escorted.

One plane out of three which approached Toulon was shot down for certain by a harbor defense boat and a further one probably shot down.

The heavy damage previously reported in the submarine base at Toulon is actually not so severe that the repair of submarines at an alternative point would be impossible.

2. Area German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

The eastbound transport convoy reported north of Bougie on 26 Nov. at 1545, which was attacked by our Air Force, has not been detected again. After the attack two stationary destroyers were observed 30 miles northeast of Bougie on 27 Nov. at 0913.

On the same day at 1000 there was a convoy consisting of 20 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers 190 miles southeast of Malta on southeasterly course.

On 28 Nov. reconnaissance in the central Mediterranean was without tactical results.

Own Situation:

During the night of 27 Nov. torpedo boats TA "23" and "24" carried out minelaying operation "Greif" in the Elba area.

Submarine U "407" torpedoed a light cruiser off the coast of Cyrenaica at 1117.

In the afternoon boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla left Nettunia; three boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla left Civitavecchia for operations.

Ferry ship "844" was commissioned as minelayer DWARSLAEUFER at Spezia on 25 Nov.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the morning of 28 Nov. a large concentration of fishing vessels was sighted in the area of Bari; at 0940 on the same day a group consisting of five merchantmen was sighted off Termoli.

At noon on 27 Nov. Benedetto was attacked by planes; Zara was attacked at 1115 on 28 Nov. The harbor of Benedetto was not damaged; there are no further details regarding Zara.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "453" carried out minelaying off Brindisi as planned and returned to Pola.

At 1700 on 27 Nov. PT boats S "61", "33" and "30" left Dubrovnik for operations against ferry traffic between the islands and the mainland. They entered Split at 0600 on 28 Nov. The three PT boats are scheduled to leave for Pola at 1700. With the cruiser CATTARO, Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia carried out escort of landings on the islands west to south of Zara on 25 and 26 Nov. and on the morning of 27 Nov. covered the landing on the island of Kornat.

b. Aegean Sea:

The island of Santorin surrendered at 2200 on 27 Nov. The island was taken over at 1100 on 28 Nov. The occupation forces, consisting of 19 officers and 624 noncommissioned officers and men, are being evacuated.

According to the report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, the appearance of Italian planes with American markings is to be expected in the Aegean area.

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c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance did not observe any enemy shipping movements in the central and eastern part of the Black Sea. There were no ships in the harbors of Anapa and Taman. Radio intelligence located two PT boats and destroyer "H" in the northern part, off the Caucasian coast and three PT boats, two motor gunboats and probably destroyer "F" in the southern part.

Own Situation:

Nothing special to report on operations by nine naval landing craft in the Strait of Kerch during the night of 27 Nov. Enemy air supplies to the beachhead of Eltigen were continued during the night. Naval landing craft fired 100 rounds of 7.5 cm at the beachhead.

Five naval landing craft were in patrol line in the Strait of Kerch during the night of 28 Nov. Operations by three PT boats and three motor minesweepers were broken off because of the weather.

Submarine U "9" left Constanta for an operation against the enemy.

In the course of an air attack on Kamysh Burun one naval landing craft received a direct hit and was lost. Two further naval landing craft were slightly damaged.

Submarine chaser "2311", which ran aground near Bugaz, was towed-off and entered Bugaz.

Minesweeping was carried out according to plan without any mines being swept. Convoys were resumed after an improvement in the weather.

Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports that the requested air attack on the airfield of Skadovsk was carried out accurately by 23 planes of the 4th Air Force; fires were observed on 15 enemy fighters and 20 bombers on the ground.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has requested information as to whether Chief, Naval Staff carried out his intention of discussing with the Fuehrer the question of extending the base of

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Constanta, and with what result.

After fundamental agreement has been reached with Naval Staff and Commanding Admiral, Black Sea, Group South proposes dissolution of Naval Shore Command, Ukraine, and re-designation of the remaining Naval Shore Commands as Naval Shore Command, Eastern Crimea and Naval Shore Command, Western Crimea - Ukraine. The former Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine will be Naval Shore Commander, Dodecanese, with the staff personnel which becomes available. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea did not agree with the intention of the Group, and put forward a new proposal. This matter will be dealt with further by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

About happenings during the last days it is now reported:

Colombia joined the Allies in the war against the Axis powers.

A speech by Salazar shows increasing understanding with the Anglo-Saxons, particularly with regard to the Portuguese - Japanese tension.

The Turkish Ambassador left Rome. Black-out exercises were ordered in Istanbul for the first time.

A declaration by Montgomery announces a strong offensive in Italy aimed specifically at the occupation of Italy up to the area north of Rome.

Chief, Naval Staff returned to Berlin from France.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. Report by Quartermaster General:

1. The Air Force has declared its inability to reinforce the air defense of Toulon. The Navy will withdraw four batteries from submarine bases in western France. In addition, further batteries must be brought up from the Channel Islands in order to attempt an adequate defense of Toulon.

2. The commander of the island Leros will be provided by the Army.

3. In spite of objections by Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Loewisch was subordinated to the German General with the Croatian Armed Forces by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy had agreed without knowing the views taken by Naval Staff.

II. Report of Chief, Naval Intelligence Division on political news in accordance with "Items of Political Importance."

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Special Items:

I. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff expressed the thanks of Naval Staff to Group North/Fleet "for quick and smooth assumption of control and its efficient handling by Group North/Fleet after the destruction of the offices of Naval Staff. This made it possible to keep firm control of the Navy and to ensure that High Command was properly informed at all times. It has also been acknowledged at the Fuehrer Headquarters."

Teletype 1/Skl 50209/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol V.

II. Chief, Armed Forces High Command issued the following instructions:

"1. According to a report made by the German General attached to the High Command of the Rumanian Armed Forces, over 100,000 soldiers of all branches of the Armed Forces will be stationed in Transnistria if troops continue to pour in. These include units and supply services which no longer have any duties to the changed situation. Most of them are idle and, according to the report received, are leading a vagabond existence and endangering discipline in every way.

2. The force stationed there is greatly out of proportion with the present strength at the front. Unfavorable effects on persons of German nationality and on other inhabitants are unavoidable. In case of heavy enemy air and sea attacks on large places, particularly on Odessa, unnecessary losses will be caused due to excessive occupation.

In addition, there arises the danger that in case of a further change in the situation at the front, a large number of unorganized troops would pour into the Rumanian area, which must be avoided at all costs.

3. I request that strictest orders be issued for checking all units stationed in Transnistria so that:

a. only the essential units and supply services remain in Transnistria and

b. all other units, as far as they cannot be used for reinforcement of the front-line troops, be transferred without regard to the western Ukraine or to Poland, for dispersal or more useful employment

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4. In this connection I again point out that any transfer of units to Pumania is subject to my approval."

Copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 40335/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

III. Group North/Fleet advised Naval Staff for information of the instructions to other Groups and Naval Commands regarding the establishment of a Naval Special Operations Unit in accordance with the order of Naval Staff:

The Naval Special Operations Unit constitutes a manning unit, school and training unit for operational commands and incidental tasks in all theaters of operation. The tasks of Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section remain unaffected. At present six land operational commands with twelve men each are being established.

Letter to this effect as per 1/Skl 40658/43 Gkdos. in records 1/Skl I op.

Situation 29 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff, Operations Division sent instructions to Group West, Operations Staff regarding blockade-run.

Copy of order 1/Skl. I k 3521/43 Gkdos., Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Naval Staff intends to hand over the command for the incoming ships OSOPNO and ALSTERUFER to Group West only east of 20° W. This longitude will be reached by the OSORNO probably on 23 Dec. and by the ALSTERUFER

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on 27 Dec. Outgoing blockade-runners will not be ordered to leave until January 1944 after the evaluation of experiences by the OSOPNO and ALSTERUFER. Contrary to former intentions, the latter must be met by destroyers shortly after daybreak. The break-through through the Bay of Biscay can only be enforced with the aid of destroyers and bombers. The establishment of an escort or diversionary group of torpedo boats to the north is to be investigated. Details of the plan are to be settled in a verbal discussion with Auxiliary Cruiser Section, Operations Division; the Group will then report its intentions regarding meeting the ships.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Sixty-two planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay. On 28 Nov. one British vessel each was located in CF 6660, CF 6860 and BE 9830, and on 29 Nov. in AL 6830.

At 1503 our air reconnaissance sighted three merchantmen and two U.S. destroyers in AM 4784, course 90°, speed ten knots.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

A submarine escort entering Brest was attacked with bombs and machine-guns by 16 enemy planes off St. Matthieu at 0915. There were casualties on two patrol boats and the deck of patrol boat "715" was damaged by a dud bomb. Two planes were observed shot down. Brief report of the 7th Patrol Boat Flotilla see teletype 1400.

Three submarines were escorted in off Lorient and St. Nazaire.

Mine-exploding vessel "149" struck two mines off St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

No escort, patrol and minesweeping duties due to bad weather.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

On 28 Nov. from 1800 several hundred nuisance balloons crossed over the Heligoland Bight and the coastal area in an easterly direction. The balloons trail a wire rope for damaging lighting mains and other overhead wire-networks.

Convoy "1191" Hook - Elbe was carried out. One mine was swept in front of the convoy north of Ameland. Minesweeper M "323" was towed into Cuxhaven because of engine trouble. Convoy "470" Elbe - Hook anchored on Borkum roads on account of stormy weather.

Armed trawler KFK "1227", in company with another armed trawler, was lost sight of by the latter off Bovbjerg and presumably capsized or grounded as two corpses and wreckage were washed up. For the present, code security is jeopardised.

Minesweeping and patrol duties were broken off due to stormy weather.

From 1345 about 300 enemy planes in six formations with fighter cover entered the area of Bremen. For details of the attack see Aerial Warfare.

Naval Command North advocates the plan by Admiral, Netherlands regarding the laying of an RMH barrage in the fairway Veere - Hook near Walcheren for defense of the island against landings. Thirty-four PMH's are required for this.

A landing on the lee-shore of Walcheren is quite possible.

Naval Command North was advised as follows (copy to Admiral, Netherlands):

"1. Barrage for defense against landings on the northeast coast of Walcheren is approved in principle.

2. Investigate use of LMB's (magnetic, acoustic firing 1 - 5 moe), the firing devices of which also react to smaller landing craft, instead of RMH's (20 moe)."

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

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Our air reconnaissance on 28 Nov. west of the Faeroes and Jan Mayen, over the coast of central Norway as well as in the area of Banak - Bear Island was incomplete and brought no tactical results. According to uncertain sighting reconnaissance on 29 Nov., one minelayer (1,000 tons) was reported 60 miles east of Lerwik on easterly course.

On 27 and 28 Nov. single flights were reported in the areas of Kirkenes, Vardoe, Berlevaag, Petsamo and Trondheim. Further planes appeared in the area of Bergen and Egersund - Lister on 28 Nov.

There was surprise gunfire with 200 rounds in the area of Petsamo on 27 Nov. at 1032. Material damage was caused.

At 0008 and 0415 on 28 Nov. noises of PT boats were located off the harbor entrance of Petsamo.

Own Situation:

Group North/Fleet reports that minelaying operation "Fridolin" will not be carried out before 30 Nov. The destroyers are at six hours notice.

At 1214 Admiral, Northern Waters ordered three hours notice for the Task Force.

According to a report of Naval Command, Norway, complete repair of the BEITZEN in Norway is impossible. Provisional repair will require about four weeks.

The tanker BANCO was towed-off on 27 Nov. and brought into Berlevaag.

Thirty-three ships were escorted north and thirty-seven south. Seven ships remained lying in harbor due to lack of escorts.

Naval Command, Norway directed an inquiry to the 5th Air Force regarding the possibility of submarine chase in the Arctic area. The 5th Air Force Command sent the following reply on 14 Nov.:

"1. It is impossible to introduce measures now for intensified operations by planes for defense of convoys in the daylight period of next year. The bringing-up of new formations is dependent on the development of the situation in the other theaters of operation and cannot be decided by Commander in Chief, Air Force at long sight but only at short notice.

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2. A more successful combat of enemy submarines during the period of darkness and during unfavorable weather cannot be expected either from increasing the number of planes or from further equipment with search gear against shipping. Attention is also called to the fact that vessels which are less than 2 km from land or in bays or skerries cannot be detected by the search gear. Moreover, the search gear against shipping available at present in the area of the 5th Air Force is mostly needed for the reconnaissance over a large area which is being carried out daily at the special request of the naval offices. Increased allocation of new gear is not to be expected as there is a bottleneck in the supply of this and no improvement in the supply situation is likely in the near future.

3. It is not possible to carry out a continuous control of the sea area in question for reasons sufficiently well known (fuel, number of planes available). In addition, reference must be made to dependence on the weather which often limits the possibility of obtaining a complete picture.

4. The 5th Air Force is of the opinion that during the daylight period of 1943 the available reconnaissance and fighter forces succeeded in protecting convoys off the Arctic coast not only against airraids but also against the danger of submarines. While no losses were incurred by the air attacks - some of which were very heavy - only 5 of 987 vessels escorted were sunk by torpedoes of enemy submarines. During the same period the Air Force sank four enemy submarines, damaged three and in ten cases warned the convoys of a torpedo-track. Thus, previous air defense has proved effective and prevented appreciable losses. So far the 5th Air Force sees no signs of an aggravation of the submarine situation.

In case this is assumed, better equipment with modern convoy escort vessels with suitable recognition and warning gear as well as with reinforced defensive weapons is considered as an effective counter-measure."

The 5th Air Force therefore confines itself to pointing out that the Air Force has adequately fulfilled its present defensive tasks. A precautionary measure as conceived by Naval Command, Norway, for an expected future increase in defense requirements is not considered possible for the time being by the 5th Air Force Command. However, Naval Staff considers it necessary to make due preparations in this direction.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Due to stormy west winds, investigation of the gap in the barrage at Hanstholm was not carried out.

The NUERNBERG will probably arrive at Copenhagen on 30 Nov. at 1000.

One mine was swept 14 miles east of Neufahrwasser.

Due to the weather minesweeping duties in the Sound were broken off. Otherwise minesweeping, patrol and escort duties were carried out in the whole area according to plan.

V. Submarine Warfare.

No further reports on the operation of Group "Weddigen" have been received. Three submarines were presumably lost already before the beginning of the operation.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The northbound convoy in the Atlantic was not detected again. In the course of free-lance fighter patrol in the Bay of Biscay one Sunderland with three guns was shot down by eight Ju 88's after 16 attacks.

During the night of 29 Nov. one of our heavy fighters was sent out on night fighting in the area of Cape Ortegal.

During the day the enemy attacked the airfields of Chievres and Moorseele with heavy forces. Three high-explosives were dropped on the naval battery position near Fort Philippe at 1050. A report has already been made on the attack on the submarine convoy in the area of Brest.

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2. Reich Territory:

Strong formations of four-engined bombers, with fighter escort up to the line Wilhelmshaven - Oldenburg, flew into the area of Bremen beginning at 1345. Two other fighter formations were waiting in the area of Texel - Amsterdam to meet them. The attack, which was directed against the southeastern part of Bremen from a height of 5,000 - 7,000 m., caused comparatively slight damage, as most of the bombs fell into the marsh. Our fighters numbering 202 and heavy fighters numbering 119 were sent out for defense. Nine Fortresses and five fighters were shot down by our fighters and a Fortress was shot down by anti-aircraft guns near Helder. Seven of our fighters were lost and eighteen damaged.

During the night of 29 Nov. 20 - 30 Mosquitoes flew into the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area. Twenty bombs were dropped without causing appreciable damage.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our forces carried out reconnaissance.

During the day the enemy twice attacked the airfields of Grosseto, Civitavecchia and Mostar as well as the town areas of Sarajevo and Zara with strong forces.

Eighteen enemy planes were observed on reconnaissance over the Aegean Sea during the day, and at night five planes were observed on reconnaissance or carrying supplies to partisans in the Balkans. One Baltimore was shot down north of Kos.

4. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Area Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

The number of ships in Gibraltar is substantially unchanged. On 28 Nov. at 1400 Tres Forcas reported a convoy consisting of 9 transports, 20 freighters with 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 5 fairly

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large vessels on westerly course.

The same day at 1330 1 loaded troop transport escorted by 2 destroyers and 4 LCI's of a new type put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

Two British steamers left Lisbon on the morning of 28 Nov.

Own Situation:

On the evening of 28 Nov. one harbor defense boat was unsuccessfully attacked by about 35 planes with 30 bombs west of Toulon. Four convoys totaling 20,300 BFT were escorted off the south coast of France.

2. Area German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was a convoy consisting of 5 transports and 7 large freighters 120 miles northwest of Benghazi on course 110° at 0745. The unit was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs by 17 Ju 88's. At 0845 1 transport with 1 escort vessel was sighted 160 miles southeast of Malta on course 110°.

Photographic reconnaissance revealed:

at Bari (80% covered): 71 small naval vessels, 6 large landing craft, 2 tankers, 20 freighters,
at Tarent (50% covered): 2 Italian cruisers, 1 gunboat, 1 destroyers, 30 small auxiliary naval vessels, 4 large landing craft, 1 troop transport, 9 freighters.

According to photographic reconnaissance there was only a small number of vessels in Tobruk on 28 Nov. and there were no landing craft.

During the night of 28 Nov. reconnaissance detected ships by radar in the Bay of Manfredonia. The harbor of Barletta was lit up.

Own Situation:

During the night of 28 Nov. two boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla were out on operation in the area of Naples/Salerno, but sighted nothing except two enemy PT boats. Beginning at 2300 our boats were continuously located so that harassing of the enemy was achieved.

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Torpedo boats TA "23" and "24" and five motor minesweepers were transferred together to Elba and Piombino.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea.

Enemy Situation:

Five to six landing craft were sighted three miles west of the mouth of the Drin River at 1830 on 28 Nov. At 0245 on 27 Nov. Fort Commander, Dubrovnik reported gunfire from the sea in the direction of Lapud.

On the mornings of 28 and 29 Nov. there was lively air activity in the area of Zara - Valona. The steamer SEBENICO (864 BRT) was sunk at Zara and Siebel ferry SF "108" was sunk at Sibenik.

About forty bombs were dropped on the city and harbor of Gravosa at 2040 on 28 Nov. One picket-steamer and two auxiliary sailing vessels sank; three further auxiliary sailing vessels were damaged. Considerable material damage was caused to buildings. An air attack on Ombla Bay near Dubrovnik on 28 Nov. caused no damage.

Own Situation:

PT boats S "61", "33" and "30" put into Pola at 0750.

The anti-aircraft cruiser CATTARO was sent to Trieste for decommissioning. Due to lack of coal her further participation in the island operation is impossible. Furthermore, according to a report of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea, the ship is not suitable for use in the island operation south of Split owing to lack of anti-aircraft fire control and fighter defense; the crew is more urgently needed for commissioning the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla.

b. Aegean Sea:

The steamer SALOMEA was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine south of Lemnos at 0954 on 26 Nov.; on 27 Nov. at 0703 the steamer PALMA was sunk near Samos but the crew and ship's anti-aircraft guns were saved.

One officer and 26 men of the prisoners and Italians taken on Samos on 27 Nov. were shot as armed insurgents. Up to now 93 officers and

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4,262 men were taken prisoner, in addition to 527 men of a battalion of Blackshirts.

The roads and harbor of Naxos were searched but no mines swept.

On 29 Nov. Group South submitted for information a list of enemy naval vessels which were in Turkish territorial waters in the course of the last few weeks. The Naval Attaché in Istanbul was also informed.

Copy as per 1/Skl 41217/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV.

Naval Staff, Operations Division is investigating whether sufficient facts are available justifying diplomatic steps, which come into question if Turkish waters have been used as a base for British forces.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 28 Nov. at 2010 submarine U "19" reported a miss in CL 9666 on an enemy submarine leaving Poti. On 29 Nov. at 0602 submarine U "20" reported two misses on a tanker (1,500 BRT) in CL 9525.

Due to the weather, naval landing craft put in from patrol line in the Strait of Kerch before scheduled on the evening of 28 Nov. There were no possibilities of an enemy landing for the same reason.

Submarine chase and minesweeping were carried out as planned; escort was to some extent prevented by the weather.

Operations by ten naval landing craft in the Strait of Kerch are intended on the night of 29 Nov.

In the evening PT boats S "28" and "45" will be transferred from Balaklava to Constanta for repair.

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Commanding Admiral, Black Sea, Chief, Supply and Transport, points out that for the time being 50% of all tugs are old, under repair or in urgent need of repair, mostly due to damage caused by the weather, and he requests that more consideration be paid than up to now to the weather and seaworthiness of the vessels, as otherwise towing operations and transport demands can no longer be met.

As regards the situation on land on the Crimea, the Naval Liaison Officer attached to Army Group A reports collapse of a strong enemy attack supported by tanks and ground-attack planes against the eastern part of the Tartar Wall and Schtschemenovka. Enemy troop concentrations were observed before the Perekop front from 1700.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

It seems that the Russians are once again pressing for a speeding-up of the Anglo-American advance in southern Italy. Montgomery's declaration was probably an answer to this.

According to a report of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow on the conference with the British Ambassador there, the British and Americans have actually demanded Turkey's entry into the war. The Turkish attitude is evasive. Our successes in the Dodecanese, therefore, gain increased political importance.

Chief, Naval Staff is staying in Berlin on account of a slight illness.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. In the course of a report on the situation, Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division stated that twelve of the assault guns destined for the Crimea were lost aboard the SANTA FE and thirty-three arrived at their destination. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea referred to suspected sabotage regarding the SANTA FE and ordered an intensified watch.

Due to the inadequacy of communications, the transfer of German Naval Command, Italy to its new Headquarters can only be carried out with the support of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest.

II. Quartermaster General:

a. Group South intends to bring four armed trawlers through the Dardanelles. Naval Staff agrees to this attempt.

b. The question arose as to whether, with the bringing-up of defensive material by the Navy, control of the air defense of Toulon should be passed over to it. Group West was asked whether two anti-aircraft battalions could be transferred from the islands of western France to Toulon. Fixed emplacement does not come into the question until a decision is reached regarding assumption of control by the Navy.

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c. Two German smoke-laying companies in Swinemuende were relieved by Italians in order to be transferred to Toulon.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Army Situation:

Cherkazy is still encircled by the enemy. The area of Korosten - Kiev is comparatively quiet. West of Gomel our troops withdrew behind the Beresina. New enemy preparations for attack are being observed west of Smolensk.

In Italy the large-scale attack announced began. Two of our divisions are available as reserves.

In the Balkans subordinate commanders of the Chetniks, some of them also Albanians, joined German formations in the fight against Tito's troops.

Lissa and Korcula are occupied by the enemy.

IV. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff discussed experiences regarding the preparation of Headquarters "Bismarck" which did not prove satisfactory.

Special Items:

I. According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, the Japanese crew will take over independent control of the submarine turned over to them in the Baltic on 5 Dec. Operational Training Group requested permission to fly the Japanese ensign on that day.

Naval Staff, Operations Division agreed and ordered Commanding Admiral, Submarines to inform the operational stations concerned.

II. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division has exact data only on the disposition of heavy British naval forces in the Mediterranean; only uncertain, out-of-date data are available on other sea areas. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division assumes the following disposition:

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1. Home waters: 8 battleships, 2 of them possibly being overhauled, 6 aircraft-carriers;
 2. Mediterranean: 3 battleships (1 of the RENOWN class, 1 of the NELSON class and the WAFSPITE, the latter damaged in Gibraltar);
 3. Indian Area: 4 battleships, 2 aircraft-carriers.
-

Situation 30 Nov.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

From the War Diaries transmitted by the Naval Attaché in Tokio, it is revealed that the RIO GRANDE and OSORNO successfully repulsed attacks by submarines in the South China Seas. The cool and skilful behaviour of the OSORNO deserves particular mention.

Naval Staff expressed its appreciation to both captains by radio message 1717.

Naval Staff informed Naval Intelligence Division and Chief, Naval Communications Division that at present the following blockade-runners are at sea en route for Europe:

a. In the South Atlantic:

using secret
call signal:

OSORNO	V T 4 I N	as the	NOOFDAM
ALSTERUFER	K R C J	" "	SANTA MARTA
RIO GRANDE	W D U L	" "	JAMES LYKES

b. Indian Ocean:

WESEPLAND	B D 4 G I	" "	NAPINGA
	<u>later in the Atlantic Ocean</u>		
	C B 4 O C	" "	KRISTIANAFJORD
BURGELAND	B V 4 A G	" "	KOTA AGOENG
	<u>later in the Atlantic Ocean</u>		
	B I 4 O P	" "	KARAGOLA.

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Both offices are asked to pay special attention to these secret call signals and to inform Naval Staff, Operations Division immediately in case emergency reports are received from the ships. In addition it is requested that an investigation be made now as to whether these secret call signs appeared in any emergency report during the period from 22 to 30 Nov. and the result **communicated**.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-seven planes were detected on operation in the Bay of Biscay.

One British vessel each was located at 0420 in AL 5120,
at 1209 in AL 9940,
at 1913 in AL 9370,
at 2124 in AL 6690,

and a convoy (HX 267?) 230 miles west of Ireland.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine each was swept off the Gironde and off Nantes. One mine detonated in a fishing net west of Bordeaux.

Off the harbors in the west of France three submarines were escorted in and six out.

Channel Coast:

On 29 Nov. one dud bomb from enemy planes fell on battery "Lindemann" in the area of Calais, without causing damage or casualties.

No minesweeping activity due to the weather.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

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Mine-exploding vessel "10" repelled a bombing attack by a four-engined plane on the Weser river at 1533. At 1410 the Ems - Elbe convoy was unsuccessfully attacked with three bombs.

Due to stormy weather, westbound convoy "470" is still lying in Borkum roads. In the morning strong air formations were reported coming in and returning in the south of Holland. Naval anti-aircraft guns in the area of Flushing and IJmuiden went into action.

Three convoys totalling 45,538 BRT were escorted in Zeeland Waters.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Altogether 32 enemy planes flew into the area of Petsamo - Kirkenes - Vardoe on 28 Nov. At 1135 on 29 Nov. our northbound convoy was attacked by planes off Sogne Fjord. One tanker sustained slight damage and casualties, but continued her passage. The steamer HARTMUT had to return to Bergen because of damage and the fact that the captain was wounded.

Our air reconnaissance in the sea area of Jan Mayen, off the east coast of Scotland and in the area of the Shetlands sighted nothing of importance.

At 1235 our air reconnaissance sighted a destroyer and two escorts in Thorshavn.

Own Situation:

In the course of firing exercises in Hjelte Fjord PT boats "10", "13" and "16" were unsuccessfully attacked by four British planes.

Fifty-six ships were escorted north and 31 south. Due to lack of escorts 14 ships remained in harbor.

Group North/Fleet issued executive order for minelaying operation "Fridolin" for 30 Nov. The Task Force was temporarily at three hours notice. The operational order was cancelled after a few hours.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

On the afternoon of 29 Nov. the Danish steamer SKODSBORG (1,450 BRT) loaded with coal was rammèd by a submarine in Kiel harbor and beached.

At 1428 on 29 Nov. the target ship SINDING was rammèd by submarine U "129" and beached in shallow water for pumping out.

The NUERNBERG put into Copenhagen at 1630 on 30 Nov.

One mine was swept southeast of Helsingfors.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Submarine U "238" was attacked by three carrier-borne planes in CF 3477 (area of the Azores) and suffered casualties. The boat was ordered to return.

Group "Weddigen" is to be in reconnaissance line from CF 2581 to 3513 at 2000 on 1 Dec. and is to advance on course 310° with day's run 80 miles.

Submarine U "967" was attacked by an enemy plane on inward passage in BF 6758.

The Naval Attaché in Madrid reports that on the evening of 29 Nov. the Spanish Foreign Minister transmitted the refusal of the Spanish Government to release the crew of submarine "Wolf".

The German Ambassador immediately raised objection. He was, however, informed that this measure, like many others, was due to very strong British pressure. The Naval Attaché suggests that, in addition to measures taken by the Foreign Office, Commander in Chief, Navy, should direct a personal appeal to the Spanish Secretary of the Navy, pointing

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out in a friendly manner the danger of an estrangement between the two Navies and asking him to exercise the greatest personal influence in German interests. (For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII). Copy of letter see teletype 2140.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio asked Naval Staff, Submarine Division to investigate the possibility of operations in the area of southern and western Australia. In case of approval, equipment of the "Monsoon" boats with maps and naval handbooks can be provided by the Japanese Navy.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division informed the Naval Attaché in Tokio by way of Naval Staff, Operations Division that it is not intended that "Monsoon" boats shall operate in the area of southern and western Australia as long as the prospects for attacks in the Indian Ocean are good. For the time being it cannot be determined whether occasional operations in these areas by submarines arriving later in Penang will come into consideration.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

No special reports on air activity on either side during the day have been received from the rendezvous area and the occupied west area. Late in the evening 30 planes were reported entering western France and concentrating on the mouth of the Gironde, probably on minelaying.

2. Reich Territory:

From 1055 to 1315 three strong enemy bomber formations as well as three fighter and two rendezvous formations flew into the Rhine - Westphalian industrial area. Two further rendezvous formations were in operation in the area of the Scheldt estuary. Eight points were attacked, concentrating on Remscheid. For damage see Daily Situation. Our planes numbering 440 were sent out on defense. Three enemy planes were shot down by fighters and three by anti-aircraft guns.

During the evening 25 - 30 enemy planes again flew into the Rhine - Westphalian industrial area. Single high-explosives were dropped on

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Crefeld, Dinklage and Essen.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance in the central Mediterranean.

The enemy carried out fighter-bomber and bomber attacks in the Italian front area, in the course of which three planes each were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and fighters. Civitavecchia and Orbitello as well as our anti-aircraft position at Fieri on the Dalmatian coast were attacked.

Eighteen planes were reported during the day and five during the night of 30 Nov. over the Adriatic Sea on reconnaissance or carrying supplies to partisans in the Balkans.

4. Eastern Front:

For enemy activity in the Norwegian area with attack on one of our convoys see Situation Norway/Northern Waters.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Area Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

As regards the battleship of the REPULSE class reported on 27 Nov. off Cape Tres Forcas making for the Atlantic, it is now reported that confusion with the RODNEY is possible.

On 29 Nov. at 1100 a convoy consisting of about 60 ships passed the Straits of Gibraltar heading for the Atlantic. Five merchantmen, 1 destroyer, 5 gunboats and 3 submarine chasers joined it at Gibraltar. At 1450 on 29 Nov. the convoy was reported from Tangiers as consisting of altogether 66 ships.

A convoy consisting of 9 freighters and 2 escort boats left Algeciras for the Mediterranean on 29 Nov. at 1800.

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One cruiser and three destroyers were sighted at Mahon (Minorca) at 0735 on 30 Nov.

Own Situation:

A steamer (397 BFT) was escorted off the south coast of France.

2. Area German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

Two small convoys were sighted off the west and southeast coast of Sardinia.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 29 Nov. torpedo boats TA "23" and "24" and five motor minesweepers carried out minelaying operation "Fanfare" in the area of Elba as planned.

The reported suspicion of enemy minelaying south of Spezia was not confirmed.

On 29 Nov. enemy air attacks were carried out on Guilianova, Benedetto, Civitavecchia and Grosseto. None of the attacks caused special damage.

PT boats S "154", "155", "156", "157", and "158" are ready for operations at Nettunia. They cannot put out due to the weather.

Motor minesweeper PA "256" was re-commissioned in Genoa and attached to the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla.

In the course of minelaying operation "Fanfare", attacking enemy PT boats were repulsed by our motor minesweepers. One enemy PT boat was rammed and fired on with success. Shelling of the coast by torpedo boats as planned could not be carried out on account of bad weather.

Convoy traffic was delayed by the weather.

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3. Area Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The following were sighted:

On 29 Nov. 2 destroyers west of Saseno on northwesterly course; at 1400 on 30 Nov. 7 merchantmen, 1 cruiser, 1 escort vessel in CK 7281 (south of the Straits of Otranto) on northerly course.

Own Situation:

The minelayer CIGNO was sunk in the course of an enemy air attack on Zara on 28 Nov. Other boats were damaged.

The operation against Zara is completed. One company each will remain on Uljan and Pasma for defense of the Pasma Channel.

During the night of 28 Nov. PT boat S "61" captured and blew up a southbound auxiliary sailing vessel carrying no cargo, 20 miles west of Zara.

At 0700 PT boat S "61" left Pola for Venice for change of engines.

The cruiser CATTARO entered Pola at 1800 on 29 Nov. Group South has ordered that the cruiser shall not be decommissioned but shall be used in the mopping-up of the islands after quick coaling; fighter defense will probably be provided for the first time for this purpose.

Group South sent the following report to Naval Staff:

"1. The Group has repeatedly asked Air Force Command, Southeast for defense of the harbors and dockyards along the Adriatic Sea.

2. Air Force Command, Southeast recognizes the necessity of this demand, but can only put anti-aircraft guns into action by stages on the basis of the number of guns already assigned or new ones which will be assigned. Up to now anti-aircraft guns have only been put into action in Durazzo. Due to demands at home, no fighters

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can be expected for the time being.

3. Although anti-aircraft defense is the concern of the Air Force and the difficult situation as regards materiel and personnel is known to the Navy, nevertheless Group South asks that the possibility of bringing up anti-aircraft guns be investigated again, particularly in regard to the defense of dockyards in the Istrian area which represent the only major possibilities for new constructions in the entire east area. Attacks on these dockyards are to be expected at any time. The loss of the dockyards would also entail the loss of a considerable number of torpedo boats and escort vessels as well as of small ships already under construction."

As regards shipping in the Adriatic Sea, German Naval Command, Italy transmitted the demand of Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas, Outstation Trieste that, in addition to 20 tanker-barges, 50 freight-barges, 50 auxiliary naval landing craft and 25 Siebel ferries be supplied by 1 Feb. 1944, as otherwise a catastrophe must be feared regarding supplies to the troops and population in the Adriatic area. In addition to this, Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas expects a further 25,000 tons capacity of large shipping at the end of January.

Naval Command, Italy supports an immediate increase of shipping. The demands of the Supply and Transportation Office cannot be met by 1 Feb. 1944. Transfer of 50 freight-barges from the western Mediterranean is impossible, as this number is not available. Transfer of the barges provided will not begin until the end of January at the earliest in connection with the transfer of motor minesweepers and PT boats; eight barges will be transferred monthly.

Naval Command, Italy suggests:

1. Utmost acceleration of construction of naval landing craft to be provided with stronger armament, better equipment, armor plating, gun shields, wireless transmitter 40/70 Watt; no escort vessels will be built for the time being. At least 30 boats are necessary for the east coast of Italy.

2. Priority repair of auxiliary sailing vessels at small dockyards which are less vulnerable to air attacks.

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3. Accelerated construction of small vessels between 100 and 600 tons capacity, a great number of which are in progress. Intervention of the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean is desirable.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will deal with this matter further.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Photographic reconnaissance detected one small naval vessel in Castellrosso at 1410.

Own Situation:

The convoy of steamer GEFDA TOFT left Portolago for Piraeus at 0030. The ship is escorted by torpedo boat TA "16" and six infantry boats.

Task Force "Mueller" reported a quiet day from Samos, Leros, Calino and Kos.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea advised Naval Staff for information of the following report to Group South:

1. Tasks of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea to be carried out in the near future:

a. Evacuation of prisoners:

From Rhodes to Leros about 35,000 men.
From Samos to Leros about 5,000 men.
From Stampalia to Piraeus about 350 men.
About 3,000 men are still on Leros.

Leros is intended as a transit camp for prisoners. From here they will be evacuated to Piraeus by steamer.

b. Troop movements:

3rd Group of 1st Battalion of Regiment "Brandenburg":

From Samos/Leros to Piraeus, about 250 men; 12th Group of 999th Battalion from Piraeus to Leros, 13th Group of 999th Battalion from Piraeus to Samos, 15th Group of 999th Battalion from Piraeus to Mylos; of the latter three about 800 men each. Fortress Infantry

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Battalion 1001 and 1002, altogether 1400 men (since 29 Nov. in Piraeus) from Piraeus to Rhodes. 1st Battalion, 22nd Air Force Infantry Regiment from Mylos to Piraeus, about 800 men. Occupation forces of Levita - Stampalia to Piraeus, about 130 men. 3rd Group of 440th Battalion from Samos to Khios/Mytilene about 400 men. Return of Task Force "Mueller".

- A. Troops to Piraeus.
- B. Heavy weapons to Crete
- C. Convoys:

Beginning 3 Dec. : the tanker BACCHUS (Diesel oil from the Black Sea ready for transportation to the Aegean Sea); Crete convoy steamers ORIA and AGADE ready at Piraeus; transfer of about 2,500 men as reinforcements for Crete from Piraeus to Crete; transfer of the freighters KAPOPINO, SUSANNE, SABINO, PETRELLA and motor tanker MT "3", which have been ready at Salonika for eight days, to Piraeus and from there to Crete.

- D. Minelaying.

In the Dodecanese and East-West Wall.

Defense of bases Leros, Syra, Naxos, Stampalia, Samos; net barrage in the areas of Monemvasia, Suda, Mylos, and Dodecanese.

2. Nearly all of the escort forces necessary for 1. A. - D. are not ready for action at present. It may be expected that the majority of the escort forces (torpedo boats, submarine chasers) will be in a state of readiness again by the beginning of next week, so that the most urgent tasks of evacuating prisoners and moving troops can be carried out.

3. Meanwhile prisoners will be transported from Rhodes as well as from Samos to the transit camp in Leros in shuttle traffic with small craft."

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, destroyers "H" and "G" were off the northern and central part of the east coast; altogether eight submarines were at sea, five of them probably in the operational area, one on outward and two on return passage.

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Own Situation:

During the night of 29 Nov. vessels in the patrol line in the Strait of Kerch did not contact the enemy. As planned four naval landing craft shelled the beachheads at Eltigen at dawn.

On return passage two naval landing craft went aground off the northwest point of Kossa Tussla. Attempts at salvage had to be abandoned on account of heavy enemy gunfire. The scuttling of the boats was ordered. Thus the total losses during the Eltigen blockade have risen to six naval landing craft.

Operations by eight naval landing craft and three PT boats in the Strait of Kerch are ordered for the night of 30 Nov.

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine reports to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea that after discussion with Army Headquarters, withdrawal from Kherson is planned for 2 Dec. and the night of 2 Dec. For the transfer of four cranes and two barges, the Navy will provide crews for four tugs under the navigational command of a naval officer. (see teletype 2143).

Group South sent the following answer to the teletype - not known by Naval Staff - of Chief, German Naval Command, Naval Liaison Staff, Rumania:

"Without reference to possible intentions of going over to the enemy, the Rumanians are to prepare the Italians for the taking-over of Italian submarines by Germany. Thereby supervision is to be exercised by the 30th Submarine Flotilla, already planned as a temporary measure. In case further investigations confirm the unreliability of the Italian personnel, the boats and berths are to be watched by German personnel."

This obviously refers to disturbances caused by the crews of Italian midget submarines laid up at Constanta. A more detailed report is to be awaited.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reports:

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"Due to the interruption of communications with the main islands, little more information on the events on the Gilbert Islands is obtainable than announced in the press. The loss of the whole Gilbert group is certain. All carriers sunk are auxiliary-carriers. Details will be given as soon as possible."

GLOSSARY FOR NOVEMBER 1943.

AAI

Subsonic mine unit. Acoustic mine with subsonic firing mechanism.

"Anton" (route)

A German shipping route. Its geographical borders were: The French coast at 47° 30' N; 47° 30' N, 29° W; 43° N, 40° W; continued on 37° N; the southern and eastern borders of route "Anton" were defined by the borders of the operations zone of the submarines in the South Atlantic.

Aquila

(later Merkator)

Italian submarines used for transport between Bordeaux and the East.

BMA

Bomb mine, type A.

"Damokles"

Operation against Samos.

ELM

British aerial mine.

ELM/A

British aerial mine with acoustic firing mechanism.

ELM/J

British aerial mine with induction firing mechanism.

EMC

Standard mine, type C. A contact mine against surface vessels.

EMF

A German moored influence mine.

Fugas

Russian minesweeper or patrol boat.

HS 293

Type of remote-controlled bomb.

"Leopard"

Capture of Leros.

LMA

German aerial mine type A Weight 540 kg.

LMB

German aerial mine type B Weight 975 kg.

Merkator

See under "Aquila".

m Oe

milli Oersted, a unit of measurement for terrestrial magnetism.

RMH

Standard mine, type H.

SC

Thin-shell high explosive bombs.

SD

Thick-shell high explosive bombs.

"Taifun"

New code name for "Leopard", capture of Leros.

UMA

Anti-submarine mine, type A.

UMB

Anti-submarine mine, type B.

"Wallenstein"

Code signal notifying the German fleet that the Allied invasion of Europe had begun. That meant that all ships were to get ready for action without delay and remain in a state of combat readiness until further notice.

Zaunkoenig

Anti-destroyer, acoustic homing torpedo.

